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3Abstract
To ask whether Paul de Man still matters is perhaps to have already answered the
question. De Man's work, as 1. Hillis Miller writes in a telling irony, "is a violent
allergen that provokes fits of coughing, sneezing, and burning eyes, perhaps even
worse symptoms, unless it can be neutralized or expelled." There is something
inherently resistant in de Man then that goes beyond his wartime journalism.
Dust having settled, one must have good reasons today to whip it up and risk
another reactive fit. Yet it is precisely this resistance in de Man that will pivot the
movement ofthis thesis, as it sneezes and coughs along the way. Relayed
through the allergen of terms like deconstruction, unreadability, rhetoric, it will
come to remark a trace of something inappropriable, inhuman in texts, which
persistently stalks our attempts to be rid of it. It articulates a crisis in the empire
of cognition and a disruption of epistemo-aesthetic ideologies that inform our
thinking of the political. The thesis plots a narrative that interrogates the relation
between the rhetorical, the inhuman and the political, which in de Man comes to
activate a new exigency of reading, constantly overtasking received epistemic
regimes that integrate dissention to open a passage for the new ones to emerge.
What is consistently traced is the measured emptying out of ontology and
psychologism from language and its opening to unmasterable linguistic agencies.
This general freeing of latency in structural closures that de Man's reading
always teases out not only unsettles their epistemic reliability but also calls for a
permanent assault on the authoritative grounding of their legitimacy. What
shocks in de Man's work, provoking systemic fits, is a kind of permanent
revolution to which his writing is committed.
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5Profound aversion to reposing once and for all
in anyone total view of the world.
Fascination of the opposing point of view: refusal to be deprived of the stimulus
of the enigmatic.
-- Nietzsche, The Will to Power
6Preface
Because reading is always reading otherwise, no two repetitions of the book are
the same. Preface, writes Gayatri Spivak, comes to "commemorate that
difference in identity by inserting itself between two readings - in our case, my
reading (given of course that my language and I are shifting and unstable), my
rereading, my rearranging of the text - and your reading.") The preface, then,
would be the site of a certain unreadability of the "book," a placeholder for its
scattered repetitions and its disinscription by reading. Indeed, "[t]he preface, by
daring to repeat the book and reconstitute it in another register, merely enacts
what is already the case: the book's repetitions are always other than the book.
There is, in fact, no 'book' other than these ever-different repetitions: the 'book'
in other words, is always already a 'text,' constituted by the play of identity and
difference" (xii). Writing prefatory remarks to the text is subject to the same
general law of reading. It does not bind the "book" but perforates it yet again.
Itself a text, preface would have to be pre-prefaced in tum by the general laws of
its own expository reading. There can be no end to prefacing. And, indeed, the
text prefaced is nothing other but a preface to another text that comes to displace
it in misreading. It is a question of a certain resistance of reading that syncopates
the "book" by shedding it in textual displacements. One never knows whether
one writes a preface to the book or a book to the preface.
I Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Translator's Preface." Preface to Of Grammatology by Jacques
Derrida (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1997), p. xii.
7Prefacing is an "essential," yet "ludicrous operation," Jacques Derrida
writes. Not "only because such an operation would confine itself to discursive
effects of an intention-to-mean, but because, in pointing out a single thematic
nucleus or a single guiding thesis, it would cancel out the textual displacement
that is at work 'here. ",2 That is at work everywhere where there is reading, and,
in particular, reading of Paul de Man. For reading, in de Man, is what always
double backs on its own statement and disaffirms it in a permanent shedding of
thematic closures. It initiates, one could say, an unrelieved pledge to the other to
whom reading is owed. To preface thematic pivot points or a topological relief
that would account for the curvatures of de Man's writing would be precisely an
attempt to domesticate the alterity of his texts that testify to a challenge and a
profound resource of a certain resistance that prevents all reading from reifying
into positive, exploitative truths. Indeed, as Derrida writes, "if such a thing were
justifiable, we would have to assert right now that one of the theses ... inscribed
within dissemination is precisely the impossibility of reducing a text as such to
its effects of meaning, content, thesis, or theme. Not the impossibility, perhaps ...
but the resistance - we shall call it the restance [that is, some other, atopos,
always left unappropriated] - of a sort of writing that can neither adapt nor adopt
such a reduction" ("Outwork," 7-8). What the text will have shown is the
impossibility of prefacing its eventfulness and uncertainty that is also a resource
of reading. "Hence," Derrida continues, "this is not a preface, at least not ifby
preface we mean a table, a code, an annotated summery of prominent signifieds,
or an index of key words or of proper names" (8). This preface is then more of a
2 Jacques Derrida, "Outwork," in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone
Press, 1981), p. 7.
8retractive rent present in every reading that in providing "key terms" also, and by
the same token, opens itself to a fund of repressed energies and discontinued
possibilities that belong to de Man's text and disrupt all possibilities of its
totalisation, keeping the "book" unwritten along its margins. It proceeds with no
finality in view and, indeed, in most general terms possible. What it sets forth is a
trajectory of a certain reading resistance in de Man that will come to empty the
referential fiat of language and mount an assault on cognitive orders, keeping
open the possibility of disruption as the very eventfulness of reading and a
chance for politics. There is something impossible, indeed inhuman, in reading,
an exigency that with a force of compulsion overtasks all possibility.
But what one essentially does here is a conferring of masks or faces
(prosopon poien) on a writing that has none in order to make it readable, to make
it speak. Prosopopeia, however, as de Man has shown, defaces to the exact extent
that it restores. It recalls the substitutivity and exteriority of the face that accounts
for the possibility of reading. One always makes the text say more or less than it
does and risks being struck dumb on what matters. But this is the essential risk of
reading.
The introductory chapter will consider and address the critical reception
of de Man's writing, its immediate implications for our reading of literature, and
what appears to have caused a certain topological concern within deconstruction,
its crisis. This crisis is motivated not only by specific institutional and
disciplinary needs, a guardrail against the entire register of irresponsibility and
political apathy de Man's writing seems to solicit, but by an underlying
opposition between literature and philosophy and its systematic disarticulation in
9de Man, as a certain pressure or exigency of reading to account for the
irreducible rhetoricity of philosophical concepts. What is put in question towards
the end, however, is the possibility of anything like a topological margin that
would presuppose a rigorous demarcation of meaning of deconstruction. There is
nothing to signal the epoch of its meaning.
This opens to the next chapter where the possibility of deconstruction,
that in de Man seems to have lost its initiative and its ethico-political exigency, is
made to hinge precisely on a certain impossibility of its margins. There is,
perhaps, deconstruction only there where it is not, cannot be owned, attested to in
its presence, nor secured against the invaginations that constitute it. De Man, that
dangerous supplement, a marginal presence, is shown to be an irreducible
presence of a margin inside deconstruction. In terms of its philosophical topoi
that would come to carve out the property of deconstruction from the travesty of
its rhetorical and literary perversions, deconstruction only affirms the very
possibility of incursion of the literary. If there are borders between literature and
philosophy, deconstruction is the borderline constituting their difference. Neither
proper nor improper, it constitutes, and essentially limits, the very possibility of
property. De Man can no longer be consigned to the margins in terms of this
opposition because deconstruction is both traced by and is a tracing of the margin
constitutive of all concepts. Philosophy, in the end, will be shown to harbour the
conditions of its own impossibility.
The third chapter traces de Man's early work against the background
noise of the questions of subjectivity, interiority and the structural limits of
understanding that all come to place his writing in a specific horizon of
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intellectual concerns brought to bear on his texts. Itwill not be a question here of
geneticism of de Man's thought or genealogic mapping of influences but rather
an exposure of certain nodal points, upheavals of condensed intellectual concerns
that were to shape his critical output. A notion of irreducibly temporal poetics
and finitude will carve out a threshold of transcendence that is impassable but
against which alone poetry comes to inscribe its defiance. Subjectivity is forever
torn and poetry is the place, the very signature of this tearing, rather than its
recollection. Itwill fault reflexivity it initiates by writing it without end. It is a
historical depositary of unfinished truths and an unsurpassable memory, always
larger than the capacity of consciousness to remember. Certain concerns, such as
the radical uprooting of reference, that were still to come - and, indeed, haunt de
Man - are already evident here and yet unacknowledged, displaced in the haze of
pathos as the very tissue of time.
De Man's turn to rhetoric is considered in the following chapter where
the pathos of his early writing, always a trace of the impossibility of self-
reflection and the irreducible finitude that faults it, is open to a certainjouissance
of reading. Reading no longer mourns the subject but unravels it without end in a
textual shedding or misreading that is an absolute affirmation of reading but also
an opening to the political as a space where the subject - if there is the political -
is lost without grandeur. Concerns of temporality and subjectivity traced in his
early work are here specific tropological concerns that will be given in terms of
allegory as a disinscriptive syncope of temporality present in every text.
Reflections on rhetoric lead de Man to a certain perfunctory reflex of reading, an
interference of the machine in the text that disconnects its cognitive wiring and
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the ability to close itself off. The machine would be the disruptive possibility of
the text that outmatches its potential to be read. It is not only irreducible to desire
but precisely what traumatizes all desires insofar as it keeps open the possibilities
of virtual presents and undesired futures that any event true to its name carries.
The rhetorical turn in de Man, considered as politically disabling because of its
obsessive referential attrition, is rather, and for precisely the same reason, what
opens the agonistics of the political, leading to too much politics, to politics de
trop.
In the last chapter, "Politics de trop," the machinal exteriority, repetition
and hypomnesic degradation constitute the empty place of the political. Politics
is only in the interminable unfulfillment and drift of its ground. It is in the
unmasterability of reference that it will have found its conditions of possibility.
The rhetorical structure of the political points to the radical impossibility of its
closure. By reactivating the originary technics of the system and its radical
contingency that the ideologico-referential programs push into latency, rhetoric
saves the political from the terror of positivism. Rhetorical reading becomes a
mnemic device that liberates memory traces in the collective psyche and opens it
to disruptive energies that constitute its very politicity. It unblocks the passage of
the to-come of justice as an always other possibility, one whose infinite demand
is overbearing, a constant pressure on the possible to contain more than it does.
Rhetorical reading and the machine intervene in the reference regimes precisely
by recalling the allegorical structuring of their authority. It is always virtual
presents that haunt the very structuring of anything like polity as its
undecidability that de Man's reading reactivates in a bid that saves the possibility
of imagining alternatives to the world. The exigency of reading is to keep this
possibility forever open.
12
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Chapter One
Introduction: Disfiguring de Man
... all true criticism occurs in the mode of crisis. To
speak of a crisis of criticism is then, to some degree,
redundant.
- Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight
There is something allergenic about Paul de Man, as 1. Hillis Miller writes, and it
doesn't let off. "It gets under your skin, or into your nose, and 'there is a certain
reaction which is bound to occur.' You sneeze or break out in a rash.") But the fit
de Man's writing provokes is one of cognition. And it seems to empty it, to
hijack our right "to know" as well as our right "to do." As de Man, indeed, says:
"after Nietzsche (and, indeed, after any 'text'), we can no longer hope ever 'to
know' in peace" nor "can we expect 'to do' anything" in peace." The allergen
seems to rescind epistemic and performative criteria that would make deciding
"in peace" possible. It is what through a kind of syncope and disturbance of
cognition inclines all decision to verge on the pathology of paranoia. No wonder
"the rash" breaks out across the academic corpus and the resistance gets
mobilised against further incursions. To unravel reactions "bound to occur," is
3 J. Hillis Miller, "Paul de Man as Allergen," in Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of
Theory, ed. Tom Cohen et al. (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001), p. 184.
4 Paul De Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and
Proust (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1979), p. 126. Hereafter cited as Allegories.
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also, in a sense, to thematize precisely the anxiety of critical discourse, the
expanse of its denial. The stronger the resistance to de Man, to the irreducible
implications of his writing, the stronger the authority of what is resisted. This
anxiety will thus form a silent deposition of this chapter that, in exposing the
resistance, unavoidably exposes certain ethico-ontological presuppositions of
critical discourse that de Man puts in question.
The curve of de Man's writing cannot be thought outside its collusion
with deconstruction, a critical "force" that emerged in the 1960s to let loose a
hesitation in the modalities governing the intellectual thought of the day. A
contagion cutting in and across, wrapping itself round the edges of every
discourse, from literary to popular, to expose their limits to a certain night-
thinking, if it happens, as we know, happens only on the edges of light. This
thinking remains even today precisely what reserves an unconditional right to
question all conditions, all certainties and arbitrary constraints.' And it is
precisely at this point where de Man's thought intersects this radically
affirmative limit-work of deconstruction that an allergenic fit sets in." For what is
put in motion is the disciplinary "project" of the Yale School deconstruction,
including prominent, influential theorists as J. Hillis Miller, Geoffrey Hartman
5 Deconstruction is, one could say, only at work at/as this limit, this limit-work: "For
deconstruction, if something of the sort exists, would remain above all, in my view, an
unconditional rationalism that never renounces ... the possibility of suspending in an argued,
deliberated, rational fashion, all conditions, hypotheses, conventions, and presuppositions, and of
criticising unconditionally all conditionalities, including those that still found the critical idea,
namely, those of the krinein, of the krisis, of the binary or dialectical decision or judgment."
Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas
(Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2005), p. 142.
6 It was at the international conference on the status of literary theory in 1966, held at John
Hopkins University, that de Man was introduced to "deconstruction," a term presented and
unleashed upon the institutional protocols for reading by Jacques Derrida, specifying a new form
of "criticism" whose implications were in close affinity with de Man's critical concerns about the
reliability of language and the radical impossibility of closure or total reading.
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and, to an extent, Harold Bloom, with Paul de Man at the vanguard as one of the
principal figures in (mis)appropriating Derrida's thought and claiming it for
literary criticism. Under the sober judgment of contemporary thought, the Yale
School brand has been denounced for having bastardised what is an event of
deconstruction, its untimeliness, and for having debordered its limits 7 and
commodified its initiative, turning it into a discursive disciplinary enterprise for
producing readings. What deconstruction, according to Derrida, decidedly is not,
"neither a methodological reform that should reassure the organization in place
nor a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-making deconstruction, whose
most certain effect would be to leave everything as it is and to consolidate the
most immobile forces within the university.t" is readily attributed to de Man.
The iterability of enterprise is inimical to the initiative of deconstruction
because it is precisely the institutional regimes and epistemo-political programs
governing our practices that deconstruction calls into question." It is what
reactivates difference that unblocks foreclusive regulative structures.
Deconstruction is not "a specialised set of discursive procedures, still less the
rules of a new hermeneutic method that works on texts and utterances in the
shelter of a given and stable institution" but, Derrida continues, "at the very least,
a way of taking a position, in its work of analysis, concerning the political and
7 As if an event had policed borders; the event is precisely what is unpresentable, and hence
without limits, what in its very eventfulness exceeds limits, takes them by surprise, what comes
as the always exceptional, untimely, excepting itself from the instituted limits, always anew and
irreplaceably. But more of this later.
8 Qtd. in Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 156. Hereafter cited as On Deconstruction.
9 In "On Colleges and Philosophy," Derrida writes: "I will insist that there is no such thing as a
deconstructive enterprise - the idea of a project is incompatible with deconstruction.
Deconstruction is a situation." Jacques Derrida, "On Colleges and Philosophy: Jacques Derrida
with Geoffrey Bennington," in Postmodernism: ICA Documents, ed. Lisa Appignanesi (London:
Free Association Books, 1989), p. 222.
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institutional structures that make possible and govern our practices, our
competences, our performances" (qtd. in On Deconstruction, 156). In de Man,
however, it seems to lose its radically affirmative exigency of questioning
unconditionally the powers that be.
Deconstruction, as Jeffrey T. Nealon writes, was challenged in literary
departments by "calls for rehistoricizing and recontextualizing the study of
literature.v'" Literary text was to be reinstituted as a register of social, political
and historical stresses but also saved from the ravages of "self-cancelling
textualism" (22), almost an axiomatics of deconstructive pressure upon texts. The
critics of deconstruction have either seen it as a dead-end formalism, which, in
denying meaning altogether by its nihilistic method of aporetic reading, provides
the same totalising logic of New Criticism it had set out to displace, or as a
reactionary abdication of responsibility, starving the text of its political
accountability. Uniform disclosure of textual undecidability, an impasse or
aporetic opening that no text can escape, "places the reader in an impossible
situation that cannot end in triumph," Culler writes, "but only in an outcome
already deemed inappropriate: an unwarranted choice or a failure to choose" (On
Deconstruction, 81). As such, deconstruction seems to pronounce judgment on
the aporetic structure of all judgments, their essential precipitousness, but, in its
exposure, somehow remains outside them: "It is a suprahistorical criticism that
pretends to speak from a position free of ideology - that is, from an absolute
10 Jeffrey T. Nealon, Double Reading: Postmodernism after Deconstruction (Ithaca and London:
Cornell UP, 1993), p. 22. By and large in the US and particularly after the disclosure in The New
York Times (1987) of de Man's early contributions to Le Soir and Het Vlaamsche Land, both
administered by the collaborators during the German occupation. Hereafter cited as Double
Reading.
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point of view." II It exceeds the constituted powers that it questions and
ultimately re-anchors, rather than disrupts, the existing hierarchies that govern
the field. Terry Eagleton never tires of testifying to the political impassivity and
the noncommittal pragmatics of deconstruction - although it is not at all certain
that the political can be exhausted by the pragmatic, as we shall see later.
Deconstruction, he writes,
now reaches out and colonises ... history, rewriting it in its own image,
viewing famines, revolutions, soccer matches and sherry trifle as yet
more undecidable 'text'. Since prudent men and women are not prone to
take action in situations whose significance is not reasonably clear, this
viewpoint is not without its implications for one's style of social and
political life ... It frees you at a stroke from having to assume a position
on important issues, since what you say of such things will be no more
than a passing product of the signifier and so in no sense to be taken as
'true' or 'serious' ... Since it commits you to affirming nothing, it is as
injurious as blank ammunition.V
It is as if deconstruction had colonised all the discourses of social practice
and emptied them of meaning, signifying content or consequence, to the benefit
of the exterior signs. The world is drained of pathos and what is left is an
arbitrary act of reading which defines it, and the act itself is yet another triumph
of textual undecidability.
However, the allergen of deconstruction that provokes such systemic fits
is not usually associated with deconstruction proper. For there is a property of
IIRodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1986),p. 139.Hereafter cited as The Tain.
12 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 125-27.
Hereafter cited as Literary Theory.
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deconstruction, an all-rights-reserved constructed by the discourse itself, as we
shall see. It implies split allegiances, an immanent conspiracy as it were, even a
coup d'etat, within its borders. The criticism deconstruction has suffered never
fails to distinguish between a deconstruction as an intervention, marked by
resistance, a counter-mark, and an abortive, "irresponsible-making"
deconstruction of the Yale School. John M. Ellis, when writing Against
Deconstruction, is attentive enough to inscribe in a footnote that "the character of
deconstruction in its French origin is quite different from that of its American
adoption. In France, deconstruction is part of a revolt against an extremely
narrow rationalist tradition in criticism and, more broadly, in cultural life ...
while the American counterpart represents only a new way to cling to an old set
of attitudes.t'':'
This distinction may seem imperative in view of the fact that the critical
insights reached by de Man and Derrida respectively, more often than not, have
been misplaced as deconstruction was "commodified for an American market,
simplified and watered down for use in how-to books, which gave (and continue
to give) an entire generation of literature students a suspiciously de Manian
overview of what was supposedly Derrida's work" (Nealon, Double Reading,
28). Christopher Norris, for instance, positions a deconstructive momentum in
the notion of textual undecidability, arrival "at a limit-point or deadlocked aporia
of meaning which offers no hold for Marxist-historical understanding.?" and
which is grounded in the irreducible metaphoricity of language that forecloses
13 John M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 1989), p. 154.
14 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London and New York: Routledge,
1991), p. 79. Hereafter cited as DTP.
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any possibility of other than tropological truth. "The textual 'ideology'
uncovered by Derrida's readings is a kind of aboriginal swerve into metaphor
and figurative detour which language embraces through an error of thought
unaccountable in Marxist terms" (DTP, 79). It becomes a politically disabling,
errant rhetorical effect. This, indeed, is a distinctive de Manian gesture revealing
the metaphoricity of conceptual structures upon which the text relies, and "a
suspiciously de Manian overview" of deconstructive reading is sustained.
However, an opening of a text onto the intolerable experience of the undecidable
- that without which there would be no decision - the fact that all texts, as de
Man writes, "compel us to choose while destroying the foundations of any
choice ... [and finally] tell the allegory of a judicial decision that can be neither
judicious nor just" (Allegories, 245), is also, according to the critics, what leaves
the system of oppositions intact. Whereas Derrida tries to trace the totalising
logic which leads to an impasse in order to intervene, displace and rethink the
grounds of the system experiencing its own closure, for de Man, Nealon writes,
"the determination (as indetermination) that no text can escape" is a teleological
closure of a deconstructive critical project, that which "deconstructive readings
seek to reveal" (Double Reading, 35, 36).
Unreadability, for de Man, or the fact that the same text can lead to
radically irreconcilable readings (a text, he writes "can literally be called
'unreadable' in that it leads to a set of assertions that radically exclude each
other." Allegories, 245) is irreducibly grounded in metaphor - that is, in language
Whose economy always bears witness to its own failure, to the fact that
"convergence of the referential and the figural signification can never be
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established, the reference can never be a meaning" (Allegories, 208). For
Derrida, textual undecidability is structural rather than rhetorical; it is what frees
up the latent energies of the text, the unthought conditions of its possibility,
opening its reference to alternate futures. Discursive contradictions are a
profound textual resource, the most affirmative opening to the possibility of an
event or a decision taken by the other. Deconstruction affirms that there is always
something left unthought, what cannot be brought to account, the impossible that
holds all possibility to ransom. However, we shall see later that commitment to
(the) other (of) reading, what also preserves the alterity of the text, is not foreign
to de Man's writing but constitutes the very energy and pull of its responsibility.
In "Outwork," Derrida writes that "deconstruction involves an indispensible
phase of reversal. " But to
remain content with reversal is of course to operate within the
immanence of the system to be destroyed ... to sit back, in order to go
further, in order to be more radical or more daring, and take an attitude
of neutralising indifference with respect to the classical oppositions
would be to give free rein to the existing forces that effectively and
historically dominate the field. It would be, for not having seized the
means to intervene, to confirm the established equilibrium. (6)
Deconstruction that denies meaning, that is a nihilistic death sentence of
every reference, that grants primacy to the aporetic, to dead-ends to which
literature is destined by the foreknowledge that all texts are allegories of their
own unreadability, as de Man contends, is the allergen of any positivist
rationality. The dominant reading of Derrida, "the reading upon which the
sceptical and political critiques of deconstruction are based," is, for Nealon, the
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tropological or rhetorical reading, which radically "fails to account for the
complexities of Derrida's work" (Double Reading, 26). The tropological
deconstructive practice becomes a spawning device for its own disintegrative
premise, a set of discursive procedures and a new negative hermeneutic that
reveals the forestructure of all literature as a witness to its own unreadability. It
exposes the structural limit of language as the negative interchange that
constitutes the text and suspends any determined meaning or the very possibility
of krinein. Since this possibility names the very possibility of criticism, 15 it is, at
the same time, what solicits - in Derrida's sense of shaking the totality - the
entire discipline. If reading, as de Man says, "is a praxis that thematizes its own
thesis about the impossibility ofthematization" (Allegories, 209), then it
thematizes precisely what always remains unthematized, which opens the text
towards irreparable losses and cuts across and reverses the very possibility of
decision, of mastery of meaning upon which all criticism rests. For de Man, as
for Derrida, what threatens the very discipline of criticism is what makes
anything like reading possible.l" What is exposed in reading is always the ruin of
criticism, criticism (is) (in) crisis. But this is affirmative, and precisely insofar as
it disaffirms the possibility of reading, precisely insofar as it tends to a certain
IS Gasche: "The critical enterprise is, as its name reveals, a philosophical enterprise. It is linked to
the possibility of the krinein - that is, to the possibility of decision - of a mastery of the meaning
or signified of the literary text" (The Tain, 262).
16 Reading in de Man is a counterintuitive praxis. It is what incompletes the violence of aesthetic
closure and the totalising project of criticism. It breaks open the possibility of reimagining virtual
presents; in other words, it desediments thinking by proposing it to an always-there of its
otherwise. Reading is what, for de Man, no totality of thought can encompass. It measures only
an excess of totality. It is radically disruptive insofar as it puts the instituted protocols for reading
in question. One only ever reads against the horizon of the impossibility of reading. Cf. chapter
below, "Reading Con: Rhetoric, Allegory and the Machine," for further reference on what can
only be a radical exigency of reading otherwise. Cf. also note 243 below, for what Gasche
identifies as a "nonphenomenal reading" in de Man, a certain para-reading, a pressure and assault
on cognition.
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syncopation in every text that limits all self-reflexivity, that prevents the text, in
other words, to close in upon itself.
However, for the critics of deconstruction, determinacy as indeterminacy
is both constitutive of the text initially and is the text's telos finally. Not only is it
a laying waste of literature but a wasteland of the political, nothing short of a
culture machine dispensing radical relativism that vacates all power positions and
makes the politicised space a site of loss without the possibility of
reterritorialisation. And, having been subject to didactic demands for
transmissible and controlled meaning, it has become an "easily reproducible
disciplinary project," a methodology that, in its iterability and general claim,
reassures its institutional commodification as a critical practice par excellence.
Still, "it is important to distinguish among deconstructions," Nealon writes, in
order to shore up, "to recall the specificity that is at the heart of Derrida's
itinerary." For, "when deconstruction becomes a method, its specificity is lost;
the singularity of deconstruction and its concern with alterity becomes smoothed
out into an all-encompassing, easily reproducible disciplinary project, a project to
which Derrida's texts pose an essential question" (Double Reading, 48).
De Man is thus played out against "the singularity of deconstruction and
its concern with alterity." A certain "orthodoxy" of deconstruction cannot let
itself be seduced by its misappropriations, by the play of its "specificity." One
must "distinguish among deconstructions," "it is important" to separate, and all
separation is a souvenir of crisis (from krinein, "to separate, decide, judge,,).17
17 For Derrida, crisis would be "the moment when simple decision is no longer possible, where
the choice between opposing paths is suspended." Jacques Derrida, "Mallarrne," in Acts of
Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 1l3. The moment, in
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"We can speak of a crisis," de Man writes, "when a 'separation' takes place, by
self-reflection, between what ... is in conformity with the original intent and what
has irrevocably fallen away from this source.,,18 In terms of deconstruction and
its legitimacy, crisis is taxonomic, it becomes necessary in order to shore up what
"is in conformity with the original intent," a kind of phenomenological
bracketing that will restore ownness, meaning and property of deconstruction. It
is a crisis that consolidates by tearing apart. And it does so by "self-reflection."
Deconstruction, however, is precisely what is not self-reflexive. It is itself always
re-marked= inscribed back as a mark in the structure of referrals it no longer
and, in fact, never has governed. Being itself reactivated as a mark, its self-
relation can only be one of self-deferral that can never quite finish accounting for
its own movement. Deconstruction can never gather itself in reflexivity. It is
even only this "falling away" from the source. However, crisis will have, "by
self-reflection," pronounced judgement and secured the distinction between
deconstruction proper, "what is in conformity with the original intent," and
"what has irrevocably fallen away from this source." It is what will mark and
other words, when judgement trembles, breaks down, apprehensive, before the abyss of ground.
The moment where decision is none other than a leap of faith. An indecision then before which
we kneel defeated, paralysed, not knowing. But a moment in every decision. It is hesitation that
summons responsibility from the depths of indecision.
18 Paul de Man, "Criticism and Crisis," in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of
Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 8.
19 Deconstruction does not escape - neither in Derrida nor in de Man, as we shall see later - this
structure of re-marking. It is not itself a master term hors-texte but is put back in, and thus
essentially incompleted by, the system of traces, the very insignia of the other, that it designates.
This is what Derrida writes of a "general text:" "There is such a general text everywhere that (that
is, everywhere) this discourse and its order (essence, sense, truth, meaning, consciousness,
ideality, etc.) are overflowed, that is, everywhere that their authority is put back into the position
of a mark in a chain that this authority intrinsically and illusorily believes it wishes to, and does
in fact, govern ... The writing of this text, moreover, has the exterior limit only of a certain re-
mark." Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982), pp. 59-60.
Deconstruction is not exempt from the "general text" that it names, but is itself re-marked, and
thus never in full possession of itself. It is thus not, as its critics contend, transcendent in any
sense - although it is perhaps a mark atlofthe threshold. In other words, deconstruction does not
exceed the history of its misappropriations by which, in fact, it is carried and articulated.
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maintain the borders between what warrants the identity of deconstruction and
what does not. For one cannot play on both sides of the border without collusion,
without the border giving way to erasure.
Deconstruction, however, never remains in absolute proximity to itself.
To police it is to police the very voiding of the borders within which its status is
guaranteed. Because deconstruction always plays on both sides of the border. It
is never truly, only, where it is but always, and at the same time, on the other
side. And this is precisely why deconstruction is not an easily defined and
"reproducible disciplinary project." Where it is, the border will have been
outflanked. Itwill always shun its own limits, bend to its own margins, weaving
its threads round them, making them spin, crossing over and pulling back,
reserving itself in the hollow of difference. What one dreams of watching over is
what was never there as such to begin with. For, there is no as such of
deconstruction, nor is there any "specificity" of its dis-course. What one thinks
one saves, in other words, is precisely what one fears. It is an attempt to master,
to think what flirts with the other that is always other of thought.f
20 Madness, Derrida says, "a certain 'madness' must keep a lookout over every step, and finally
watch over thinking ... " Jacques Derrida, Points ... : Interviews, 1974-1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf et
aI., ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995), p. 363. Deconstruction, in terms of
its radical pledge to the other, would be the madness and tireless maddening of thought. But this
is a chance for thought, the constitutive and necessary condition of anything like its future. Only
by risking madness and night, the loss of meaning, does thought remain open to the horizon of its
possibilities. Also in "Cogito and the History of Madness:" "To define philosophy as the attempt-
to-say-the-hyperbole is to confess - and philosophy is perhaps this gigantic confession - that by
virtue of the historical enunciation through which philosophy tranquilizes itself and excludes
madness, philosophy also betrays itself (or betrays itself as thought), enters into a crisis and a
forgetting of itself that are an essential and necessary period of its movement. I philosophize only
in terror, in the corifessed terror of going mad. The confession is simultaneously, at its present
moment, oblivion and unveiling, protection and exposure: economy. But this crisis in which
reason is madder than madness - for reason is nonmeaning and oblivion ... this crisis has always
begun and is interminable." Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness," in Writing
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 75-76.
25
In Literary Theory, Eagleton writes of a certain "travesty of Derrida' s
own work:"
If the American deconstructionists considered that their textual
enterprise was faithful to the spirit of Jacques Derrida, one of those who
did not was Jacques Derrida ... Derrida is clearly out to do more than
develop new techniques of reading: deconstruction is for him ultimately
political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular
system of thought, and behind that a whole system of political structures
and social institutions, maintains its force. He is not seeking, absurdly,
to deny the existence of relatively determinate truths, meanings,
identities, intentions, historical continuities; he is seeking rather to see
such things as the effects of a wider and deeper history - of language, of
the unconscious, of social institutions and practices. (128)
The complicity of de Man's thought with political apathy and the
disempowerment of the political subject implied by his critics is closely aligned
with his historiographical scepticism. For de Man, historical discourse is all too
often grounded in the mimetic nature of language. It takes reference for granted
and represents historical causality as empirical phenomena. However, these
phenomena are the effects of the figurative patterns and tropes of historical
discourse. History is the nominal writing that chronicles the past in order to
account for and justify historical events. Its narrative unity, however, which
informs them with coherence, is generated by the discourse itself rather than a
continuity found in the phenomenal world. There is, in other words, an essential
disturbance in the historical archive that remains unaccounted for, but one that
opens history to reading we will never have finished. It is a specific form of
language, a "Cratylic language" that dissimulates the rhetorical status of its own
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discourse, "the writer's quest for a perfect coincidence of the phonic properties
of a word with its signifying function.,,21 De Man identifies here an ideologically
duplicitous movement that makes us confound signs with phenomena and assign
the past an order of progression that is an effect of tropo-economic systems of
language rather than the property constitutive ofthe world. Historical objectivity,
however, assumes the relation between names and phenomena to be naturally
motivated. History is made accessible by a metaphoric erasure of linguistic
agency, by "a convergence of the phenomenal aspects of language, as sound,
with its signifying function as referent" (RT, 9). The world enters a historical
jurisdiction in which signs correspond to causes and offers itself to monosemic,
totalitarian registers of reading, which somehow circumvent rhetoricity and the
inherent obliqueness of its articulation. For de Man, historical writing, in terms
of the narrative unity and referentialism it posits, is by no means a privileged
form of writing. It is subject, like any other narrative, to a decapitated
intentionality of its discourse, the impossibility of the sign to fully coincide with
its reference. However, a distinctive propensity of historical writing, by nature
the very movement of phenomenological concealment, is to dissimulate this
duplicity and its own exposure to ideological interest.
In "The Critic as Host," Miller writes: "If 'deconstructionist principles'
are taken seriously, he [M. H. Abrams] says, 'any history which relies on written
texts becomes an impossibility.' So be it ... A certain notion of history or of
literary history, like a certain notion of determinable reading, might indeed be an
21 Paul de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1986), p. 9. Hereafter cited as RT.
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impossibility, and if so, it might be better to know that. ,,22 History does become
an impossibility precisely, as de Man insists, in virtue of its enslavement to
written texts: "[T]he bases for historical knowledge are not empirical facts but
written texts, even if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars or
revolutions.r" There can be no distinction between history and the writing of
history. History becomes an impossibility, however, only insofar as it remains
caught in a certain metaphysics of its language, its ethico-ontological value as the
unmediated expression of the being of the referent. Nihilism attributed to de Man
("Nihilism - that word has inevitably come up as a label for 'deconstruction,'
secretly or overtly present as the name for what is feared from the new mode of
criticism and from its ability to devalue all values, making traditional modes of
interpretation 'impossible. '" "Critic as Host," 185), then becomes rather a critical
demand that necessitates reactivation of critical heritage to overtask the
categories governing interpretative modes of understanding history and keep
open the passage for the new ones to emerge.i" It becomes, as Miller writes, "an
22 J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic as Host," in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom et al.
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 177-78.
23 Paul de Man, "Literary History and Literary Modernity," in Blindness and Insight: Essays in
the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 165.
24 For Giorgio Agamben, nihilism is the facing up to an insurmountable challenge that modern
thought solicits by the very rigour of its critique, "the Copernican revolution" of our time to
which all contemporary thought must answer. And it is a challenge de Man's entire oeuvre
testifies to. Agamben: "If God was the name oflanguage, 'God is dead' can only mean that there
is no longer a name for language. The fulfilled revelation of language is a word completely
abandoned by God. And human beings are thrown into language without having a voice or a
divine word to guarantee them a possibility of escape from the infinite play of meaningful
propositions. Thus we finally find ourselves alone with our words; for the first time we are truly
alone with language, abandoned without any final foundation. This is the Copernican revolution
that the thought of our time inherits from nihilism: we are the first human beings who have
become completely conscious of language. For the first time, what preceding generations called
God, Being, spirit, unconscious appear to us as what they are: names for language. This is why
for us, any philosophy, any religion, or any knowledge that has not become conscious of this turn
belongs irrevocably to the past ... We now look without veils upon language, which, having
breathed out all divinity and all unsayability, is now wholly revealed, absolutely in the
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inalienable alien presence" and "the latent ghost encrypted within any expression
of a logocentric system" ("Critic as Host," 185, 186), an unrelieved exigency, in
other words, of critical vigilance. Consensus required for such a practice that
dismantles and remounts conventional, narrativist interpretative models will be
denied precisely in view of the fact that it was extended to the received set of
principles deconstruction places in question.
De Man's rejection of historical models of understanding literature comes
from a radical suspicion of the forms of writing that implicitly motivate the
foundational notion of presence in language. However, for Marxist-historicist
critical thought, history provides a horizon for the ceaseless emancipation of the
collective subject, the critical awareness of which is the condition of the
possibility of change. Deconstruction, according to Eagleton's verdict, "sees
social reality less as oppressively determinate than as yet more shimmering webs
of undecidability stretching to the horizon" (Literary Theory, 126). Eagleton
furthers his charge to suggest that the Yale deconstructive practice is a formal
textual practice, suspending the very terrain that constitutes the material
conditions of discursivity, the "real sphere of struggle." It becomes a linguistic
monism destined by its methodology to "chum out," time and again, the same
excess of meaning that destabilises any given reading rather than question the
traditional structures of thought and the institutional practice that sustains it:
Anglo-American deconstruction largely ignores this real sphere of
struggle, and continues to chum out its closed critical texts. Such texts
are closed precisely because they are empty: there is little to be done
beginning." Giorgio Agarnben, "The Idea of Language," in Potentialities, ed. and trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999), pp. 45-46, emphasis added.
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with them beyond admiring the relentlessness with which all 'positive'
particles of textual meaning have been dissolved away. Such dissolution
is an imperative in the academic game of deconstruction ... (127)
The charge takes its departure in de Man's conception of history as a
writing constantly covering up its own ungroundedness and the primacy
extended to rhetoric. Hors-texte is that which history cannot escape plotting. As
such, it cannot escape the tropological nature of its discourse. In "Criticism and
Crisis," de Man writes: "Historical 'changes' are not like changes in nature, and
the vocabulary of change and movement as it applies to historical process is a
mere metaphor, not devoid of meaning, but without an objective correlative that
can unambiguously be pointed to in empirical reality ... " (6). This is where
historical narrativisation betrays its own duplicity. It proceeds to unravel the
meaning of historical changes independently of the modes of its enunciation. In
other words, it claims to reflect what it actually produces. It skirts round the edge
of metaphor and rests its legitimacy on a forgetting of its silhouette. All writing
is summoned by difference not by identity, by the indefinite reserve of presence,
"the diversion and the reserve of what does not appear. ,,25 The authority of
historical writing, however, is warranted precisely by an unwarranted
suppression and anonymity of this difference. Exposing the archives of history as
archives, as textual stresses "without an objective correlative that can
unambiguously be pointed to in empirical reality," de Man is surreptitiously
disarticulating the relation between the moment of acting, the empowered agency
of the subject, and a historical consciousness of the past that motivates it, the
25 Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and
London: John Hopkins UP, 1997), p. 69.
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very relation upon which any historical understanding accountable in Marxist
terms rests. In the rhetorical recesses of de Man's writing, what is seemingly at
risk, the transcendental reading itself, is thus what implicitly disrupts the
traditional model of politically informed criticism, which is reliant precisely on
the intersecting moment of critical historical awareness and empowered agency
for change. The irrepressible exigency towards referential grounding of what
scatters every possible ground is called into question and this, for de Man, is a
nonnegotiable demand of reading, but, in that it is, it is also what calls for endless
negotiation. It is what reactivates the repressed annals of history that reissue a
call for a historical reading that is always to be done. History, in de Man, as we
shall see later, is always "brushed against the grain," to use Benjamin's idiom.i"
This disidentificatory practice could be seen as a rearticulation of radical
contestation that is constitutive of political space. What in de Man thus seems to
withdraw before existence in its sacrifice of what grounds the criteria of
responsibility is all the more responsible in that it relegitimates the exigency of
questioning of that which grounds the criteria of responsibility. De Man writes:
26 The task of rewriting history from the underbelly of its triumphs, so to speak. Benjamin:
"There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.
And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it
was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself
from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain." Walter
Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn, ed.
Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 248. This is not to identify de Man's task here with
"historical materialism" - although "materialism," as we shall see in the last chapter, a certain
paleonymic regrounding of the term outside the tradition, a stolen materialism, one could say, is
not at all unrelated to de Man's writing (cf. below, note 272, for instance) - but rather to suggest
an opening of history to reading, that is to say, to the shadow of its unwritten records that
destabilise its present but make possible alternate and irreducible futures to which the traces of
!he other, history carries by erasing, are pledged. The demand "to brush history against the grain"
IS that history, in its writing, be carried by a sworn allegiance to its unwritten accounts.
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What we call ideology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with
natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism. It follows that, more
than any other mode of inquiry, including economics, the linguistics of
literariness [the notion that reference is a function of language] is a
powerful and indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideological
aberrations, as well as a determining factor in accounting for their
occurrence. Those who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to
social and historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating
their fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by the
tool they are trying to discredit. (RT, 11)
Ideology, for de Man, is an abuse of language. A tropic movement of
analogism that dissimulates the arbitrary proximity between sign and meaning
and grounds language in a fiction of legislative beginnings. It phenomenalizes
the trope making two essentially heterogeneous orders cohere, providing thus a
stable epistemological system of substitutions that gives the signifier referential
anchor and semantic depth. It institutes and determines meaning by suppression
of difference. To deconstruct a textual claim is thus to lay bare the referential
aberration of language, to expose ideology at work. In other words, it is to reveal
the rhetorical and, therefore, contingent structuring of power. "One can see,"
then, de Man writes,
why any ideology would always have a vested interest in theories of
language advocating correspondence between sign and meaning, since
they depend on the illusion of this correspondence for their
effectiveness. On the other hand, theories of language that put into
question the subservience, resemblance, or potential identity between
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sign and meaning are always subversive, even if they remain strictly
confined to linguistic phenomena."
It is thus the semantic voiding or rather the arbitrariness of conceptual
content in relation to the signifier that, as de Man contends, "gives the language
considerable freedom from referential restraint, but it makes it epistemologically
highly suspect and volatile, since its use can no longer be said to be determined
by considerations of truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, or
pleasure and pain" (RT, 10). Ifreference is a mere effect of the systematic play of
differences, the structure of the trace that relays and inclines one signifier to the
other, than there is no hors-texte. If behind signification - what would ground it-
is only more signification then we truly are alone with language and any
epistemological, ethical or aesthetic categories ideology uses to reproduce the
stability of the hegemonic order are put in question insofar as the force of their
authority cannot be derived from anything outside the structure and the
movement of signification that constitute it. De Man thus exposes the graphic
nature of the referent, its writtenness, and the essential instability of its
determination." This is far from political quietism; on the contrary, it is precisely
what enables "political critique." Norris writes:
27 Paul de Man, "Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism" (1972), in Romanticism and
Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers, ed. E. S. Burt et al. (Baltimore:
John Hopkins UP, 1993), p. 170.
28 "Contemporary literary theory," de Man writes, "comes into its own in such events as the
application of Saussurian linguistics to literary texts ... The phenomenality of the signifier, as
sound, is unquestionably involved in the correspondence between the name and the thing named,
but the link, the relationship between word and thing, is not phenomenal but conventional" (RT,
8, 10). The exposure of the "conventionality" of this relationship is nothing but the exposure of
the contingency of the social that also enables its revision. The irreducible gap between "word
and thing" is both what enables the foundationalist fictions of ideology while at the same time
being the very means of their undoing.
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For de Man, then, the ethics of reading is closely bound up with a
political critique of the powers vested in aesthetic ideology ...
Deconstruction would then be a vigilant practice of textual critique alert
to those moments where the drive for aesthetic transcendence creates the
kind of timeless, mystified ideal of 'tradition' (or 'unified
'b'l' ') 29sensl ihty ...
Aesthetic or symbolic totalisation - the confusion of "reference with
phenomenalism" (RT, 11) - that writing interrupts, opens and turns aside without
re-tum.l" is precisely the ideologico-aesthetic transcendence of heterogeneous
orders. By naturalising the sign, ideology provides a mythologised narrative of
beginnings that tethers language to the origins supposedly outside it. De Man's
writing, insofar as it exposes a disjunction in the relation between "the symbol
and what is being symbolised.v" interrupts or desubstantiates the myth and does
so by unmasking its fictionality. If ideology, in Althusser's idiom, "represents the
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence,,,32 then
the representational aspect is realised through the mimetic function attributed to
the sign in order to instantiate a particular state of affairs as naturally motivated.
The illusion of ideologico-aesthetic totalisation is mimetological, the effacement
29 Christopher Norris, Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology (New
York and London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 118-19.
30 The movement of writing scatters origins in its very attempt to weave its figures. The
recuperative or totalising power of language - that is to say, its ideology in de Man's terms - to
appropriate or reconstitute the living present in a complete figure, symbol or metaphor that work
by resemblance, is threatened by writing that exposes precisely the impossibility or interruption
of its completion; writing disseminates it without return - that is, metonymically. Writing is thus
the effraction of every circle and is what every ideology will try to suppress insofar as it
inevitably frays at the edges of its economy.
31 One could say simply "relation" here because what separates is what puts in relation. Relation
already presupposes difference. This relation, de Man goes on, is "a disjunction on the level of
tropes between the trope as such and the meaning as a totalizing power of tropological
substitutions." Paul de Man, "Conclusions: Walter Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator,'" in
The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986), p. 89.
32 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 162.
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of the sign that becomes a mark in Derrida's sense, no longer a supplementary
mark inscribed or re-marked in the series of marks but precisely governing the
series, which is to say, outside the system of inscription. The ideological sign is
no longer a sign but precisely the closure of signification. By constantly
reactivating difference, de Man's writings unmask this very mode of ideological
phenomenalization by breaking open the vertigo of re-marking, a mise en abyme
of reference in an infinite drift of ground that never saturates the field. And it is
precisely this infinite errance and the lack of any foreseeable program that makes
responsibility inescapable. That there is an effraction of rapport between the
linguistic sign and its referent, an empty space that fissures the referent insofar as
it articulates it - in other words, a disjunction between the name and the thing -
is precisely what gives traction to political strategies in their legitimation of
authority. The gap then is both what makes political programs possible but, at the
same time, also what voids them of authority insofar as it exposes the constructed
nature of their legitimacy. De Man never tires of this exposure. Insofar as
ideology is an organised amnesia of its own ungroundedness - most at work
when internalised, unrecognizablef - de Man's rhetorical critique that exposes
the ungrounded nature of our discourse, which is the condition of possibility of
anything like politics, rather than being a withdrawal, is what opens up the play
33 Ideology is most at work precisely when effaced, when anti-physis, to use Roland Barthes's
vocabulary, what is essentially constructed, operates as pseudo-physis, as essence: history-
become-nature. What is natural is what is most ideologically valorised. Although the
semiological structuralist critique of ideology and its demystifying rigour is, in de Man's view,
critically irreversible, it fails to recognise the inadequacy of its own discourse and falls prey to
the very mystification whose logic it reaches to expose. It does not account for the irreducible
referential aberration it is bound to produce in the very process of its own critique and thus
compounds the exact error it demystifies. Cf. de Man on Barthes here in "Roland Barthes and the
Limits of Structuralism," in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism (Baltimore: John Hopkins
UP, 1993), pp. 164-181. Cf. also note 285 below for further reference.
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of the political. Politics only ever is insofar as it continues to stray, irremediably
lost, away from ground. We shall return to this notion of the political that
reactivates itself precisely by voiding all political programs." "In these all too
summary evocations of arguments," de Man writes, "we begin to perceive some
of the answers to the initial question: what is it about literary theory that is so
threatening that it provokes such strong resistances and attacks?" The immediate
response of The Resistance to Theory is that "it upsets rooted ideologies by
revealing the mechanics of their workings ... " (11).
Rhetoric, in de Man, and its insistence on the irreducibility of a certain
metaphorology of all concepts." also seems to deconstitute the philosophical
difference of deconstruction, to efface "philosophy" that, Gasche writes, "is
spelled out in capital letters throughout Derrida's work, his seemingly more
playful texts included" (The Tain, 8). De Man's work systematically
disarticulates a tenuous margin that secures the possibility and constitution of
rigorous philosophemes over and against the exorbitances of literature precisely
by "forcing it [philosophy] to deliver the metaphorical credentials of its
concepts" (308). De Man's deconstructive readings are thus a systemic assault on
34 Cf. chapter below, "Politics de trop," where this possibility and (de)constitution of the political
space, in terms of its essential emptiness, is further engaged.
3 For de Man, as for Nietzsche, rhetoricity inhabits all epistemic concerns. De Man on tropes:
"As soon as one is willing to be made aware of their epistemological implications, concepts are
tropes and tropes concepts." Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," in Aesthetic
Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 1996), p. 43. The
tropological nature of language is thus part of the cognitive structures of knowledge. Cognition,
for de Man, is nothing other than the process oftropological totalisation and, as such, the
structure of cognitive processes is inherently rhetorical. For Gasche, however, any such general
metaphorology inevitably fails precisely because metaphor is a concept that any general
metaphorology must presuppose. One concept in the system, "'the founding' trope of the project
of a metaphorology" (The Tain, 309), thus always remains unaccounted for - "plus de
metaphore" that keeps the field open, as Derrida has shown. Cf. Jacques Derrida, "White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982), pp. 219-20.
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the possibility of philosophical inquiry whose limits Derrida interrogates but "not
insofar as this discourse may be construed as literary (sensible, fictional, and so
on) because of its inevitable recourse to metaphor and poetic devices, but insofar
as it is a general discourse on the universal." Derrida, in other words, writes in
order to account for the "nonorigin" of philosophical concepts whereas the
"literary dimension of the philosophical text," as Gasche continues, "is by nature
incapable of pointing to, let alone accounting for, this constituting nonorigin of
philosophy" (The Tain, 316). Deconstruction is aphilosophical index of the
impossibility of philosophy and should be returned to the proper history of its
exposition. It is a question of "retranslation of Derrida's writings back into the
technical language of philosophy and its accepted set of questions" (8). As if to
finally return the question of philosophy to philosophers and history and
literature to literary historians. At the hands of de Man, history loses grip of its
object, distinctions blur, philosophy gives way to rhetoric, deconstruction to in-
difference. Gasche thus, in order to redeem from an uninterrupted erosion, from
the depths of in-difference, the wreckage of "philosophical difference," writes:
de Man's reading of philosophy is not about philosophy. It tries to show
little or no concern about philosophy. It is a reading that challenges
philosophical difference by not being about it, by not referring to it, by
making no difference with respect to it. In contrast to philosophy, de
Man's readings do not attempt to make any difference. In this sense they
are "different," idiosyncratic to a point where, by making no point, they
will have perhaps made their point - so singular as to make no
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difference but, perhaps, in that total apathy a formidable challenge to
philosophical difference."
De Man is at the margins of deconstruction precisely for having revealed
a certain in-difference of its margins to literature and to philosophy, a certain
absent pivot round which these margins are gathered, a certain polysemy that
will always prevent deconstruction to close in upon its own. This polysemy does
not come from an outside, from elsewhere of deconstruction, surrounding its
margins, but is precisely its pivot, an emptiness that makes it tum ever so slightly
but inexorably from itself and makes it misalign itself with itself, makes it enter
fully what it has always been. For deconstruction has not entered crisis, it is, if
there ever is any, only ever in crisis. It is thus at the hands of de Man, one could
say, that deconstruction comes into its own, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Patiently, however, with a reckoning, threads of disavowal weave around
de Man's thought a snare of "faithfulness" to the "spirit of Jacques Derrida"
(Eagleton, Literary Theory, 128). A bond and a debt, one could say, to the host, a
debt that can never be repaid, that is always binding, wraps itself around de
Man's writing, shadowing its every word with threats of disapproval. It is a
faithfulness that dictates, points fingers and calls for censure. A faithfulness to
the law that must be there in order to indicate a deviation, a departure from the
law, always denounced as improper, wayward, as a threat to what is proper, to
the authority of the host. It is a faithfulness that measures the expanse of denial,
that anticipates the faithless, that which is not itself, from the outset, in itself.
These threads come at once to disavow and, by that very disavowal, determine
36 Rodolphe Gasche, "In-difference to Philosophy," in The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de
Man (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard UP, 1998), pp. 89-90.
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the law, determine what is proper to deconstruction, as if deconstruction had a
law or a host apart from the text. Whoever watches over deconstruction proper,
and thus restricts its unconditional licence to play at perverting the laws that
restrict its play, its insistent decentring of its own terms to reveal an emptiness
and impropriety of its concept that is essential and proper to it - precisely those,
that is, who safeguard deconstruction against its prostitution - whoever then
anticipates and thus annuls its pure eventfulness, the unforseeability of its play, at
the same time, at once, cancels its future. For it is precisely this unforseeability,
the hollowness of its concept and the blank at its centre that constitute its future.
Deconstruction harbours a continual possibility from within itself to be carried
outside itself.
De Man's writing has thus "fallen away" from "the source" to expose
deconstruction in crisis. It has betrayed its host to the point of a parasite become
host. Hence the pressing need to safeguard the host, to recuperate the authentic
from an imposture, from what threatens to pass itself off as the host itself.
Because it fails, Nealon writes, "to account for the complexities of Derrida's
work" (Double Reading, 26), it is determined as a derivate and an absence. Two
consequences: de Man's failure is the failure to assign limits to deconstruction;
this failure is inherent in the very "concept" of deconstruction that is always in
misalignment with itself. If there is a law of deconstruction, it is a differential
law. Differance at the origin cancels all origins. Deconstruction thus proceeds
without identity always ahead of itself or behind itself, lacking the it-self of
itself. It is therefore proper only when improper, when faithless and inadequate to
itself, when crossing its own margins. Deconstruction is a failure of
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deconstruction, possible only as impossible.i Second, de Man's failure is also a
chance of deconstruction. Insofar as it is thus foreign to its own concept, in
excess or lack of it, or rather insofar as its concept is what eludes conceptuality"
deconstruction opens itself up to its own prostitution. It is as improper to itself
that it is. What appears thus to threaten deconstruction is what constitutes it.
Crisis did not befall deconstruction, deconstruction is this very crisis. It becomes
an allegory of a failure to constitute deconstruction. De Man is already there. In
"Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," which precedes Derrida's Of
Grammato!ogy, de Man already anticipates the mode of crisis, a certain rupture
in critical discourse, which deconstruction would later appropriate as its own:
As it refines its interpretations more and more, American criticism does
not discover a single meaning, but a plurality of significations that can
be radically opposed to each other. Instead of revealing a continuity
affiliated with the coherence of the natural world, it takes us into a
discontinuous world of reflective irony and ambiguity. Almost in spite
of itself, it pushes the interpretative process so far that the analogy
between the organic world and the language of poetry finally explodes.
37 In "Psyche: Inventions of the Other," Derrida, in fact, insists upon this failure of
deconstruction: " ... the most rigorous deconstruction has never claimed to be foreign to literature,
nor above all to be possible. And I would say that deconstruction loses nothing from admitting
that it is impossible; also that those who would rush to delight in that admission lose nothing
from having to wait. For a deconstructive operation possibility would rather be the danger, the
danger of becoming an available set ofrule-govemed procedures, methods, accessible
approaches." Only as impossible does deconstruct ions remain close to itself - that is, only by
putting the "itself' under erasure. Jacques Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other," in Reading
de Man Reading, ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich (published as part of Theory and History
o{ Literature series, vol. 59, Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 36.
3 Differance is neither a concept nor a word, as we know. It is rather the condition of the
possibility of conceptuality. Derrida writes: "Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed
in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the
systematic play of differences. Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but
rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general. For the
same reason, differance, which is not a concept, is not simply a word, that is, what is generally
represented as the calm, present, and self-referential unity of concept and phonic material."
Jacques Derrida, "Differance," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982), p. 11.
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This unitarian criticism finally becomes a criticism of ambiguity, an
ironic reflection on the absence of the unity it had postulated."
To consign de Man to the improper, the rhetorical other of deconstruction
proper, is to assume that the margins of deconstruction can be fixed, can remain
unforgetful of their own limits, a demarcation that defines itself over and against
the essential incompletion of its concept that constantly calls for and revalidates
its critique and thus constitutes its absolute contemporaneity. One might say that
any such attempt itself becomes "an ironic reflection" precisely "on the absence
of the unity" of deconstruction it posits. Deconstruction is always beyond its
covers, it is an open configuration, a "situation."
De Man's critical writing does not adopt a set of deconstructive precepts
and mobilise them into a discursive methodology that legislates for a determinate
positivistic reading, nor does it generalise the singularity of deconstruction into a
transhistorical principle uniformly applicable to any text. It mobilises rather a
critical vigilance and re-calls an inherent resistance of any text, it reactivates "a
rhetorical and structural limit that prevents the dissolution of art into positive and
exploitative truth.,,4o But what preserves the alterity of the text is the text itself:
ea se deconstruit, as Derrida would say." "The deconstruction," de Man writes,
"is not something that we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the
first place" (Allegories, 17). That the text always falls victim to the pressure of its
39 Paul de Man, "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," in Blindness and Insight:
Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 28. The essay
was first written and delivered as a lecture at John Hopkins University in the early 1960s, later to
be included in Blindness and Insight.
40 Geoffrey H. Hartman, Preface to Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom et al.
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. vii.
41 On ea se deconstruit of deconstruction - that also puts reflexively the "it" of it-self under
erasure - cf. Jacques Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend," in Psyche: Inventions of the Other,
ed. Peggy Kamufand Elizabeth Rottenberg. vol. 2 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2008), pp. 1-7.
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own self-interrogation, however, does not mean that this statement is the logos or
grund of all literature, as Nealon appears to suggest: " ... this determining of the
whole of literature as simply unreadable makes it possible to thematize
deconstruction as a 'new new criticism,' a criticism that reveals the meaning of
literature as and in its unreadability" (Double Reading, 35) -literature is thus
reduced to an all-inclusive signified which it will inevitably resist. In fact, de
Man, when writing on Proust in Allegories of Reading, as we shall see later,
insists that the text always "narrates the flight of meaning, but this does not
prevent its own meaning from being, incessantly, in flight" (78), which thus
defers without end the arrival of any such signified and its teleological
thematization attributed to de Man's reading.
Something we have lost the sight of in de Man must reach back to seize
our sight, but from the to-come of the history of his writing. In order to open up a
space where the history of this future comes to pass, the crisis of deconstruction
first must be rethought as a deconstruction of crisis, the impossibility of thinking
de Man outside even the most radical gesture that would be the epoch of its
meaning. If deconstruction, indeed, is a saying "yes" to an absolute arrivant, to
an untimeliness of absolute contemporaneity, it is then what will have
debordered all its borders in advance, even the most rigorous philosophemes that
would constitute the epoch of its meaning are open precisely to the same flashes
of alterity that carry its future. First then, we must tum to the impossible
topology of deconstruction, to a necessary detour and a dangerous swerve of the
supplement that carries it away towards where it does not know. The notion of
secondariness, of de Man's writing that seems to trick the origin and seduce its
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innocence, implies a certain identity, as we have seen, that is also a limit of
deconstruction. It is also a limit at the margins of which larger stakes appear at
risk: between philosophy and literature. This is the terrifying horizon of
philosophy that must be kept apart. The apartness of dissolute figures of
literature towards which philosophy drifts as it nears its limits reveals also a
certain crisis of its limits. This is the horizon towards which, if only ever so
slightly, the turn of the following pages will take us. What will be in question is
the (im)possibility of mastering the irremediable plurality of deconstruction. Like
de Man, deconstruction is an insurmountable allergen of reflexivity and
systematic thought.
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Chapter Two
De Man, That Dangerous Supplement
The supplement itself is quite exorbitant, in every sense
of the word ... But its operation is not simple. It tricks
with a gesture of effacement ...
- Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology
De Man seems to call for deconstruction. He calls for its law and its name
(nomos) by perverting it, he counterfeits its signatures, signing in its name what
it does not name (anomos). But is there a law or a proper name of
deconstruction? Deconstruction itself, if there is one, is perhaps precisely a name
- or rather is always in the name - of that defiance (nomos anomos) to the law.
De Man names a crisis of legitimacy of deconstruction. And only philosophy can
intervene to save its face. This chapter will place in question the very possibility
of anything like deconstruction proper and its legitimacy, given in terms of
recursively philosophical topology over and against its literary prostitution.
There can be no orthodoxy of deconstruction, no protocols of reading can
guarantee its legitimacy; it is a discursive field of overlaps rather than discretions
mastered by philosophical categories. This "quibble," so to speak, seems called
for in view of the fact that de Man's thought is often perceived as having
(mis)carried deconstruction beyond the legitimacy of its theoretical inquires and
accepted set of questions. De Man becomes a supplement that overruns the
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topological limits of deconstruction and is better bracketed than left to roam,
taking licence and counterfeiting its signatures.Y Topology becomes tropology
and the matter of philosophy the practice of literature. All specificity of
deconstruction seems lost and its face defaced. So one must recover what Gasche
calls "the profoundly philosophical thrust of Derridean thought" to save its face,
and, indeed, set forth "the strict criteria to which any interpretation of his work
must yield, if it is to be about that work and not merely a private fantasy" (The
Tain, 3, 8). It is, however, the supplementary logic, as we shall see, that threatens
any attempt to recast deconstruction in a neat taxonomy that would save it from
incursions and invaginations. The opposition that underlies this attempt, between
philosophy and literature, will be considered in the latter part as untenable.
Deconstruction, if there is one, will have always been open to defacements: this
is what constitutes its future and its insurmountable contemporaneity.
In his introduction to Acts of Literature, Derek Attridge writes: "Literary
theory, or poetics, has always consciously worked under the sign of
philosophy.v'" It is on this signature that everything depends, that the law and the
name of deconstruction - what would separate "the logical and the ludic," as
Attridge puts it (Acts, 12), that which is worthy of its name and that which is not
42 Bracketing here is also clearly related to de Man's inadmissible journalism and collaboration
whose implications for deconstruction and saving faces can hardly be overstated. However, this
will not be the subject of the work at hand, largely because it requires a different referential and
theoretical approach than the one set within the scope of this inquiry, which, throughout, deals
with de Man's critical thought alone and not with the impressionable and misguided ideals or
opportunism of his youth. For further reference on de Man's wartime journalism, cf. for instance,
Derrida's response in "Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments," in Critical Inquiry, 15.4 (1989):
812-73. Also David Lehman's Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man
(New York: Poseidon Press, 1991) for a more sensationalist, polemical account of the scandal.
Cf. here note 194 below on Lehman's account.
43 Derek Attridge, "Derrida and the Questioning of Literature." Introduction to Acts of Literature
by Jacques Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 3. Acts of Literature, hereafter
cited as Acts.
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- continue to maintain its force. Only "under the sign of philosophy," can a status
of legitimacy be conferred. Its status is only guaranteed then by the signature that
divides it. "The opposition that underlies" the crisis of deconstruction, Attridge
continues, is one of "'philosophy' versus 'literature," law versus unlaw, and "is
an opposition that Derrida has patiently chipped away at in his readings of both
kinds of text." But, for Attridge, "the opposition itself [is] a philosophical one, it
is an opposition by means of which philosophy produces, and thus constitutes
itself against, its other" (Acts, 13). One can still only read literature "under the
sign of philosophy." For, "any thought of expelling philosophy from the
practices of writing in the name of literary 'free play' or 'textuality' is doomed:
philosophy will always come in by the back door - indeed, it will never have left
the house" (13).44
To safeguard deconstruction proper is to mobilise the vigilance of
philosophical difference against the imposture, the corruptive faith of literature
that forever haunts at the borders. Its practice is the very "intrusion of an
effective simulacrum or of disorder into philosophical writing,,45 over and against
which alone this writing can constitute itself. But can these borders remain ever
so clear? The supplement "tricks with a gesture of effacement" (OG, 163).
Therein lies the danger, as we shall see. For what if there were already lodged
there a wordplay at the heart of philosophical difference, a hetero-affection
44 Attridge follows one of Gasche's readings here that mimics Plato, of literature as a pure
supplement, with "a status of metaphoric secondariness," that has never stopped speaking "the
voice of philosophy:" "With the exception of certain rare examples, literary writing has
subjugated itself to the constrains of the concept and to the ethos of philosophy. Literature, then,
speaks the voice of philosophy. It is a mere proxy, stillborn. There has hardly ever been any
literature, if literature is supposed to mean something other than philosophy" (The Tain, 256).
45 Jacques Derrida, "The Strange Institution Called Literature: An Interview with Jacques
Derrida," in Acts of Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 39. Hereafter cited
as "Strange Institution."
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amidst of its dream of self-foundation, of auto-affection, a gag, a trick, a trope
already there, that can only get carried away in an uninterrupted redoubling of
originary losses, that can only multiply in a relentless supplementary vertigo?
What if de Man was never outside but always a belonging, a spilling-over always
and already begun inside?
The imperative to save face has become ever so pressing not only because
of de Man's misguided journalism that remains inadmissible, but because of the
persistent voiding of philosophical authority "in the name of literary 'free play'
or 'textuality,'" in the name of rhetoric, ofparanomasis, allegory, anacoluthon,
prosopopeia, parabasis, that all radically destabilize the possibility of ever
reaching beyond the beginning, let alone reaching anything like a positive truth.
It is a pernicious metonymic system, says de Man, that "contains no responsible
pronouncement on the nature of the world - despite its powerful potential to
create the opposite illusion" (RT, 10). But this irresponsibility is also a guardrail
against the tyranny of positivism." This, as Spivak writes in her preface to Of
Grammatology, "might seem an attractively truant world of relativism. But the
fearful pleasure of a truant world is the sense of an authority being defied' (lxxii,
emphasis added). The "absolute ground of authority," she continues, "Derrida
would deny." But
[i]t would be a spurious pleasure for the literary critic to feel that this is
a more literary idiom than the austere propositional language we
46 We shall return to this tyranny and its displacement by the political- that is, politics itself is
this displacement - in the concluding chapters, but important to note already is that referentialism
or positivist rationality always implies a return to a mythology of legitimation, to a certain social
epistemic that justifies binding decisions. As if knowledge could legitimize the pragmatics of
decision; if it does, it sanctions oppression in and by the same token.
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habitually associate with philosophy proper. Textuality inhabits both ...
Once this is grasped, it may be noted that the awareness of the need for
deconstruction seems more congenial to the "irresponsible" discourse of
what is conventionally called literature. "The natural tendency of theory
- of what unites philosophy and science of episteme [the accepted
description of how one knows] - will push rather towards filling in the
breach than towards forcing the enclosure. It was normal that the
breakthrough was more secure and more penetrating in the areas of
literature and poetry." The method of deconstruction has obvious
interest for literary criticism. Problematizing the distinction between
philosophy and literature, it would read "even philosophy" as
"literature." (lxxii)
Deconstruction is prepared to read philosophy as literature, indeed, to
read philosophy under the sign of literature. It is literature that "will always come
in by the back door" (Acts, 13). And nowhere more than in the hands of Paul de
Man. "Forcing the enclosure," as Derrida writes, rather than "filling in the
breach" (OG, 92), is also opening philosophy onto the experience of itself as text,
that is, opening it on all sides, even if the violence of the breach may be
exorbitant." Philosophy read as literature is what is inadmissible. If
deconstruction is to have any traction it must be wrenched away from its "ludic"
counterpart, from "deconstructionist criticism and its miscomprehension of
deconstruction in a strict sense" (Gasche, The Tain, 3). The parasitic has come to
identify with the host to the point of absolute porosity: deconstruction, as Nealon
writes, "commodified for an American market, simplified and watered down for
47 And for Gasche it is. De Man's reading of Hegel and Kant inAesthetic Ideology, in particular,
are targeted in The Wild Card of Reading as exorbitant and unintelligible: "The difficulty in
question first arises from a systematic estrangement to which the philosophical texts are subjected
in rhetorical reading" (57). Cf. below, "Reading Con: Rhetoric, Allegory and the Machine,"
especially pp. 245-252, where Gasche's indictment of de Man's arbitrary readings that
disarticulate conceptual differences philosophy has laboured long to determine is engaged more
closely.
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use in how-to-books, which gave (and continue to give) an entire generation of
literature students a suspiciously de Manian overview of what was supposedly
Derrida's work" (Double Reading, 28). The supplement, as in the
grammatological narrative of the graphic nature of the phone, has here "usurped
the main role," has come to efface, to de-constitute what it represents. "A
dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity ... which lets itself be seduced
narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes
ungraspable" (OG, 36). Countermeasures must be deployed and deconstruction
sanitized. Gasche:
Just as any possible extrapolation of Derrida's philosophy for literary
criticism can be fruitful only if even his developments concerning
literature and literary criticism are understood within the boundaries of
his debate with the philosophy of phenomenology, all the so-called
infrastructures can be put to use in literary criticism only on the
condition that their status is fully recognized, as well as their purpose, or
what, precisely, they are to achieve in Derrida ... (The Tain, 270)48
48 "Infrastructures" that Gasche identifies as quasi-transcendental concepts such as differance,
trace, writing, iterability, text, supplementarity, mise-en-abyme, undecidability etc., are precisely
those that "[a] certain brand of literary criticism has avidly appropriated ... in a thematic manner,
losing sight of what these notions were initially meant to achieve" (The Tain, 269). Indeed,
Gasche accounts with exceptional rigour for the strict sense of the "infrastructures," their "full
philosophical impact" that "literary criticism" seeking "self-authorization in the Derridean
[text] ... would have to confront" (278). But all the "infrastructures" bear witness to a certain
referential undecidability no concept or philosopheme can saturate. They are all shadowed by an
unsuturable relation to alterity as the structural condition of all conceptuality. Paradoxically, they
mark a closure of philosophy, as Gasche writes, "because its heterological presuppositions
constitute it as, necessarily, always incomplete" (251). If the infrastructures account for the very
possibility ofphilosophemes, they cannot themselves, in the strict sense, be philosophical, they
must be radically other to the order they account for. Just as "literary criticism" seems unable to
master the text it writes, philosophy is just as disarmed in its ability to appropriate its own
grounds, as Gasche amply shows. Indeed, the very rigour and thrust of Gasche's argument never
tires of pushing against the grain of his own thesis, "to determine what philosophical task" the
operative concepts in Derrida's work "are meant to perform" (7), for they perform an undoing of
this very task.
49
Deconstruction cannot be given over to "what seems more congenial" to
it, "the 'irresponsible' discourse of what is conventionally called literature." If
one is to defend deconstruction one can do so only on the grounds of its
philosophical rigour." Indeed, Gasche indicts those who prostitute it, who have
"chosen simply to ignore the profoundly philosophical thrust of Derridean
thought, and have consequently misconstrued what deconstruction consists of
and what it seeks to achieve" (The Tain, 3). This is a strategic distancing of
deconstruction from the disease of irresponsibility, from de Man. But that there
has been a power reversal is not accidental, it is implied in the very possibility of
deconstruction. There is no deconstruction that is not already diseased, because
deconstruction is the disease of philosophical thought. It is viral from the start,
the very cause of infection one tries to rid. The strategy is "too reactive," as
Simon Critchley writes, "where a transcendental-philosophical defence of
Derrida is itself a reaction to either a 'literary' assimilation of deconstruction (in
the work of Geoffrey Hartman, Paul de Man and the Yale School) or to a Critical
Theory-inspired critique of Derrida ... ,,50 Furthermore, he continues, "it sets up
49 Philosophy, in other words, remains a standard, a flag of legitimacy for what is proper in
deconstruction, and a means by which to flush out the frivolity of its other, but also wash away
the stains of guilt and fmally save its face.
50 Simon Critchley, "Deconstruction and Pragmatism - Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public
Liberal?," in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe, (London and New York:
Routledge, 1996), p. 31. It is Richard Rorty's charge against Derrida as a "private ironist" and "a
sentimental, hopeful, romantically idealist writer" (13) with no true political traction that is
addressed here. Although Rorty, in his contribution, "Remarks on Deconstruction and
Pragmatism," distinguishes between "playfulness" he associates with Derrida from "what the
know-nothings mean by 'frivolity'" (14), it is telling, however, how this unfortunate
misconception has come to take place. Indeed, it was due to the "flurry of deconstructive
activity" in the 1970s and 1980s, Rorty writes, that "seems to me to have added little to our
understanding of literature and to have done little for leftist politics. On the contrary, by diverting
attention from real politics, it has helped create a self-satisfied and insular academic left which -
like the left of the 1960s - prides itself on not being co-opted by the system and thereby renders
itself less able to improve the system" (15). Again, it is precisely the trace of de Man in Derrida
that seems to have obscured the vision of deconstruction, and that to the extent that one should
dissociate Derrida from deconstruction entirely. Rorty: "I see no real connection between what
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an unhelpful opposition between the transcendental and the pragmatic, where
philosophy becomes identified solely with the former against the latter" (31).
However, that deconstruction in the wrong hands, as Nealon suggests,
"clearly privileges rhetoric over logic and likewise argues that the distinction
between literature and philosophy is delusive" (Double Reading, 47), that, in its
frivolity, it dispenses with the methodology and rigours of conceptual critique, is
never truly alarming, because, Attridge claims, "philosophy will always come in
by the back door - indeed, it will never have left the house" (Acts, 13). The
supplement never really threatens the oikos, only defers it with interest.
Philosophy can never lose itself gratuitously. It reappropriates all its attitudes.
Indeed, he continues, "the very notion of literature as ungoverned rhetoricity, as
a practice safely 'outside' philosophy, is a philosophical notion par excellence."
(13). But why not: the very notion of philosophy, as a practice "outside"
literature is a literary notion par excellence. This is the radical reading of
philosophy as literature, the exposure of originary irony, dramatic in structure,
where philosophy, like Oedipus Rex, remains blind to the state of its own
theatricality. It may not be possible to read philosophy as literature but only
because literature is not an oikos, but what infinitely interrupts it.51 It is an
unsurpassable horizon of philosophy. For what departs in literature, departs
Derrida is up to and the activity which is called 'deconstruction,' and I wish that the latter word
had never taken hold as a description of Derrida's work" (IS). The collusion or the scandal is
absolute. And the "attempt to excommunicate Derrida from the philosophical profession" as a
"frivolous and cynical despiser of common sense and traditional democratic values" (l3) is no
less grounded in de Man having "usurped the main role."
51 In terms of oikos, of house holding, indeed, poetry, and by extension literature, as the next
chapter wilJ come to show, is what, for de Man, radically disrupts any economy that registers
temporality or history as a capital venture of subjectivity whereby it comes to collect itself in
absolute knowledge or account for its expenditures in the other not as losses but as amortized
interest. Literature, for de Man, is an agent of losses that cannot be recouped, as we shall see.
What departs, departs without return.
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radically and without return: "Literature writes the end of philosophy by writing
without end."s2
The valorization of philosophy is thus structurally inherent to the crisis of
deconstruction. Attridge never questions its authority. In fact, in a footnote, he
reasserts it yet again:
Thus a number of the very specific arguments made by Derrida in
relation to particular philosophical texts have been generalised ad
absurdum, and used to legitimate free-wheeling discourses claiming to
be deconstructive: all binary oppositions and all indications of presence
are illusory or evil, all meaning is indeterminate, there is a place in
every text where it undoes itself, language is essentially unreliable or
self-reflexive, communication always fails, intention or context or
theme are irrelevant, there is no such thing as the referent, etc., etc. A
major topic for intellectual historians of our time will be the
(mis)appropriation of Derrida's work in this manner, often by intelligent
and well-informed commentators. (Acts, 12)
Derrida's questioning of philosophical difference through the labour of its
margins at which literature is (not) only reinstitutes him as a philosopher, the
founder of the house built in 1967. The polarisation of deconstruction is, for
Attridge, "the polarisation ... of Derrida's work" (13). It is philosophy being
robbed of its own discourse, of its own question "generalised ad absurdum" and
(mis)appropriated by the topoi inadequate to its complexities. It is as if
deconstruction proper were a signified that is not a signifier, a transcendental
pivot of signifying structures that itself escapes structurality. As if its borders
52 Mark C. Taylor, "System ... Structure ... Difference ... Other." Introduction to Deconstruction
in Context: Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago and London: Chicago UP,
1986), p. 34, emphasis added.
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admit of no malleability, no hospitality, no intrusion by its other, its apocryphal,
"free-wheeling" literary supplement. "A major topic for intellectual historians of
our time will be" to keep the corpus from bleeding and to purify it - both in the
sense of becoming rid of something harmful, an unwanted surplus, and in the
sense of exonerating of sin, of guilt and uncleanness. However, this "topic" is
destined to fall short by the very logic of its own making because the harmful or
the unwanted is intrinsic to the very process of purification. Purifying means
getting one's hands dirty. This, however, as Attridge inscribes in another margin,
is not to deny the value of the truly original work carried out during this
period [the 1970s and '80s, the period of disciplinary prostitution of
deconstruction] especially in the United States, by literary theorists who
read Derrida carefully and responsibly (and therefore from their
specific time and place); the most influential mediating figure was, of
course Paul de Man. In a longer study, it would be necessary to take up
the complex issue of the relation between Derrida and de Man, vis-a-vis
the question of literature and philosophy. (Acts, 12, emphasis added)
"The truly original work" remains "truly original" only insofar it remains
an apposition to "the house." It is under this sign, and this sign alone, that de
Man remains "influential." The "true" deconstructive poetics is "original" only
inasmuch as it echoes faithfully. Itmust retain and safeguard that which is
integral to its derivative value. For, in the very last instance, it must recapture
"carefully" and "responsibly" what in Derrida's work constitutes its "profoundly
philosophical thrust" (Gasche, The Tain, 3) - that which, being a poor derivate, it
inevitably lacks. There is an internal division of the supplement here. Poor
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mimesis, that "must be contained like madness and (harmful) play."s3 It is "truly
original" ifit exnominates itself in the movement of its own (re)inscription. A
supplement, adding nothing, is nothing. It can take the place because it never
takes place. Original because erasable, replaceable. It becomes "truly original"
the moment it becomes innocuous reproduction. The game of mirrors. Or
perhaps, the intimacy whereby the derived steals away, touching its limits, and,
in a secret rapture of the hymen that here really holds together by keeping apart,
reverting, shifting, inside and outside, unsteady inversion, spills the ink in a
seminal theft of innocence. The scattered incestuous moment when the
inauthentic, "(mis)appropriation of Derrida's work" (Acts, 12), in all its
fallibility, becomes the infallible origin of the work. The moment that continues
to give "an entire generation of literature students a suspiciously de Manian
overview" of Derrida's work. What is now represented is only the forgetting and
de-presenting of the proper. The proper loses itself in its own
"(mis)appropriation." A forgetting that must be undone ("A major topic for
intellectual historians of our time ... " Acts, 12) in order to recover what has
allowed itself to be foreplayed by its after-effect, spun by its spin-off. But there is
no unravelling here, no untying the knots of theft, rape and deception, and, first
of all, because there is no law of deconstruction, no deconstruction proper that
begins outside the movement of its own "(mis)appropriation." Begun, it begins to
fester, lends itself from (at) the beginning to the rhetorical perversity of its
53 In the first part of "The Double Session," in a footnote, Derrida writes of mime to logy: "What is
important for our purposes here is this' internal' duplicity [emphasis added] of the mimeisthai
that Plato [in The Republic] wants to cut in two, in order to separate good mimesis (which
reproduces faithfully and truly yet is already threatened by the simple fact of its duplication) from
bad, which must be contained like madness and (harmful) play." Jacques Derrida, "The Double
Session," in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 186-
187.
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outside. It lives its own outside. Born, it carries the moment of its own
miscarriage. The "(mis)appropriation of Derrida's work" is always already
Derrida's work of (mis)appropriation. The double genitive, is effected, and is an
effect, already at the origin. The effect as cause. The effect that splits the cause is
at the cause.
It is not a question of vindication here. Of disarming guilt to uncover the
lost records of innocence in de Man's writing. It is rather to let slip the guilt at
the heart of innocence. The becoming-inside of outside is always already begun.
This is the law of the supplement: "'Usurpation' has always already begun. The
sense of the right side appears in a mythological effect of return (Derrida, OG,
37). At the place of the authentic - or rather its non-place (atopos) - de Man has
already left a watermark of inauthenticity that erases the possibility of a unique
signature.
The supplement is always treacherous, as we know: inasmuch as it is
added to the same it is not the same, it takes place, insinuating itself to take the
place, even if innocuous, it doubles and, in doubling, estranges the simple, moves
it further away, defers it, represents it and, in representing, de-presents - a threat
by forgetting, the erasure of limits within which the supplemented remains close
to itself. And it becomes a scandal when homology is disturbed. Violence is done
to the proper. The mirror has lost its tain. The dangerous surplus, all that now
constitutes a missed encounter and a "(mis)appropriation of Derrida's work,"
must be renounced. In the name and for the name of the proper that founds it. It
is in the fold of this internal division that de Man is always placed.
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The proper, to constitute itself, would risk nothing less than the loss of
itself if the possibility of the improper, its misappropriation, were absolutely
excluded. Itwould break down, empty itself of itself. Itwould collapse in its own
indifference. The proper must allow itself to be haunted by the possibility it
excludes, that of the improper. The exclusion here becomes inclusion. There can
be no proper without the improper taking place. The proper is thus never
properly proper but always already given over to the other that constitutes its
(im)propriety. There can be no epilogue here for de Man that does not, at once,
consign Derrida to his death. What is exiled was never outside. De Man spills his
ink the moment Derrida begins writing. The improper - the supplement, the
image, the double that is always improper, dangerous - only reflects the splitting
in (of) the proper from itself. What is proper here has always already defected, is
already separated from itself, is itself only at the scattering point of its origin -
that is, of its loss.
The law of the image, Derrida writes, "is always a relation to a past
present. The imitated comes before the imitator [l'imitant] ... The difficulty lies
in conceiving that what is imitated could be still to come with respect to what
imitates, that the image can precede the model, that the double can come before
the simple ... (the future as a past present due to return), the preface, the anterior
future ... " ("Double Session," 190). The question here then is whether what will
come has always already come as anterior to what makes its arrival possible - the
question of originary derivation. Of the supplement being at the point of origin,
which inevitably erases itself as being-at-the-point of origin. Because it is a
supplement. If it were to take place properly, it would empty itself of its essential
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replaceability. It would empty itself of its essential emptiness, no longer
replacing another, no longer the point of replacement but the point of non-
replacement, of irreplaceability. But insofar as it is called for, what precedes it
must be lacking. If it is at the point of origin, then origin is non-originary. The
supplement cancels out precisely what it supplements - that is, the point of
irreplaceability or origin itself. It rests its empty weight there in the place of
beginning, in beginning's non-place, and mocks every geneticism in advance. If
one tries to take out the excess of ink and brush off the stains of dried spill-over
that have penetrated the fabric of the page, one takes the paper with it.
Deconstruction cannot be rid of excess because it is this excess. To unravel it is
to obliterate it, to make it conform, to "turn the page," Derrida writes:
To make "deconstruction in America" a theme or the object of an
exhaustive definition is precisely, by definition, what defines the enemy
of deconstruction - someone who (at the very least out of ambivalence)
would like to wear deconstruction out, exhaust it, tum the page ... there
is no sense in speaking of a deconstruction or simply deconstruction as
if there were only one, as if the word had a (single) meaning outside of
the sentences which inscribe it and carry it within themselves."
54 Jacques Derrida, Memoires: for Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay et al. (New York:
Columbia UP, 1989), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Memoires.
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Deconstruction is only ever in plural,55 not a meaning, but rather a
trembling of meaning particles as they rub and push against each other without
letting off. Any desire for retracement can only give itself after the fact of its
impossibility. De Man is not "the enemy" of deconstruction, perhaps he is even
too faithful to its shedding of identities, 56but its bodyguards "who would like to
wear deconstruction out, exhaust it" precisely by defining its horizons, protecting
its body, its property and its limits, against night raids and illicit incursions.
Deconstruction "is not just one other method by means of which literature can be
taught." But, de Man goes on in the same breath, "there is an element in Derrida
that lends itself to that, because we can find in Derrida exemplary ways of
reading, an awareness, for example, of rhetorical complexities in a text which are
applicable to the didactics, to the pedagogy of literary teaching ... ,,57Once again,
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Indeed, "deconstruction is eminently plural," writes Gasche. But also, and in the same breath,
se~ms eminently qualified, anything but plural: "This plural nature, or openness, of Derrida's
philosophy makes it thoroughly impossible to conceive of his work in terms of orthodoxy ...
primarily because it resists any possible closure, and thus doctrinal rigidity, for essential reasons."
~till, there must be restrictions, a kind of philosophical checkpoint, not everyone, not everything
ISallowed to pass. Gasche continues: "Still, such openness and pluralism do not give licence to a
free interpretation of Derrida's thought, or for its adaptation to any particular need or interest.
Nor are all the interpretations of Derrida's thought that seek legitimacy in such openness equally
valid" (The Tain, 8, emphasis added). It is a structural, active plurality that, in the end, will
depose by incompleting any possibility of mastery, of krinein, of decidability of Derrida's work,
but, at the same time, a plurality that is somehow no longer truly plural, no longer active, because
Gasche calls for, and hopes to "set forth more rigorous criteria for any future discussion of
Derrida's thought" (9). For Gasche, it becomes a plurality of restricted access, a conditional
plurality, no longer plural but exclusive, a philosophical precinct guarded by "rigorous criteria"
that are "philosophical and not literary in nature" (8). A plurality that, strangely, guards against
f6lurality.
If deconstruction has a purpose, in the end, it is to unravel identity by showing its contingency,
which to say, by unravelling it without end. This affirmation of its structural undecidability, that
we shall return to, is neither nihilism nor paralysis that disallows politics but an affirmation of
~hat can only be an insatiable passion for justice that is never done with. In de Man, reading
Itself, as we shall see, becomes a test-diagnostics for this passion that no political program can
ever saturate but without which no politics would be possible. To do deconstruction is to be
attentive to alterity, but one does not make the other come, Derrida would say, one only allows
for its passage by forcing enclosures. Deconstruction is the unrelieved pressure on identity. And
~e Man will be the one never letting go.
Paul de Man, "An Interview with Paul de Man," in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1986), pp. 116-17. What de Man means by "didactics" or "pedagogy of literary
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deconstruction is the very possibility of night raids one solicits philosophy to
watch over.
The exterior, the outside, that which is added, coupled - and, hence, can
be easily uncoupled - the surplus of ink, the stains of writing, appear to have
taken hold of the inside. There is no washing the paper over repeatedly for the
purpose of neutralising any remainders that may have left its trace on the paper
without weakening it. To take out the spill here is to take out writing,
deconstruction itself. By virtue of its supplementarity, the supplement extends,
adds, complements that which is lacking but is itself lacking because it is - in
that it is - compensatory, a substitute, always already deficient. It has not taken
place, not once, it is not at the point, but rather splits the point in (from) itself, as
if placing a mirror that both (re)presents it to itself and thus separates it from
itself. For, the proper, that is anterior to its image, can only appear after the
Image, can only operate as proper after the fact of its decay. The proper comes to
its own only as nom impropre. Derrida writes: "Proper meaning derivesfrom
derivation. The proper meaning or the primal meaning (of the word source, for
example) is no longer simply the source, but the deported effect of a tum of
speech, a return or detour. It is secondary in relation to that to which it seems to
give birth, measuring a separation and a departure from it. The source itself is the
teaching," as he further explains to Stefano Rosso, is the necessary departure from the "didactic
assignment of reading specific texts rather than, as is the case in Derrida, from the pressure of
general philosophical issues" (117). And on the following page, "I have a tendency to put upon
texts an inherent authority, which is stronger, I think, than Derrida is willing to put on them ... In
a complicated way, I would hold to that statement that 'the text deconstructs itself, is self-
deconstructive' rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical intervention from the outside
of the text" (I 18). Derrida's writing, with what Gasche has identified as its quasi-synthetic terms
that are properly philosophical, insofar as they try to provide the conditions of (im)possibility of
conceptual structures under critical lens, is also given over, "lends itself' to close reading of texts,
attentive to its "rhetorical complexities." Why would the former exclude the latter? The two
cannot be separated from Derrida's work except by violence. Those willing to defend
deconstruction against violation may be those violating it all the way to misprision.
59
effect of that (for) whose origin it passes. ,,58 The proper finds itself only by
having lost itself infinitely. Itself only after its precisely having become other that
corrupts it irreparably. After having been seduced by the mirror that only
parades a false front, that can only unveil its impossibility. And it is precisely this
drift of its face, unceasingly reflected, sidetracked in detours - and, hence,
deflected, drawn away - precisely, then, this impossibility of face, the faceless
silhouette ofthe proper, that constitutes the desire for its presence. The
impossibility of face and, therefore, desire to see it. Or, in other words, desire
that carries the seed of a ceaseless distress, of its incompletion. And one can only
get caught in this after-fact, the after-effect of broken mirrors. For what is
reflected in the tain of the mirror cannot be desired before its distortion, it can
only give itself to recognition after the scars have marred it beyond recognition.
If the origin is an anachronic effect of its impossibility and if it is always
"secondary in relation to that to which it seems to give birth," then, perhaps, it
will all have begun with de Man.
The only tour to deconstruction proper is by detour of its beginning
improper. One can seize it only by mastering its effects - one is left to begin with
souvenirs alone. 59 This is where deconstruction becomes something of a fetish.
S8
Jacques Derrida, "Qual Quelle: Valery's Sources," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago:
~hicago UP, 1982), p. 280, emphasis added.
The proper, after all, "is nothing other than the apprehension of the improper." In "The Passion
of Facti city," Giorgio Agamben's reading of Dasein 's opening in the world, that is its facticity, as
" k~a~ ed by an original impropriety" reveals an insight whose implications are not without
slgmficance for our question but rather determine its very limits. The relation between the proper
and improper is not constituted by a suppletory falling-away from origin but by an essential
falling-away at the origin; perversion does not befall the proper, the proper begins perverted.
Agamben writes: "Heidegger often emphasizes that the dimension of impropriety ... is not
Something derivative into which Dasein would fall by accident; on the contrary, impropriety is as
originary as propriety ... Even in proper Being-toward-death and proper decision, Dasein seizes
h~ld of its impropriety alone, mastering an alienation and becoming attentive to a distraction." To
seize hold of the proper is to let go of the proper. It is to "'appropriate [its] untruth
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The fetish, Agamben writes, "is not an inauthentic object. Instead, it is both the
presence of something and the sign of its absence; it is and is not an object. And
it is such that it irresistibly attracts desire without ever being able to satisfy it"
("PF," 196). Deconstruction that can give itself only as other than itself. But it is
only because the proper is marked by an originary impropriety, "by a kind of
original fetishism" (196), that robs the desire forever of its destined fill, that
fetish can assert its power of impotence. Desire for the proper is born out of the
originary theft of the proper that is also promised in what robs it of itself ("it is
both the presence of something and the sign of its absence"). Fetish evokes by
hiding, gives what it denies. Derrida, therefore, is both promised and denied in de
Man. But insofar as the proper, the authentic, "has no content other than
inauthentic" (197), the detours, guises, and perversions are not vulgar
misappropriations of deconstruction proper. Rather, they constitute its belonging
from the beginning, its topos-atopos. Which is why, for Derrida, deconstruction
can only be thought as transference: "But is there a proper place," he asks, "is
there a proper story for this thing? I think it consists only of transference, and of
a thinking through of transference ... " (Memo ires , 14-15). Transference, indeed,
would mark this strange topography of a non-place (topos-atopos).
Deconstruction as transference is exilic, for transference is born out of the
originary loss of place, and lives by its default in love, by its failure to appear.t"
authentically.'" Giorgio Agamben, "The Passion of Facti city," in Potentialities, ed. and trans.
PoanielHeller-Roazen (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999), p. 197. Hereafter cited as "PF."
Place of matemallove, of originary unsplitness whose loss feeds the desire in its breathless
pursuit of substitutes for what is always elsewhere, what always escapes it and what in its
Irremediable exile gives life to passion and love. Without transference, without the ceaseless
recasting of the impossible love in its metonymic substitutes, there would be no love. Indeed, in
"Observations on Transference-Love," Freud inquires whether we can "truly say that the state of
being in love which becomes manifest in analytic treatment is not a real one ... It is true that the
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Deconstruction, like transference-love, is always elsewhere but here. And "one
Cannot and should not," Derrida cautions, "attempt to surveyor totalize the
meaning of an ongoing process, especially when its structure is one of
transference. To do so would be to assign it limits which are not its own; to
weaken it, to date it, to slow it down" (Memoires, 17). Deconstruction itself
Cannot be possessed; it is inscribed within the sentences that carry it out of itself,
that it no longer masters. Transference-love is never in place, it is never at
home.?' In it something is promised as it moves away, traction as a distraction. It
pulls desire closer to its root only by substitution. It gives what it takes away in
the same movement. Pleasure, the instant without temporal thickness, is instantly
and absolutely deferred. Possession is lived as the moment of dispossession, the
same as difference. For something is always lost in transference, something
become other. The essential here, in thinking deconstruction as "a thinking
through of transference," is coming to its own of deconstruction by never letting
go of its withdrawals. Only by passing through what is foreign to it, by spreading
itself wide to its own parenthesis, does deconstruction come home. Its home is
already outside itself. Violated from outside by rhetoric inside. There "is no
love consists of new editions of old traits and that it repeats infantile reactions. But this is the
~ssential character of every state of being in love. There is no such state that does not produce
Infantile prototypes. It is precisely from this infantile determination that it receives its compulsive
character, verging as it does on the pathological." For Freud, transference is love. Sigmund
Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (London:
Vintage, 1995), p. 385. But this place of infinite difference that would be the "infantile
prototype" or, properly speaking, the impossible, is itselfbom out of originary unknowing. The
repetition of what we never knew is thus precisely what constitutes transference and what
constitutes the compulsive and unrelieved movement of desire destined never to have its fill,
~hich is why it verges "on the pathological." What constitutes it, in other words, is what forbids
It~closure. It is due to transference that pleasure is always lived as the irrecoverable loss, as
~lstance rather than proximity.
At home here would mean death, literally. Derrida writes: "For this presence [the point of non-
replacement] is at the same time desired and feared ... Pleasure itself, without symbol or
suppletory, that which would accord us (to) pure presence itself, if such a thing were possible,
Would be only another name for death" (OG, 155).
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sense in speaking of a deconstruction or simply deconstruction as if there were
only one" (Memo ires, 17). As if all the pens that disseminate and spill its ink
were one. And if rhetoric has seized its place, if the improper has seduced it,
however faintly, then this only implies a certain originary complicity of
deconstruction. Deconstruction itself begins as a loss of self. As transference, it is
the affirmation of a certain openness, a dispersal of places, an affirmation of
scattered beginnings and, like transference-love, it is ex-centric to itself. And to
give it a centre, to totalize its meaning, "would be to assign it limits which are
not its own; to weaken it, to date it, to slow it down" (17). There is no turning the
page here without betraying the very movement of the hand, fated somewhere
beyond the margins of its own inscription. Spilling over beyond the covers that
would close it, deconstruction is carried away towards the outgoing tide of its
original loss. Deconstruction no longer masters the sentences that hide it, in
which it would linger unsaid as it were. But nothing is sheltered here, because the
sentences that (mis)carry deconstruction, that make it lose face, are its only face.
And one will never have lost it more than where one tries to save it. What de
Man says of rhetorical readings is, after all, true of deconstruction: "They are
theory and not theory at the same time, the universal theory of the impossibility
of theory. To the extent however that they are theory, that is to say teachable,
generalizable and highly responsive to systematization, rhetorical readings, like
the other kinds, still avoid and resist the reading they advocate" (RT, 19). There
IS a programmatic self-resistance and a syncopation of alterity that beats in
deconstruction and aborts all theoretical enclosures. If, indeed, there is a
language of deconstruction, it is this "language of self-resistance" that no
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philosophy can overcome, but that keeps it open on one side where the other may
venture in. The supplement, the threat of perversion, is also a chance for
deconstruction, what guarantees, but without guarantee, the alterity of its future.
Literary theory, de Man writes, "is not in danger of going under; it cannot help
but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes, since the language
it speaks is the language of self-resistance. What remains impossible to decide is
whether this flourishing is a triumph or a fall" (RT, 20).
Of the Original Polemic: Philosophy's Flowers
It appears that philosophy either has to give up its own
constitutive claim to rigor in order to come to terms
with the figurality of its language or that it has to free
itself from figuration altogether. And if the latter is
considered impossible, philosophy could at least learn
to control figuration by keeping it, so to speak, in its
place ...
- Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology
Metaphor is less in the philosophical text ... than the
philosophical text is within metaphor.
- Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy
64
If philosophy could only learn to keep its figures in place. But is this possible?
Deconstruction, as we have seen, flirts too much with figures. Like literature, it
cultivates flowers, plays with semblances, flouts certainties. It becomes a kind of
philosophical noise, a sophistry that turns hard won wisdom inside out. It is
disruptive because it makes certainty lose ground. In deconstruction, philosophy
experiences the exile of its own terminology, a permanent uprooting of its
language.62 And nowhere is this uprooting, that is also a certain unblocking of
the referential power of language, more at work than in de Man.63 Deconstruction
IS a constant anxiety of philosophical language. An obstinate exposure of its
ungroundedness. For philosophy, in the end, itself cultivates flowers that
intoxicate it without end.
If one can show the unmasterability of figures in the text of philosophy,
one will have shown something like literature folded inside. Stilled, but not
effaced, preventing philosophy to close in upon itself, to recall itself absolutely.
And insofar as the opposition between literature and philosophy seems to inform
the typology of deconstruction, its concern with faces as we have seen, this
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In "Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality," Agamben alerts us to this crisis: "Philosophical terms
rem~~nnames, but their referential character can no longer be understood simply according to the
tradItIonal scheme of signification; it now implies a different and decisive experience of
language." Deconstruction, he continues on the following page, "suspends the terminological
~haracter of philosophical vocabulary; rendered inde-terminate, terms seem to float interminably
In the ocean of sense. This is not, of course, an operation accomplished by deconstruction out of
ca~riciousness or unnatural violence; on the contrary, precisely this calling into question of
phIlosophical terminology constitutes deconstruction's insuperable contemporaneity." Giorgio
Agamben, "Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality," in Potentialities (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP,
!3999), pp. 208, 209. Hereafter cited as "Pardes"
~e Man's writing foregrounds precisely this crisis of terminology. Philosophy here seems most
at fisk oflosing its specificity, and de Man goes all the way: "All philosophy is condemned, to
th~extent that it is dependent on figuration, to be literary ... what seems to bring literature and
ph~losophy together is ... a shared lack of identity or specificity." Paul de Man, "The
EpIstemology of Metaphor," in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP,
1996), p. 50. Hereafter cited as "EM."
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would also be nothing less - but nothing more - than exposure of deconstruction
to defacement from the beginning, the impossibility of determining a limit, a
property, an all-rights-reserved of deconstruction/"
We will approach this limit obliquely, through the notion of translation
and the unsaid, through the task of impossible translation, Benjamin's task65 and
its later reading by de Man. For is not the task of the translator, of carrying over
(from trans- "across, over" and latus, "borne, carried"), also the question of
rhetoric, of metaphor a, of the figure in general? The question of translation is
first of all the question of vicariousness, of taking the place of another, of
carrying over that at once inscribes distance and proximity.
The philosopher's task has always been one of translation, but one that
leaves no remainder, that finally translates by letting everything be said. As it
passes through translation, something is always forced outside the crypt of its
irreplaceability and translation seems to replace what will have remained in
silence. It replaces the silent irreplaceability. In its words, something is preserved
as it is ruined. We are here already at the limit, criss-crossing round a certain
absence, a gap that compromises all translations while making them possible. It
is an absence round which literature is gathered and that breaks open, at the
limits of philosophy, a ravenous silence feeding on a dying present that the trope
makes only too apparent.
Philosophy is tormented by this silence; it is the persecuted truth it
compulsively repeats, attempts to translate, gather fully in a total word, but can
64 In other words, insofar as the opposition literature/philosophy grounds the opposition de
~an/Derrida, disarticulating the former would inevitably solicit a collapse of the latter.
Walter Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator," in Illuminations (London: Pimlico, 1999).
Hereafter cited as "The Task."
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do so only by being attentive to its escape in figures that fault the gathering.
Something essential will have slipped through the clutches of its seizure.f" And
this something Benjamin calls "the true language:"
If there is such a thing as a language of truth, the tensionless and even
silent depository of the ultimate truth which all thought strives for, then
this language of truth is - the true language. And this very language,
whose divination and description is the only perfection a philosopher
can hope for, is concealed in concentrated fashion in translations. ("The
Task," 77)
The task of the translator is the task of the philosopher. Philosophy has
never given up this task. It is this task.67 Translating what, for Benjamin, is "the
tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which all thought
strives for." Philosophy has always dreamed of "pure language," of saying being
whose meaning it has forgotten, the untranslatable itself.
For Benjamin, there remains something unsaid in every expression, what
never properly appears, and yet still appears, but as a destitution. It is because
appearance, to invoke Heidegger, "as the appearance 'of something', does not
mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something
66
And, what is more, in its slipping, will have opened up time that seems to interrupt the task
without end. Time that always and infinitely recurs as an incursion that interrupts philosophy's
gathering in self-knowledge. For Benjamin, time will be hopelessly melancholic as it tries to
~r~sp the anteriority it hopelessly and infinitely interrupts. Renunciation not only belongs to time,
It ISthe very fabric of time. More on melancholy and the pathology of time will be said later
when we discuss the nature of allegory in de Man and Benjamin. Cf. below, section on
:'f-liegory'S Contresens: 'To brush history against the grain. '"
The task of translation, as we approach it, only recasts the question of being whose meaning,
says Heidegger, we have forgotten. "This question has today been forgotten," opens Being and
Time, but it is one, he continues, that "provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and
Aristotle ... [and] was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of
Hegel." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 21. Cf. also note 82 below for Heidegger on the "task," the very
"matter" of philosophy.
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which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which
does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself." And all "indications,
presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of
appearing, even though they differ among themselves" (Being and Time, 52).68
The ambiguous structure of appearance thus forces the entire discourse (logos)
on being (to on) into secrecy. It destines it, one might say, to rhetoric. It is what
is always said, in what appears, as unsaid. What remains a secret kept in its very
disclosure. What reveals itself by withholding itself. There is no better place for a
secret to hide than in what "appears" to make it known. Insofar as language
signifies, insofar as it is diseased by signs and symbols, the very symptoms of
disclosure, it will continue to revoke what can be announced in it alone. It will
continue to betray that of which it always speaks. Something will always remain
abandoned:
In all language and linguistic creations there remains in addition to what
can be conveyed something that cannot be communicated; depending on
the context in which it appears, it is something that symbolizes or
something symbolized. It is the former only in the finite products of
language, the latter in the evolving of the languages themselves. And
that which seeks to represent, to produce itself in the evolving of
languages, is that very nucleus of pure language. Though concealed and
fragmentary, it is an active force in life as the symbolised thing itself,
68 When writing on the concept of phenomenon, three figures of appearance appear: "the
expression 'appearance' itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of
announcing-itself as not-showing itself [this is the figure that dominates our reading of
Benjamin]; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst] - that which in its
showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself [this is the originary irony that all
language is destined to repeat in its failure to transcend it. Insofar as language always speaks in
order not to say, one no longer has to speak ironically; one always already does]. And finally one
can use 'appearing' as a term for the genuine sense of 'phenomenon' as showing-itself. If one
designates these three different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable" (Being and
Time, 53).
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whereas it inhabits linguistic creations only in symbolised form" ("The
Task," 80).
The philosopher's task then is not to reveal or speak of but to translate
"the symbolised," that which is "an active force of life" but remains withheld in a
passivity "that cannot be communicated," in pure language that finally speaks it.
Language that has escaped itself and has thus become its own presupposition.
Language that says being. But, for de Man, that is precisely the experience of
poetry, the experience of its impossible task: "For the poet the anguishing
question - and it is indeed the subject of the poem [Holderlin's unfinished hymn,
"Wie wenn am Feiertage das Feld zu sehn"] - is: how can one not only speak of
Being, but say Being itself. Poetry is the experience of this question.t''" It is from
this "specific tension," de Man writes, that "the poetic act is born" ("Heidegger's
Exegeses," 255). Pure language then, "whose divination and description is the
only perfection a philosopher can hope for" ("The Task," 77), is to be sought in
the poetic - in literature. Something in philosophy, that of which philosophy
always speaks, exceeds philosophy. It can only be spoken as the unspoken that
speech scatters. The said, that is, or the word, carries within itself what it cannot
say but what at the same time is present in it as unsayability, as a withdrawal and
difference in what is said. It is what always passes itself into what is said as
unsayability. It takes place as the underside of all language, as that over and
against which alone language can gather itself. What exceeds all language then
belongs to language. And it is a belonging that pure language would saturate. A
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Paul de Man, "Heidegger's Exegeses of Holderlin," in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the
Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 256. Hereafter cited as
"Heidegger's Exegeses." "Just as on a feast day, to see his field" is de Man's translation of
Holderlin's untitled poem.
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wound in the midst of every word that pure word would suture. Language is thus
tethered to what it cannot say. The unsayability that can be said only where the
word is lacking can thus paradoxically announce itself in language alone. Only
language can say the unsayable. It is because of this essential tethering that
Heidegger, in "What Are Poets For?," can say:
Being, as itself, spans its own province, which is marked off (temnein,
tempus) by Being's being present in the word. Language is the precinct
(templum), that is, the house of Being. The nature of language does not
exhaust itself in signifying, nor is it merely something that has the
character of sign or cipher. It is because language is the house of Being,
that we reach what is by constantly going through this house."
The unsayable "spans its own province." It traverses its own house every
time we speak, but in secret. Sheltered by detours and figures of its revelation.
For revelation here does not reveal anything, it rather makes a figure that
conceals it. And it is only by abandoning ourselves to detours, to figures, to what
infinitely sidetracks us, that we come closer to it. What sidetracks us is what
brings us closer. What leaves us at a distance is precisely what carries the
intimacy of the unsaid. And only by turning away ever more do we draw near the
deep of being. We "reach what is by constantly going through this house." The
house of unreserved intimacy and alliances but also of infinite recesses and
separations through which we shall never have finished advancing. Language is
the house of ghosts, of silhouettes that figures cast obliquely. Language thus
reveals only the emptiness that it shelters. The barrenness of its secret. But a
7°M .artin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For," in Poetry. Language. Thought, trans. Albert
HOfstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 129, emphasis added.
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barrenness that destines language to figures, to history, and its perennial
restlessness. It reveals thus only itself - language one will never have spoken
enough. Language is a permanent interruption of all self-reflexivity, it essentially
limits philosophy's appropriation of difference.
Pure language, however, no longer wanders. It says what it longs to say,
and in saying what lacerates it, it says its own limit. This is why in philosophy
that longs for this limit, secrecy is no longer possible, for there is nothing left to
keep, nothing left to remember. It is a language that, after infinite turns (tropoi),
re-turns to itself. That exhausts history, or the gathering of figures in the infinite
to-come of history, and runs out of ink. Now, it finally speaks, but does so only
when it has nothing to say: "In this pure language - which no longer means or
expresses anything but is, as expressionless and creative Word, that which is
meant in all languages - all information, all sense, and all intention finally
encounter a stratum in which they are destined to be extinguished" ("The Task,"
80, emphasis added). And this is both the fulfillment and end of language. Pure
language that fulfills itself by finally emptying itself of all its figures. It expresses
the most only when it is finally expressionless. It says what it means only when it
no longer means, when "all information, all sense, and all intention" break
gently, give way to silence. The figure or the trope that signifies at the same time
the fall and the birth of language, the very broaching of time, carries within itself
the seed of its own infinite fulfillment in pure language, that must be a language
that projects itself beyond and before itself and appropriates the unsayable while
losing itself in it. It is no longer descriptive, but finally is what it says: "Only if
the sense of a linguistic creation may be equated with the information it conveys
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does some ultimate, decisive element remain beyond all communication - quite
close and yet infinitely remote, concealed or distinguishable ... " ("The Task," 79-
80). In other words, communication does not exhaust language; what exhausts it
is rather its underside, that which exceeds any recognizable idiom, what
communication understands only as what escapes it because it comes to pass in
its anteriority that language cannot speak except by refusing to speak, except by
announcing the ruin of all communication.
What every language means then is what meaning destroys. It is meaning
that weighs, "heavy" and "alien," on the fulfilled figure of language. Benjamin:
"While that ultimate essence, pure language, in the various tongues is tied only to
linguistic elements and their changes, in linguistic creations it is weighted with a
heavy, alien meaning" (80). Meaning is the malady of all language. The more
lucid it is, the more it seems to obscure. "To relieve it of all this," Benjamin
continues, "to tum the symbolizing into the symbolized, to regain pure language
fully formed in the linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only opacity of
translation" (80). To translate would be to let the shadows of clarity linger and
dance in pauses where language falters, where it is timid and withdrawn before
the immensity of its task, before it scatters being. This is a "tremendous" task,
and philosopher's only task. To "regain pure language" that tolls the pauses at
which communication bends and breaks down. That rings the noise that seals
itself around the word which sinks unrecognizable in its clamour of silence.
One appropriates what Benjamin calls the "active force in life" (80), only
by sinking into the night of death. It is a tremendous task that must outrun
history. For only when it no longer communicates, by emptying the expression of
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its words, can philosophy reveal the "expressionless and creative Word" (80).
"For this very reason translation must in large measure refrain from wanting to
communicate something ... " (79). The "expressionless" word is the immortal
word that rings in the falling echoes of language as it carries itself ever faster,
losing its breath, exhausting the infinite alignment of metonyms, but turning at
every turn only to find another. And that, until death. For, as we have seen, to
finally say what it means, language would have to cease (to mean). It is thus only
as figurative, insofar as it continues to stray, irreducibly lost to itself, that
language can mean. Language only means insofar as meaning escapes it. Which
is why it is constitutively ironic.
Language returning home is equal to itself. Fulfilled, it is language
without figures, language of absolute anonymity, "reine Sprache" or pure
language and, hence, no longer language. In the face of the impossible task,
when writing on "The Task of the Translator," de Man tells us precisely that the
"movement of the original is a wandering, an errance, a kind of permanent exile
if you wish, but it is not really an exile, for there is no homeland, nothing from
which one has been exiled. Least of all is there something like a reine Sprache, a
pure language, which does not exist except as a permanent disjunction which
inhabits all languages ... ,,71 Language equal to itself, finally having outdone
itself, played itself out, having used itself up, language that, in its scattering, has
gathered "the active force of life," is a dead language. The point at which
language becomes breath is the point at which language stops breathing. Pure
71 Paul de Man, "Conclusions: Walter Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator," in The
Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986), p. 92. Hereafter cited as
"Conclusions."
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language does not exist. Except "as a permanent disjunction that inhabits all
languages." It is equal to itself only as unequal. For only as unequal to itself-
language is born of this unequalness - does language trace for us the shadow or
the figura of its origins. It is precisely the exile of language, that "is not really an
exile, for there is no homeland," as the only dwelling of language, that gathers
the effect of absent time that seems to precede language. What Maurice Blanchot
calls the "terrifyingly ancient past,',72 the unpresentable time of being whose
death language announces. But it is the rhetorical effect of absent time that
language, in "the permanent disjunction," spills in advance. For the unsaid is
nothing other than the figures of its sayability. That is why, says de Man, "pure
language is perhaps more present in the translation than in the original, but in the
mode of trope" ("Conclusions," 92). Benjamin is thus reiterating the
impossibility of identity, its irreducibly differential structure or, in de Man's
terminology, "the inability of the trope to be adequate to meaning" (92). The
signified is abandoned the moment it is proffered. The trope carries it out and
outside itself before it is itself inside. The figure or trope is not an exile of
history, a hole of time dug out in pure language that fills up over and beyond
time,73 the figure is the very watershed of being. The moment of becoming-
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The effect is "the slip or the fragile fall that abolishes time in time, effaces the difference
between the near and the far, the marks of reference, the so-called temporal measures (all that
makes contemporary) and shrouds everything in non-time, from which nothing could come back,
less because there is no return than because nothing falls there, except the illusion of falling
there." It is a time that cannot be timed, "when books, long since having disappeared, would
evoke only a terrifyingly ancient past, as if without speech, without any speech but this
murmuring voice of a terrifyingly ancient past." Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, trans.
~ycette Nelson (Albany: SUNY UP, 1992), pp. 14, 20-21. This murmur of the dreadfully ancient
~~what rivets all writing.
For Benjamin, "it is fallen nature which bears the imprint of the progression of history." This is
the ineffaceable pathos of language in Benjamin, of time as the fall of language. It inscribes the
Web of eschatology no time can cut through. It is also what de Man tries to rid in his later
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language is the moment of missing contents of pure language already broached in
figuration.
Flowers and lies are thus smuggled in at the very beginning of language,
and the moment one speaks, one will have been seduced. Yet, only as deceived,
and that absolutely, conned without reserve in a confidence trick of language,
taken in and betrayed by its twilight, abandoned between day and night,
intimately close and yet losing grip, without assurance, going under, can we
ascend the withdrawing path of deserted truth. Always an escapee, a deserter on
the run or playing hard to catch, bouncing off the interminable strips of
metonyms, without ever touching ground, always ahead, unforeseeable,
impossible. For the tropic turn is quick and ceaseless in its unceasing: "For not
only are tropes, as their name implies, always on the move - more like
quicksilver than like flowers or butterflies, which one can at least hope to pin
down and insert in a neat taxonomy - but they can disappear altogether, or at
least appear to disappear" (de Man, "EM," 39).
De Man on "The Task:" "So, we have ... a disjunction, says Benjamin,
between the symbol and what is being symbolised, a disjunction on the level of
tropes between the trope as such and the meaning as a totalizing power of
tropological substitutions" ("Conclusions," 89). It is the tropic turn that
forecloses the possibility of totalisation or the totalising final turn as the infinite
task of philosophy. Once the trope overtakes beginning - and that is at the very
beginning - there is no stopping it, as it relays itself infinitely. The
archaeological moment, which is the proper teleological moment, pure presence
Writings, as we shall see. WaIter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John
Osborne (London and New York: Verso, 1998), p. 180.
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and, therefore, death, is an archival moment. There is no outside to the system of
tropes. And, hence, no end to metonymic turns of substitution and fragmentation
("They follow each other up metonymically and will never constitute a totality."
91). By the same token, ifpure language is fragmented in its plurality of
languages that are "recognisable as fragments of a greater language, just as
fragments are parts of a vessel" ("The Task," 79), then the vessel will keep
breaking continuously, and irreparably, without any possibility of re-collect ion
that governs the infinite task. Fragments are not only not synecdochal here,
reconstituting a whole, but are "initial," as de Man indicates:
What we have here is an initial fragmentation; any work is totally
fragmented in relation to this reine Sprache... and every translation is
totally fragmented in relation to the original. The translation is the
fragment of a fragment, is breaking the fragment - so the vessel keeps
breaking, constantly - and never reconstitutes it; there was no vessel in
the first place, or no awareness, no access to it, so for all intents and
purposes there has never been one. ("Conclusions," 91)
The recuperative power of language is at the same time a disease of
language. The figure signifies, at once, both an avowed desire to appropriate or
reconstitute its missing contents and thus efface itself in absolute anonymity of
knowledge - the ideal figure is no longer a figure but becomes its own anteriority
empty of figures, just as the perfectibility of translation consists precisely in its
effacement - and what destines that desire to its incompletion, as it scatters its
object in a non-circular grid of substitutions. It is, at once, a symbolic
repossession and a metonymic dispossession. "We have a metonymic, a
successive pattern" de Man writes, ,
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in which things [fragments of a vessel- de Man here still keeping
within Benjamin's amphoric metaphor] follow, rather than a
metaphorical unifying pattern in which things become one by
resemblance. They do not match each other, they follow each other;
they are already metonyms and not metaphors; as such they are certainly
less working toward a convincing tropological totalization."
("Conclusions," 90-91)
The figure thus constitutes the symbolic reappropriation of presence
(insofar) as it divides it, robs it of itself. It is this privation of presence, its infinite
scattering, or dissemination in advance, in a metonymic movement of desire, that
becomes the condition of the possibility of presence at the limits of language.
Possibility that is, at the same time, impossibility, for "the vessel keeps breaking
constantly" ("Conclusions," 91). The fragments will never reconstitute it. For not
only is there nothing primary to reconstitute, "no vessel in the first place, or no
awareness, no access to it, so for all intents and purposes there has never been
one" (91), but the very thing used to glue them together forecloses the possibility
of reconstitution. What is promised in the figure - the possibility of eskhatos or
the final turn/4 of first-last turn of pure language - is thus withdrawn as it is
promised, collapsed and emptied by the figure that makes it possible. What is
made possible by the figure is what the figure makes impossible. There "never
would be a need for imitation [that is, metaphora] if the presence had not been a
74 A .
s mdicated before, Benjamin's thought remains riddled with this possibility. It is also a
possibility that is too messianic for deconstruction, that binds Benjamin to an irreparable
nostalgia and reversal of pathos, of the Fall manifested in the plurality of languages and need for
translation. The Fall, for Benjamin, is a linguistic fall that announces finitude as the impossibility
of knOWing- what for Benjamin is pure naming - which one can only mourn in awaiting against
the horizon of pure language. Cf. below, note 207, for Derrida's response to the messianic inActs
of Religion.
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priori pre-emptied (entamee),,,75 says de Man. And the figure that comes to
supplement the lack, the moment it is called for, liberates the sign that, once
broached, can only multiply in what becomes an ever more obscuring movement
of forgetting and diversion. It is then "the movement of [this] drift/derivation
[derive]," Derrida writes, "the emancipation of the sign [that] constitutes in
return the desire of presence" (OG, 69). Presence is nothing prior to its emptying
out. Nothing before difference that constitutes and de-constitutes it, that makes it
possible while refusing it, writing and erasing it, without end.
The unrelieved tropic drift, the drift that burns being, by which the
present is tom away from itself and carried impoverished by the gusts of its
metonymic figures, supplements and substitutions, will never saturate itself, burn
itself out of breath, as it were ("This relationship of mutual and incessant
sUpplementarity or substitution is the order oflanguage." Derrida, OG, 235).
And, insofar it is thus ceaseless in its incompletion, growing evermore restless in
its errancy, without genetic assurances that would give it a gathering pull," it
will never transcend itself and escape the condition of its irreducible temporality.
It is impossible for language to seal itself round the point of irreplaceability,
where sUbstitution ends and the supplement no longer supplements but gathers
the supplemented that carries itself fully into it and preserves itself there, the
point that would reverse the drift of time (derive) and collapse words inwardly.
7S
Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau," in
Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge,
J?83), p. 126.
Genealogy remains here, as always, arrested in the semiotic system of reference without ever
transcending it. It refers to "the genetic root-system" that never leaves the order of the sign.
Derrida writes: " ... the genetic root-system refers from sign to sign. No ground of
nonsignification - understood as insignificance [that is, in-signifiance] or an intuition of a present
truth - stretches out to give it foundation under the play and the coming into being of signs" (OG,
48).
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Meaning would cease by finally revealing itself fully. But this signified, the very
meaning of being signified, remains displaced as that which takes flight and that
upon which its shadow can tread, scattering it, dividing it, but softly, without
ever touching it. De Man continues:
Therefore the distinction between symbol and symbolized, the
nonadequation of symbol to a shattered symbolized, the nonsymbolic
character of this adequation, is a version of the others, and indicates the
unreliability of rhetoric as a system of tropes which would be productive
of meaning. Meaning is always displaced with regard to the meaning it
ideally intended - that meaning is never reached. ("Conclusions," 91,
emphasis added)
Differance. That which makes the same divide itself in order to produce
itself. It can only be itself become other. The same is differential. It infinitely
reserves itself, slipping under every word that shadows its glow as much as it
reveals its obscurity. It is in distraction which withdraws that it infinitely attracts
itself. Itmust thus, in its indivisibility, partition and share itself in order to be
itself. Differance also as spacing that rivets the same to the other, to what it is
not, for it is itself only by being other than itself. It is thus also referred to and
refers itself, from the beginning, the moment it announces itself, to the other.
Announcing itself thus without announcement. The same announces the other
alone. It is traversed and traced over by the other from the moment it proffers
itself. The same is the impossibility of sameness. It is only in differance. There
can be no identity except by the relation of otherness that devastates it. Identity is
by virtue of its devastation alone. And because of this essential "nonadequation,"
its figures, the figures that shatter the identity they repeat, that interrupt what
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they make possible, remain essentially "unreliable." For repetition here is never
equal to the same, to what it repeats, it rather divides the same as it makes it
possible in its repetition. It all begins with an impossible beginning, with a
repetition, with a deferral and division of the same.77 The symbolised itself is
thus produced in erasure of itself. Itwrites itself in the blank of it own
unreadability, letting slip itself through the repetitions of its separation. And the
figures, in saying again for the first time, every time, only repeat this separation,
only ever speak its reserve. "This signification [the movement (derive) of figures
that splits and carries off] is formed only within the hollow of differance: of
discontinuity and of discreteness, of the diversion and the reserve of what does
not appear" (Derrida, OG, 69).
The truth of language is thus untranslatable. Not only because of the
recoil of the unsaid, as it steals away discrete, as it runs through the fingers of
desire, elusive, unavowable, but because its translation is prohibited by what
makes it possible. And the unsaid will remain exiled ("a kind of permanent exile
if you wish, but it is not really an exile, for there is no homeland ... "
"Conclusions," 92) because it borrows from the order foreign to itself, in order to
translate itself. The necessity of detour.
)
I
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It all begins with an essential failure to begin. In "Differance," Derrida writes: "there is
now?ere to begin to trace the sheaf or the graphics of differance. For what is put into question is
precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal
responsibility. The problematic of writing is opened by putting into question the value of arkhe'
(6). The value, one could say, de Man has never stopped putting into question. Furthermore, and
~ec~use of this, axis is always implicated in the arkhe (origin, mastery) precisely insofar as it is
ackmg. The legitimacy of the law in its ultimate absence of ground is thus always illegitimate
~d .the force of law and/or its enforceability (there cannot be one without the other) rests on a
sleight of hand" that is always ideological. Cf. Derrida's "Force of Law: The 'Mystical
Foundation of Authority," in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York and London:
~~utledge, 2002), pp. 228-99. It is precisely this axis, as we shall see later, always "sleightly"
a Igned, that is to say, ideological and, therefore, political, that de Man's reading unmasks.
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However, digressions, tropic forays and improper ventures do not
abandon the proper. The abandon of the proper, for philosophy, its unrest, is
Whatbinds the proper. This, Derrida writes, "is the philosophical metaphor as a
detour within (or in sight of) reappropriation, parousia, the self-presence of the
idea in its own light. The metaphorical trajectory from the Platonic eidos to the
Hegelian Idea.,,78An expropriation, a theft and the erasure of presence that is
thus never a waste without profit or amortisation, that never ruins unreservedly
because metaphor somehow sketches its own unwrittenness, all the time
(re)collecting the very thing it scatters, assembling in what is always more
dissemblance and closing the circle. The circular economy of the same is never
in danger. Metaphor interrupts and divides it, but the division of the same is the
manner of being of the same destined, at the end of history and limits of
language, to recover its losses that were always investments, and thus complete
itself by sinking into plenty of itself. "Metaphor, therefore, is determined by
philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning, an economy of the proper without
Irreparable damage, a certainly inevitable detour, but also a history with its sights
set on, and within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation of literal, proper
meaning" ("WM," 270). However, it still risks the proper. The proper opens
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Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins of
l!hliosophy (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982), p. 253. Hereafter cited as "WM." Derrida will come to
Identify metaphor with Aujhebung, each metaphor "deciphered simultaneously as a particular
figure and as a paradigm of the very process ofmetaphorization: idealization and
reappropriation" ("WM," 253). And several pages later: "Metaphor then is included by
me~aphysics as that which must be carried off to a horizon or a proper ground, and which must
finl~h by rediscovering the origin of its truth ... This end of metaphor is not interpreted as a death
OrdIslocation, but as an interiorizing anamnesis (Erinnerung), a recollection of meaning, a releve
ofl~ving metaphoricity into a living state ofpropemess. This is the irrepressible philosophical
deSIre to summarize-interiorize-dialecticize-master-reiever the metaphorical division between the
origin and itself ... " (268, 269). But also one whose totality metaphor comes to interrupt, as an
opening that can never be sutured. Literature would be the name of this very opening, freedom
and effraction of all circles. Not anamnesis but a hypomnesic machine that multiplies figures at a
speed of light and overloads all memory circuits.
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itself to the speculative risk, however slight, of infinite loss. Metaphor is thus
dangerous, Derrida continues,
dangerous and foreign as concerns intuition (vision or contact), concept
(the grasping or proper presence of the signified), and consciousness
(proximity or self-presence); but it is in complicity with what it
endangers, is necessary to it in the extent to which de-tour is a re-turn
guided by the function of resemblance (mimesis or homoiiisis), under
the law of the same. (270)
Insofar as it is necessary to the unfolding of truth, the tum is always a re-
turn. Turning thus towards itself in withdrawal from itself. Occultation of truth
and its forgetting, that is its very historicity, is constitutive of the movement of its
unveiling. Language is forgetful of truth. And metaphor carries the forgetfulness
that thus remembers. It is an impoverished presence. The truth having fled,
having withdrawn in dispersion of its figures - its modes of being, its
mannerisms - the figures that are also its precinct, is thus still present as
remembrance, that is, in the form of withdrawal and delay that metaphor tries to
recoup while infinitely separating it in a continuous movement of forgetting.I"
Language thus mourns the absence upon which it is predicated. But this
79 S.
Imultaneously, however, metaphor puts at risk, "opens the wandering of the semantic," folds
~d ~ms aside, what it should let unfold. "By virtue of its power of metaphoric displacement,
sIgmfication will be in a kind of state of availability ," Derrida writes, opening itself thus to an ad-
ven~re of unforeseen permutations. It risks breaking the circle, "disrupting the semantic
plemtude to which it should belong" ("WM," 241). It is therefore, he continues, both "the chance
and risk of mimesis" that "can always miss the true" (241). And only insofar as the truth ("a
~omplete adequacy" in de Man's terminology, a circular ratio in the economy of the same) risks
Itself, is inadequate to itself does meaning emerge. Meaning is thus possible only when truth can
~e missed: "Lexis [i.e., word, descriptive noun, statement, that is, in extension, discourse] is itself,
If Wemight put it thus, only at the stage when meaning has appeared, but when truth might still
be missed ... (241, emphasis added). Language is thus essentially unreliable. And this
unreliability is the radical possibility of meaning. To speak to tell the truth is to no longer speak.
~e truth of language, in its "linguistic creations," to recall Benjamin, "is weighted with a heavy,
ahen meaning" ("The Task," 80). And where there is meaning, the truth is already elsewhere.
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mourning or pathos of history, which is the beginning of history - it is the loss of
truth to itself that initiates the birth pangs of history; meaning and history are of
the same date - although present as the messianic delayed in Benjamin, de Man
tells us, it is not "so much in what he says:"
It is not the pathos of a history, it is not the pathos of what in Holderlin
is called the "dtlrftiger Zeit" [time of dearth] between the disappearance
of the gods and the possible return of the gods. It is not this kind of
sacrificial, dialectical, and elegiac gesture, by means of which one looks
back on the past as a period that is lost, which then gives you the hope
of another future that may occur. The reasons for this pathos, for this
Wehen, for this suffering, are specifically linguistic. ("Conclusions," 86,
emphasis added)
It is the fact that words are all alone, rooted in the dizzying slipping away
of ground, and every time they reach for ground they sink ever deeper. They say
the ground and each time the ground pulls away from underneath. And as the
ground gives way, the ground becomes unground, each time. As ungrounded,
Words, in reaching for ground, that threatens them - words only are insofar as
they are in unrest and away from ground - are thus destined to repeat the
unground which abandons them to solitude. It is the fact that words are all alone,
and only thus in solitude can they breathe, although every breath is spent to
betray solitude and be thus breathless. It is in the solitude and longing of words
10 complete abandon that pathos is borne. The pathos of history is a longing of
Words to even the obliquity of being in saying being. In staging ground, language
only disseminates unground, silhouetting infinitely its flight and mass departure.
Unable to finally fold itself flat, language plunges in a fractal space of repetition
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that multiplies zeroes in a movement towards its own emptying out that is also
the place of fullness. Words are thus the folding moment of infinite unfolding,
carrying only semblances that proliferate without end, in a setting the abyss, a
. 80mise en abyme. De Man continues:
The reasons for this pathos, for this Wehen, for this suffering, are
specifically linguistic. They are stated by Benjamin with considerable
linguistic structural precision; so much so that if you come to a word
like "abyss" in the passage about Holderlin, where it is said that
Holderlin tumbles in the abyss of language, you should understand the
word "abyss" in the non-pathetic, technical sense in which we speak of
a mise en abyme structure, the kind of structure by means of which it is
clear that the text becomes itself an example of what it exemplifies ...
The text is untranslatable ... it is an example of what it states, it is a mise
en abyme in a technical sense, a story within the story of what is its own
statement. ("Conclusions," 86)
The abyss here is not the plenitude of emptiness that shadows language
against which sinking words would finally break. The abyss is not outside
language, the open towards which language is riveted, pouring itself out to win
out over itself in what is the impossible saying, pure naming. It is not the saying
of the outside which would be death of language or rather death of what no
longer is language. The abyss in not outside what speaks of it, it is language
itself. Splitting itself unceasingly, it stratifies its incompleteness in "a mise en
abyme structure." The ground withdraws beneath the word that supplements it
every time it says ground. Language thus in staging presence opens itself up to a
80
The structure, as we know, borrowed from heraldry by Andre Gide where an image of an
escutcheon is placed within a larger one. Used to designate a structure of infinite self-reflective
stratification whereby the embedded smaller shield represents the larger. The plunging into the
abyss of a sign ad infinitum.
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vertiginous abyss of presence that it repeats every time it translates. It is itself the
cause of the separation it mourns. At every turn, the referent turns away and
language multiplies the remove. In multiplying the remove, language zeroes
itself out. It says nothing outside itself, outside its own "story," but rather
becomes "an example of what it states ... a story within the story of its own
statement." An abyme is set to work and the untranslatable is plunged into the
abyss of translation. In staging presence, language thus becomes the abyss of
presence, an empty place where everything and yet nothing takes place.
Language summons being only to evacuate it in its figures. Presence made
Possible by language is by language made impossible. It is forbidden by
precisely what permits it to come to pass. And it comes to pass only in the act of
this prohibition. An abyme is the structure of supplementary presence, the
supplement of presence that comes to its support, but is at the same time the
figurative fold of presence, the interval and spacing of differance, that infinitely
stratifies the play of its ruin (The "abyss of metaphor will never cease to stratify
itself, simultaneously widening and consolidating itself: the [artificial] light and
[displaced] habitat of classical rhetoric." Derrida, "WM," 253). The vessel, de
Man has told us, will keep breaking continuously. Itwill stratify itself before
gathering itself in what is a continuous tropic drift or derivation that always calls
for another turn bringing forward the movement of regression. It will thus never
gather itself. The point of collecting itself will always require an extra metaphor
that Scatters it. The collecting itself of the ground will thus never have used up
the figures that collapse the ground. But there is nothing to collect, "no vessel in
the first place," says de Man, "or no awareness, no access to it, so for all intents
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and purposes there has never been one" ("Conclusions," 91). The figurative fold
of ground that ungrounds is the beginning of all ground. If it thus all begins with
a turn aside, if there is only detour, if everything bends to it, then there are no
more detours. There is nothing any longer to police its errance, nothing to secure
the margins of an exile." If indeed the origin of truth is rhetorical, as a certain
madness of Nietzsche states, then truth is always already at loss; it finds itself
seduced by what it disavows. De Man:
The critical deconstruction that leads to the discovery of the literary,
rhetorical nature of the philosophical claim to truth is genuine enough
and cannot be refuted: literature turns out to be the main topic of
philosophy and the model for the kind of truth to which it aspires. But
when literature seduces us with freedom of its figural combinations, so
much airier and lighter than the laboured constructs of concepts, it is not
the less deceitful because it asserts its own deceitful properties ...
Philosophy turns out to be an endless reflection on its own destruction at
the hands of literature. This endless reflection is itself a rhetorical mode,
since it is unable ever to escape from the rhetorical deceit it denounces.
(Allegories, 115)
81 In Nietzsche, the true has long lost its policing powers and mandate over its other because it
has never been anything but a construct, an expedient of reason and a safety measure pressing
uncertainty into service, as he writes in The Will to Power. After all, for Nietzsche, the root of the
"in-itself' is in language, not outside it. Truth, as we know, is a figure whose figurative status has
worn off and is now forgotten. In "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense:" "What
therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum
of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed,
adorned, and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic, and binding; truths are illusions of
which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become
powerless to affect the senses, coins which have their obverse [that is, their image] effaced and
now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal" (263). What man forgets is "that the
original metaphors of perception are metaphors, and takes them for the things in themselves."
And only by forgetting alone, he continues, "that primitive world of metaphors, only by the
congelation and coagulation of an original mass of similes and precepts ... does he live with some
repose, safety, and consequence" (264). For "between two utterly different spheres, as between
subject and object, there is no causality, no accuracy, no expression, but at the utmost an
aesthetical relation, I mean a suggestive metamorphosis, a stammering translation into quite a
distinct, foreign language ... " (265). Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral
Sense," Excerpt in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 262-266. Hereafter cited as "On Truth and Lying."
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If the task of the translator is truly the philosopher's task,82 then it is a
task destined to digressions, to detours and turns philosophy seeks to surpass.
Literature, indeed, then becomes both "the main topic of philosophy and the
model for the kind of truth to which it aspires." But it is also what undelivers it
from its task by binding it to a truth that radically states the impossibility of its
ever being done. What is beside, what philosophy has always looked to overlook,
becomes "the main topic of philosophy." For, tropes, as we know by now, "are
not understood aesthetically, as ornament," de Man writes,
nor are they understood semantically as a figurative meaning that
derives from literal, proper denomination. Rather, the reverse is the
case. The trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language
but the linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative structure is
not one linguistic mode among others but it characterises language as
such. (Allegories, 105, emphasis added)
By the way of by-way is thus the only way. What is aberrant is
constitutive. What is turned aside by philosophy as aberrant, as that which
obscures the path is constitutive of philosophy's path. Insofar as philosophy is
bound by the word that escapes it, that, unavowable, chronicles the missing
82 The task Heidegger thinks has been "the matter" of philosophy since Plato. Be it speculative,
"the movement in which the matter as such comes to itself, comes to its own presence" (Hegel) or
intuitive, that brings "the matter of philosophy to its ultimately originary givenness, that means:
to its own presence" (Husserl), what it "should be is presumed to be decided from the outset. The
matter of philosophy as metaphysics is the Being of beings, their presence in the form of
substantiality and subjectivity." Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking," Excerpt in Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy (Chicago and
London: Chicago UP, 1986), pp. 249, 247. Speculative or intuitive, philosophy will have passed
through language and its figures, the disruptive evidence of time, and there sidetracked without
limit. Its matter will never be brought, will remain unbrought, to either "absolute knowledge" of
speculative thought or "ultimate evidence" (249) of phenomenological reduction. Literature will
have written them both offby writing them without end.
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language, philosophy can draw near only by becoming attentive to what
ceaselessly distracts it, to "the rhetorical model of the trope or, if one prefers to
call it that, literature" (Allegories, 15). Philosophy's faith is in the slippery hands
of tropes and these "are not just travellers, they tend to be smugglers and
probably smugglers of stolen goods at that. What makes matters even worse," de
Man continues, "is that there is no way of finding out whether they do so with
criminal intent or not" ("EM," 39). Smugglers of bad faith that cross the borders
at night when the watchful eyes are most at their guard. Clandestine commerce of
black market that upsets the revenue. A conspiracy that is always at work and
most so when one rests assured that there is none.
The history of philosophy, its "endless reflection," as de Man indicates,
"is itself a rhetorical mode, since it is unable ever to escape from the rhetorical
deceit it denounces (Allegories, 115). What philosophy turns aside has seduced
it, turned its inside aside and outside itself. It now enters the wandering and
errance of its own terminology, exposing without limit the literary nature of its
own discourse. But this is far from reassuring. De Man:
Finally, our argument suggests that the relationship and the distinction
between literature and philosophy cannot be made in terms of a
distinction between aesthetic and epistemological categories. All
philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is dependent on
figuration, to be literary and, as the depositary of this very problem, all
literature is to some extent philosophical. The apparent symmetry of
these statements is not as reassuring as it sounds since what seems to
bring literature and philosophy together is ... a shared lack of identity or
specificity. ("EM," 50)
88
Literature has never had an "identity" or "specificity," a body anchored in
a fixed belonging. It is by nature exilic and dispossessed, and in nature lacking. It
brackets all determinations, formalistic or philosophical. This is precisely what
Derrida means: "Literature voids itself in its limitlessness. If this handbook of
literature meant to say something, which we now have some reason to doubt, it
would proclaim first of all that there is no - or hardly any, ever so little -
literature; that in any event there is no essence of literature, no truth of literature,
no literary-being or being-literary ofliterature" ("Double Session," 223).83
Literature will have lost nothing by a "lack of identity or specificity" because it is
this very lack that never runs ashore. Philosophy, however, enters a crisis." It
finds itself trapped by an empty snare of its own secret. And by the same token,
what has borne the signature of deconstruction proper, has given way to the
frivolity of its other that, in fact, has never been the other of deconstruction. By
83 Literature is only at the fragility of its borders. It is migratory, nomadic. Among seven passions
of literature Derrida lists in "Demeure: Fiction and Testimony," the seventh would be the
suffering "of an indeterminate or undecidable limit where something, some X - for example,
literature - must bear or tolerate everything, suffer everything precisely because it is not itself,
because it has no essence but only functions ... There is no essence or substance of literature:
literature is not. It does not exist. It does not remain at home, abidingly [a demeure] in the
identity of a nature or even a historical being identical with itself ... The historicity of its
experience - for there is one - rests on the very thing no ontology could essentialize." Jacques
Derrida, "Demeure: Fiction and Testimony," in The Instant of My Death by Maurice Blanchot,
trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2000), p. 28. Hereafter cited as
"Demeure." If literature can contain anything, "say anything, accept anything, receive anything,
suffer anything, and simulate everything; it can even feign a trap, the way modem armies know
how to set false traps; these traps pass themselves off as real traps and trick the machines
designed to detect simulations under even the most sophisticated camouflage" (29), then
literature has never been itself, or "hardly any, ever so little" of itself. That literature then is "to
some extent philosophical," as de Man says, barely does anything, for literature, that never is, can
"simulate everything," but that philosophy, by the same token, would be literary, this is what is
intolerable and for precisely the same reasons. "The apparent symmetry," therefore, "is not as
reassuring as it sounds."
84 An epistemic crisis because it no longer masters its own terminology. Its own terms now, to
recall Agamben, "seem to float interminably in the ocean of sense." Not that they are no longer
valid, "there is certainly a philosophical terminology; but the status of this terminology has
wholly changed, or more exactly, has revealed the abyss on which it always rester!' ("Pardes,"
209, emphasis added).
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opening the margins ofrhetoricity, deconstruction also opens the expanse of its
own denial.
Literature, voiding itself, crosses borders and invades territories. That
which is kept apart and away, always operates in what sets it apart, what
separates it. It is a passivity that is all but passive.f A spectral flower of too
many colours, too many valences that will never completely dry out, that always
comes round again, and the more philosophy resists learning to cultivate its
deceitful glow, the more vigorous the growth of its own deceit. Literature will
always win out over reason, for, accustomed to nothing, it has nothing to lose,
no-thing properly its own. To defeat and condemn it would only see it
triumphant. What has become clear, however, is that figures, the very matter of
literature, will always be folded between the sheets of philosophy like dried
flowers that prevent the closing of its books. And any criteria, in terms of this
division, that would regulate the property of deconstruction become impossible.
Any attempt to recast or determine what Gasche calls "the profoundly
philosophical thrust" of deconstruction, "to expose its essential traits," against its
misappropriations, indeed "to suggest some of the criteria that a possible
deconstructionist literary criticism would have to observe" (The Tain, 7),86 is to
85 Indeed, for Blanchot, literature, having given up on mastery and power - it does not pretend to
know anything ("passiveness of the incessant, feverish, even-uneven movement of error which
has no purpose, no end, no starting principle") - is itself un-power, the falling out of mastery of
speech that no discourse can seize hold of. It is thus what comes closest in its movement towards
that radical passivity of "the immemorial past" that has never been present, that "is measureless:
for it exceeds being; it is being when being is worn down past the nub - the passivity of a past
which has never been ... " For Blanchot, the passivity of this irreducible exteriority can be evoked
"only in a language that reverses itself," in certain silences of literature and poetry, as we shall
see in the following chapter. Cf. Maurice Blanchot, Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock
(Lincoln and London: Nebraska UP, 1995), pp. 14, 16, 17.
86 And Gasche will underscore, of course, that "these criteria, at center stage in this book, are, as I
shall show, philosophical and not literary in nature" (8).
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destroy the very historicity of deconstruction and its to-come - in the sense
Derrida gives to it - that also arrives to us from Paul de Man.
We shall now leave, even if prematurely, the lack of what goes on under
the name of deconstruction - which, however, is precisely what constitutes its
always untimely contemporaneity - in order to see the tireless work of de Man's
thought that incompletes all memories of his work. We shall begin with his early
critical writings where truth that comes, comes also as a memory of the other, or
as a disaffirmation of being, but comes, even if "all that it promises is aridity,
bareness, and depravation. Perhaps this is because, at least in its beginnings, such
is the climate of our truth. ,,87
87 Paul de Man, "Process and Poetry" (1956), in Critical Writings, 1953-1978, ed. Lindsay
Waters (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 75.
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Chapter Three
Towards a Temporal Poetics: Riss des Grundes
When pure thought speaks of the immediate unity of
reflection-in-itself and reflection-in-other, and says that
this immediate unity is abrogated, something must of
course intervene so as to divide the two phases of this
immediate unity. What can this something be? It is time.
But time cannot find a place within pure thought.
- Seren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript
To speak of truth is to say precisely nothing in which it takes refuge. But it is
also to say everything, to allow everything to abrogate itself. Final destitution of
thought is also where it attains to itself in absolute plenitude. This specific
vacillation, whereby withdrawal in time becomes the fulfillment of time, finds its
complete articulation in Hegel. However, time will also become, as Kierkegaard
writes, "an extremely long dragging out of things, a ludicrous delay.,,88 It is
Hegel, in the end, that incompletes Hegel, as we shall see.
As late as 1982, de Man writes: "Whether we know it, or like it, or not,
most of us are Hegelians and quite orthodox ones at that." The very "name
88 Seren Kierkegaard, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," Excerpt in Deconstruction in
Context: Literature and Philosophy (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986), p. 187.
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'Hegel,'" he continues, "stands here for an all-encompassing vessel in which so
many currents have gathered and been preserved that one is likely to find there
almost any idea one knows to have been gathered from elsewhere or hopes to
have invented oneself. Few thinkers have so many disciples who never read a
word of their master's writings.t''" One cannot go beyond Hegel, but there is in
Hegel a fascination with difference that had come to sweep across the intellectual
landscape of French thought during the 1930s and was going to leave an
indelible trace on its subsequent development. De Man's early critical work, his
concern with the conditions of truth and its articulation in poetics, was cross-
fertilized by the intellectual currents coming from France that had already begun
to brush Hegel against the grain and articulate the impact of temporality, of
negation and difference in Hegel, on poetics. Maurice Blanchot, as de Man will
later say, has pursued this reading to its limits, showing "how the works of poets
gravitate around the ontological question, how they try and fail always again to
define human existence by means of poetic language. ,,90 Although it may seem
futile to speak of filiations, belongings and genealogic fantasies of influence, this
chapter will track de Man's early writing in its genetic crossovers rather - the
illegitimate pregnancy of thought that does not know to whom it belongs."
Hegel and Blanchot, rather than being points of departure for this chapter, are
89 Paul de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis and
London: Minnesota UP, 1996), p. 92. The essay had first appeared, however, in Critical Inquiry
8.4 (1982): 761-75. Aesthetic Ideology, hereafter AI.
90 Paul de Man, "Modem Poetics in France and Germany" (1965), in Critical Writings, 1953-
1978 (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 156.
91 Indeed, it is always a question of theft here, of illegitimate appropriations. There are no virgins
in writing only prostitutes and thieves. " ... I never had an idea of my own," as de Man admits in
an interview with Stefano Rosso, but only in order to concede his dependency on the text, "it was
always through a text, through the critical examination ofa text." From "An Interview with Paul
de Man," in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986), p. 118.
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only relays, congested grid nodes and porous reference systems that make de
Man's critical writing readable without providing the phantasm of narrative
continuity. What will become clear, however, is that temporality that faults and
interrupts identity, faults it irreparably. What language opens is the impossibility
of closure, an excessive hypomnematic archive that consciousness will never
finish surpassing. The past that it tries to recollect (Erinnerung) is never present
other than in mythogenic effects of its retreat leaving behind only memory stains
that poetry comes to retrace in mourning. De Man will return to Hegel in
Aesthetic Ideology, but the stains of pathos will have long been wiped out, as we
shall see later. The last section of the chapter will then proceed by a closer
reading of de Man's early essay on Mallarme that does not provide a privileged
entry point but grafts precisely the strands of thought we will trace in a voice and
concern indicative of his early writing.
To pursue this moment of exhaustion in which the world and its history
would finally be seized is always already to pursue the retreat of the world, the
spacing and the blank of time left behind as a trace of its writtenness. And poetry
is the experience of this exhaustion in its unfinishedness. Of a certain spectrality,
of bodies never fully present, that make themselves known only as disembodied,
that appear fully only by having emptied their presence while keeping a ghostly
relation to it. To seize literature is only to seize traces, its ghostly footsteps that
lead nowhere, that is to say, precisely everywhere without assurance. This is both
what keeps reading it always in abeyance, what can only promise misreadings,
but it is also what makes literature readable. In its unreadability it allows us to
read it. And one never masters one's ghosts, whence the haunting of the
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undecidable without which there would be no reading. Poetry would be the place
of this haunting where nothing is seized but the ghosts that elude seizure. No
thing, only its reserve, its spectrality that keeps a memory or a dead trace of
presence - a memory that opens the gap and pathos of mourning and desire for
transcendence - no thing, then, can ever be encountered there, nothing unique in
this place, only what Mallarme calls "its vibratory near-disappearance ... without
the annoyance of a near or concrete reminder.r'" It is this experience, in a way at
the edge of everything, that permeates de Man's early writing. And death works
under its name. Body disfigured every time. But there is no body. Only traces of
its disfigurement that scatter it in echoes of writing. De Man's essay on Mallarme
testifies to this work. And it is a testimony that is always referenced somewhere
in the margins of his writing. The rupture of presence, of justified beginnings, is
at the beginning and the end of de Man's writing. The end that is thus without
end. For de Man will never let closure take place. The end never encounters itself
at the beginning, never gathers itself finally at the beginning. There is no end to
detours of the beginning. There are only aborted beginnings. Telos, closure,
identity are infinitely dispossessed. And later on, even pathos will subside, there
will be no mourning or loss.
We will thus follow this testimony as it pirouettes across the gap it opens,
as it evacuates being, and follow the traces that will pull us towards the body that
has disappeared, towards the broken trail of its "resonant" retreat. We might
catch a glimpse of its omission into which its sinks. Poetry is the scene of a
92 Stephane Mallarme's "Foreword" to Rene Ghil's Traite du verbe. Qtd. in Maurice 8lanchot,
"The Myth of Mallarme," in The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford
UP, 1995), p. 30.
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perfect crime. It pursues the suspect to the point of becoming one. It interrogates
the crime it itself commits. Poetry is sick. The sickness of its prying voyeuristic
eyes: it gets off at seeing everything die under its gaze. But it continues to gaze.
It digs under the words, lifts them to see the roots that it severs. It rips apart and
cuts what it wants to shelter. Itwants to keep what it subjects to the unceasing
omission, the annihilation as the only signature of words. The body is consigned
to appear only in its dismembered traces.
Is poetry then the body of writing that scatters the body it writes,
infinitely, without ever collecting itself, reassembling its pieces in a metaphor of
Narcissus, a body finally close to itself, touching its own image in the pond of
echoes, caressing itself? "We still have trouble," Derrida writes, "defining the
question of literature, dissociating it from the question of truth [which is also,
and always, the question of image, of repetition, of Echo], from the essence of
language, from essence itself. Literature 'is' the place or experience of this
'trouble' we also have with the essence oflanguage ... " ("Strange Institution,"
48). "Poetic Nothingness," de Man's essay on Mallarme, is precisely where this
"trouble" takes place, the trouble and sickness of language. Thinking de Man
outside this "trouble" is unthinkable. This scene of a certain trouble in
Mallarme's supreme game (jeu supreme) of speech and writing. But to play here
is also to be faithful to a movement that strains towards the place of unknowing.
It is to be overtaken by the play, to lose one's thread in unavoidable detours on
the way, in the grid of intersecting digressions, the textual knots of Bataille,
Blanchot and Derrida that infinitely complicate this supreme game of dices and
surfaces. The game that stakes being at every throw. The game where knowing
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equals, what Blanchot calls, "deferred assassination.t''" as it comes face to face
with what undoes all knowing. Where the very possibility of speech is under
strain from the radical acknowledgment of language as that which will always
have fled the scene, leaving the moment of truth infinitely breached.
Hegelian Without Reserve
The historical movement is that of becoming: being
consciously created, whether as the work of art or
historical deed in general, is unstable in its essence,
and it denies itself to be reborn in another being. The
two are separated by the abyss of a negation (in
organic language: a death), and the passage from one
to the other is essentially discontinuous.
- Paul de Man, Critical Writings 1953-1978
In OfGrammatology, Derrida writes:
93 Blanchot on the essential negativity of language: "Of course my language does not kill anyone.
And yet, when I say, 'This woman,' real death has been announced and is already present in my
language; my language means that this person, who is right here now, can be detached from
herself, removed from her existence and her presence, and suddenly plunged into a nothingness in
which there is no existence or presence; my language essentially signifies the possibility of this
destruction; it is a constant, bold allusion to such an event. My language does not kill anyone.
But if this woman were not really capable of dying ... I would not be able to carry out that ideal
negation, that deferred assassination which is what my language is. Therefore it is accurate to say
that when I speak, death speaks in me." Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death," in
The Work of Fire (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995), p. 323. Hereafter cited as "Literature and
Death."
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The horizon of absolute knowledge is the effacement of writing in the
logos, the retrieval of the trace in parousia, the reappropriation of
difference, the accomplishment of what I have elsewhere called the
metaphysics of theproper ... Yet, all that Hegel thought within this
horizon, all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation
on writing. Hegel is also the thinker of irreducible difference ... the last
philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing. (26)
There is a double reading in Hegel. One of Geist that animates history as
a horizon of self-possession, of egology and specular recollection of identity in
the other. "Only this self-restoring sameness or this reflection in otherness within
itself," Hegel writes, "is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle
that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only
by being worked out to its end, is it actual.,,94 In this reading, history will have
always been only a passage, an encyclopedic loop of consciousness, in the
economy of the same. "Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness ... " ("PS,"
73). History becomes the drama and pathos of self-consciousness where relation
to alterity is always a relation of self-reflexivity. But "the last philosopher of the
book," is also "the first thinker of writing." For there is, indeed, another reading,
almost amnesic, that incompletes the first. That opens the passage in a radical
acknowledgement of its breaking off, so as to put the present in relation to itself
by putting it beside itself. So as to open history that becomes one of infinite
mourning, one of being beside itself unreservedly. Becoming itself by being
offered in its shatters alone. History that is a spacing out, a measure and a
rhythm, that drives the same off the course. For de Man, there is only this
94 G. W. F. Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit," Excerpt inDeconstruction in Context: Literature
and Philosophy (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986),p. 70. Hereafter cited as "PS."
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history, one of almost abandoned events," there can only be, if there is reading,
an infinite dislocation of the encounter between the two readings of Hegel.
Even in his early writing, it is the second reading, the thought of finitude,
that is also one of language, that comes to organize itself as the conceptual grid
and tension of all thematic aggregations that will come to cross it. It is time, the
irreducibly temporal structure of self-consciousness, that frustrates auto-
affectivity and interrupts its gathering. For de Man, presence will always be an
elsewhere, out of time and out of language. And it can only maintain itself as an
elsewhere, as a scattering in language that unravels its being absolutely, that
collects by absolutely scattering its self-possession. "De Man's effort," Lindsay
Waters writes, "has been all along to understand 'subjectivity, precisely at the
point where subjectivity destroys its functioning. ",96 His early writing is
concerned with the problematic of self-understanding and it is played out in the
space that makes the structure of its representation impossible. De Man begins
with the necessity to understand the impasse of reflexivity that the thought of
finitude implies. Consciousness only ever asserts the slippage of its delay that
95 I say almost, for it is impossible not to summon the limit of history in the very thought of
finitude, not to call for anamnesis at the heart of amnesia, not to cite the first reading of Hegel
whenever one reads the second. Derrida, reading Levinas: "Under these conditions, the only
effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel [for Levinas, of course, just to
clarify here, it is a question of the irreducible exteriority of the other as the radical departure from
the same] would seem to be, for an instant, the following: to consider false-infinity (that is, in a
profound way, original finitude) irreducible ... by showing that since consciousness is irreducible
[what Husserl does, says Derrida], it can never possibly, by its own essence, become self-
consciousness, nor be reassembled absolutely close to itself in the parousia of an absolute
knowledge. But can this be said, can one think 'false infinity' as such (time, in a word), can one
pause alongside it ... without already (an already which permits us to think time!) having let the
true infinity ... be indicated, presented, thought and stated?" It is impossible, in other words, not
to encounter Hegel as one tries to escape him. Indeed, "as soon as he speaks against Hegel,
Levinas can only confirm Hegel, has confirmed him already." Jacques Derrida, "Violence and
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 149.
96 Lindsay Waters, "Paul de Man: Life and Works." Introduction to Critical Writings, 1953-1978
by Paul de Man (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. xxxii. Hereafter cited as "Life and
Works."
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devastates its project in advance. What it discloses is not an integrative gathering
of difference in a comprehensive totality, but precisely the discontinuity, the
disintegrative work of negation - memory incapable of recollection. It essentially
opens up the possibility of destruction alone - but destruction that is also the
possibility of meaning. It is only in annihilation that consciousness maintains
itself. Its life, "the life of Spirit," says Hegel, "is not the life that shrinks from
death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures
and maintains itself in it." ("PS," 77). It is at this impasse of reflection, at the
opening of history of meaning, at the second reading of Hegel, that de Man's
reading begins. Waters writes:
In 1983 de Man projectedwriting a book on the aesthetic ideology that
would have centered on Hegel. The critique of the aesthetic ideology, of
aesthetic nationalism, of romantic anticapitalism began here with
inwardness and more generally with the notion of negation, the
noncoincidence of self (understood in the abstract sense only) and
world. ("Life and Works," xxxix)
Inwardness would cover a persistent interiorizing movement of negativity
and failure in which consciousness is caught up. Death, what radically shatters
every relation, but also that without which there would be no relation, is
precisely what sustains this movement of consciousness in its attempt to know
the totality of that from which it is separated: "Death, if that is what we want to
call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is
dead requires the greatest strength ... But the life of Spirit is not the life that
shrinks from death ... It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds
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itself' ("PS," 77). The point of the height of knowledge, of self-proximity or
auto-affection, would be the point of the height of death. Consciousness is only
at the edge of everything, never truly in possession, but disinherited by the will
of history. "In every act of knowledge," de Man writes,
there is a profound flaw that leads to an insoluble dilemma: its object
can be known only at the price of the existence of the knowing agent
(cognitive consciousness) ... But the lucid mind can know its own
subjectivity, precisely at the point where subjectivity destroys its
functioning. It recognizes that its life consists in an endless series of
failures of this order, and it finds that it retains the power to stock them
all. This power is asserted ... as a positive force; just when the mind falls
into the despair of its impotence, it regains all its elasticity in perceiving
hi . 97t ISvery Impotence.
It is the "noncoincidence of self and world" that makes the structure of
understanding fold upon itself in "an endless series of failures." It all begins with
a rupture of time that in breaking off puts us in relation. Separated - that is to
say, in relation, the spacing and the interruption measuring the reserve and the
abyss at the ground of every relation - consciousness can only know the object,
in its absolute reserve, by sacrificing its ability to know." "Without this
sacrifice," de Man continues, "there can be no really objective knowledge"
97 Paul de Man, "Montaigne and Transcendence" (1953), in Critical Writings, 1953-1978
(Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), pp. 6, 7. Hereafter cited as "MT."
98 This follows the subject's completion in absolute knowledge that finally knows itselfby
exhausting all knowing, all there is to know, completion, that is, in absolute unknowing. The
more there is to know the less there is to know. Bataille writing on Hegel: "The unending chain
of things known is for knowledge but the completion of oneself. Satisfaction turns on the fact that
a project for knowledge, which existed, has come to fruition, is accomplished, that nothing ...
remains to be discovered. But this circular thought is dialectical. It brings with it the final
contradiction (affecting the entire circle): circular, absolute knowledge is definitive non-
knowledge" Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: SUNY Press,
1988), p. 108. Hereafter cited as IE.
101
("MT," 6). To know the object, to possess it, is to be destitute in dispossession.
Dwelling aside being is dwelling in infinite difference, that is to say, total
indifference or death that is finally without power, without reserve. Presence here
equals the completion of the subject in what is its absolute absenting. "At its
origin," de Man writes, "the motive for knowledge is 'pleasant;' in its
consequences, it is the most terrifying impulse imaginable, since it can lead to
the very destruction of the thinking being" ("MT," 6).99 The light of absolute
knowledge then is the night of unknowing. "The problem has gained in density;
knowledge is complicated by two profound dimensions: that of its essential
failure and that of the danger of this failure to being." (6-7). What saves the mind
is the knowledge of its failure to know. Failure that both destines subjectivity to
non-identity - one could say to language - but also to the work of becoming
close to itself in its remoteness. This failure, as de Man indicates, is not the limit
99 In a later essay, "Process and Poetry" (1956), collected in the same volume, de Man identifies
this movement as one of "poetic eternalism" (65) or "poetry of substance, maintaining the
sensuous object at the expense of consciousness" (71). The pull toward eternalism here sees "the
temporal destiny of being" (64), its being-there (Da-Sein), the very opening of history in the
originary transcendence of Being - this transcendence is originary because Being is always
already Being-in; there is no Being outside or before its Being-in-the-world that is its constitutive
state ('" Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein which has
Being-in-the-world as its essential state." Being and Time, 80) - sees it then as a pathetic
dispersion that in becoming gathers the loss of being upon which becoming is predicated. De Man
writes: "When contemporary thought, in its most legitimate forms, concerns itself with poetry, it
is generally by conferring on it a power of eternity that makes it either distinct from or superior to
a process of becoming. Those writers who try to move beyond the historical concept of becoming
that preoccupied nineteenth century consciousness approach poetry as anticipating, in
Heidegger's terms, 'that which remains in the process of becoming.' Poetry thus acquires a value
analogous to that which childhood held for certain romantics: that of an ideal state from which we
have already separated ourselves, but one that acts in memory as a redemptive power. It is a
world of irresistible charm, even though its remoteness makes it magical, strange, and totally
unknown. However, by overcoming the dread felt in the face of something unknown only
because it is in reality the one thing that is truly familiar, we would somehow be able to move
back into the light [the light here that is nothing other but the eternal night] and fmally 'to dwell
poetically on the earth" (64). It is both in Blanchot and Heidegger that de Man identifies this
"metatemporal poetics" (65). For de Man, however, poetry is historical through and through, as
we shall see: "poetry [is] the logos of ... becoming. As such, far from being what Nietzsche calls
an eternalising power, poetry is the constant negation of the eternal" (66-67). It is the very putting
in question of its "redemptive power." Crucial difference here between both de Man and
Blanchot and de Man and Heidegger that we shall dwell on later.
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of knowing but the very condition of its possibility: "The main object of
knowledge becomes the knowledge of its failure. Not of its limits; that would be
a banal attitude. The limitation of knowledge is total, in simple as well as in
complex problems, for that limitation is inscribed in the very constitution of
knowledge, colors its very activity, great or small" ("MT," 7). Knowledge then is
founded upon the impossibility to know that "colors its very activity." It is
privative. It consists in the depletion of the object in order to name it, make it
known ("clarity ... is made possible only by a necessary sacrifice of the sensuous
object." "Process and Poetry," 70). The name is thus both what founds and what
empties the object. It is what "kills" it, in de Man's terminology, which, indeed,
as Norris suggests, is "heavy with existential overtones, a rhetoric more typical
of his earliest essays but by no means absent from the writings of his middle
period." 100
In a sense then, there is no object, insofar as it trails in the name as
erasure. There is only an elision of the object and its slipping away that
knowledge repeats - but an elision without which there would be no
transmissible knowledge - rather than its sensuous resurrection in repetition.
Repetition, iterability, that is to say, language, thus only ever repeats the interval
that registers this slippage. It is the repetition that is transmissible - and
100 Christopher Norris, Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology (New
York and London: Routledge, 1988), p. 6. Hereafter cited as The Critique. However, Norris,
following Geoffrey Hartman, identifies a certain pathos of reconciliation on another discursive
level in de Man's later work as well: "de Man's later work grew out of an agonised reflection on
his wartime experience, and can best be read as a protracted attempt to make amends ... " (190).
One can argue, however - and this, indeed, will become unmistakable in the later stages of our
reading - that de Man's later writing on language is language on writing rid of any subjectivity or
pathos of renunciation that may account for such an expiatory reading. That language, as he
writes, "is not made by us as historical beings, it is perhaps not even made by humans at all" (RT,
87), implies that we can no longer recognise ourselves in language and any residue of existential
pathos, temporal predicament or loss that may have lingered in de Man's earlier writing now
completely dissolve as language breaks the fetters of its relation to the subject entirely.
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transmissible due to the difference or spacing it repeats - not the object. The
sensuous must be lost to language if language is it to transmit it. This is the
exigency of all knowing, of its very ideality. It demands sacrifice.lol De Man,
writing on Mallarme:
clarity ... is made possible only by a necessary sacrifice of the sensuous
object. Rather than establishing correspondences [this would also be
Baudelaire's correspondences, trying to capture the elusive moment that
precedes them] that would make the movements of consciousness look
like the sensuous phenomena of the natural world, the Mallarrnean
metaphor transforms the physical world into the operations of the
mind ... More than anyone else, Mallarme constantly described this
dialectic thanks to which an object is transformed into "its vibrating
near disappearance ... " a supremely acute inward vision perceives
nothing but the spectacle of a disappearance of objects that are already
disembodied ... Starting from an experience of alienation or separation
that is universal, it tries to suspend it by safeguarding the movement of
consciousness at the expense of the object, to save consciousness by
killing the object. ("Process and Poetry," 70-71, emphasis added)
At the very moment of its appropriation, the object is disembodied or,
more radically, killed in order to be. Hegel: "The activity of dissolution Is the
power and work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of
powers, or rather the absolute power" ("PS," 77). It is death, the radical
discontinuity of the passage, that assures the passage. Only as vibratory "near-
disappearance," as absence, can presence be truly mastered. To possess the
object is to master its absence. What was never there before it disappeared, now
101 And sacrifice properly speaking, insofar as sacrifice is never pure but always implicates an
economy, a return. What is sacrificed is always put in reserve, temporised; offered yes, but not
absolutely, not gratuitously. Sacrificial economy is the economy of Reason.
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retreats and remains as that which will never have been treated - and so nothing,
Mallarme writes,
NOTHING
of the memorable crisis
or might
the event have been accomplished in view of all results null
human
WILL HA YE TAKEN PLACE
an ordinary elevation pours out absence
BUT THE PLACE 102
Presence is only ever present in its traces, that is, in the very impossibility
of knowing - this is where we know- in the "NOTHING / of the memorable
crisis," in "the spectacle of a disappearance" that solicits thought. It is night, but,
at the same time, night as the dawn of meaning alone. Silence, that which is
before speech and that into which everything sinks for speech to begin, is that
towards which words are riveted. That is why Mallarme is the "poet of sterility
and the blank page.,,)03
Night, the impossibility of knowing, does not destroy subjectivity.
Cognition does not break down here; it begins. "It recognizes that its life consists
in an endless series of failures ofthis order, and it finds that it retains the power
to stock them all" ("MT," 7). The moment at which "an ordinary elevation pours
102 Stephane Mallarme, Un coup de des (A Throw of the Dice), in Stephane Mallarme: Collected
Poems, trans. Henry Weinfield (Berkeley and London: California UP, 1994), p. 142. Unless
otherwise stated, all further references to Mallarme's poems are to Weinfield's translation in this
edition.
103 Paul de Man, "Poetic Nothingness: On a Hermetic Sonnet by Mallarme," in Critical Writings,
1953-1978 (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 18.
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out absence," is the break of day, of logos, of meaning; the object endures but
only to emerge as a quiver, a "near-disappearance," a name rid of solidity,
universal, free, equal.l'" But this freedom comes at a cost, for it is a quiver of
reference. All negativity is repossessed by consciousness, maintained and
surpassed (Aujhebung), "stocked," as de Man writes, and reinvested as work.
That which is not, which no longer is, is summoned into being. Death labours a
reserve of meaning, collaborates as its "underside and accomplice" in the
movement towards the for-itself of consciousness. "In discourse ... negativity is
always the underside and accomplice of positivity. Negativity cannot be spoken
of, nor has it ever been except in this fabric of meaning," says Derrida.105 Death,
what is truly (at) the limit, never takes off headless, never exceeds the limit
within which it signifies. What is a non-path, the point one will never have
traversed, the limit experience, the instant that cannot pass, is never done with,
that can only begin endlessly, is surpassed "according to the game of speech."
Mallarme asks:
What use is the wonder of transposing a phenomenon of nature into its
resonant near disappearance, according to the game of speech; unless
there emanates from it, without the hindrance of an immediate or
concrete prompting, the pure idea? (qtd. in "Poetic Nothingness," 21)
104 Equal, Nietzsche would say, insofar as it treats the edges of singularity by equalising them:
"Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar
to any other, so certain is it that the idea 'leaf has been formed through an arbitrary omission of
these individual differences, through forgetting of the differentiating qualities ... " ("On Truth and
Lying," 263).
105 Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve," in
Writing and Difference (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 327, emphasis added.
Hereafter cited as "General Economy."
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All language tends towards where separation breaks but only proves its
impotence. Everything begins with death. Beginning itself, life, Blanchot never
tires of repeating Hegel, as if repetition that serializes origins could somehow
exhaust the moment that completes us but that infinitely exceeds us: "'life
endures death and maintains itself in it' in order to gain from death the possibility
of speaking and the truth of speech." This, he continues, "is the 'question' that
seeks to pose itself in literature, the 'question' that is its essence" ("Literature
and Death," 322). Literature is thus essentially tied to the other and its name, the
name that calls for presence that it annihilates in the call which keeps the call
open. It is tied to language and to its limit where the question begins. "Literature
is bound to language," Blanchot continues, and language "is reassuring and
disquieting at the same time" (322). It is reassuring because, in annihilation, it
sets us free, but disquieting because the price of this freedom is a quiver of
reference that no longer can be stilled. The name names what is no longer there,
what no longer is. It names the absence of what it gives us to think: "The word
gives me the being, but it gives it to me deprived of being" (322). It puts us on
the traces of the unthinkable. The name is an index of the unthinkable that trails
absent, ghostly, in it. It registers death of being. But death, "the putting at stake
of life," as Derrida writes, "is a moment in the constitution of meaning, in the
presentation of essence and truth. It is an obligatory stage in the history of self-
consciousness and phenomenality, that is to say, in the presentation of meaning"
("General Economy," 321). There are thus two registers oflanguage in
language.l'" the one that quantifies, serializes, compares and the other that
106 What Blanchot, as we shall see later, will call two slopes of literature: "If one looks at it in a
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suspends the first, as an instance of silence within language; it is in language
what suspends it. What exceeds language is in language, staying close, ghostly,
other. There is seduction between the two registers that call for each other, reach
over to the other. But there is also irreducible heterogeneity between the two that
makes the call possible. They are inseparable in the bond that divides them, in
their very separability.l'" De Man's writing, from the beginning, is a testimony to
the uprooting of the bond, without which there would be no call and thus no
response, and no responsibility.
One must attend then to a certain rupture that guards all intimacies by
keeping them wounded. And thus to a limit at which alone the possibility of
closeness is preserved. But also, at the same time, the limit that removes
closeness, detaches from roots, divides and spectralises. Where language, the
machine, re-producibility by division of the same, begins. And with it also the
certain way, literature has two slopes. One side of literature is turned toward the movement of
negation by which things are separated from themselves and destroyed in order to be known,
subjugated, communicated ... But there is another side to literature. Literature is a concern for the
reality of things, for their unknown [in other words, for precisely what will always have stolen
away on the first slope - whence "the unknown"], free [because immoderate - incalculable,
Derrida would say], and silent [because it is the end that precedes language] existence; literature
is their innocence and their forbidden presence, it is the being which protests against revelation
[that would destroy it], it is the defiance of what does not want to take place outside ('~Literature
and Death," 330). Blanchot's writing pursues the moment there where language has evacuated
itself and having lost all meaning is finally "speech empty of words" (332). Opacity, for
Blanchot, is what salutes being (both wishes good health, but also saves, salvages, from saivus,
"unharmed, safe"). More of the two slopes and de Man's implicit critique that can be gleamed
here will be said later.
107 In Allegories of Reading, when writing on Rousseau's distinction between the denominative,
that is referential, and conceptual or metaphorical language, de Man will precisely pivot this bond
of dis-association between the two orders: " ... the substitution of sameness for difference that
characterizes, for Rousseau, all conceptual language is built into the very act of naming, the
'invention' of the proper noun. It is impossible to say whether denomination is literal or figural:
from the moment there is denomination, the conceptual metaphor of entity as difference is
implied, and whenever there is metaphor, the literal denomination of a particular entity is
inevitable: 'try to trace for yourself the image of a tree in general, you will never succeed. In spite
of yourself, you will have to see it as a small or large, bare or leafy, light or dark ... '" (148).
Denominative is always already metaphorical. There is no language of pure naming that does not
betray its own movement. In other words, there is no language other than metaphorical but there
is other of language suspended in it. What remains in language are only the remains of a
shattered belonging.
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work of mourning - that which tethers, keeps close, what it must renounce - of
metaphor and memory, as the (re)collection of the pre-machinal.i'" There is thus
a double bind here that this limit commands. It is the originary structure of all
aporias. And one of its figures that ghostly lingers over de Man's writing,
inflecting, at least in the beginning, the beginning of its every curve, is Hegel -
himself a figure disfigured through the folds ofmisreadings, to use de Man's
terminology, which allow us to read him and read him the only way we can:
improperly.l'"
The organizing metaphor mirroring the structural limit of the mind is the
Hegelian notion ofinteriorization. Under the sway of Alexandre Kojeve, 110 a
Hegelianism not of totality, as mentioned above, of Geist that archives history,
the dispersion of its content, as the phenomenology of self-exposition, "pure self-
identity in otherness," as Hegel writes ("PS," 82), but of separation and tear
(Riss), a certain distress of thought, broke open a poetics of uprootedness and
estrangement. Consciousness stumbles upon the truth of its own contradiction,
108 The machine that tries to remember is also what dismembers without reserve. Wherever there
is machine, there is repetition. And the repetition is compulsive, trying to master the loss by
multiplying it. As Blanchot writes in The Space of Literature, "what is present is not
contemporary; what is present presents nothing, but represents itself and belongs henceforth and
always to return. It isn't but comes back again ... so that my relation to it is not one of cognition,
but of recognition, and this recognition ruins in me the power of knowing, the right to grasp. It
makes what is ungraspable inescapable; it never lets me cease reaching what I cannot attain. And
that which I cannot take, I must take up again, never let go." Maurice BIanchot, The Space of
Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, London: Nebraska UP, 1982), pp. 30-31, emphasis added.
Hereafter cited as TSL. But we shall return to the machinal in language, to hypomnesic memory
attrition, but also to a certain performativity of reading that "must take up again, never let go."
109 For de Man, one can only ever read improperly. Insofar as there is not One reading, there can
only be misreadings. On the structure of reading as misreading cf. chap. below, "Reading Con:
Rhetoric, Allegory and the Machine."
110 Kojeve delivered a series of lectures on Hegel at the Ecole des Hautes-Etudes in Paris from
1933-1939. These lectures, attended by Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan,
Jean-Paul Sartre and others, came to have a lasting influence on the subsequent development of
the French poetics, itself caught in the post-war dialectic between the Sartrean literature of
commitment (litterature engagee) - the reconciliation of politics, of pro-active engagement, with
the world - and literature as a studious bourgeois avoidance of genuine commitment - epitomised
by the Proustian aesthetics and intellectual psychologism.
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upon itself, Jean Hyppolite writes, as "the consciousness of the I that is internally
rent ... This unhappy consciousness is subjectivity, which aspires to the repose of
unity; it is self-consciousness as consciousness of life and of what exceeds life.
But it can only oscillate between these two moments" (qtd. in Waters, "Life and
Works," xxxvi). It is the awareness of this estrangement that inheres in being-
the excess of being in being - and its critical consequences for reading and
writing of literature, its historical stresses, in other words, that the French poetics
articulated in the 1940s. Writing in 1955, de Man will say:
This awareness of a deep separation between man's inner consciousness
and the totality of what is not himself had certainly existed before 1800,
but it becomes predominant around that time ... Man is thrown back
upon himself, in total inwardness, since any existence within the
framework of accepted reality can no longer satisfy him. We know all
this; the characteristics of romanticism are now a part of literary history.
But we do not generally realize that we are still living under the impact
of exactly the same ontological crisis. Never have truly great minds of
romanticism, such as Rousseau, Holderlin, or Hegel, been more familiar
and more directly concerned with our own situation. I I I
"Our situation" then is one at which being is at stake. "Time of dearth" is
our time and we can only reflect upon the moment of eschatological withdrawal.
Thought cannot find refuge from its own predicament that binds it to belatedness
which also puts it in relation to history. There would be nothing to remember
without this originary belatedness that will always leave the moment of acting
precipitous and blind. This moment, in its blind intoxication, is what suspends
III Paul de Man, "The Inward Generation" (1955), in Critical Writings, 1953-1978 (Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 15. Hereafter cited as "IG."
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history, but, at the same time, it is the whole of history, what constitutes its fabric
by tearing it apart. Decision that tears apart is structurally unjustifiable. It is the
moment of totality that is always premature. If it initiates, performatively
interrupts, if it is transformative, it can be justified neither by the logic of what
precedes it nor by what it will have opened up. It is always the instant that
exceeds history, is without temporal thickness, not an instant that can be counted,
outside history, but that makes history. This is the revolutionary instant that
contracts time: blind, premature, unjustifiable, sovereign, and, hence, inherently
violent. At issue here is the impossibility of grounding any decision true to its
name - in a sense, thus always illegitimate, without ground or foundation - in a
truth that would call for its necessity. Quoting Norris here on this terrifying
revolutionary instant - exceptional, but an instant in every decision -
commenting on de Man's essay "Wordsworth and Holderlin" in The Rhetoric of
Romanticism, will help pivot the issue:
it [the instant of instituting decision] leaps toward a kind of premature
transcendence that would raise political action to the level of revealed
truth. And in so doing ... ignore the constraints placed upon human
knowledge by the limiting conditions of time, mortality, and chance-
by the fact that there exists no ultimate, validating truth that could save
such actions from their own utterly contingent historical nature. (The
Critique, 6)
Political impatience here, for de Man, is a vector of discharge for
diseased being. In his early writing, politics provides a flight from the originary
anxiety by organizing a studious overcoding, which is to say forgetting, of what
constitutes authentic awareness of privation - of our inability to identify with the
111
totality of what is. Indeed, in "The Inward Generation," de Man writes ofa
certain "resistance" to poetics of inwardness that has tended to "decry it as
pathological or morbid development," but, he continues, has "more often,
suggested concrete systems of organization as substitutes. These systems,
whether political, literary, or philosophical, are mainly characterized by the
studious avoidance, under a variety of pretexts, of the ontological question" (15,
emphasis added). "Resistance" itself here may be pathological insofar as it
produces supplementary symbolic structures (political and narratological) in
order to displace the originary lack that motivates them - the lack that is the
disaffection of being at the origin. It is indicative, de Man will say, of "a
temptation that exists in all of us: a desire for serenity," in other words, for
narcissus of auto-affection or self-proximity of being. Further down, he
continues:
This being the case [the studious forgetting of the ontological], we must
realize that this difficulty prevents us from dealing with the entire realm
of problems that result from this awareness of separation, and this
includes most matters of contemporary history, literature, and, to a large
extent, ethics and theology. When systems claim their ability to solve
such problems, they are in fact appealing to a temptation that exists in
all of us: a desire for serenity that tries to forget and to repress the
original anxiety. We must remember that the inwardness of our age has
its origin in what Hegel called the unhappy consciousness. ("IG," 15)
But what constitutes being, what is proper to it, is its dislocation, its rift
(Riss) - that which makes it improper - rather than a repose of unity. This is
what makes it historical: the impossibility of auto-affection. But, therefore, also
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an insatiable desire for it(self). Desire thus without respite, always discontent:
"We must remember that the inwardness of our age has its origin in what Hegel
called the unhappy consciousness." For de Man, authentic criticism that is truly
historical begins here, "facing the issues in which our being is at stake" (15). It
begins with the awareness of our impropriety; it begins with what lacerates.I'''
Riss is the instant ofinteriorization, of will to power, but also of
severance that leaves consciousness sunk in solitude. Nothing is ever present for
consciousness that can only mourn in that silence upon which the outside,
everything, is proffered. We are never in the depth of things, always in their
dispossession. This is both the ecstasy of the executioner and his infinite misery.
It is what liberates us to the light of day while condemning us to the night of
solitude in the midst of day. The cognitive act severs the sinews that would
compel conviction. Its object remains fundamentally separated, shrouded in the
still gloom of secrecy, which to manifest is to annihilate. Bataille writing on the
annulment: "Nature giving birth to man was a dying mother: she gave 'being' to
the one whose coming into the world was her own death sentence" (IE, 78).
Consciousness breaks off all contemporaneity. It opens the spectacle of
emptiness, of repetitions, erasures, distances and speeds that leaves being
uncertain of its belonging. "Being is in the world so uncertain," Bataille writes,
that I can project it where I wish - outside of me. It is a sort of inept
man - who did not know how to unravel the essential plot - who limited
being to the self. In actual fact, being is exactly nowhere and it was a
112 But this, however - and de Man does not see it yet - is precisely what destines us to politics
that is nothing other - and nothing less - than improper, forever uncertain of its ground, its site
that is one in which what is to be done can never be justified. Without this impossibility, there
would be neither politics nor (the unfulfilled) being of politics.
113
game to grasp it as divine at the summit of the pyramid of individual
beings. [Being is 'ungraspable '. It is only 'grasped' in error; the error
is not just easy - in this case, it is the condition of thought.} Being is
nowhere. (IE, 82)
Being is only ever "grasped in error." There is thus a certain irreducible
error or thoughtlessness that commands thought. It is its very "condition." To
grasp what will have always reserved itself and to grasp only its reserve that
gives itself in specters and phantasms is not the error. The error is to forget this
difference to which the supplement bears witness. Nowhere is where there is
being ("Being is nowhere."). It is there where we do not enter, where we do not
know. We only know its name. It is not One. It is incalculable, "ungraspable."
There can be only two. This being-two, its plurality and dispersion, is where we
grasp and account but is what remains, at the same time, inadmissible to reason.
Supplementarity that uproots, destines One to dispersal of its shatters and yet
introduces it in the midst of its shatters, its phantasm at least, or its fetish. But
there is no being apart form its shatters that name it. Name is its being - which is
to say, being is its being-plural, its uninterrupted alterity. There is only name.
Nothing trails behind. It is without remainder. Insofar as we live, we dwell
without being, not even in its shadow but in its absolute absence. But this
absence, however, is never absolute precisely because it introduces the pathos of
solitude and mourning that poetry comes to trace. The authentic that imposture
thus isolates, makes more apparent, by losing sight of it. Pathos will have
resurrected being. The relief of presence is sketched by precisely the pressure of
its erasure.
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In Hegelian terms, negativity, in negation, only ever draws the figure of
life. It is the very "path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to
true knowledge," Hegel writes. The itinerary of "the Soul which journeys
through the series of its own configurations as though they were the stations
appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the
Spirit, and achieve finally, thorough a completed experience of itself, the
awareness of what it really is in itself ("PS," 91). Negativity, even when it
implies the possibility of loss, is never absolute effraction. The other is only the
existential playground of identity, of its Odyssean departures: "what is in fact the
realization of the Notion, counts for it rather as the loss of its own self; for it does
lose its truth on this path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of
doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair" ("PS," 91). But never of radical
uprooting, "unhappiness" is never total but only an eleatic reserve, as it were.))3
A hypomnesic reserve where knowledge will have lost itself in order to find
itself: "But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial
progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself,
113 Kojeve, whose reading of Hegel spotlights the master/slave dialectic of recognition as the
cipher of historical progress, comments on the power of the negative: "'To overcome
dialectically' means to overcome while preserving what is overcome ... The dialectically-
overcome entity is annulled in its contingent (stripped of sense, 'senseless') aspect of natural,
given (,immediate') entity, but is preserved in its essential (and meaningful, significant) aspect;
thus mediated by negation, it is sublimated or raised up to a more 'comprehensive' and
comprehensible mode of being than that of its immediate reality of pure and simple, positive and
static given, which is not the result of creative action (i.e., of action that negates the given)."
Alexandre Kojeve, "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel," Excerpt in Deconstruction in Context:
Literature and Philosophy (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986), p. 108. In Inner
Experience, Bataille will recognize Kojeve's reading of Hegel as "the decisive moment in the
history of the consciousness of self and, it must be said, to the extent that we have to distinguish
between each thing that affects us, no one knows anything of himselJifhe has not understood this
movement which determines and limits man's successive possibilities" (lE, 109). The dialectic
movement is one of labour: "it is indeed the originally dependent, serving, and slavish
Consciousness that in the end realizes and reveals the ideal of autonomous Self-Consciousness
and is thus its 'truth, '" writes Kojeve (120).
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where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to
Notion ... and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the
way" ("PS," 92-93). Knowledge only ever borrows outside itself, supplements
itself on credit by adventuring or writing itself. But it has never left itself.
Bataille, referring to Kojeve's translation of the Phenomenology of the Mind, the
principal text studied at the time, reinforces this negative that is never gratuitous,
that never ruins absolutely:
A passage from the preface to the Phenomenology of the Mind
forcefully expresses the necessity of such an attitude. No doubt that this
admirable text, from the initial contact, is of "capital importance," not
only for understanding Hegel, but in every sense: "Death, as we may
call that unreality, is the most terrible thing, and to keep and hold fast
what is dead [that is to say, precisely the work of mourning] demands
the greatest force of all. Beauty, powerless, helpless, hates
understanding, because the latter exacts from it what it cannot perform.
But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of
destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only
wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly tom asunder. It is this mighty
power, not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as
when we say of anything it is nothing or it is false, and being then done
with it, pass off to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power
only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This
dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into
being."!"
114 Qtd. in a footnote to "General Economy," pp. 435-36. Derrida further indicates the intricacy of
establishing the origin of the translation Bataille is reproducing here.
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De Man's essay "Montaigne and Transcendence," published in Bataille's
journal Critique,115 in the passage already quoted, mirrors the error that
conditions every cognitive act: "In every act of knowledge there is a profound
flaw that leads to an insoluble dilemma: its object can be known only at the price
of the existence of the knowing agent" ("MT," 6). But also the sacrificial nature
of understanding that "wins to its truth only when it finds itself utterly tom
asunder:" "But the lucid mind can know its own subjectivity, precisely at the
point where subjectivity destroys its functioning" (7). Sacrifice expects a return,
a deferred interest that it counts on. It has never left the economy but is its very
ruse. What is offered at stake is never at stake, never burns without remainder. It
is never absolutely expended. This is where the negative absolute is denied its
absoluteness. Prohibited to take off across the threshold onto nothingness of pure
loss or pure excess that is no longer accountable, the negative, "thanks to an
amazing change of sign," de Man writes, "is asserted ... as a positive force; just
when the mind falls into the despair of its impotence, it regains all its elasticity in
perceiving this very impotence" ("MT," 7). And from the negative with the
absolute as its ultimate horizon, to invoke Mallarme, "out of it cradles (he virgin
sign" (A Throw of the Dice, 134) and, at the very limit of being, incompletes it:
115 In 1946 Bataille founded an influential journal Critique in Paris and emerged as a counter
presence to Sartrean litterature engagee. As the editor-in-chief, he was the first to publish early
writings by Barthes, Blanchot, Derrida and Foucault. De Man came to be associated with
Critique and its eminent following through his own short-lived, post-war publishing partnership
Editions Hermes. His arrival in the US 1948 was prompted by an aspiring attempt to introduce
the new intellectual scene of French contemporary writing (he managed to place Bataille's "On
Hiroshima" in a special issue of Politics) and, as he writes in a letter from 1951 to Harry Levin at
Harvard, "to evolve a critical language that would fuse recent European with the American
vocabulary" (qtd. in Waters, Notes to "Life and Works," lxv).
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IT WAS
born of the stars
THE NUMBER
WERE IT TO EXIST
other than as a scattered dying hallucination
WERE IT TO BEGIN AND WERE IT TO CEASE
springing up as denied and closed off when made manifest
at last
through some thinly diffused emanation
WERE IT TO BE NUMBERED
evidence of a totality however meager (140)
As the spectral presence of "the virgin sign" (l' etant) is "born of the
stars," cradled from the night as the abyss of presence (etant) - the abyss that
consciousness stirs up as presence "denied and closed off when made manifest" -
difference is introduced, "an impenetrable screen between object and mind ...
[and the] mind will be exercised on the level of this very screen and will find in
the acknowledgment of its failure its only positive function" (de Man, "MT," 7).
The "screen" is the moment of slippage that diffuses the object. The same that
"at last / through some thinly diffused emanation," takes place in its own
dispersal, in being-plural that begins to count. The radicality of its otherness is
dissolved in iterability - death here, one could say, disidiomatizes - but presence
lives only by this dissolution. Its heart beats only by what stops it.
De Man's early writing repeats this instant of evacuation that wipes any
arrival blank, keeping the place "where knowledge finds itself, where Notion
corresponds to object and object to Notion," forever lacking. It is the second
reading of Hegel, one of "irreducible difference," one that will have always
disabled the first, that the French poetics has tried to articulate since the 1930s.
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The specific trajectory of de Man's beginnings intersects it and quickens its
execution. In "Modem Poetics in France and Germany," de Man writes of this
particular concern:
French literary theory has more and more felt the need for an ontology
of the poetic as preliminary to a study on such a highly integrated level
as that of style. The writer who has perhaps gone furthest in the
formulation of such an ontology is Maurice Blanchot ... Blanchot shows
how the works of poets gravitate around the ontological question, how
they try and fail always again to define human existence by means of
poetic language. (156)
For Blanchot, poetic language is where being is at stake; it is the memory
of its burning up. "His writings," de Man continues, "are unsystematic and
highly subjective, but if the necessity for a fundamental questioning of the poetic
act is granted, it is bound to begin as a tentative, difficult exploration, and not as
a self-assured doctrine" (156). If literature truly begins, as Blanchot writes, "at
the moment when literature becomes a question" ("Literature and Death," 323),
the moment of absolute exposure to its own condition of possibility.!" then there
can be no guarantees. No "self-assured" path, no itinerary can be given there
where being is at risk - nothing would be risked otherwise. It is precisely the
double genitive, the pirouetting from right to left of the "fundamental questioning
of the poetic act," that tethers - but also ultimately separates, as we shall see -
Blanchot and de Man.
116 Blanchot defines precisely this moment of exposure as literature itself: "When Mallarme asks
himself, 'Does something like Literature exist?,' this question is literature itself. It is literature
when literature has become concern for its own essence. Such a question cannot be relegated.
What is the result of the fact that we have literature? What is implied about being if one states
that 'something like Literature exists'?" (TSL, 42-43).
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On the Second Slope: Blanchot and de Man
Language is possible because it strives for the
impossible.
- Maurice Blanchot, The Work of Fire
The movement of irrealisation is intrinsic to the movement of the hand plying the
surface, writing, repeating, that writes more in order to suture the blanks it
continuously opens up. The blanks here hold the work, hold everything that is
realized in precisely its emptying out. "The work disappears," Blanchot says,
"but the fact of disappearing remains and appears as the essential thing, the
movement which allows the work to be realized as it enters the stream of history,
to be realized as it disappears" ("Literature and Death," 307-08). The movement
of losses and surpassing where everything recoils in dissipation that is the force
of its gathering (Aufhebung). Losses are essential because they save the words.
Ruins of negation to which the words testify, the night which surroundsthem, the
very curve of writing that drives being off its course, are never gratuitous.
Catastrophe is only a measure of possibility, the very force of creation. And the
writer, Blanchot continues, "the individual who writes - a force of creative
negation - seems to join with the work in motion through which this force of
negation and surpassing asserts itself' (308). The dialectic stroke introduced here
shadows and organizes the entire arborescence of Blanchot's thought ("For me to
be able to say, 'This woman,' I must somehow take her flesh-and-blood reality
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away from her, cause her to be absent, annihilate her. The word gives me the
being, but it gives it to me deprived of being." 322), but, whereas Hegel begins
from annihilation that is consummated in apprehension, the very work of
autoscopy of subjectivity, Blanchot's writing is magnetized towards the
maddening of annihilation, its doubling that fissures the system. Literature, for
Blanchot, sustains the absence. It is its very agent that does not enter the work
(desoeuvremenq. Negation is never sublated but kept suspended as a debt that
remains unamortized. Negativity is redoubled as it is not only presence that is
abolished in the word but the power of its referentiality. Tracing "the play of
speech" in Mallarme: "the word has meaning only if it rids us of the object it
names; it must spare us its presence or 'concrete reminder.' In authentic
language, speech has a function that is not only representative but also
destructive. It causes to vanish, it renders the object absent, it annihilates it"
("Myth of Mallarme," 30).117 Death, however, is not outdone in literature, but
117 Authentic language that for Blanchot is literature, because literature saves language. This may
demand closer consideration. In Mallarme, there is a double condition of the word: the essential
and the crude (Cf. Blanchot's TSL, chap. 2, "Approaching Literature's Space," pp. 35-49). The
crude word is the slave of understanding, it vanishes in "the idea it communicates, in the action it
announces." It is the neglect of language. The pressure of its utility makes language recede: "In
crude or immediate speech, language as language is silent," Blanchot writes (TSL, 40, emphasis
added). The more language represents, the more it communicates, that is, the more it is de-
presented. It gives itself only to withdraw in clarity. The essential word or authentic language,
however, is where words take initiative. This is where meaning is ruined in order to make words
appear for the first time - this is why poetry is necessarily difficult, because it makes us repeat
and preserve the words. What authentic language, literature, says is only that language is, and that
alone. What it unveils is the persistence of the veil. It brings to light precisely what understanding
bums. Unforgets that which in understanding is consigned to forgetfulness. It reveals obscurity
itself, one could say (if it were not of the essence of obscurity to remain precisely impenetrable),
makes it "present" and brings to light what light shuns: darkness itself. If crude language has "the
force by which mediation (that which destroys immediacy) seems to have the spontaneity, the
freshness, and the innocence of the origin" (TSL, 41), the authentic language no longer betrays,
but precisely by being openly deceptive. It is the very coming to language of language. In it,
language is no longer silent, but roars, cries out, contorts, asserts its weight, its thickness. Poetry
becomes an unforgetting of itself. Literature then is authentic because it is also, and essentially,
the abolition of presence that it sustains in dissimulation it does not hide. This is why Blanchot
will say that ambiguity is the essence of literature: "Literature is language turning into ambiguity"
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rather unreservedly exposed in the discretion of its speech. Death, in Blanchot, is
no longer a power, an accomplice of positivity, but precisely an impotence that
reverses us radically towards what precedes it: being.IIB Death becomes a
passage that no longer turns us away from what apprehension ruins but towards
ruins before they become the vestiges of historical progress. It turns us towards
the impossible encounter with the terrifying wholeness that runs underneath the
shatters of words. 119 It is death stalled that opens back onto the immoderate that
poetry traces by losing its sense in it. Poetry as the measure (rhythmos) of the
("Literature and Death," 341). If "ordinal)' language limits equivocation" (341), literature
decidedly does not: "It is as though in the vel)' heart of literature and language, beyond the visible
movements that transform them, a point of instability were reserved ... " (343). What is important
is that authentic language or literature, for Blanchot, unforgets the destruction that is essential to
language by doubling it in the ambiguity of the referent, which makes literature unworkable. Cf.
also Valery's essay, "Remarks on Poetry," where verse sides with the vanity of dancing that is
unproductive (as in Blanchot's unwork or desoeuvrei, for further resonances of the same
problematic inherited from Mallarme, Paul Valery, "Remarks on Poetry," in Literature in the
Modern World: Critical Essays and Documents, ed. Dennis Walder (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004),
fR. 154-58.
Although the moments of dialectical rupture perforate Blanchot's writings along the middle to
better tether what de Man calls their unsystematicity, on death as reversal, "death purified of
dying" (154), that turns us toward the Open ("The Open is the poem. The space where everything
returns to deep being ... " 142), cf. chap. 4, "The Work and Death's Space," in TSL, pp. 85-161.
119 In a passage from Allegories, discussing Rousseau's Julie ou la Nouvelle Heloise, de Man
identifies a similar encounter here, but an encounter that is never transparent: "In the very
passage in which Julie speaks of an encounter with God [an encounter that would abolish all
mediation], the encounter is not described as a transparency but by means ofa metaphor, the
curiously unreadable metaphor of reading which one never seems to want to read (192,
emphasis added). In Julie, this is literally the case, as de Man indicates. The metaphor of reading
is used for a communication that no longer communicates difference in the same: "it is 'an
unmediated communication, similar [analogy that is, constitutive of metaphor] to the one by
which God reads our thoughts already in this life, and by which we will, in tum, read his
thoughts in the afterlife, since we will see him face to face'" (192). Reading, however, is
precisely always allegorical insofar as it is always reading otherwise. It introduces the fold that
preserves the alterity of the text. If poetry then reads what precedes it, what escapes the
rhetoricity of the text - its formal structure of representation - and this is what Blanchot
implicitly desires, according to de Man as we shall see, then it inevitably repeats only difference
or non-identity. Presence, if there is one will always have remained unreadable and poetry, like
all literature, is only an allegory of this unreadability. Blanchot's reading then does not escape
the differential structure that conditions it. As a reading, no matter how blank and transparent - a
reading that, he says, "does not produce anything, does not add anything ... [but] lets be what is"
(TSL, 194) - as a reading, it is only ever a trace in the general structure of differance. In other
words, it is always an other reading that affirms the impossibility of reading other.
122
measureless, as that which indexes a foreignness and an elsewhere.V" Blanchot
writes:
To read the word death without negation is to withdraw from it the
cutting edge of decision and the power to negate; it is to cut oneself off
from possibility and the true... It is to surrender to the indistinct and the
undetermined, to the emptiness anterior to events, where the end has all
the heaviness of starting over. This experience is the experience of art.
Art - as images, as words, and as rhythm - indicates the menacing
proximity of a vague and vacant outside, a neutral existence, nil and
limitless; art points into a sordid absence, a suffocating condensation
where being ceaselessly perpetuates itself as nothingness. Art is
originally linked to this fund of impotence where everything falls back
when the possible is attenuated. (TSL, 242-43)
Poetry commands the ruins upon which language rests - and it does so by
ruining itself, by becoming mangled, inarticulate, surrendering "to the indistinct
and the undetermined." Its language borders an outside that is absolutely without
measure, indeterminate ("the menacing proximity of a vague and vacant outside,
a neutral existence, nil and limitless") and it is a violent advance on the borders,
an advance at their disastrous obliteration. Poetry traces the line along the
Riemann surface that is non-orientable.V' that blows the inside/outside open on
all sides. It is Hegel turned back on himself. As it slides from the grasp towards
its other, "this fund of impotence" that empties it in one blow, poetic language
binds a double motion: it asserts what assertion annihilates - this is its work, the
120 Indeed, as we shall see, rhythm, meter, thickness and texture of words, everything that in
language indicates an intrusion of time, its rhythmos or measure of distance and spacing, is
precisely what, for Bianchot, hides proximity. The "silent existence," without rhythm or
articulation, the impossible, is most approachable where sense is workless.
121 "To write: to trace a circle in the interior of which would come to be inscribed the outside of
every circle" (79). Cf. Maurice Blanchot, "Interruption (as on a Riemann surface)," in The
Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993), pp. 75-80.
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tireless digging of the negative - but it is also a motion that interrupts its forward
thrust by sinking back into the hollowness that withholds the intimacy of
everything but where nothing is done, "where the end has all the heaviness of
starting over" (TSL, 242). The motion that poetry, or literature, commands is thus
essentially ambiguous. It measures the space towards which it is open at the limit
that puts in contact precisely what it separates. Limit of language is the face of
poetry. Its limit, where there is silence, is not a limit but an exposure. Perfection
begins here. It begins where there can only be a question - one could say then, an
imperfection. For Blanchot, the negative is not a force or a power, but an
affirmation of utmost impotence that withdraws "the cutting edge of decision"
(TSL, 242). It is not the work that negates what in negation finds its utmost
possibility but precisely the unworking (desoeuvrementy that testifies to the
perfection where nothing comes to pass. There is no wound in perfection and
therefore no call, which is precisely the infinite call of perfection - this infinite
call is the condition of our perfectibility. It is where language breaks against the
monotony of boundless emptiness. Poetry is set adrift towards this incapacity that
is immobilizing but fundamental, where everything is and where nothing is to be
done (relevey. Poetry, for Blanchot, is a retention that tries to circumvent the
recesses of its memory; it no longer remembers what it retains but takes
possession of it. 122 It wants to close the interval, a diastem that allows us to
remember, to exhaust finitude. "In the poem," Blanchot says,
122 Remembrance is always indicative of a temporal disjunction and difference. It cleaves the
subject and re-marks a separation. It does not recuperate anything but rather exposes the
irrecoverable interval, a dis-membering without which it would not re-member. Insofar as
remembrance recalls nothing apart from the interval that both makes it possible and destroys the
possibility of a total recall, for de Man, it would always be a question of allegorical difference
rather than anamnesic or symbolic recuperation. "In the world of the symbol," he writes, "it
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language is never real at any of the moments through which it passes,
for in the poem language is affirmed in its totality. Yet in this totality,
where it constitutes its own essence and where it is essential, it is also
supremely unreal. It is the total realization ofthis unreality, an absolute
fiction which says "being" when, having "worn away," "used up" all
existing things, having suspended all possible things, it comes up
against an indelible, irreducible residue. What is left? "Those very
words, it is." (TSL, 45)
Discussing Mallarme here, Blanchot organizes the reversed pull of poetic
expression that is also its attack on language to rid it of history, to empty it, use
up all its figures, to literally dis-figure it, stripping away with it, however, the
very spectrality of language in which being is announced (as unannounceable),
Being only survives shattered and only through its shatters is it announced in
time. History is both the torture of being and its exposure, that is, its origin.123 It
would be possible for the image to coincide with the substance, since the substance and its
representation do not differ ... Their relationship is one of simultaneity ... whereas, in the world of
allegory, time is the originary, constitutive category ... Whereas the symbol postulates the
possibility of identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own
origin ... it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference" (207). Paul de Man,
"The Rhetoric of Temporality," in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary
Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), pp. 187-229. Re-membrance or re-collection (that can only
begin at the limit of language - this is where, for Blanchot, poetry begins) that the poetic
language tries to establish can indeed only be constituted "in the void of this temporal difference"
that dis-members it. Temporality then, history, is the destiny of poetry for de Man, rather than, in
Blanchot's words, that "anterior region" where "the world recedes and goals cease; [where] the
world falls silent; beings with their preoccupations, their projects, their activity are no longer
ultimately what speaks" (TSL, 41). The poetic act itself testifies, on the contrary, precisely to the
dismembering of this project. It is, as de Man says in his early essay, "the quintessential
historical act: that through which we become conscious of the divided character of our being ... "
Paul de Man, "The Temptation of Permanence" (1955), in Critical Writings, 1953-1978
(Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 33, emphasis added. Hereafter cited as "Temptation."
Poetry, then, is itself the agent of fracture in the transcendence it seeks.
123 For Heidegger, this is clear. Being is radically historical. Sein is its Da ("The essence of
Dasein lies in its existence." Being and Time, 67). It is only in its finitude and as original finitude.
It is finitude that gives us Being in its dissimulation. It is then Time that opens Being, one could
say, not the other way around. The figure, then -for de Man, always the breaking open of
temporality - would not be its provisional necessity, as it is for Hegel, but precisely the very
mode of its phenomenality. Being begins as Being-other, destined only to erring (irren) - not just
errance but also in the sense of cunning and deception, destined, in other words, to rhetoric.
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is in history that being loses itself by finding its face. The face of being, its
words, is what mourns its loss, which gives language a quality of onto-
theological pathos that grows deeper the more one tries to exorcise it. One uses
words to get rid of words. It is in defacement of language then, "when all words
cease," that "one comes up against an indelible, irreducible residue ... 'Those
very words, it is. '" Blanchot continues: "Those words sustain all others by letting
themselves be hidden by all the others, and hidden thus, they are the presence of
all words, language's entire possibility held in reserve. But when all words
cease ... 'those very words, it is,' present themselves, 'lightening moment,'
'dazzling burst of light. '" (45). This, for Blanchot, is the light of poetic language.
"A dazzling burst of light," that can only find expression in the midst of night,
opacity and defacement, in the sterility of a blank page where the iridescence of
the scattered suns on the surface starts retracting towards the source. Where its
language becomes a "simultaneous vision" in which the light is no longer
refracted through the diastem of memory that words carry but where words
become precisely the carriers of light in "its total presence" with nothing to
intervene, no time to split the instant: "This lightening moment flashes from the
work as the leaping brilliance of the work itself - its total presence all at once, its
'simultaneous vision' (TSL, 245). For later de Man, simultaneity here would have
the force of a tropic ruse, a metaphor that literalizes the referent and, effacing its
own figurative structure, disfigures itself. Simultaneity would thus not escape
but, being a figure, only repeat the delay constitutive of its rhetorical structure.
There are no words of immediacy that escape the delay by which they are
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given.124 "Poetry becomes the putting into language of the failure of the true to
found itself," writes de Man ("Process and Poetry," 66). It is thus not founding
but precisely what repeats the impossibility of foundation. Poetic language, for
de Man, enacts the scattering of its own recollection in advance. Itwidens and
incompletes the circle, the more it contracts it. It plies and creases the surface in
order to preserve it intact. Magnetized towards the infinite, poetry inscribes only
the failure of its own movement, in advance. "And since the process of
becoming," de Man continues, "is what constitutes the very experience of this
failure, poetry appears as the logos of this becoming." (66-67). Poetry is thus the
very articulation of finitude, not its reversed itinerary that Blanchot's writing
faithfully traces. 125 Rather than carrying itself outside itself towards the
inarticulate, the space that would close it but that recedes before the lines that
trace it, it articulates only its erasure, zeroing it out in inscription. What was
blank and never treated is now blanked further by writing called for by the lack it
124 This delay is essential, and essentially ethical, as de Man will say of allegory (cf. below, note
230), insofar as it conditions the discursive production of society, that is also the contestability of
what is to be done. It is what raises the question of the just. And maintaining this question is what
constitutes the political, its very politicity. Words always remain contestable precisely because of
this delay that uproots any referential certainty or positivism - what would erase the question -
and puts it to the test. It also gives perfectibility a chance, the to-come that for Derrida is
constitutive of democracy as a militant self-contestation. For there to be ethical demand, there
will have always been a delay and a disjuncture. We shall return to these all too important
questions of allegory, rhetoric and the political that, in fact, shadow all de Man's writing in the
following chapters.
125 On desoeuvrement, Blanchot writes: "Thus it seems that the point to which the work leads us
is not only the one where the work is achieved in the apotheosis of its disappearance - where it
announces the beginning, declaring being in the freedom that excludes it - but also the point to
which the work can never lead us, because this point is always already the one starting from
which there never is any work" (TSL, 46). It is this second point that, in "Literature and Death,"
becomes "the slope of literature" where all "poets come together." "Why? Because they are
interested in the reality of language, because they are not interested in the world, but in what
things and beings would be if there were no world; because they devote themselves to literature
as to an impersonal power that only wants to be engulfed and submerged. If this is what poetry is
like, at least we will know why it must be withdrawn from history ... " (333). The work, for
Blanchot, has to lose itself in order to enter the intimacy of its reserve. Possibility must be
"attenuated, the notions of value and utility effaced, and the world [must] 'dissolve" (TSL, 47).
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supplements. What poetry articulates is not-being or being-two, the impossibility
of being first or being one without the other. It is the very figure (temporization)
of temporality: "As such, far from being ... an eternalizing power, poetry is the
constant negation of the eternal. But it is a negation that transforms the eternal
aspect of what is immediately given into an intention, and it does so to the
precise extent that it recognizes the necessity of naming the eternal by means of
an entity -language ... " ("Process and Poetry," 67). It is language that splits the
eternal that precedes it and makes what precedes an exiled effect of language
rather than its origin. The infinite, what precedes time or completes it - arche
and telos being the same in the circular economy - is an after-effect of time that
draws out or measures a distance and a deviation of the present in relation to
itself. What precedes is itself a seductive figure - a metaphor that allows for the
possibility of identity and a repose for the mind - and as such precisely an
instance of what it states - and in that it states - to have escaped. The infinite has
always been a moment in time - in other words, the infinite has no place outside
finitude (this is "the paradox of human existence [Dasein]," de Man writes, "a
desire for eternity but which can take shape only in the finitude of the
moment ... " "Process and Poetry," 66). What precedes language then, what is its
outside, silence, has never been elsewhere but inside. Language never ends in
anything but more language. And it introduces the diastem that opens the
maddening of desire to reduce it by fetishistic supplementation or repetition that
is always a repletion and a depletion at the same time because it evacuates what
it names.126 Negation then, de Man says, "transforms the eternal aspect of what is
126 In Allegories, de Man comments on the same structure of desire organised precisely around
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immediately given into an intention," a striving.127 It is what vectors the poetic
act but remains permanently suspended, a horizon that retreats for each repeated
word. Irrealisation of presence in its repetition that temporizes, defers it from
itself, is intrinsic to the process of becoming. History thus begins precisely with
the loss of its own truth that opens it to the negatively magnetized drift towards it
and it is the poetic act that registers this opening. Opening that is also a
dismemberment of Being, what would be its being-n - 1 that calls for an
overload of plurality. Poetry then, rather than being a redemptive power, what
silently stages the drama of Blanchot's writing, becomes, for de Man, precisely
the agent of dismembering. It is "the quintessential historical act: that through
which we become conscious of the divided character of our being, and
consequently, of the necessity of fulfilling it, of accomplishing it in time, instead
of undergoing it in eternity" ("Temptation," 33). Permanence, being the striving,
the interval that denies full possession of its object: " ... the coincidence of an entity with its own
present, requires the vocabulary of an inwardness detached from anything that is other or
elsewhere, containing nothing desirable that is not already possessed. It evokes afulfillment no
longer associated with desire, since desire is organized around the moment that separates
possession from its opposite" (215, emphasis added). In other words, the movement of desire is
the movement of ex-appropriation. It is sustained by a dispossession of the object that forbids
precisely what it makes possible: fulfillment - that is to say, narrative closure.
127 In another early essay, collected, however, in Blindness and Insight due to its critical method,
de Man, engaged in the polemic with Heidegger, identifies the same striving in Holderlin: "If one
could say it [Being], it would be founded because the word has durability and founds the moment
in a spatial presence where one could dwell. [But] that is the supreme goal, the ultimate desire
[emphasis added] of the poet, which is why Holderlin adopts the tone of prayer: 'Und was ich
sah, das Heilige sei mein Wort [And what I saw, the Holy be my Word].' He does not say: 'das
Heilige ist mein Wort [the Holy is my Word].' The subjunctive is here really an optative; it
indicates prayer, it marks desire, and these lines state the eternal poetic intention [emphasis
added], but immediately state also that it can be no more than intention. It is not because he has
seen Being that the poet is, therefore, capable of naming it; his word prays for the parousia
[Being self-present], it does not establish it" ("Heidegger's Exegeses," 258). De Man's exposure
here, contrary to Heidegger, of the inability of language to state presence is precisely what
constitutes the ever receding horizon of poetic vision, its striving. This inability that is at the same
time a capability, as it supplies (also supplements) the receding vision, is given in explicit
Hegelian terms. He continues: "It cannot establish it for as soon as the word is uttered, it destroys
the immediate and discovers that instead of stating Being, it can only state mediation. For man
the presence of Being is always in becoming and Being necessarily appears under a non-simple
form" (259).
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is impermanence, the very restlessness of the poetic act whose reach (meter) is
always too short but drawn out all the more in its absolute exposure. Its truth is
not "the depth of being's inertia" (Blanchot, TSL, 46), but precisely its drawing
out in rhythmos. In "The Inward Generation" (1955), de Man writes:
Poetry is concerned with the rediscovery of whatever makes its
existence possible, and it tends to look to the past to reassure itself that
there have been times in which it could be. What it keeps and shelters,
however, is not the immediate, the stable or the primitive. Instead of
seeking protection from painful consciousness, it tries to expose itself
completely to a total awareness that can only be the result of the most
intense mental concentration. It thinks of truth not as stability and rest
but as a balance of extreme tensions that, like a drawn bow, achieves
immobility when it is bent to the point of breaking. It needs all the
consciousness it can find and shuns whatever tries to dim the vision it
has left. ("IG," 17)
Truth that is a "balance of extreme tensions" can go either way. It is thus
always a presentiment of error that it anticipates. Far from being stable in its
immobility, far from being "a region anterior to the beginning where nothing is
made of being, and in which nothing is accomplished" (Blanchot, TSL, 46), it
achieves the moment of stability precisely when most unstable, when it is
outspent, when "bent to the point of breaking." Poetry binds the truth only by the
repetition of its failure. It is a "struggle through and through," de Man says, "and
forever" ("Temptation," 36).
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What de Man identifies in Blanchot then is the redemptive possibility or a
certain messianicity of the poetic actl28 that ultimately contracts it to an
affirmation, which for de Man is always a disaffirmation. "This view," he writes,
"remains historical in appearance, since it situates poetry with respect to a
certain temporal destiny of being. But this temporal movement is always one of
error and forgetting, whereas poetry, inasmuch as it is a recollection [a re-
membering] of original being, remains superior to it" ("Process and Poetry," 64,
emphasis added). History, in other words, as the movement "of error and
forgetting," that is also precisely the movement and exigency of reading, of
submitting truth to its essential flight that is its unreadability, has no hold on
poetry because it adulterates it. Indeed, de Man continues: "Here, the historical
destiny of the created object that poetry becomes, and which generations of
readers will use for various purposes, has therefore strictly speaking nothing in
common with the poetic act itself. In this history, says Maurice Blanchot,
'neither the work of art, nor the reading is present" (64). For Blanchot then,
reading is the essential reading, a reading that no longer "makes" anything ("The
word make here does not designate a productive activity." TSL, 194), that no
longer reads but listens to what reading delivers us from. A blank reading that
does not produce anything, does not add anything. It lets be what is. It is
freedom: not the freedom that produces being or grasps it, but freedom
that welcomes, consents, says yes, can only say yes, and, in the space
128 Writing on/with Kafka, Blanchot says: "One believes in a beyond of words, a beyond of
failure, in an impossibility that might be more than an impossibility, and thus restore hope to us."
Maurice Blanchot, "Kafka and Literature," in The Work of Fire (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP,
1995), pp. 23-24.
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opened by this yes, lets the work's overwhelming decisiveness affirm
itself, lets be its affirmation that it is - and nothing more. (TSL, 194)
To read the unsung, what the ink sullies ("I want to read what is,
however, not written." TSL, 195) is the anonymous reading, an essential
translation. Its discovery is complete self-effacement because it no longer
narrates the flight of meaning ("does not produce anything, does not add
anything"), which is to say that it no longer narrates. This reading itself becomes
the silence whose reverberation no listening has ever heard, the stillness of being
no gaze has ever possessed, for all of its reflection is present only in the mirror of
its echoes. It escapes the ravages of history that every reading not only testifies to
but conspires with. What gives us to read can do so only on the condition of its
own unreadability. This is what makes its history readable, one that is always of
error and infinite drift. Only if there is this other that is radically unreadable can
there be narrative, which is to say, only if there is differance can there be reading,
and a reading that is never satisfied, for the reader never reaches the bottom that
would justify it - or rather exonerate it for losing its way - but precisely the
bottomless that can never warrant its status.129 The (im)possibility of the 'other
assures the possibility of narrative that makes the face of the other possible
(readable) only as what will have remained impossible. Reading then is radically
historical; rather than being a reflection of its own transparency, it never loses its
129 Unreadability here, a theme we shall return to, that is the condition of the possibility of
narrative, is also what prevents narrative closure, what makes every reading an allegory of its
own misreading, but also that which preserves the aiterity of every reading. What makes reading
singular - and what is, at the same time, the demand and exigency of its respect - is its failure of
totalisation. It is always a question of allegorization of metaphor that every reading blindly
carries out, which, however, does not make them similar but, at most, comparable in their very
incomparability .
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thickness and its interiority. "This kind of metatemporality," that de Man
identifies in Blanchot, "coincides at bottom with a belief that poetry founds
Being immediately, without having to work its way toward it by a risky process
of successive mediations and stages of consciousness" ("Process and Poetry,"
64). What we cannot escape is representation. This is where we encounter
presence precisely by missing it. This is both liberating and estranging.
Consciousness interrupts; it introduces distance that measures everything in
between. It gauges the between to bring together what it equally keeps separate.
Representation, to which we are destined, does not expose anything; it doubles
everything in its belatedness. It signifies the fact that things are both equally near
as they remain absolutely distant. The essential interruption that opens history
(Dasein's originary thinning-out in transzendentale Zerstreuung)130 also opens
truth to an infinite migration in the other. Poetry that "founds Being
immediately" circumvents this migration. It says Being without breaking it. This
is precisely the ruse of "metatemporal poetics" that seeks refuge from finitude
and from the negative knowledge of "the persistent indetermination that is
historical temporality" ("Process and Poetry," 65, 67). Such a poetics, de Man
continues, "knows that no matter how strong the pull exercised by a historical
process that would assimilate poetry to its own movement, it is always possible
for poetry to elude this pull since it is not bound to it essentially, and to return to
the immediate self-presence that is also an immediate presence to Being" (65).
Being gives (es gibt). But it does not return to itself from giving itself. If it
130 For transzendentale Zerstreuung, that Agamben, reading Heidegger, also calls the "original
facticity" of Being, cf. "The Passion of Facticity," in Potentialities: "Here, it is possible to see the
full sense in which Heidegger's ontology is a hermeneutics offacticity. Facticity is not added to
Dasein; it is inscribed in its very structure of Being" (195). Cf. also note 59 above.
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returns to itself, it does so only across the giving-itself which means that it never
returns whole. Being comes back to itself cracked. The return comes to pass only
across the rupture that scatters it. The rupture is then both a promise and a broken
promise, at once. This means that Being returning in its self-presence is no
longer possible without something that remains behind. This remainder is what
keeps Being cut open. If poetry relates Being to itself, it relates by cutting across
and separating it. Poetry presents Being to itself broken. It is the unfulfillment of
Being that it promises. Poetry is Being broken. De Man will always remind us of
this very rupture that is constitutive of but forgotten in poetry's gathering pull.
Poetry then is not the "essential presence" but its infinite upheaval in negative
appropriation that constitutes its history. Again Blanchot is named here: '" Why is
it,' asks Blanchot, 'that at the point where history contests and subordinates it, art
becomes essential presence?" For de Man, the question makes the answer all too
apparent: "Such a question contains its own answer since it is obvious that, if art
(or poetry) can be essential presence, that is, grounded and preserved, then
history can have no hold on it. Its permanence and power remain secure despite
the hollows and chasms it contains" ("Process and Poetry," 65). But it is
precisely to "hollows and chasms" that its redemptive promise is lost. What
incompletes poetic fulfillment is not accidental, coming from outside, but is
constitutive of its movement. Poetry is what frustrates poetry. It is sick of itself
and built upon its own disease. It holds a mirror of unrequited love eaten by
corrosion of its own abjection. Its face skirts the edges of the infinite towards
which it is borne only by the gusts of finitude. It is the continual rhythm that
beats the breaking up of the total work it tries to compose. This continual rhythm
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is both the breathing of poetry and its sickness. Its movement is its diseased
breath. De Man identifies this same threat that constitutes the poetic act by
undoing it: "At a particular moment of its development, for example, poetry is
threatened by reason of the increasing difficulty of accomplishing the movement
it assigns itself' ("Process and Poetry," 65). Poetry serializes the failures of this
order. In the end, it gives nothing but the profusion of being that is also the
poverty of its essence. Being will have always flown to pieces. But poetry never
ceases to interrogate the conditions of its own possibility. Carried precisely by
the impossibility to escape the condition of its own impasse, it never ceases to
reach for the answer to the question that it is. It is this search, its diseased
repetitive beat, that reawakens poetry to the essential distance in relation to its
origin, in other words, to its finitude. Its redemptive power, the erasure of all
distances, would be the ruin of its speech. Silence is thus redemptive. The
immeasurable ruin of words that is poetry's anonymous extension, "where
language names in silence and by silence, and makes of the name a silent
reality," is a space that "exceeds us and translates things" (Blanchot, TSL, 141).
The "essential translator," Blanchot continues, "is the poet, and this space is the
poem's space, where no longer is anything present, where in the midst of absence
everything speaks, everything returns into the spiritual accord which is open and
not immobile but the center of the eternal movement" (141). The promise of this
space is prophetic. It exorcises ghosts - ghosts are already vestiges of negated
presence; what is thus negated in Blanchot is negation itself - to let come the
unsung secrets of their plenitude, appearing in their disappearance. Affirmation
of the absolutely anonymous made possible by the ultimate negation. It is
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prophetic because it never leaves the vision of wholeness, because in partitioning
and bursts of being it finds identity, in death the possibility of transcendence. But
it is this vision that, for de Man, poetry puts radically in question: " ... some of
the most authentic and greatest poets have put into question precisely this
redemptive possibility. Their testimony is not in itself decisive, but failing to take
it into account leaves us open to the aberrant forms of thought that result from an
unwarranted simplification of the task of poetic consciousness" ("Process and
Poetry," 65). Their testimony is not one of transcendence but one of failure that
testifies to the essentially "temporal character of poetry." De Man, a few pages
later:
Through the experience of a voluntary death - that of Empedocles
[Holderlin] or that ofIgitur [Mallarme] - these poets were not
necessarily attempting to transform negation into determination [that is
to say, the fundamental inertia of being, its uneventfulness, rather than
historical indetermination of becoming], as Maurice Blanchot thinks. On
the contrary, they resigned themselves to the transformation of the
eternal into the temporal and recognized the necessarily temporal
character of poetry" (67).
Only in view of its unhappy consciousness does poetry leave a trace
readable. It is the letting-be-seen of the intervals alone that preclude any
identities. Identity is only mimed out, left blank by repetition which repeats only
difference and distance in relation to it - suspends the symmetry of the equation
in temporality ("the correspondence between each object and its ideal content
[/ 'etre] cannot of course be perfectly stable or symmetrical." De Man, "Poetic
Nothingness," 23). Poetry will never defeat its impotence to win out over itself,
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to restore to its object the flesh of its past and venture a comment beyond
pretence, all in a single stroke of a unified impression. This, for Blanchot, is the
gravitational pull of the second "slope" of literature, where all poets gather. What
literature still speaks when everything has been said. "If one looks at it in a
certain way," Blanchot writes,
literature has two slopes. One side of literature is turned toward the
movement of negation by which things are separated from themselves
and destroyed in order to be known, subjugated, communicated.
Literature is not content to accept only the fragmentary, successive
results of this movement of negation: it wants to grasp the movement
itself and it wants to comprehend the results in their totality ... But there
is another side to literature. Literature is a concern for the reality of
things, for their unknown, free, and silent existence; literature is their
innocence and their forbidden presence, it is the being which protests
against revelation, it is the defiance of what does not want to take place
outside. In this way it sympathizes with darkness ... with everything in
the world that seems to perpetuate the refusal to come into the world. In
this way, too, it allies itself with the reality of language, it makes
language into matter without contour, content without form, a force that
is capricious and impersonal and says nothing, reveals nothing, simply
announces - through its refusal to say anything - that it comes from
night and will return to night. ("Literature and Death," 330)
Literature begins by temporization of the first slope that opens delay and
alienation from origins, from "the reality of things" and, therefore, the
mythogeny of "their unknown, free and silent existence." But this is also where it
ends for de Man. In difference that foils the movement of closure on the second
slope while at the same time making it possible. This movement then is not
totalizing but one of mutilation of totality. Literature is the sharing of its
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mutilated body. It is born in allegory of the first slope - insofar as allegory is a
relation of its severed body in drift and distance from its origin - and it ends in a
compulsive repetition of the cutting stroke that it tries to expiate. Without this
originary scission there would be no second slope, no dyad of spacing. By the
same token, however, the second slope can only be possible as retreating, in its
absolute recoil. It is made possible then by what makes it impossible, infinitely
(dis )lodged in history of its becoming that is also the burst of its exposure in
difference - history is not an autopositioning of being, its coming to itself in its
being other than itself, "having its otherness within itself' (Hegel, "PS," 82); the
other cleaves its identity and leaves its limits porous and bleeding without end.
What begins thus in exile from itself, in expropriation - and this is where
literature begins; it is constitutively exilic, foreign to itself, it is not - does not
retumfrom exile - exile does not befall literature; it is its very interior - so what
begins in expropriation, Derrida would say, "ends by leaving reappropriation
breached.,,131 On the first slope literature is set adrift where all conditions of
determination are lacking. It begins in nonidentity and without semantic anchor
(this is its inability to remain "in the inside of an 'at home, '" to recall Derrida, to
remain "abidingly [a demeure] in the identity of a nature or even a historical
131 Derrida in Of Grammatology: "Difference began by broaching alienation and it ends by
leaving reappropriation breached. Until death ... This means that difference makes the opposition
of presence and absence possible [in Blanchot's terms here precisely the opposition between the
"forbidden presence" on the second and the negation of the first slope. Blanchot says as much:
"Literature is divided between these two slopes. The problem is that even though they are
apparently incompatible, they do not lead toward distinctly different works ... " ("Literature and
Death," emphasis added, 332)]. Without the possibility of difference, the desire of presence as
such would not find its breathing-space [In other words, without the erasure of origin on the first
slope, desire for its presence would have no lack to feed on]. That means by the same token that
this desire carries in itself the destiny a/its non-satisfaction [emphasis added]. Difference
produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible" (143). What
makes the second slope possible then is precisely what makes it impossible. Literature is destined
to incompletion.
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being identical with itself." "Demeure," 28). It opens it to ceaseless wandering,
that is to say, to ceaseless error as the only mode of truth absolutely proper to
literature -literature has no (other) reserve - and this radical uncertainty, that
obscures decision, where the power to begin wavers and action risks its utter ruin
because it cannot find what warrants its power to begin, is what makes it
historical. Once the alienation is thus broached - and that is from the very
beginning - there can be no "reality of language" ("Literature is a concern for the
reality of things ... it allies itself with the reality of language, it makes language
into matter without contour, content without form." "Literature and Death," 330).
There is no such thing as the flesh of language, its underside as it were, that
literature disinters on the second slope. Derrida: "Is it not evident that no
signifier, whatever its substance and form, has a 'unique and singular reality?' ...
From the moment that the sign appears, that is to say from the very beginning,
there is no chance of encountering anywhere the purity of 'reality,' 'unicity,'
'singularity'" (OG, 91). What is disinterred is only more language. Rather like
Baudelaire's Digging Skeleton,132 literature digs assiduously to find its promised
sleep elude her. Death digging to find itself betrayed by the rattle of its own
bones. Language is the plague of literature, but its own figures are the cause of
the infection. It hates words, but hates them in words. It tries to abject words with
more words, so it catches the infection whose outbreak it tries to prevent. The
second slope is nothing but an obsessive ritual literature stages to its own
disembodiment. Something of a game, a "hoax," afort-da literature uses to
132 Cf. Charles Baudelaire, "Skeletons Digging," in Parisian Scenes in The Flowers of Evil, trans.
James McGowan (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1993), pp. 189-193.
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master the absence by staging it, rehearsing it compulsively, as if to possess it.133
In early de Man, the agent of displacement - Blanchot's first slope - is also
consciousness but the play of absences it opens becomes a "value" precisely
because of the impossibility of its completion, of ever being done with the game.
"The mind must move," de Man writes,
and every action of consciousness is an effort to escape the monotonous
repetition of immediate identity. This does not keep the immediate
datum of immediacy from persisting, nor every construction based on
this desire to explode it from becoming illusion, snare, hoax, and
game ... But such destruction is neither easy nor painless. Since the
knowledge of being's immediate identity persists, immediacy also
becomes value. As opposed to consciousness and to poetry, there exists
a world of a spontaneous contact with things, within a single sphere of
unity. The more conscious we become, the more desirable and precious
this world appears - and the more impossible to achieve. ("Poetic
Nothingness," 23)
133 It is in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) that Freud relates a child's attempt to master the
anxiety caused by the intermittent absences of his mother. He saw his grandson repeatedly
staging a game of throwing a cotton reel over the edge of his cot where it disappeared followed
by a distressing "o-o-o-o!" he interpreted as representing the German word "fort' ["gone away"]
and retrieving it with a gratifying "da" ["there," it is!]. "This, then," Freud writes, "was the
complete game - disappearance and return. As a rule one only witnessed its first act, which was
repeated untiringly as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was
attached to the second act" (599). The child then is trying to master displeasure by causing it
vicariously through the repetitive manipulation of the sign. The sign here or "the game,"
however, is what specifies not satisfaction but rather, as Freud will say, its "renunciation." It
names a lack and a dispossession, a rupture in plenitude, in view of which it is called for. There
can be no play without difference: "The interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was
related to the child's great cultural achievement - the instinctual renunciation (that is, the
renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away
without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by staging himself the
disappearance and return of the objects within his reach" (600). Sigmund Freud, The Freud
Reader (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 594-626. Possessing the mother (taken also metonymically
here: pleasure, nature, immediacy, object, presence) is only ever possible by mastering her
absence through substitutes that we compulsively pursue. But the substitute is born of
dispossession and only relates its own belatedness. It narrates its only ever being in flight without
which there would be no narration. And this is precisely where this game intersects our argument.
140
There is no total word for de Man, a word that would be restored to the
plenitude of its origin without exploding it "from becoming illusion, snare, hoax,
and game." His essay on Mallarme, we now turn to, shows precisely the poverty
of words, their absolute widowhood. For Blanchot, however, a conversion takes
place. And takes place in the opacity and texture of language, in the ruin of
meaning which is its light and its absence.l'" De Man and Blanchot part on the
second slope, as it were. As soon as reappropriation is announced, it is
renounced, and the gathering of poets on the second slope lets itself be
mournfully scattered in advance. It is always a play of omissions, of separations
and origins cast aside, extending only the margin of blanks in a compulsive
repetition that produces ever more empty supplements. More partial objects
whose identity has been purloined and is now all the "more desirable and
precious." For what is present in words is the theft of presence that both calls for
and incompletes the process of total isation. But no totality is ever possible.t" De
Man is clear: "As opposed to consciousness and to poetry, there exists a world of
a spontaneous contact with things, within a single sphere of unity" (emphasis
added). Poetry, then, as "the logos of becoming," is precisely what leaves this
134 Blanchot: "In itself this metamorphosis [the second slope] is not unsuccessful. It is certainly
true that words are transformed. They no longer signify shadow, earth, they no longer represent
the absence of shadow and earth which is meaning, which is the shadow's light, which is the
transparency of the earth: opacity is their answer; the flutter of closing wings is their speech; in
them, physical weight is present as the stifling density of an accumulation of syllables that has
lost all meaning. The metamorphosis has taken place" ("Literature and Death," 330-31).
135 At the risk of reductiveness and violence, if it were possible to condense and arrest the long
trajectory of de Man's work with all its resonances still ahead of us, it would be precisely the
distribution, the dissemination of the effects of this sentence, that, already operative in his early
work as we are trying to show, will come to split itself in a different modality - or mood - as we
shall see, across the entire grid of his writing, which it would silently govern. If it were possible,
that is.
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world in a state of emergency, evacuated. It narrates its flight, its conflagration,
the fraying and coming apart of its gathering on the second slope.136
The Widowed Word: Mallarme and de Man
The serene irony of the eternal Sky
Depresses, with the indolence of flowers,
The impotent poet cursing poetry
Across a sterile waste of leaden Hours.
- Stephane Mallarme, "The Azure"
That poetry is an unveiling of privation, "that through which we become
conscious of the divided character of our being" ("Temptation," 33), that its
language is barren and impoverished (diirftig), without body or weight it scatters
- indeed, it founds itself precisely in the space that its vacated, shattered body
opens - is what de Man's essay on Mallarme, "the poet of sterility and the blank
page" ("Poetic Nothingness," 18), comes to inscribe. Poetry as a disaffirmation
136 In "The Temptation of Permanence" (1955), engaging Heidegger's notion of the poetic act as
"gathering contour" (Grundriss), as we shall see in the following section, de Man will say: "How
can Heidegger say that the work, insofar as it is contour, gathers opposition in its unity, and that
in a manner apparently permanent? Is being this unique foundation of their unity? But if two
beings are defmed in their being as opposed, the common fact of being could not constitute in
itself a unifying principle, since their division extends precisely to the foundation. The tearing
apart is thus not Grundriss (ground plan), that is, a groove in the foundation with a view to
construction, but Riss des Grundes, a tearing open of the foundation itself that prevents all true
construction" (emphasis added, 35-36). No transcendence here of the fundamental division of
being whose destiny (Geschick) - that is to say the sending (Schickung) of being rather than its
presence - history (Geschichte) unveils. History, then, as the manifesting of the division of being,
its sending, not its presence.
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of unity, not a gathering, but a tearing of its fulfillment in what can only be time
or history. De Man begins by relating Mallarme's interrogation of the poetic act
and its possibility to Holderlin, where it first "assumes the anguished aspect that
has become so familiar to us:
Meanwhile, it often seems to me / it is better to sleep than to flounder
thus / and to be thus friendless. I know not what to do meanwhile / nor
what to say; what use are poets in a time of dearth?
"Since 1802," de Man continues, "when these lines were written
[Holderlin's lines from an elegy "Bread and Wine"], there have been great poets,
Mallarme among them. But his predecessors as well as his successors have
achieved greatness by confronting this same obstacle, and not by surmounting it"
("Poetic Nothingness," 18-19). The poet's distress here is identified as an
obstacle. But would there be poetry without it? What interests us here is precisely
the nature of this obstacle and the essential risk, the abandon of being implied in
it, its shipwrecked destiny that is also its historicity and poetry's profound
resource.
So, "what are poets for in a destitute time," in a time of ceaseless drift
where error feeds on our lack of conviction, where the only beginning is a failure
to begin, for gods having disappeared, the conditions that would warrant a
beginning are lacking? And this time, Heidegger writes, "forebodes something
even grimmer, however. Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine
radiance has become extinguished in the world's history" ("What Are Poets For,"
89). This time, "the time of the world's night" (89), in other words, is even more
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destitute, for even the disappearance of gods has ceased to appear. The wanderer
cannot stay to abide for even the trace ofthe laws has been obscured, the path to
them sullied, forgotten. Even the trace of this destitution where the wanderer
would find repose in the ill-fated promise of a presence, of forgotten intimacy, of
recovering the sullied path to the laws, the scattered origin in its very scattering,
has withdrawn its nature and its presence. The very destitution has become
destitute and the forgetfulness alone now remembers. So, having no certitude of
presence or even absence of this presence, having no other law than to lose
himself in the foreign that is himself, the wanderer cannot rest but continues to
stray, persists to err in the complete groundlessness of the human condition, in
Heidegger's Abgrund, 137 that is the essential of our time and the radical exposure
of night in which being is risked. So there is no respite because there is neither
shelter nor compass but only the threat that looms its claw ahead, blinding every
glimmer of insight, rending every venture to tread forward. Treading forward
here is always a coup de force; it is law-making rather than law-abiding, for
nothing justifies it in advance. This is the destitute time of the world's night, and
it is "now approaching its midnight. .. now becoming the completely destitute
time" (91).
But in this time, in this age where all ground breaks off, "in the age of the
world's night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But for
this it is necessary that there be those who reach into the abyss" (90). If Being is
137 Heidegger defmes the essential of our time as follows, "The word for abyss - Abgrund-
originally means the soil and ground towards which, because it is undermost, a thing tends
downward. But in what follows we shall think of the Ab- as the complete absence of the
ground ... The age for which the ground fails to come, hangs in the abyss" ("What Are Poets
For," 90).
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that which presences itself, then, by the necessity of its absolute will to presence,
it must manifest itself as that which defines the essential of our time, that is as
"the complete absence of the ground" (90). It is only by experiencing and
enduring the abyss that we can dwell in parousia - that is thus a coming, but it is
a coming-to-view of absence that "holds and remarks everything" and a placing
of oneself within it: "Mortals ... remain closer to that absence [AbgrundJ," writes
Heidegger, "because they are touched by presence, the ancient name of Being.
But because presence conceals itself at the same time, it is itself already absence.
Thus the abyss holds and remarks everything" (91). In other words, by turning
away from the abyss, we tum away from the emptiness that is our utmost
possibility - the totality of our possibilities that is and must remain empty.
But this time of absolute destitution, where not only "there fails to appear
for the world the ground that grounds it" (90), but where even the trace of this
failure remains visible only in its being-forgotten, the time where "the abyss
holds and remarks everything," is precisely the time absolutely proper to art.
Blanchot writes:
The force, the risk [emphasis added] proper to the poet is to dwell in
God's default [that is, the god's failure to appear], the region where
truth lacks. The time of distress designates the time which in all times is
proper to art. But when historically the gods lack and the world of truth
wavers, the time of distress emerges in the work as concern - the
concern in which the work finds its preserve - threatening it: making it
present and visible. (TSL, 246)
The risk is the essential here. The throw of the dice in "God's default"
and the force of error as the condition of its possibility (without error there,
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nothing would be risked and there would be neither decision nor responsibility,
we will return to this). The risk then, critical both to Holderlin and Mallarme, is
what, in the time of dearth, of impotence, becomes a power. A power of straying
always in error, but the power, in that it is in error, of necessary invention
because the lack of any foreseeable future demands invention. What guarantees
the future is its unforseeability, its being without guarantee. The unhappiness of
this ceaseless straying.v" "this perpetual departure, the sorrow of straying which
has no place to arrive, to rest [becomes] also the fecund migration" (Blanchot,
TSL, 246-47). But this "fecund migration" rests precisely on the radical exposure
to night that grounds it without grounding, that allows of no beginning or end,
the radical uncertainty which is not the other of truth but the truth proper to art.139
And it is precisely why it remains impotent, why it begins always anew. What is
proper to art is not the truth but its conflagration that guarantees its future. From
the beginning, this conflagration belongs to art and constitutes its ethos.140
The obstacle identified by de Man, the distress of the poet, is a certain
night walled up in language against which one is powerless. A night that
138 Important to note here is that for early de Man consciousness is still unhappy, but after the
rhetorical tum, as the following chapters will indicate, this pathology of self-exile will become an
opening of affirmation and freedom of reading, indeed of the political that must be thought
outside renunciation and eschatology, where absence would still gain a foothold and be put to
work.
139 Kafka: "Art flies around truth, but with the determination not to get burnt by it. Its skill
consists of finding a place in the void where the ray of light focuses most powerfully, without
knowing beforehand the location of the light source itself." Qtd. in Maurice Bianchot, "Kafka and
Literature," in The Work of Fire (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995), p. 18. Truth is the face that
irresistibly rivets the attraction of art only by the measure of distance, that pieuse distance that is
the measure of any attraction. And it is the drift of its face, without location, that produces the
desire for its presence. Kafka continues: "Our art is to be blinded by truth: the light on the
r,rimacing face as it pulls back, that alone is true and nothing else" (18).
40 The ethos (from ethos, "moral character, nature, disposition, habit(at), custom"), the very spirit
of art or its gathering place, its habitat and shared experience, would then be precisely the no-
place, the dispersal of places in infinite migration, where one no longer comes across anything
like its domicile. It is an infinite nomadism of gathering that would be the habitat of art. Its
habit(at) is the most uninhabitable.
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consigns thought to error, but is also its utmost possibility. For only when set
adrift in the default of ground without assurance of arrival can there be anything
like thought. Is this not, in fact, the only chance for thinking? When thought
hurls its defiance against the limits that enlighten it? There, along the limits,
where one truly does not know? Night is what saves thought, but also what opens
up the space of poetry in the default of light that infinitely attracts it.
In Mallarme, this anguish of thought assumes the specific "theme of
nothingness (neant)," as the sunken present upon which poetry rests its words
("Poetic Nothingness," 20). De Man takes his departure in the last of the sonnets
in Mallarme's triptych141 that allegorizes the elision of being, the spectacle,
Mallarme would say, of "its resonant near disappearance, according to the game
of speech" (21), in the sepulchre of words:
Une dentelle s'abolit
Dans le doute du Jeu supreme
A n'entr'ouvrir comme un blaspheme
Qu'absence eternelle de lit.
Cet unanime blanc conflit
D'une guirlande avec la meme,
Enfui contre la vitre bleme
Flotte plus qu'il n'ensevelit.
141 "Tout OrgueiJ fume-t-iJ du soir" ("Does Pride at evening always fume"), "Surgi de la croupe
et du bond" ("Sprung from the croup and the flight"), and "Une dentelle s'abolit" ("Lace sweeps
itself aside") all appeared together in the issue of La Revue Independante (1887). The triptych
dramatises the vanishing of familiar objects, their irrealisation, in the light of consciousness
illuminating only the empty vestiges of their disappearance. For further reference, cf. Henry
Weinfield's translation of the sonnets in Stephane Mallarme: Collected Poems (Berkeley and
London: California UP, 1994), pp. 78-80. Following St. Aubyn's Stephane Mallarme, Weinfield
describes the triptych as the "'[s]umptuous allegories of the void'" (232). Weinfield's translation
cited hereafter as Collected Poems.
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Mais, chez qui du reve se dore
Tristement dort une mandore
Au creaux neant musicien
Telle que vers quelque fenetre
Selon nul ventre que le sien
Filial on aurait pu naitre.
[A lace does away with itself
In the doubt of the supreme Game
To half-open like a blasphemy
Only an eternal absence of bed.
This unanimous white conflict
Of a garland with the same,
Fled against the pale pane
Floats more than it buries.
But, in one who gilds himself with dreams
Sadly sleeps a man dora
With music's void in its emptiness
Such that toward some window
Depending on no womb but its own,
Filial one could have been born.]142
"In a poem like this one," de Man writes, "we are concerned with the
dramatic representation of a purely mental process ... " (20), of conceptual
142"Une dentelle s'abolit," reproduced here, is from "Poetic Nothingness" (19-20), in de Man's
own translation, which may dispense with Weinfield's "musical essence" ("I would say," says
Weinfield, "that my primary struggle in this translation has been to render the 'music' or 'musical
essence' ... of the poetry." Introduction to Collected Poems, xi) but which does retain the
semantic erosion that the poem ultimately allegorizes. The image is one of the curtain swept aside
along the windowpane by the morning breeze. The windowpane in Mallarme's symbolism is the
pane of misalignment, the pane of interval without which there would be no exposure to the
outside but which also keeps the outside at variance, ever so slightly, with itself. All further
references to this sonnet will be to de Man's own translation in "Poetic Nothingness."
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understanding that, according to Hegel, is equivalent to murder. The "white
conflict" of the sonnet is the allegorization of the fractured relation between the
intellectual and the perceptual element that ultimately calls into question the
organic conception of language precisely by virtue of a certain unevenness: "The
dramatic fate of [the] objects [that is to say, their fatality] corresponds to the
unfolding of the intellectual process. Things are complicated insofar as the
correspondence between each object and its ideal content cannot of course be
perfectly stable or symmetrical" ("Poetic Nothingness," 20). The irrealisation of
presence in the labour of consciousness (Mallarme's "doubt of the supreme
Game") frees us at a stroke from the flesh of things, their unbearable weight, but
does so precisely at the expense of anteriority with which it can never coincide.
As the object gives way, its empty resonance, a disembodied vestige "'without
the hindrance of an immediate or concrete prompting" (21), is left as a trace of
separation, an echo of what is never there for us but always only before us, and
we are left to experience its abandon alone. What is given up for lost is the
intimacy that the mind can never reconquer and the poem itself becomes the
witness and the agent of a perpetual leave-taking that it seeks to abolish, or in
Mallarme's diction, a "Pure vessel of no liquor brewed / Save the bottomless
widowhood." 143
143 In the second sonnet of the triptych, "Sprung from the croup and the flight," the poetic act is
widowed and destitute, a "vessel of no liquor brewed," the image it creates - of two lovers
kissing - fluttering on the border of emptiness from which it is summoned. Poetry is
"bottomless," because without support (Collected Poems, 79). In Weinfield's comment, the poem
is one of"Mallarme's trompe l'oeil effects ... a gestalt image in which figure and ground are
reversible, such that we either see two lovers about to kiss or a vase rising in the empty space
between them" (233). In other words, there would be no image without the emptiness ofthe vase
that, at the same time, annihilates it.
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It is in the "white conflict," that supreme act of repeating that only repeats
omission, that the poem retains its faith to begin. But it is instantaneously made
barren by the subject it takes, summoning into being what it plunges to the
borders where nothing is all and always on the border of passing from all to
nothing. And before the end, it will be folded back to the beginning by the very
impossibility, Blanchot's "deferred assassination," of its speech ("Literature and
Death," 323).144Poetry lives only by the incantation of death upon which its
existence is predicated. The "supreme game" of absences is given a dramatic
unfolding in this sonnet, but one that unfolds only as fatality of what appears.
Mallarme's use of objects - of laces, curtains, beds, all domestic, familiar,
intimate - far from restoring presence in a semblance of repetition, in which
everything is trapped as it were, represents its loss. The poem struggles to free
itself for "the initiative [to be] taken by the words themselves, which will be set
in motion as they meet unequally in collision.,,145 The loss of representation is
evoked in the slipping away and recoil of objects, and the play, the unequal
"collision," of supplements which erase and substitute to let appear.l'" There is
thus a ceaseless slide, coil and recoil, a double reverberation, the clearing and the
sullying at the thresholds of ambiguity, of presence, leaving the scene of its
144 Cf. above, note 93.
145 Stephane Mallarme, "Crisis in Poetry," in Mallarme: Selected Prose Poems, Essays & Letters
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 40.
146 "Let us note," Blanchot writes parenthetically, "that if we accept the observations of
Mallarme, for whom to write is not to evoke a thing but an absence of thing, we find ourselves
confronting this situation: words vanish from the scene to make the thing enter, but since this
thing is itself no more than an absence, that which is shown in the theatre, it is an absence of
words and an absence of thing, a simultaneous emptiness, nothing supported by nothing."
Maurice Blanchot, "Mystery in Literature," in The Work of Fire (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP,
1995), p. 49, emphasis added.
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appearance always through false exits and "half-open blasphemies," and the only
way to follow is through false entrances and doorways of incomplete allusions.
From the beginning then, the object betrays an "ontological ambiguity," it
is triggered to appear by its very recoil, by sweeping itself aside ("a lace does
away with itself'). De Man writes: "By naming an object poetically (as opposed
to ordinary speech, merely a means of exchange and communication), this
object ... acquires an ontological ambiguity; it has lost its primary opacity insofar
as it is posited for us, but preserves it insofar as it is not a pure instrument. It
exists within the fringe of interference between these two modes" ("Poetic
Nothingness," 21). The name is only the impoverished stain of presence but also
its only chance survival. What is named is no longer simply present, no longer
simply there. It can now only ever appear within the quotation marks. It lends
itself to language only through a detour of reported speech, stripped of any first
instance. This "transformation of the given," de Man continues,
is related to the need of our own consciousness to be grounded in its
own being ... Self-consciousness needs to ground itself by this transit
into the created object, which then becomes what Mallarme calls "the
pure idea" - in reality, the perfect correspondence between the idea of
the object and the object itself. But this gain in consciousness is
accompanied by an inevitable dissolution of the object, which explodes,
so to speak, in the infinity of its formal possibilities. It is no longer just
what it is ... (21, emphasis added)
The "perfect correspondence" here is always already imperfect. And it is
this imperfection that triggers and vectors the desire for reappropriation which
can only announce itself unevenly, that is to say, as infinitely broken.
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Correspondence in general is a testimony of a broken relation it seeks to amend.
The object gives itself now as a fictive upsurge flooding back from the dead in a
thought with no support. It is a correspondence thus that ricochets back and
breaks off against the ground of its own mirror without ever breaking it. It never
simply corresponds because something in this correlation always remains
unrelated, something "no longer just what it is ... " From here on, there is no
object, properly speaking, only a suggestive hesitation of its absence, only the
"infinity of its formal possibilities" in which it had sunk to entertain the thought
with a mimic of meaning. This is Mallarme's "transposition." Speech, he writes,
"is no more than a commercial approach to reality. In literature, allusion is
sufficient: essences are distilled and then embodied in Idea ... This is the ideal I
would call Transposition ... " ("Crisis in Poetry," 40). Even if "transposition" here
assumes the rigour of eidetic abstraction, it still testifies to the voiding of
sameness, to erasure of the first time in which meaning could find reassurance of
belonging, and tied, it could be untied to reveal the roots beyond its textual knots
in which it voids itself, beyond its doubling and beyond distance of which it
always speaks. For what remains foreign to literature are precisely the roots of its
duplicity. Whatever begins here begins redoubled. And carried out of itself, it
begins by becoming a story of its own unravelling that can only ever "allude" to
its missing, and by that very allusion, supplemented present. It becomes "that
evanescent movement that flees before the growing consciousness constantly
threatening to make it vanish. Mallarme calls it, very clearly, 'its resonant near
disappearance. ,,, ("Poetic Nothingness," 21-22). And "it is precisely this
process," de Man continues, "that the sonnet's first two lines evoke. The
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'supreme Game' is the act of (poetic) consciousness, and the 'lace' that 'does
away with itself' is a sort of fringe of the evanescent object in its 'resonant near
disappearance.' The action is 'doubt' by its suspension between being and
nonbeing" (22). Without this "doubt" nothing would ever come to pass. It is both
the destruction of the unified subject, its historical disbanding, and the
emergence of what is not itself - but is older than the subject, that through which
the pathos of the subject comes to us. It is what through the loss of unity
introduces its mythogenic presence that motivates poetry never to cease echoing
in the music it writes, like the seashell, the sound of its lost seas, "a world of a
spontaneous contact with things, within a single sphere of unity" ("Poetic
Nothingness," 23). So it surges forth in words, line after line, for there still might
be, in the word, there still might survive there, an imperceptible pulse of being,
that is also the pounding of the outside it cannot hear. The failing but ceaseless
beat of this pulse deep within the shell of growing echoes, its chance survival
when everything has been lost to silence, is the promise of the next line that the
dead ones bear and hide under the rubbish heap of history. 147Its beat and "its
presence," de Man writes, "underlies Mallarme's entire oeuvre and confers upon
that oeuvre its contour and agonizing depth" (23). Indeed, allegorized in
Mallarme's sonnet "The virginal, vibrant, and beautiful dawn," the horizon that
carries the "drunken" wings of poetry in its surging lines is one of "flights never
flown," but what is evoked is precisely the possibility of transcendence that the
next line, the "virginal" and "vibrant" beginnings of the next poem, might
147 In the first sonnet of the triptych, "Does Pride at evening always fume," Mallarme indexes this
silence as the "Disavowal's sepulcher," the night of renunciation to which all objects Pride keeps
close are resigned (Collected Poems, 78). It is also the sepulchre of words as the perishing of
being.
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establish: "The virginal, vibrant, and beautiful dawn, / Will a beat of its drunken
wing not suffice / To rend this hard lake haunted beneath the ice / By the
transparent glacier of flights never flown?" (Collected Poems, 67). This is where
poetic consciousness suffers the "agonizing depth" of its pathological privation
that constitutes the very ecstasy of its movement. Caught in the impasse of what
de Man elsewhere calls its "authentically temporal predicament.v" its
movement becomes one of catastrophic loss, of melancholia for Benjamin, that
mourns the shed contents in the empty casings of allegory.l'" And riveted
towards the end of history, the limits of "the here-below," it is caught in the
infirmary of its wounds: "But, alas! The Here-below is master: it sickens me /
Even in this refuge where I shelter secure, / And the foul vomit of Stupidity /
Forces me to hold my nose before the azure" ("The Windows," Collected Poems,
12).150 The "azure" is what reveals itself at the limits of poetry that constitute its
148 Discussing the symbolic conception of Romantic form in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," de
Man writes: "The dialectic relationship between subject and object ... becomes a conflict between
a conception of the self seen in its authentically temporal predicament and a defensive strategy
that tries to hide from this negative self-knowledge ... the asserted superiority of the symbol over
allegory, so frequent during the nineteenth century, is one of the forms taken by this tenacious
self-mystification" (208).
149 This is why allegorical structure becomes proper to history, both for Benjamin and de Man, as
we shall see in the ensuing chapter that deals extensively with allegory as a structure of shedding.
For melancholia as an "open wound," or the impossible mourning, cf. note 204 in the next
chapter.
ISO The window or windowpane, as indicated above, is a point of breach in Mallarme's symbolic
- insofar as it is both a limit and an exposure, both a face and an impossibility of facing.
Mallarme associates it with art, even if negatively as an interpolated injunction, or rather a
subjunctive, that marks a desire for transcendence, but also, and at the same time, the pathos of its
renunciation: "I look at myself and see myself as an angel! and I die, / and I yearn / -Be the
windowpane art, be it mysticism- / To be reborn, bearing my dream for a diadem, / In the former
sky where Beauty flourishes" (Collected Poems, 12). Desire is sustained only as the following
lines, quoted previously, state the impossibility of its completion: "But, alas! The Here-below is
master: it sickens me ... " The windowpane is a mark that is proximity and distance at once, inside
and outside, both interior and exterior, that locks the poet's art in an asymptotic movement
toward "the former sky where Beauty flourishes" by precisely revealing its impossibility, pass as
impasse. "The azure" (l'azur), alluded to in the stanza, frames the Mallarmean alembic as one of
the symbols that metonymically supplements both the forbidden plenitude and the void that rests
its full weight there. As a metonymy of skylheaven, both embraced by the French word ciel, it
brings a rich connotative fund of Mallarme's spiritual crisis during the 1860s (see below) and the
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face. But what is revealed in this face-to-face encounter is their irremediable
strangeness. Without this strangeness poetry would lose its face in complete
effacement of limits. The "azure" must be blinding and intolerable to poetry that
can only face it in its withdrawal. The gaze of the poet desires precisely what is
intolerable to it. If poetry reveals anything it is only the radical strangeness in
which being discloses itself to it. So the movement of poetic consciousness is one
of disclosure of this limit and not its identity. One thing necessarily supplants and
shadows its other that cannot be seen as other than its shadow. Poetic
consciousness is tom, stung and cut off by its own tragedy - which is also its
own historicity - that gives it its face.
The Azure of the poems collected in Le Parnasse Contemoporain (1866),
"the world of immediacy" that consciousness exappropriates by repeating, "in
our poem," de Man writes, "is summed up in the one symbol-word lit (bed). The
evanescent action of dawning consciousness (une dentelle qui s 'abolit [a lace
that does away with itself]) provokes the dissolution and absence of the world of
immediacy ... a world that can never exist in consciousness: absence eternelle de
lit (eternal absence of bed)" ("Poetic Nothingness," 23-24). The mind reveals the
void, "an eternal absence of bed," that is the ab-grund, the (cancelled) support,
and the emptying or de-presentation of all its representations. This introduces the
inescapable ambiguity in the index of its representations that can no longer map
the tracks back to their genetic marker that consciousness has ripped up.
shipwreck of theology, no longer able to confer meaning transcendentally. The metaphor for the
human condition that governs the entire poem, however, is "sickness," that forces the diseased
poet, and diseased by existence which Hegel had already found sickening, to face ''the azure"
through the hospital windowpane as the only cure - but also one that can never be administered.
This is how ontology becomes the pathogenic of existence.
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Representations are now in a state of permanent disinheritance that opens them to
the risk of false leads and displaced attachments. "But this destruction," de Man,
continues, "is profoundly tragic, for it signifies the mortal blow to life itself.
Moreover it implies the death of God, in the Nietzschean sense, for to Mallarme
the Christian God of his childhood is the God of spontaneous and immediate
unity who cannot survive consciousness ... Such is the outcome of the concept of
poetic nothingness for Mallarme ... " (24). Indeed, in a letter to Henri Cazalis
(April, 1866), having devoted three months to Herodiade, Mallarme writes of
"the Void:"
Unfortunately, in the course of quarrying out these lines to this extent,
I've come across two abysses, which fill me with despair. One is the
Void and I'm still too distraught to be able to believe even in my
poetry which this crushing awareness has made me abandon. Yes, I
know, we are merely empty forms of matter, but we are indeed sublime
in having invented God and our soul. So sublime, my friend, that I want
to gaze upon matter, fully conscious that it exists, and yet launching
itself madly into Dream, despite its knowledge that Dream has no
existence, extolling the Soul and all the divine impressions of that kind
which have collected within us from the beginning of time and
proclaiming, in the face of the Void which is truth, these glorious lies!lSl
It is "verse" then that wrecks theological certainty and reveals the subject
in crisis, amputated and fractured. Poetry, as suggested earlier, is the disclosure
of difference and not identity. It is a disclosure of identity in crisis, of the bare
interior of the subject whose autonomy and absoluteness have miscarried. "By
digging this thoroughly into verse," the destitution of truth, Holderlin's "time of
151 Stephane Mallarme, Selected Letters of Stephane Mallarme (Chicago and London: Chicago
UP, 1988), p. 60.
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dearth," and of the god's default is made manifest. But it is only in this
destitution that modem man acquires his elevation. This destitution - which is
then also the destitution of the proper - is properly the ethos of art. For only
where all support has withdrawn, "in the face of the Void which is truth"
(Selected Letters, 60), can there be the experience of anything like ethos.
The withdrawal of the divine offers us art. But art is also its infinite
approach. If the divine comes, it comes in the shatters of art. The divine is the
difference that art makes manifest in its withdrawal. The two offer each other at
the limit that separates them. For where would poetry be without the sacred
whose omitted locus it offers? The poet stays on the traces of the fugitive divine.
For Mallarme, "nothingness" that poetry offers is the locus of its desertion, its
trace. A hole of time is dug out by words in place of the sacred in which it flies
into million shattered pieces.152 Poetry traces the sacred as it unravels its bare
threads in words. Mallarme knew this well when he wrote: "We dream of words
brilliant at once in meaning and sound, or darkening in meaning and so in sound,
152 In Blindness and Insight, de Man writes on the sacred in Holderlin's hymn and, in extenso, on
the nature of the poetic task: " ... if it is admitted that the hymn ["Just as on a feast day, to see his
field"] expressed the impossibility of the desired identification between language and the sacred,
then its development and the difficulties of its conclusion become apparent. The awakening of
nature, caused by the poet, is not the immediate manifestation of Being, but the awakening of
history that resumes its progress [emphasis added]. The poet cannot say Being, but he can
awaken its indirect action ... This supreme act is also a supreme sacrifice, for the restoration of
Being to consciousness is effected at the cost of necessarily denying its ineffable all-presence and
the no less necessary acquisition of the finite and alienated character of Dasein. The poet knows
this necessity ... it appears in the guise of sorrow" ("Heidegger's Exegeses," 261-62). Again, the
poetic consciousness is a historical one and infinitely sorrowful, that is to say without assurance
of reconciliation. What offers itself offers itself to a radical loss, is infinitely lost without ever
being able to reconstitute itself in an economy that guarantees a return - economy always does,
always returns horne (oikos), having traversed the full circle of exchange and substitutions-
nothing is ever exiled in economy properly speaking, for there is always a reckoning of losses or
a re-partitioning before the fire in the end. But Hegel, for de Man, is never economical: " ...
Idealist philosophy is presented in a false light ... If there ever was a philosophy of necessary
separation, it is Hegel's; to assimilate the notion of Absolute Spirit with idealist reconciliation is
to simplify all the way into misprision" (265). In Mallarme, as in Holderlin, the sacred is
precisely what sustains the pathos of alienation, of "necessary separation."
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luminously and elementally self-succeeding. But, let us remember that if our
dream were fulfilled, verse would not exist - verse which, in all its wisdom,
atones for the sins of languages, comes nobly to their aid" ("Crisis in Poetry,"
38). The "dream" is one of identity that is misshapen in poetry but that would
equally be its end. As long as the words express the evacuation and impossibility
of expression, there will have been languages to whose aid poetry comes by
trying to efface them. The words surge forth to cover lost ground but only end in
words that lose ground, or rather liquidate it. Mallarme already in 1865: "The
flesh is sad, alas, and there's nothing but words!" ("Sea Breeze," Collected
Poems, 21). Poetic vision is one of survival, but it ends in "a sort of immense
hecatomb," Blanchot would say.IS3And nothing is spared - nothing can be, if
everything is to begin. "Once this certainty," de Man goes on,
is established in Mallarme's mind, he is obsessed by the problem of
survival, not in the personal sense but in the historical sense of
continuity of mind.Mallarme would say with Hegel that mere "life" has
no history, since it has neither future nor development. .. This accounts
for his being so disturbed by a negating mediation, beyond which any
reality of being becomes problematic. ("Poetic Nothingness," 25)
"Mere life," life without difference or, what Derrida calls, life "of a 'zero
degree' with reference to which one could outline the structure, the growth, and
153 In "Literature and Death," Blanchot writes: " ... before any word is spoken, there must be a
sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary flood plunging all of creation into a total sea. God had
created living things, but man had to annihilate them. Not until then did they take on meaning for
him, and he in tum created them out of the death into which they had disappeared; only instead of
beings (etres) and, as we say, existants (existants), there remained only being (l'etre), and man
was condemned not to be able to approach anything or experience anything except through the
meaning he had to create" (323). Meaning that is a death and birth certificate of being at once. It
empties being in one blow to allow the beginning of its withdrawal. Being must be preemptively
evacuated, emptied in advance, as it were, in order to begin.
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above all the degradation of our society and our culture" COG, 115)154- that is to
say its historicity - is the moving principle of logos. "Zero degree" is both its
arche and its telos: "As always, this archeology is also a teleology and an
eschatology; the dream of a full and immediate presence closing history, the
transparence and indivision of a parousia, the suppression of contradiction and
difference" COG, 115). One does not dwell in it; one can only be towards it. One
is not in it other than by an infinite approach or ending that is always what comes
before death that never comes and one risks "falling through eternity:" "Is there a
way,O Self, thou who hast known bitterness, / To burst the crystal that the
monster has profaned, / And take flight, with my two featherless Wings - at the
risk of falling through eternity?" (Mallarme, "The Windows," 12). Be that as it
may, the law of onto-theology is suicidal. For "mere life" that is its law, and
whose historical guise has always been the name of God, is another name for
death. Derrida: "Only infinite being155can reduce the difference in presence. In
that sense, the name of God, at least as it is pronounced within classical
rationalism, is the name of indifference itself' (OG, 71).
The movement of poetic consciousness towards the moment that precedes
time, its constitution in logos, ("To take flight, far offl I sense that somewhere
the birds / Are drunk to be amid strange spray and skies." Mallarme, "Sea
IS4 That is why in Being and Time, Heidegger writes: "To Dasein's state of Being belongs
falling ... Being toward entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have
not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at
the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance ...
Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth '" (264). The
"foul" facticity of Dasein, the malady of its being-there that is its being in "untruth," is what
constitutes its historicity. History as falling, as "degradation," falling away, regressing from light
the more it progresses.
ISS Infmity here, and always, not as indeterminate or incompletion, Hegelian false infinity that
would be fmitude and difference, but rather as positive infinity, that is plenitude and totality,
auto-affection of the Same. For further reference on this difference, cf. Derrida's essay on
Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference, part 3 in particular, pp. 136-92.
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Breeze," 21), the moment then that endures without future - no longer a moment,
as it is indivisible, in-different - is affirmed always in its ruins. And upon these
ruins, poetry builds its dwelling. The "song" is what survives the shipwreck of
being that is its only salvation. Mallarme:
Steamer with gently swaying masts, depart!
Weigh anchor for a landscape of the heart!
Boredom made desolate by hope's cruel spells
Retains its faith in ultimate farewells!
And maybe the masts are such as are inclined
To shipwreck driven by tempestuous wind.
No fertile isle, no spar on which to cling ...
But oh, my heart, listen to the sailors sing! ("Sea Breeze," 21).
Art, "the song," is thus predicated on destruction, the ruins upon which
alone creation crawls on. Only where all support is broken, where distress is
infinite - "No fertile isle, no spar on which to cling ... " - can there be song. And
the entire undulation of A Throw of the Dice is precisely an unfolding of this
tragic movement of the poetic vision that destines all certainty to a shipwreck the
poem takes for its subject in order to find there the virginal trace of its own
inscription.i" What survives is the future, the certainty only of uncertainty -
without which there would be none - that sustains the poetic vision in an eternal
156 For Valery it was a dramatic unfolding of "the Creation of Language" itself that can only be
formed in the hollow of experience which it then elegises in compulsive repetitions. Upon
reading the proofs of A Throw of the Dice, Valery wrote: "It seemed to me that I was looking at
the form and pattern of a thought, placed for the first time in finite space. Here space itself truly
spoke, dreamed, and gave birth to temporal forms ... I was struck dumb by this unprecedented
arrangement. It was as if a new asterism had proffered itself in the heavens; as if a constellation
had at last assumed a meaning. Was I not witnessing an event of universal importance, and was it
not, in some measure, an ideal enactment of the Creation of Language that was being presented to
me on this table at the last minute, by this individual, this rash explorer ... " (qtd. in Collected
Poems, 265-66).
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promise of a chance survival: "All Thought emits a Throw of the Dice"
(Collected Poems, 144). But "A THROW OF THE DICE WILL NEVER
ABOLISH CHANCE." These last words weave a dominant thread along which
the poem is spun, as indicated by their typography.F" but are scattered in the
blanks and whites of the pages, as if to suggest that the aleatory, the contingency,
that wrecks the eternal is also what may save it, as it makes the pen carryon,
scribbling on the empty sheet of poetry and beating the paper in a frustration of
impotence that motivates it. Impotence - that is to say, the impossibility of
transcendence - is the power of writing, its impelling force, its chance. Its
impotence is its potential.
In our sonnet, what survives the shipwreck of experience is only
uncertainty: "the lace" near-abolished in the jeu supreme, swept aside against the
windowpane, "floats more than it buries" ("Poetic Nothingness," 20). As de Man
writes, "'buries' suggests death and disappearance, [whereas] 'floats' contains a
remote promise of survival" (26). But a survival without assurance that would
authorize it in advance, "a remote promise." The question then becomes if there
is something that endures, as de Man continues: "Does the action of total
consciousness reduce everything to nothingness, or does it permit the survival of
what for Mallarme ... can only be history?" What "floats" then is the memory of
a promise that history keeps by denying it, by temporizing it in its displacements,
by keeping what it at the same time destines to forgetting. Is this not the essence,
the impossible work of mourning? To keep close what one must renounce? The
157 The poem, taking contingency and shipwreck for its motif, is itself written in erratic, torrential
waves of free verse pouring across the pages, as we have seen earlier (cf. also note 158 below
where part of the poem and its typography is reproduced). The words themselves become the
disaster of being of which they speak.
161
poet's appears to be this impossible future. De Man: "The poet's action [the poet
who guilds himself with dreams - "But, in one who guilds himself with dreams /
Sadly sleeps a mandora / With music's void in its emptiness," 20] is the
annihilating action of all consciousness, but it might leave a trace, the work's
memory suspended in an ideal place and revealing that an action has occurred"
(26). What is revealed as an impossible witness that keeps a memory of the
disaster it mourns is a "mandora" that "sadly sleeps" in the poet; "sleeps,"
because it is an impossible witness whose speech would only perpetuate the
disaster, a silent witness that can only testify to the absence of its own
deposition; "sadly," de Man writes, "because it contains the essential tragedy of
which it is the formal incarnation" (26), mourning that it cannot name, that
mourns the loss of its name. And what it keeps from the sight of words is the
"music's void in its emptiness." Poetic imagination - that for Mallarme is not a
synthesizer of the Romantic experience but rather its allegorical defacer, as we
are trying to show - amidst emptiness and destruction of which it is the agent,
secrets - but also secretes, like a black widow - the "music's void," the future of
the song predicated upon the disaster it cannot name.IS8 The hollowness of
158 This line of "music's void in its emptiness" is a condensed echo of the one to appear inA
Throw of the Dice, where:
NOTHING
of the memorable crisis ...
WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE
an ordinary elevation pours out absence
BUT THE PLACE
some splashing below of water as if to disperse the empty act
abruptly which otherwise
by its falsehood
would have founded
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"mandora" is the hollowing of difference, an evacuated origin, or what may be
its reserve, in which alone poetry takes its beginning. Poetry begins in the
discretion of what it speaks. De Man: "The creux (emptiness) then describes the
instrument that produces music from its hollow center, like poetry issuing from
the consciousness of negation" ("Poetic Nothingness," 26). Mandora with its
pregnant form that "sadly sleeps" is the enduring image of the promise that
poetry keeps by breaking it. It is given hesitantly in the last tercet which
reintroduces "the window" that breaks the poetic vision but, by breaking, keeps
its gaze turned towards what its eyes will never have their fill of. The image is
one of promised but always uncertain birth, as indicated by the syntax, coming
from the threshold of all poetry: "Such that toward some window / Depending on
no womb but its own / Filial one could have been born" ("Poetic Nothingness,"
20). What might have been born is what remains without a name, perhaps a hope
that that the name would devastate, as de Man writes: "This something Mallarme
cannot name of course; short of rediscovering the true meaning of the verb 'to
name,' that would be to destroy the hope that remains" (27). If the hope cannot
be named then the whites and blanks, the nothingness into which it sinks, indeed
do "assume importance," as Mallarme writes in his "Preface" to A Throw of the
Dice (Collected Poems, 121). For de Man, however, they register a measure of
discontinuity that conditions all thought and sets a dispossessed consciousness on
what is an infinite procession of anamnesis or auto-affection: "The experience of
perdition
in these latitudes
of indeterminate
waves
in which all reality dissolves
(Collected Poems, 142).
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poetic nothingness that he apprehended so intensely, and that he conceived as the
inevitable correlative of consciousness itself, is a specifically 'romantic'
experience; it is Hegel's 'unhappy consciousness,' Holderlin's 'separation'
(Trennung) ... " (28). Out of this originary separation the pathos that shadows
Dasein is born. Time does not alleviate it because it is the very fabric of time, its
becoming and its passing away. But the poet takes comfort in it; it is the vein of
marble poetry keeps quarrying. As if one must
distinguish clearly enough between the Real and the Ideal. A modem
poet has even gone so far as to lament that' Action was not the sister of
Dream' [from Baudelaire's "St Peter's Denial"] 159 ••• Dear Lord, if it
were otherwise, if the Dream were thus debased and deflowered, where
would we retreat to, we unlucky ones whom the earth repels and for
whom the Dream alone offers refuge? Henri, my friend, seek your
sustenance from the Ideal. Earthly happiness is ignoble - you have to
have hands full of calluses if you're to pick it up. Saying "I'm happy!"
amounts to saying "I'm a coward" - and more often "I'm a fool." For
you have to avoid seeing above that ceiling of happiness the sky of the
Ideal, or else you have to close your eyes deliberately. (Mallarme,
Selected Letters, 22)
But the hope, "the Dream," that poetry constitutes by shedding it, in the
impossibility of its name, is itself nothingness, "a sterile specter," Mallarme
continues, stiffened on the empty page of poetry: " ... my heart, seized with
military ardor, leaps through hideous landscapes to lay siege to Hope's
stronghold, in order to plant on it this standard of fine gold. But my mad heart
realizes after this brief moment of folly, that Hope is merely a kind of veiled and
159 "-Believe it, as for me, I'll go out satisfied / From this world where the deed and dream do not
accord ... " From "St Peter's Denial," in Baudelaire's Revolt in The Flowers of Evil (Oxford and
New York: Oxford UP, 1993), p. 267.
164
sterile specter" (22). As if allegory, the "sterile specter," defeats the metaphor,
and, in defeat, opens the passage of awaiting, of eskhatos.160
The closing sentence of "Poetic Nothingness," however, distances
Mallarme from the depths of apophatic mysticism of the indivisible origin, a
dwelling that cannot be subjected to thematization and does not admit being or
thought (epekeina tes ousias, epekeina ti nou) that would scatter it in multiplicity
of partitions: "If I had to sum up his entire enterprise," de Man concludes, "I
would say that it is the nostalgic but categorical rejection of the temptation of the
occult" ("Poetic Nothingness," 28). It speaks thus not of sheltering of what
speech cannot say but rather of the inevitability of its betrayal to which speech
will have testified. In other words, in Mallarme, language, that,from the
beginning, is the shedding of identity, fully experiences the widowhood of its
own destiny.
What saves poetry then is the struggle that constitutes but also
incompletes it (" ... it is a struggle through and through and forever." de Man,
"Temptation," 36), that constitutes it by uprooting it. This incompletion,
160 Indeed, in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, de Man will return to Mallarme precisely to reassert
the nostalgia and valorization of anteriority implied in any thinking of eskhatos. Having spoken
of the impossibility of the poetic word to be epiphanic for Holderlin, de Man continues: "At other
times, the poet's loyalty toward his language appears so strongly that the object nearly vanishes
under the impact of his words, in what Mallarme called 'sa presque disparition vibrato ire. ' But
even in as extreme a case as Mallarme's, it would be a mistake to assume that the ontological
priority of the object is being challenged. Mallarme may well be the nineteenth-century poet who
went further than any other in sacrificing the stability of the object to the demands of a lucid
poetic awareness. Even some of his disciples [Valery, Claudel] felt they had to react against him
by reasserting the positivity of live and material substances against the annihilating power of his
thought ... Yet Mallarme himself had always remained convinced of the essential priority of the
natural object ... 'Nous savons, victimes d'une fonnule absolue, que certes n'est que ce qui est,'
writes Mallarme, and this absolute identity is rooted, for him, in 'la premiere en date, la nature.
Idee tangible pour intimer quelque realite aux sens frustes .... ,,, For Mallarme, he continues
further down, "the priority of nature is experienced as a feeling of failure and sterility, but
nevertheless asserted." Paul de Man, "Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image," in The
Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia UP, 1984), pp. 8-9. The Rhetoric of
Romanticism, hereafter RR.
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"through and through and forever," is nothing other than the sleepless negativity
that always and everywhere, unconditionally, puts to the question, makes every
ground - thought itself - tremble in a seizure of anxiety. It is what constitutes the
vigilance of thought and relegitimates the necessity of its critique. It is the
adrenal in of critical thought. An implacable pirouetting movement of a drilling
machine that punctures all veils of reconstituted totalities.i'" This is the piety and
the law of thought that, by this very law, is destined to fall short of its own
promise. Transcendence, for de Man, is an impassable threshold, but only so as
to be infinitely re-passed. Is this not where thinking is born? Thinking is born of
what makes it tremble and lose its bearings. It is magnetized always towards
what traumatizes it. It is madness itself that has no place. And only there, set
adrift, uprooted, does it truly happen, there in the night that obscures its vision
but makes it see. This is not an abdication of thought, for only where it abdicates
does it begin.
The "struggle" that for de Man is the beat of time in the work, its
rhythmos, that which also frays its edges, and, at the same time, announces the
dismembrance of being in its oblivion that is without messianic assurances of a
stopping point, is where Heidegger identifies a certain "common outline," or a
belonging, in the breach of the adversaries. In "The Origin of the Work of Art,"
Heidegger writes:
161 And there will be more on this machine in the succeeding chapters, and the machinic in de
Man, the unauthored, inhuman, triggered by a certain attraction/repulsion, here thematized as
"the struggle," that makes repetition compulsive - and where there is repetition there is also death
- but also, and paradoxically, the machine, because unauthored, makes "the event," the incursion
of the unforeseeable in the hermeneutic programs, possible, as we shall see.
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The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the
simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people. The
earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-
secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing. World and earth
are essentially different from one another and yet never separated. The
world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world ... The
opposition of world and earth is a striving ... In the struggle, each
opponent carries the other beyond itself. The more the struggle overdoes
itself on its own part, the more flexibly do the opponents let themselves
go into the intimacy of simple belonging to one another ... In setting up
a world and setting forth the earth, the work is an instigating of this
striving.l'"
For Heidegger, it is the "struggle," but in the struggle the alliance of the
"opponents," the torn irreconcilable difference which however consigns them
one to the other, as they only belong to one another precisely in the tearing (Riss)
that opposes them each to the other ("The conflict is not a rift [Riss] as a mere
cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong to
each other." "The Origin," 61), it is this tearing, division bound by the common
origin that constitutes the work. Its movement, as the movement of contraries
that belong to the intimacy of one another, does not abide by measure (rhythm)-
that is to say, law, history, finitude, spacing - but by the measure of the
measureless where the common origin, in its flight, refuses itself in the clarity of
its night: it can appear, Heidegger writes, "openly cleared as itself only when it is
perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable, that which
shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up" ("The
Origin," 46). It "juts through world" only by absenting itself, continually self-
162 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought (New
York: HarperCollins, 2001), 47-48. Hereafter cited as "The Origin."
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occulted. What de Man targets here, however, is precisely Heidegger's seductive
leaning towards "gathering" that would repair the wound of temporality that
scars being by constituting its historicity and that writing traces, but also, in one
swoop, close writing, insofar as writing, the devastation and crossing-out of
eRgffi - whose appearance it makes possible in its crossing-out, in which the
origin is announced and called for - is the condition of the possibility of history.
It is the unity of Grundriss, of common outline of belonging, that here for
Heidegger predates the uprootedness or technological alienation ihypomnesisv of
our experience and, like an axis, pivots the entire structure. What provides
remedy for the "fallen" condition to which our secular history testifies is poetry,
as the tracing of the common outline that is also the forgotten destiny of Being.
Poetry becomes a power insofar as it remains faithful to the originary destiny of
Being prior to its betrayal in historical determinations; in other words, insofar as
it traces abolition of difference that disfigures it - that is, time, history, politics -
in a transcendence that promises to reconstitute its shattered truth. This is an
aestheticized notion of history - that is to say, the negation of its politicity - as
the unveiling of the total work of art that removes the possibility of any (other)
reading or, in other words, of a misreading that is every reading, the incomplete
anthology of which constitutes the very essence of the politicali'" Heidegger's
later work is infected by this possibility of transcendence, what is referred to as
Kehre or "turn" in Heidegger, towards a certain "gathering" of what is man's
authentic destiny that (German) poetry shelters against its destitution in
163 The relation between reading - that is always other for de Man, and thus incomplete, as we
shall see in the next chapter - as a certain unravelling of the aesthetic, and politics, that there can
be no politics without reading, indeed, without a certain impossibility of reading, in a sense,
orients our thought on the political as it comes to unfold in the fmal chapter.
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technocracy as a specific and inevitable outcome of humanism. De Man's
objection here then, as Norris writes, is "a form of Ideologiekritik alert to
precisely the dangers and 'temptations' that attend such a project" (The Critique,
167).164De Man identifies in Heidegger a violence or an unjustifiable leap-
every totalisation for de Man is a violence and oppression, that is always
precipitate - that "carried by verbal analogies ... leaps over in a few moments
vertiginous distances, passing from the idea of struggle to that of unifying
contour" ("Temptation," 35). The passage concerned is the one in which the
tearing becomes "the rift-design" (Grundriss) or "the common ground:"
The conflict is not a rift (Riss) as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is
the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other. This rift carries
the opponents into the source oftheir unity by virtue of their common
ground. It is a basic design, an outline sketch, that draws the basic
features of the rise of the lighting of beings. This rift does not let the
opponents break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary
into their common outline. Truth establishes itself as a strife within a
being that is to be brought forth only in such a way that the conflict
opens up in this being, that is, this being is itself brought into the rift-
design. The rift-design is the drawing together, into a unity, of sketch
and basic design, breach and outline. ("The Origin," 61)
For de Man, however, there can be no repose. No rest is afforded in this
alliance of the contraries, no treaty signed or agreement ever reached - this is
what constitutes the work, its defiance to the impossible. The struggle, that is the
work, alone prevails. "To conserve being in its truth," de Man writes, "is to
164 Norris, however, is only half right here. As to why, it will become clear as we go on. Cf. also
last chapter, section 2, "Human Relapses, Inhuman Events," p. 278 and further, where this
particular problematic is taken up as integral to a more sustained argument.
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conserve the incessant struggle that constitutes it. .. " ("Temptation," 33). Poetry
does not begin until everything is unhooked. It tears everything open and, as the
ground gives in, a gap, like a wedge of fiction driven in the core of truth, bursts
open and spreads out, pivoting on the point of nothingness, revealing nothing
where everything takes place. "There is nothing here," he continues, "that could
not be translated into Hegelian terms ... there have to be two for there to be a
struggle; it is true that in the struggle opponents belong to each other ... [but] one
does not have this belonging in a unity of being, but only in a duality that is the
structure of dialectic" (34-35). No unity predates its rupture: "There will not be
reconciliation if there was unity" (35). Nothing is there to orient discourse - that
is, the circulation of being that has been shed in logos - towards its analogical
reappropriation. Being then is the site of its shedding without reserve, from the
beginning, and history is the manifesting of this shedding without stopping point
(Derrida's arret ).165 What is in question here already is the possibility of
political difference that pure negativity - as a certain deflation of dialectic
divested of its circularity, the beginning to which it would become equal at the
end - opens up. Being is such that in order to be itself it sheds itself; it is unequal
to itself. It cannot be thought of beyond the relation of difference - that is,
beyond relation in general, as every relation implies the interval or difference
that breaks it off so as to become a relation - in which it announces itself. Being
is then always and already other; it suffers from amnesia, an irrevocable memory
165 For all the valances of arret, arrest, sentence, decision, stopping point, interruption,
suspension, undecidability, etc., that enter here, cf. Derrida's essay on Blanchot's recit, L 'arret de
mort [Death Sentence]. Jacques Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines," in Deconstruction and
Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom et al. (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 62-143.
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loss of its own identity.l'" It is the multiplicity of its figures that constitute its
Wesen from the beginning and there can be no end to this partitioning which is
nothing other than finitude, that is, the manifesting of the forgetting of the origin
that would justify historical acts in a totality of gathered truths and deactivate
difference/writing that is the very pulse of the political, the uninterrupted
dissensus or invention of regional rationalities that fray the edge of, "wage a
war," Lyotard would say, on totalities and continue to inscribe the gaps of their
incompletion.l'"
The conflagration of "grand narratives" and the effraction of closure that
disrupt totalizing political "projects" in the call for identity have always been
inseparable from de Man's writing. Indeed, Derrida writes: "Every reading
proposed by Paul de Man, and recently rendered more and more explicitly, says
166 That this loss is also, and still, a mourning for de Man, is not in question here, but will become
after his tum to rhetoric, as we shall see. To quote Derrida on Levinas in Writing and Difference
here: " ... this eschatology which awaits nothing [insofar, that is, as it is "without return," or
identity irrevocably lost, as I mentioned above] sometimes appears infmitely hopeless. Truthfully,
in La trace de I'autre eschatology does not only 'appear' hopeless. It is given as such, and
renunciation belongs to its essential meaning [emphasis added]. In describing liturgy, desire, and
the work of art as ruptures of the Economy and the Odyssey, as the impossibility ofretum to the
same, Levinas speaks of an 'eschatology without hope for the self or without liberation in my
time'" ("Violence and Metaphysics," 118). Eschatology then, that puts the very meaning of
eskhatos, indeed itself, in question. What is important to bear in mind here, however;is that the
pathos of "renunciation," that will be discussed later in terms of de Man's authentic
understanding of "temporal predicament" that is "infinitely sorrowful," still belongs to the very
structure of poetic consciousness (the loss is still mourned) in his early writing. Later on,
however, it is rhetoric that will renounce this pathos of separation and a movement towards the
machinic will become apparent; it will be a question of renouncing the renunciation. Identity, as
we shall see, will be lost without grandeur.
167 In the appendix to The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard writes: "We
have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of
the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the
general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for
a return of terror, for the realisation of the fantasy to seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a
war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save
the honour of the name." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984),
pp. 81-82, emphasis added. The unpresentable for Lyotard is not a mourning for the "missing
contents" or "the lost narrative" but is writing itself-it is "perceptible ... in writing itself, in the
signifier" (80) - that is precisely what does not stop traumatising any closed structure or a
totality.
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something about institutional structures and the political stakes of hermeneutic
conflicts. The characteristics of these readings are most often discreet, but always
clear and incisive ... directed not so much against the profession or the
institution, but against the academisms of the right and the left ... " (Memoires,
142). De Man's reading resists precisely "the temptation of permanence" that
would foreclose the possibility of the political. The political is the space that
gathers round the loss of ground, emerges only by losing sight of what is in-
common. It states a permanent thinning out of Being in infinite faces of its
historicity that can never articulate the same origin that is in common. For
dispersion, as de Man says, "extends precisely to the foundation:"
How can Heidegger say that the work, insofar as it is contour, gathers
opposition in its unity [of the earth and the world that is, that introduces
decision and measure], and that in a manner apparently permanent? Is
being this unique foundation of their unity? But if two beings are
defined in their being as opposed, the common fact of being could not
constitute in itself a unifying principle, since their division extends
precisely to the foundation. The tearing apart is thus not Grundriss
(ground plan), that is, a groove in the foundation with a view to
construction, but Riss des Grundes, a tearing open of the foundation
itself that prevents all true construction ("Temptation," 35-36).
The division parts the crossing, the vision of crossing. Riss des Grundes,
also the ripping open of space at the centre that, like a hypomnesic machine,
prints out ink replicas and false constructions, constructions of cardboard
characters and silhouettes lacking depth and presence, surface structure that
everything bears but nothing holds according to some general pattern of the
source that distributes its operative concepts across the grid, following prescribed
172
linear movements, as the needle thrusts the paper to carve in it a diastem, both
the retention and an extension of the fictive limit, at once tearing and stitching
together, producing short-circuited copies - as nothing prescribes the movement
of the needle that jabs the paper - writing and erasing, crisscrossing and crossing
out along the evacuated centre, having no pattern, no blueprint, ceaselessly
inventive: writing. Any unity here is undone. If there is any, it is only ever an
effect of a throw of the rolling signifiers. The common outline, the unitary
"design" gets caught thus in the play of dice it cannot arrest (arreterv or hold
back. And the rolling never comes to a halt, never unrolls absolutely, because the
throw is re-launched without cessation along and by the gap. This is the vigil of
writing. There is never any unity finally gathered in a total arhythmos, only its
splitting in writing that is the tearing or spacing of the whole. De Man's early
work testifies to, is indeed part of, this shedding of identity in writing. In this
sense, it is committed to writing from the beginning. It divests thought of
transcendence, exacerbates it, and stamps on it a seal of its inadequacy, whose
glow, however, far from being extinguished in intellectual nihilism attributed to
de Man, is reignited with a promise of perfectibility, of to-come, Derrida would
say, of justice always to be done.
Riss des Grundes does not mean that division, consciousness lost for
intimacy where deferral itself no longer differs - differance as the becoming-
space of time and time of space - now becomes the originary signified, that it
takes place, replacing the empty place of truth, re-baptizing its vacancy so to
speak. It repeats, by repeating it, precisely the impossibility of any such place,
the always already of its breaking up that writes it. Riss des Grundes is the
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impossibility of (re)possession of meaning. It tears open and unravels the limits
of being, indefinitely.
Although a certain pathology of disenchantment, as we have seen, like an
unfinished Hegelian thread of mourning for the exiled subject left freezing on the
shoals of language, runs along the edge of his early writing shrouded in thin
existential garments, de Man was getting ready to throw them off. However, as
Norris writes of his early work,
the will to renounce ... - to do without what de Man calls 'the nostalgia
and the will to coincide' - still goes along with a certain attachment to
the idea of renunciation itself as a measure of authentic understanding.
Hence the very marked existentialist tonings of de Man's early essays,
the suggestion that authentic (undeluded) reading is capable of rising
above such forms of seductive or naive understanding. But this
standpoint proposes at least some residual notion of the reading self, of a
subjectivity that becomes all the more authentic as it manages to
renounce the false beguilements of premature meaning and method.
(The Critique, xvi)
The residue of pathos, of mourning and renunciation, Norris suggests,
trails unspoken and is present even after de Man's turn to rhetoric.168 This, in a
168 In the closing statements of The Critique, Norris concludes that "de Man's later work grew out
of an agonized reflection on his wartime experience, and can best be read as a protracted attempt
to make amends (albeit indirectly) in the form of an ideological auto-critique" (190). This, in line
with Geoffrey Hartman who sees "de Man's critique of every tendency to totalize literature and
language, to see unity where there is no unity ... [as] a belated, but still powerful, act of
conscience," would appear to confirm de Man's own confession that writing implies experience
of guilt, and could be seen as self-restorative, but he also says that "excuses generate the very
guilt they exonerate, though always in excess or by default" (Allegories, 299). "An act of
conscience" then, but one that compounds, rather than clears, guilt by writing it. And in Blindness
and Insight, he warns against this kind of convergence or "psychological fallacy of confusing the
impersonal self [of writing] with the empirical self of the life" (181), a mystification that opens
the possibility of confusing aesthetics with history that is precisely a form of aesthetic ideology
de Man's work disarticulates. In other words, de Man's work is not the work of disavowal and
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sense, would imply that de Man's entire critical oeuvre is an apology or expiation
for his youthful misguided ideals when cognition and its object seemed to
coincide and thought itself seemed capable of upheaval, leaving recognizable
marks of its agency on the world. For de Man, Norris writes, "rhetoric is a means
of disabling this project at its source, of showing how language always and
inevitably 'dissociates the cognition from the act,' thus reducing thought to an
endless reflection on its own incapacity for effecting radical change" (The
Critique, 2). There is no transcendence of ontological difference by which we are
- which may also be the end of ontology, but also its beginning. Consciousness is
destined to mourn its always untimely belatedness that intervenes between it and
its object: "The spirit cannot coincide with its object and this separation is
infinitely sorrowful.,,169 And it is language that expropriates, introduces the
separation. But by recognizing the pathos of our own predicament, the
recognition of what we must renounce, as de Man says in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality," "corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal
destiny" (206). The recognition of loss that inheres in our being also unveils our
authenticity. The measure of our authenticity indeed becomes "renunciation."
Authentic understanding is thus expiatory and de Man's writing becomes a
reflection shadowed by guilt on the naivete of his early publications that indeed
were to become his elegy.
personal redemption; if it is, by de Man's logic - not merely the logic of "Autobiography As De-
Facement" but his entire corpus - it inevitably fails.
169 In "The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism," an early essay from 1954, collected, however, in
Blindness and Insight, de Man writes: "This conflict can be resolved only by the supreme
sacrifice: there is no stronger way of stating the impossibility of an incarnate and happy truth.
The ambiguity poetry speaks of is the fundamental one that prevails between the world of the
spirit and the world of sentient substance: to ground itself, the spirit must tum itself into sentient
substance, but the letter is knowable only in its dissolution into non-being. The spirit cannot
coincide with its object and this separation is infinitely sorrowful" (237).
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There is indeed a residue of mutilated subjectivity present even in "The
Rhetoric of Temporality," an essay regarded by many, and by de Man himself,170
as the turning point in his critical thought now set on precisely voiding the
language of Hegelian pathos by turning to its rhetoricity and its material
properties free of any affective residue, marked rather by a-pathos:
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" is no longer solely concerned with the
division within self but also with the division within language. What
comes to the fore ... is not only the 'negative self-knowledge' but,
superimposed upon it, the linguistic awareness that 'the relationship
between sign and meaning is discontinuous.' This notion of division
within language, however, is not so innocuous a repetition 'on the level
of language' of the notion of division within self. .. It already attests to
an understanding of language as trope ... 171
The human predicament becomes a predicament inherent in language as
the autonomous tropological structure of substitutions and metonymic
displacements driven to extreme askesis. Language becomes inhuman. De Man:
"The way in which I can try to mean is dependent upon linguistic properties that
are not only [not] made by me, because I depend on the language as it exists for
the devices which I will be using, it is as such not made by us as historical
beings, it is perhaps not even made by humans at all" (RT, 87). We are now
170 In his "Foreword to Revised, Second Edition" of Blindness and Insight, de Man writes: "'The
Rhetoric of Temporality,' which I wrote around the same time as the papers collected in
Blindness and Insight, is a slightly different case. With the deliberate emphasis on rhetorical
terminology, it augurs what seemed to me to be a change, not only in terminology and in tone but
in substance. This terminology is still uncomfortably intertwined with the thematic vocabulary of
consciousness and of temporality that was current at the time, but it signals a tum that, at least for
me, has proven to be productive" (xii, emphasis added). Blindness and Insight, hereafter BI.
171 Minae Mizumura, "Renunciation," in The Lesson of Paul de Man, ed. Peter Brooks et al.
(special issue of Yale French Studies, vol. 69, 1985), pp. 90-91, emphasis added. Yale French
Studies, hereafter YFS. Mizumura's essay, however, still testifies to the impossibility of
renouncing the renunciation in de Man's writing (cf. below, note 173), that still keeps itself in its
erasure, precisely as erasure.
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unrecognisable in language and any vestiges of pathos that like "uncomfortable"
trappings warmed the nakedness of de Man's writing are now thrown off, as
language, having broken the fetters of its relation to the subject, shows its cold,
unfamiliar gaze. This is already at work in Allegories of Reading where the
material properties of language and their irreducibly random occurrences prior to
any consideration of reference or meaning destroy any possibility of continuity
that thus, for de Man, becomes a metaphorical aberration or an unwarranted
aesthetisation of what is irreducibly singular in service of ideology. Authenticity
for de Man is madness. What is authentic is "the materiality of the letter" (AI,
90). And there is neither compunction nor expiation there.
However uncomfortably, this leads us to the next chapter. And perhaps
the best way of introducing it is by way of a rhetorical question, de Man's way:
... asked by his wife whether he wants to have his bowling shoes laced
over or laced under, Archie Bunker answers with a question: "What's the
difference?" Being a reader of sublime simplicity, his wife replies by patiently
explaining the difference between lacing over and lacing under, whatever this
may be, but provokes only ire. HWhat's the difference" did not ask for difference
but means instead HI don't give a damn what the difference is. " The same
grammatical pattern engenders two meanings that are mutually exclusive: the
literal meaning asks for the concept (difference) whose existence is denied by the
figurative meaning. As long as we are talking about bowling shoes, the
consequences are relatively trivial; Archie Bunker, who is a great believer in the
authority of origins (as long, of course, as they are the right origins) muddles
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along in a world where literal and figurative meanings get in each other's way,
though not without discomforts. But suppose that it is a de-bunker rather than a
"Bunker, " and a de-bunker of the arche (or origin), an archie de-bunker such as
Nietzsche or Jacques Derrida for instance, who asks the question "What is the
Difference" - and we cannot even tell from his grammar whether he "really"
wants to know "what" difference is or isjust telling us that we shouldn't even try
to find out. Confronted with the question of the difference between grammar and
rhetoric, grammar allows us to ask the question, but the sentence by means of
which we ask it may deny the very possibility of asking. For what is the use of
asking, I ask, when we cannot even authoritatively decide whether a question
asks or doesn't ask?
- Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading
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Chapter Four
Reading Con: Rhetoric, Allegory and the Machine
Reading is the spanking [always hitting bottom in the
line a/hermeneutic address], the syncopation and
disturbance, the mechanically beating rhythm that has
been in part inherited from this practice at
understanding's terminus. It responds to a punishing
mechanicity, and, motored by the techno-epistemic
conversion, it proceeds according to the logic of
disturbance, casting the drama of understanding
against the comforting smoothness of interpretative
syntheses.
- Avital Ronell, Stupidity
Once upon a time, we all thought we knew how to read,
and then came de Man ...
- Wlad Godzich, "Caution! Reader at Work!"
I will speak, therefore, of reading.
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Archie Bunker's been had.172 Conned by his own language that
disconnects the intent: "That's not what I mean!" His wife doesn't get it, she fails
to read him: "What's the difference" means "I don't give a damn what the
difference is." It seems that misreading is risked every time we speak. Or is it
Archie that misreads his wife's ability to read that indeed reads him "correctly"
by spelling out the difference? Who is it that fails to read? Or is the failure of
reading inherent in every reading? "That's not what I mean!" is perhaps what
every text turns to scream back at us once we think we are rid of it. Something
unconsumed that compels reading will have always remained whenever there is
reading, whenever "literal and figurative meanings get in each other's way"
(Allegories, 9). This interference is what de Man calls rhetoric. I will speak,
therefore, of what in reading power breaks and turns against it, leaving skid
marks across the surface as it peels out against the textual grain. Rhetoric is both
the cause of reading failure and of its possibility. But the con of reading begins
before Arch(i)e, it begins with "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Its "deliberate
emphasis on rhetorical terminology," de Man writes, "augurs what seemed to me
to be a change, not only in terminology and in tone but in substance ... it signals a
tum that, at least for me, has proven to be productive" ("Foreword," BI, Xii).173
172 In "Semiology and Rhetoric" that opens Allegories of Reading, de Man uses an episode from a
television sitcom All in the Family at one instance in order to show an inherent duplicity of
language, its capacity to elide reference, and its unmasterability even when most trivial. It is
Archie's rhetorical question, "What's the difference?" that in the end testifies to the impossibility
of reading, of deciding "which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails,"
the figurative or the literal (Allegories, 10). Arch(i)e Bunker, an "origin" that commands the use,
the techne of language, is de-bunked, unmastered by his own art.
173 In her essay "Renunciation," Mizumura traces an ambivalence of de Man's rhetorical tum that
has never given up the existential moorings of his earlier writing, she argues, "the thematic
vocabulary of consciousness and of temporality." The tum, Mizumura writes, "is reached not as a
result of a disintegration but as a manifestation of the basic structure of tension that has provoked
de Man's use of the notion of renunciation [that is, as we have seen in the previous chapter,
renunciation of the seductive powers of identity as the condition of authentic knowledge] in the
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I will speak, therefore, of an-other reading that is never blank. but active,
always otherwise, allegorical. Reading, for de Man, always implies allegory as a
certain unwriting of historical erasures that he inherits from Benjamin as we shall
see, but it also implies a certain perfunctory mechanicity, the repetitive
clockwork stutter that prevents reading to fully unwind. One will have always
misread, added more and more turns that widen thus, each time and by each turn,
the gap that calls for its closure. Reading categorically misreads, even one that
thematizes misreading. "Deconstructive readings," de Man writes,
can point out the unwarranted identifications achieved by substitution,
but they are powerless to prevent their recurrence even in their own
discourse, and to uncross, so to speak, the aberrant exchanges that have
taken place. Their gesture merely reiterates the rhetorical defiguration
that caused the error in the first place. They leave a margin of error, a
residue of logical tension that prevents the closure of the deconstructive
discourse ... " (Allegories, 242)
Always in need of more reading to close reading. There is no final
signified that is not, in turn, given over to reading. In other words, we will never
have read enough, deciphering thus what is lost as a cipher, a written code that
supplements for what it defers in what is always another turn. Always in need of
first place. This structure continues to persist in his text even after the 'tum. '" Hence, she
concludes, "the story of de Man's 'tum' also becomes a story of an obsessive repetition" (YFS,
94). Yes, but obsessive precisely because the original structure of tension was nothing but
rhetorical from the beginning, pushed back under the surface of human error, and that now
returns with all the vigour and force of a primary discharge - the "exhilaration" andjouissance of
writing or the explosion of the subject. The fact is not that de Man, as Mizumura suggests, repeats
now in his rhetorical concerns, what he terms, the "unresolved obsessions" of his earlier writing
but rather that his earlier writing was obsessed with rhetoricity from the outset without knowing
it. If there ever was blindness in insight, it is evident in the following - de Man on the tum: "I am
not given to retrospective self-examination and mercifully forget what I have written ... When
one imagines to have felt the exhilaration of renewal, one is certainly the last to know whether
such a change actually took place or whether one is just restating, in a slightly different mode,
earlier and unresolved obsessions" ("Foreword," BI, xii).
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more writing to close writing. Which is to say, always in need of more language
to exorcise language and let other speak. "The most heroic effort to escape from
the prisonhouse of language only builds the walls higher," as Miller puts it in
"The Critic as HOSt.,,174Still, if an irreducible silence were not at the heart of
speech, there would be no speech. If something at the heart of reading were not
unreadable, as de Man would say, there would be no reading, nor would there be
a call for writing. It is this irreducible residue of some other that calls for its
reading, which will always narrate an allegory of its inability to read it. What is
constant in every reading is only its failure to read that it allegorizes and repeats
endlessly in a substitutive movement of successive (mis)readings that are without
truth, which would silence the call and close writing. And the closure of writing
is political. It is impossibility of reading that for de Man opens the textual field -
that is, writing in general. Writing, he will say, "can just as well be considered
the linguistic correlative of the inability to read. We write in order to forget our
foreknowledge of the total opacity of words and things or, perhaps worse,
because we do not know whether things have or do not have to be understood"
(Allegories, 203). Something first must be missing for the narrative to begin. But
as long as there is narrative, there will have been missed contents of narration.
All narrative, for de Man, is a narrative of its inability to denominate. This is a
structural flaw of language that makes language possible but always leaves a
residue of undecidability, which does not paralyse discourse but rather enables its
174 The walls are, however, strangely debordered, he continues on the next page, without any
"visible barrier." "One may move everywhere freely within this enclosure without ever
encountering a wall, and yet it is limited. It is a prison, a milieu without origin or edge. Such a
place is therefore all frontier zone without either peaceful homeland, in one direction ... nor, in
the other direction, any alien land ... " (189). This frontier line, that is not a line, is our domicile.
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politicisation. Indeed, what de Man calls rhetoric, that is, the radical figurality of
language or its representational shortfall- in other words, precisely that which
makes language epistemologically unreliable - is also what makes politics
possible. It is in the constitutive unmasterability of the signifier that politics will
have found its conditions of possibility. It is because of its inherent disobedience,
its penchant, so to speak, for missing its target, while keeping a phantom relation
to it, that something like politics is possible.!" This also destines politics to an
unceasing misreading of the social that is always incomplete. De Man thus points
towards a certain disaggregation of total politics - which would precisely
sanction the death of the political- that is radically anti-foundationalist.
The rhetorical turn then, usually misconstrued, Norris warns, as "a form
of'textualist' mystification, a last-ditch retreat from politics and history into the
realm of evasive textual strategies" (The Critique, 152), is what opens onto the
possibility of the political in de Man while at the same time liberating his
discourse from the claims of subjectivity and language of temporality - what
Norris calls the "existential pathos" (xvii), evident in his early work. De Man's
175 Much is made of missed hits, negative score lines and displaced targets in Avital Ronell's
chapter on de Man in her book entitled Stupidity, where the inability of language to score opens
precisely the site of infinite contestation that I here, in extension, call politics: "Never hitting
home, unable to score," she writes, "language is engaged in a permanent contest; it tests itself
continually in a match that cannot even be said to be uneven ... because the fact remains that this
match is ongoing, pausing occasionally only to count its losses. The contestatory structure,
yielding no more than a poor score, paradoxically depends upon failure for its strength and
empowerment." However, Ronell continues further down, this "contestatory match can never be
a dialectic but, being engaged in afundamental (mis)match, must, in a more Beckettian sense, go
on and on, seeking referent and refuge... Language never scores; it engages the experience of
failure, opening the test site to the irresolvable conflict between cognition and performance [that
is, rhetoric and grammar in de Man's precise terminology]." Avital Ronell, Stupidity (Urbana and
Chicago: Illinois UP, 2002), p. 99, emphasis mine. The "fundamental (mis)match" is the missing
fullness that language keeps dismembering while trying to fill it. In terms of the political, this
suggests that the body politic is never total but always open, wounded on one side, which
permanently prevents its identification with the fullness of meaning that it tries to embody. In-
stability of reference, its broken, aberrant trajectory that conditions reading as the site where
meaning is contested, is radically democratic.
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turn is thus also an implicit tum towards the political, in this case, the politics of
representation and aesthetic ideology that will become the increasing concern of
his later writing. As Derrida writes in Memoires: "'Reactionaries' and 'political
activists' in truth misunderstand, in order to protect themselves, the political
stake and structure of the text, the political allegory of the literary text, no less
than the allegorical and literary structure of the political text ... The word
'political' is perhaps no longer only appropriate; it is also allegorical" (142, 43).
It is a misencounter between the name on the one hand and the thing on the other
- an encounter distinctively allegorical according to de Man, because allegory is
precisely a misrecognition of the referent - that offers language its
manoeuvrability but also, and with it, offers room for misdirection, the rhetorical
play of misreadings that cannot be separated from political strategies.i" And it is
only an axiology, as Derrida says in "White Mythology," one "supported by a
theory of truth" - precisely an aesthetic ideology - that can arrest the play of this
uncertainty. And "this axiology," he continues, "belongs to the interior of
rhetoric. It cannot be neutral" (241, emphasis added).
Larger stakes are thus at play in Archie Bunker's misreading of
difference in the passage earlier quoted. The radical unease in the relation
176 Political strategies always imply a desedimentation of total structures or, what is in effect, a
decentring of the social. At least seen in the context of radical politics, strategy implies a voiding
of the ontological fiat that would ground the moment of political institution. Strategies are a trace
of the contingency within the structure of the political; this is what makes politics possible but
also what makes it essentially incomplete or impossible, if you like. In his essay "Deconstruction,
Pragmatism, Hegemony," Emesto Laclau writes: "For strategy is at the heart of any action which
can be called political. Strategy involves, in an indissociable synthesis, a moment of articulation -
the institution of the social; a moment of contingency, as far as that institution is only one among
those that are possible in a given context; and a moment of antagonism - the institution being
only possible through a hegemonic victory over conflicting wills." Deconstruction and
Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 66. And
"strategy" here cannot be dissociated from de Man's definition of reading as misreading; they are
interchangeable. Hereafter cited as DP.
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between rhetoric and grammar, as we shall see, will always produce misreadings.
For de Man, misreading is the correlative of the rhetorical or tropological nature
of language. Every reading is thus a misreading. Trope, de Man says, "is not a
derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language but the linguistic paradigm par
excellence. The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode among others but
it characterises language as such" (Allegories, 105, emphasis added). As soon as
this radical rhetoricity of language is recognised, the possibility of reading is
placed in question: " ... far from constituting an objective basis for literary study,
rhetoric implies the persistent threat of misreading." 177 It is thus the very nature
of language that makes reading problematic. All language is figurative, and, as
such, structurally fallible. This systematic dysfunctionality of language is what
every narrative attempts to correct but only repeats as an allegory of its own
misreading.l " The "persistent threat of misreading" implied in language,
however, is not an "aberration" of meaning, to use de Man's idiom, but rather its
condition of possibility. To the extent that all language is figurative, all language
is aberrant: as soon as in the territory of language, one is in the territory of
aberration - that is to say, from the beginning, one has never left aberration.
Archie Bunker, by making meaning impossible, de Man reminds us, as "the same
177 Paul de Man, "Literature and Language: A Commentary" From Appendix B to Blindness and
Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 285.
178 Put in terms of the critic and his text, Miller writes of the same aporetic experience: "The
critic's attempt to untwist the elements in the texts he interprets only twists them up again in
another place and leaves always a remnant of opacity, as yet unravelled. The critic is caught in
his own version of the interminable repetitions ... [that he] experiences as his failure to get his
poet right in a final decisive formulation which will allow him to have done with that poet, once
and for all ... [He] can never show decisively whether or not the work of the writer is 'decidable,'
whether or not it is capable of being definitively interpreted. The critic cannot unscramble the
tangle of lines of meaning, comb its threads out so they shine clearly side by side. He can only
retrace the text, set its elements in motion once more, in that experience of the failure of
determinable reading which is decisive here" ("The Critic as Host," 202-03). Decisive is
precisely the undecidability that sets everything in motion.
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grammatical pattern engenders two meanings that are mutually exclusive: the
literal meaning [that] asks for the concept (difference) whose existence is denied
by the figurative meaning" (Allegories, 9), in fact, makes possible the conditions
of its production. The true nature of language is revealed only when its promise
of communication fails. This is the double rapport of all reading. Or in de Man's
words: "Die Sprache verspricht (sich) ["Language promises" but also, and at the
same time, "Language makes a slip of the tongue"]; to the extent that [it] is
necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys the promise of its
own truth" (Allegories, 277).179 But is this not a gift of language? Language as
given that traces the legacy of its deceit in the gift of text?
Something in de Man testifies precisely to this failed economy of the gift,
always implied whenever there is text.180 For whenever there is text, something
179 "Language promises" and slips, "makes a slip of the tongue," promising only itself (sich), is 1.
Hillis Miller's translation from "Promises, Promises: Speech Act Theory, Literary Theory, and
Politico-Economic Theory in Marx and de Man," in New Literary History, vol. 33.1 (2002), pp.
1-20.
180 In Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, Derrida writes: "The defmition of language, of a
language, as well as of the text in general, cannot be formed without a certain relation to the gift,
to giving-taking and so forth, having been involved [engagel there in advance ... Even before
speaking of some gift or division [partage] of languages, it is not insignificant that one speaks of
language as a given, as a system that is necessarily there before us, that we receive from out of a
fundamental passivity ... Language gives one to think but it also steals, spirits away from us,
whispers to us [elle nous souffle], and withdraws the responsibility that it seems to inaugurate; it
carries off [and "carries off" without return, as we shall see] the property of our own thoughts
even before we have appropriated them." Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money,
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1992), p. 80, emphasis added. Hereafter
cited as Given Time. One could compare this to an interview following "Conclusions: Walter
Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator'" (1983) transcribed in The Resistance to Theory where
de Man, discussing Benjamin and the inhuman quality of language, will say: "Language is not
human, it is God-given: it is the logos, as that which God gives to man. Not specifically to man,
but God gives, as such ... something which man receives, as such, at a certain moment, and with
which he has nothing to do ... " And on the next page: "That it [the gift of language] is divine or
not makes little difference, and the more you take the sacred out of this picture, the better. But it
indicates a constant problem about the [nonhuman] nature of language ... That there is a
nonhuman aspect of language is a perennial awareness from which we cannot escape, because
language does things which are so radically out of our control that they cannot be assimilated to
the human at all, against which one fights constantly" (100-101). Language as a gift that steals in
both cases. And it robs us of the human aspect, of "the whole notion of language as natural
process" (101, emphasis added) that has always been attached to it. It is this organicist or vitalist
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will have slipped away without return. Gift, Derrida says, is a priori excessive,
beyond measure and thus beyond reckoning. It is what does not return home or
rather what home (oikos) does not master or manage. Language is first, Derrida
reminds us, an economy (" ... one must also remember first of all that language is
as well a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking - and of exchange."
Given Time, 81). But a failed one; an economy of loss without which there would
be no narrative. There must have been a default first, a totality less than equal to
itself, for narrative to have began to supplement it. But narrative only ever
compounds this originary debt in arrears. It is always in the state of belatedness.
Language is always behind in the fulfillment of a duty or obligation it promises.
But then, one could not speak of a promise without this belatedness, without this
essential failure to meet it. Every narrative, for de Man, testifies to the
(im)possibility of this promise to be done, to close the books. Language seen as
the circle of symbolic operators, the system of regulated turns (tropoi) and
substitutions that stabilizes relations without remainder, is a mock archive of an
aesthetic fantasy de Man puts in question. Gift would be the sabotage of this
fantasy, a genetic trace and a left-over of its failure. The blind matter of language
heterogeneous to any stable semantic totalisation - what will later be thematized
as the inhuman - its constitutive arbitrariness and its madness, is the effraction of
all circles. But also what can never be accounted for without reinstating it within
the economy it interrupts - that is, without another referential violence. De
Man's reading could be seen as a testimony (if there can be one, Derrida would
notion of language, its genetic model, that is put in question both in OfGrammatology and in
Allegories of Reading. In de Man, the inhuman is the gift, that which, in language, is "radically
out of control" and which cannot be assimilated to the oikos but makes oikos - both as home and
economy - possible.
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say) to the possibility of the gift, the possibility that something, some other,
without expectation, comes. The circle of exchange can only begin if there were
some gift, some inhuman, that is to say, some rupture of equivalence or
unequalness, at the beginning. It is this rupture that lends wings to the tropic drift
of rhetoric. Coins of language or tropes only move on the condition of this gift
that strictly prohibits precisely the exchange it seems to set in motion. Rhetoric is
the economic machine of language, the balancing of its books, and, at same time,
it points to the imbalance that no books can account for, the imbalance that
assures the possibility of books. A machine that is also then a constant reminder
of its malfunction.
Rhetoric, for de Man, like literature, is an operative term ("The key to
[the] critique of metaphysics, which is itself a recurrent gesture throughout the
history of thought, is the rhetorical model of the trope or, if one prefers to call it
that, literature." Allegories, 15). It is both constative and performative. Rhetoric
stabilises the essential instability, the referential power failure inherent in
language. It "articulates," de Man would say, "a random noise into a definite
pattern." 181 In other words, it allows for the illicit substitution of metaphoric and
phenomenal orders that engenders consistent conceptual systems.l'" This was
181 Paul de Man, "Shelley Disfigured," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia
UP, 1984), p. 107.
182 This specular structure is the condition of all cognitive understanding: "the mind occurs as the
distortion which allows one to make random regular by 'forgetting' differences" ("Shelley
Disfigured," 107, emphasis added). Following Nietzsche here, thought itself is a falsification
from the very beginning; it "occurs as [a] distortion" and a forgetting. And it is the figure that
"forgets" precisely by forgetting its rhetorical status, as de Man will say: " ... language performs
the erasure of its own positions ... " (119). Far from being only unreliable, knowledge, for de Man,
has always been radically privative.
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already a thematic concern of his earlier writingl83 - Riss des Grundes, as we
have seen in the previous chapter, that opens up temporality and the possibility of
the political that presupposes a certain disinheritance of truth and the inability of
time - as long as there is time - to make up for its loss, but temporality now is a
specifically linguistic category produced by the impossibility of metaphorical
closure or the radical referential dyslexia. Rhetoric, however, is also what
performs the undoing of its own aberrant mode, the fact that "all discourse has to
be referential but can never signify its actual referent" (Allegories, 160)184 - this
is what produces temporality; it is rooted, like any other category, in what is a
linguistic ruse of metaphor, as this late passage from his lecture on Benjamin,
and a certain destinerrance of language we have already discussed, states in no
equivocal terms:
Now it is this motion, this errancy of language which never reaches the
mark, which is always displaced in relation to what it meant to reach, it
is this errancy of language ... that Benjamin calls history. As such,
history is not human, because it pertains strictly to the order of
language; it is not natural for the same reason; it is not phenomenal, in
the sense that no cognition, no knowledge about man, can be derived
from a history which as such is purely a linguistic complication; and it is
not really temporal either, because the structure that animates it is not a
temporal structure. Those disjunctions in language do get expressed by
temporal metaphors, but they are only metaphors. The dimension of
futurity, for example, which is present in it, is not temporal but is the
183 Christopher Norris also calls attention to the continuity of a certain "unswerving conviction"
that shadows all de Man's writing. From the earliest to "his final essays, Norris writes, "he
remained quite unswerving in this conviction that any move to short-circuit the gap between
phenomenal and semantic orders of sense was merely a deluded attempt to escape the problems
faced by all authentic reflection on language, thought, and reality" (The Critique, 3).
184 Or, "Such is language: it always thrusts but never scores. It always refers but never to the right
referent" (RR, 285).
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correlative of the figural pattern and the disjunctive power ... locate[d]
in the structure of language. (RT, 92)
And the tropological model of this "disjunctive power," of temporality as
a failure of identity or the inability of truth to approximate itself other than in a
narration of its own impossibility, is allegoria - that is, other or another
speaking.l'" It is in the errancy of language that texts initiate which is why they
always trace the disruptive power of its figuration. Texts thus always imply an
allegorical moment - a moment of otherness or rhetorical "self-awareness" - of
their own unreadability that makes them possible. "The allegorical representation
of Reading," de Man writes, is
the irreducible component of any text. All that will be represented in
such an allegory will deflect from the act of reading and block access to
its understanding. The allegory of reading narrates the impossibility of
reading. But this impossibility necessarily extends to the word "reading"
which is thus deprived of any referential meaning whatsoever.
(Allegories, 77, emphasis added)
Unreadability is the condition of possibility of reading. The referential
flight of meaning that the text narrates, its failure to state what it knows, is what
de Man calls allegory.
I8S De Man on Proust inAllegories of Reading: "As a writer, Proust is the one who knows that the
hour of truth, like the hour of death, never arrives on time, since what we call time is precisely
truth's inability to coincide with itself. A la recherche du temps perdu narrates the flight of
meaning, but this does not prevent its own meaning from being, incessantly, in flight" (78,
emphasis added).
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Allegory's Contresens: "To brush history against the grain"
- From Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History"
In his reading of Proust, de Man singles out an episode where Marcel reflects on
the nature of allegorical blockage. Swann, who has a keen eye for analogy,
compares the kitchen maid to Giotto's allegorical representation of Charity. But
the metaphor, de Man writes, "by generalising itself in its own allegory ... seems
to have displaced its proper meaning" (Allegories, 73). Its semantic valence has
been carried out of the limits the power of analogical relation confers: "The
kitchen maid resembles Giotto's Charity, but it appears [to Marcel] that the
latter's gesture also makes her resemble Francoise ... if the image, as a
representation, also connotes Francoise, it widely misses its mark, for nothing
could be less charitable than Francoise, especially in her attitude toward the
kitchen maid (Allegories, 76).186 In other words, the vehicle or the figure of the
186 Anxiety of reference, however, is thematized even before Marcel (un)ties Charity's gesture to
the uncharitable cook Francoise: " ... and she [Charity] holds out to God her flaming heart, or, to
put it more exactly, she 'hands' it to him, as a cook hands a corkscrew through the skylight of her
cellar to someone who is asking her for it at the ground-floor window." Marcel Proust, The Way
by Swann's, trans. Lydia Davis, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p.
83, emphasis added. It is just before this that Proust begins to dramatize the power of allegory to
destabilise the narrative continuity by placing in question its referential status that opens young
Marcel to the anxiety of reference, which is ultimately unrewarding: "What was more, she herself
[the kitchen maid], poor girl, fattened by her pregnancy even in her face, even in her cheeks,
which descended straight and square, rather resembled, in fact, those strong, mannish virgins,
matrons really, in whom the virtues are personified in the Arena [the Arena Chapel in Padua].
And I realise now that those virtues resembled her in another way. Just as the image of this girl
was increased by the added symbol she carried before her belly without appearing to understand
its meaning, without expressing in her face anything of its beauty and spirit [the beauty and virtue
of charity], as a mere heavy burden, in the same way the powerful housewife who is represented
at the Arena below the name 'Caritas' ... embodies this virtue without any thought of charity
seeming ever to have been capable of being expressed by her vulgar, energetic face" (83,
emphasis added). And further down: "Envy, too, might have had more of a particular expression
of envy" (83). Allegory then narrates precisely the dissonance - one that is initially displeasing
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metaphor designates the reference of its ground split by two incompatible
meanings unable to coexist, which makes the passage unreadable. The passage
literally becomes a non-passage or an impasse for Marcel. The dissonance
between the vehicle and the tenor does not create tension but tears the connective
tissue of the metaphor apart as soon as it is allegorised: "From the structural and
rhetorical point of view ... all that matters is that the allegorical representation
leads towards a meaning that diverges from the initial meaning to the point of
foreclosing its manifestation" (Allegories, 75, emphasis added). What is
foreclosed then is the possibility of reading. Allegoria that haunts the text as its
undecidability comes here to arrogate the power of conferring meaning that it has
at the same time displaced. It disassembles the trap of literalism set up by
tropological systems and, at least, "states the truth of its aberration" (76) - this,
however, as de Man cautions, does not make allegory more authentic or
epistemologically reliable. Reference caught in a double bind that allows of no
adjudication of meaning becomes the allegorical representation of reading that
disables the semantic grid. Indeed,
[a] literal reading of Giotto' s fresco would never have discovered what
it meant, since all the represented properties point in a different
direction. We know the meaning of the allegory only because Giotto,
substituting writing for representation, spelled it out on the upper frame
of his painting: KARiTAS. We accede to the proper meaning by a direct
act of reading, not by the oblique reading of the allegory. (77, emphasis
added)
for Marcel, and displeasing because disjunctive, and unaesthetic in the Benjaminian sense -
between the sign and its meaning. Both the kitchen maid and Charity are allegorical
representations of virtue only insofar as they are incapable of representing it. What ties them
together is the unreadability of their own narration. They both express what allegory does not
narrate; they allegorize, in other words, only the impossibility of narration.
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If anything, allegory signifies the errancy of what it states, a certain
aporetic irregularity that disconnects the narrative pattern, now troubled and
nervous, no longer able to know what it means. There is a sort of static between
the allegorical sign and its reference that questions the very possibility of
connection.l'" It is "this Charity without charity," as Marcel reflects in Proust,
"this Envy which looked like nothing more than a plate in a medical book ... a
Justice whose greyish and meanly regular face was the very same which, in
Combray, characterised certain petty, pious and unfeeling bourgeois ladies I saw
at Mass, some of whom had long since been enrolled in the reserve militia of
Injustice" (The Way by Swann's, 84). There is thus a disturbance or a
tropological derailment of substitutive patterns that would stabilise the text.
Mirrors are broken, the specular structure fissured, pieces do not really coincide
as the moment of identity is ripped through by a mismatch that makes the part
larger than the whole that would contain it: the face of Charity goes beyond
charity it seeks to represent; it is "vulgar, energetic" (83), uncharitable, charity
defaced. Allegory splinters the text or rather makes its splinters blind the reader
in his attempt to read it - paradoxically however, the reader that fully sees is the
one that refuses to read. In case of this particular passage from Proust, "a single
187 Reading a paragraph from Allegories of Reading, 1. Hillis Miller identifies allegory precisely
as a figure of unread ability. Allegory, he writes, "means to say it otherwise in the marketplace, in
public, as an esoteric expression of an esoteric wisdom. As in the case of parable, for example,
the parables of Jesus in the Gospels, this is the way of revealing it and not revealing it. If you
have the key to the allegory, then the esoteric wisdom has been expressed (otherwise), but then
you would not have needed to have it said otherwise. If you do not have the key, then the allegory
remains opaque. You are likely to take it literally, to think it means just what is says. If you
understand it you do not need it. If you do not understand it you never will do so from anything
on the surface. A paradox of unreadability is therefore built into the concept of allegory from the
beginning." "'Reading' Part of a Paragraph in Allegories of Reading," in Reading de Man
Reading (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 162. Hereafter cited as RDR.
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icon engenders two meanings, the one representational and literal, the other
allegorical and 'proper,' and the two meanings fight each other with the blind
power of stupidity" (Allegories, 76). Blind, because none can see the
arbitrariness of its own insight: the allegorical, for Marcel, is unwarranted
because it reads what it does not state; the representational, by reading what it
states, reads "improperly." But it is in this blindness that the text is born as a
testimony to its own ruin and it is in it alone that reading can continue. Fully
having read, or thinking one has, is not to have read at all. For reading, as de
Man continues, is "something else:"
Everything in this novel signifies something other than what it
represents ... it is always something else that is intended. It can be
shown that the most adequate term to designate this "something else" is
Reading. But one must at the same time "understand" that this word
bars access, once and forever, to a meaning that yet can never cease to
call out for its understanding. (77)
To read is to have misread, to have read otherwise, to have already
deserted what one reads. This "otherwise" keeps the call for its understanding
open. It is also what destines reading to a certain messianicity but without the
proleptic element of expectation - found in Benjamin, as we shall see - that one
will ever have read properly. As Miller suggests in The Ethics of Reading:
"Referential statements [that would ground the text] ... are aberrant not in the
sense of wandering away from some ascertainable norm, but in the sense of
being a perpetual wandering from beginning to end ... we have no way to
measure whether or not they are aberrant. All we can know is that they may be in
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error.,,188This uncertainty is what opens finitude and the possibility of reading.
Finitude that is nothing other than the opening to the future of reading. The text,
as long as there is one, will always have cut itself loose from the truth of its
reading, although it may carry its remains in the odd number of its creases that,
unfolded, never really add up. And, as long as the text makes reading impossible,
as long as there is unreadability that, as de Man says, "necessarily extends to the
word 'reading," (Allegories, 77), there will have been time for reading.
Unreadability that is constitutive of the text is what gives us time to read.
Allegory of reading becomes the accountant of time. And this is the shift: what
produces time, the ontological difference, the division inherent in Being from his
earlier writing, is now a tropological predicament.l'" What is internally rent is
1881. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading (New York: Columbia UP, 1987), p. 57, emphasis
added. Hereafter cited as ER. Although Miller does not say so explicitly, this is precisely what
tears open a space for ethics. There is an imperative, what one must do, only against, and indeed
in spite of, the originary instability of its ground. One must precisely insofar as one does not have
to - this is the force of the imperative that commands only against the fundamental unensurability
of what grounds it. Without this contingency the imperative would lose the force of its exigency;
in its very categoricity, in other words, it is shadowed by a possible contingency. In "LECTIO: de
Man's Imperative" collected in Reading de Man Reading, Werner Hamacher writes: "There can
be an imperative only because the referential function finds no correspondence in that
imperative ... Therefore every imperative must remain exposed to the question of whether it is not
merely in the service of contingent authorities and ephemeral experiences" (RDR, 186).
189 So in "The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism" (1954), collected in Blindness and Insight, for
instance, de Man writes that the "problem of separation inheres in Being, which means that social
forms of separation derive from ontological and meta-social attitudes. For poetry, the divide
exists forever" (240). The transition to strictly linguistic concerns does not have to wait until The
Resistance to Theory and his lecture on Benjamin where they are announced perhaps most
categorically, it is, of course, already at work in Allegories of Reading, where, when discussing
Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality, the same "forms of social separation" and specifically of
polity derive from the tension between "the referential and the figural semantic fields" (157),
which is to say from the rhetorical model. The political destiny - in Heidegger's terms, Being-in-
the-world, or the originary sociality of Being, as Dasein, especially in Nancy's reading of
Heidegger, is first (and last) a Being-with, a Mitsein, that is, cut across by the other before it is
itself, which opens from the outset onto logos and the possibility of the political- "the political
destiny of man," de Man says here, "is structured like and derived from a linguistic model that
exists independently of nature and independently of the subject [that is, intention] ... Contrary to
what one might think, this enforces the inevitably 'political' nature or, more correctly, the
'politicality' (since one could hardly speak of 'nature' in this case) of all forms of human
language ... " And further down, "If society and government derive from a tension between man
and his language, then they are not natural (depending on a relationship between man and
things ... nor theological, since language is not conceived as a transcendental principle but as the
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language that constitutes us. The ontico-ontological determination of Being is
linguistic before it is ontological. 190 But language, de Man writes, "is not
conceived as a transcendental principle" but precisely as "the possibility of
contingent error" (Allegories, 156). And only because of this possibility,
inscribed in the very materiality of language, can there be anything like time or
the existential unfolding of Being in its hard and singular, mutilated faces.
Indeed, in the closing paragraphs of Allegories of Reading, de Man will say that
"[t]he main point of the reading has been to show that the resulting predicament
is linguistic rather than ontological or hermeneutic" (300). The predicament is
the impossibility of reading, the inability of language to denominate - which is to
say rhetoric - that is not derivative but constitutive of all language. Insofar as
there is something like language, referential indeterminacy remains irreducible.
And this "unensurability of meaning," as Hamacher writes, "is not an effect of
the temporal succession in which the text unfolds, as phenomenological and
historicist hermeneutic approaches would happily assume, nor is it a
consequence of the historical distance between the text and its understanding. On
possibility of contingent error" (156, emphasis added). What is important here apart from "the
originary politicality of all forms of human language" made possible in de Man's case by radical
allegorization of the "natural link" constitutive of all language is precisely the transition from
ontological to rhetorical discursive levels. The "political destiny of man" is no longer ontological
but rhetorical, "derivedfrom a linguistic model."
190 Even Dasein 's most proper possibility, "that possibility," Heidegger says, "which is one's
ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped," (Being and Time, 294), the
very site of one's irreplaceability, one's ownmost, and at the same time, one's uttermost
possibility: death, now receives no special treatment. So, in an essay "Autobiography As De-
Facement," de Man writes: "Death is a displaced namefor a linguistic predicament, and the
restoration of mortality by autobiography (the prosopopeia of the voice and the name) deprives
and disfigures to the precise extent that it restores. Autobiography veils a defacement of the mind
of which it is itself the cause" (RR, 81, emphasis added). De Man here discussing the
(dis )figurative power of prosopopeia that takes away what it seems to give: voices are struck
dumb and faces it confers defaced.
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the contrary, time and history are first opened up by the semantic indeterminacy
of language" (RDR, 174, emphasis added).
Rhetoric then is the possibility of misrecognition that is disintegrative and
allegory, for de Man, is the figure that makes this possibility apparent. Allegory
is always an allegory of figure, a counter-narrative in every text that narrates the
story of its own possibility of misrecognition or, in de Man's words, "of its own
denominational aberration" (Allegories, 162). It is a process of deconstruction
that exposes the unwarranted conceptual systems that substitute reference for
signification in a bid to finally close off the textual field. Inability to read keeps
this field open; it is the very source of reading and its takings. For what is
reading if not an allegory of its own repetitive failures to read that keeps the field
of signification open to continual renegotiation: the very revenue of reading. For
de Man, Ronell writes, "[r]eading involves the undoing of interpretative figures
to the extent that it questions whether any synthesis, any single meaning, can
close off a text and adequately account for its constitution ... [it] 'states the logic
of figures and the logic of narratives to be constantly divergent'" (Stupidity, 104,
emphasis added).191 But allegory itself, as suggested earlier, is a figure, de Man
191 Ronell, however, distinguishes here between interpretation and reading: "In contrast to
interpretation, which involves a development over the course of a narrative toward a single figure
reconciling all it diverse moments, 'reading 'states the logic of figures and the logic of narratives
to be constantly divergent." (104). This distinction is highly problematic, not only because the
shades of its edges are impossible to delimit - where does reading begin and interpretation end? -
but also because it annuls, in a stroke, the very premise of Aesthetic Ideology and politico-
epistemic stake in reading. It surreptitiously postulates the possibility of authentic or correct
reading that somehow precedes interpretative process and regulates the field of its supplementary
distribution. De Man makes no such claim for his reading but, on the contrary, repeatedly states
(in Allegories of Reading alone, pp. 162, 205, 240, 242, 275) the impossibility of any reading,
including his own, not to forget its rhetorical status. Reading cannot not be referential: "All
readings are in error because they assume their own readability" (Allegories, 202), but this is
precisely what opens it to further "mortification." This is why we never will have fmished
reading. Reading both {con)states and performs the undoing its own statement. It "never ceases to
partake of the very violence against which it is directed" ("Shelley Disfigured," 119). For de
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continues, that can "only repeat this aberration on various levels of rhetorical
complexity" (Allegories, 162). In other words, allegory does not escape its own
figurative mode. Its reactive incision that opens up closed conceptual systems
will necessarily lead to another stabilisation of the semantic field that takes its
own undoing as the referential closure. In other words, allegory as a figure
necessarily reiterates the referential model of its undoing that calls for another
reading: "Texts engender texts as a result of their necessarily aberrant semantic
structure; hence the fact that they consist of a series of repetitive reversals ... "
(Allegories, 162). Whenever reading stops, it does so prematurely. The
possibility of referential reading, however, is the teleological closure of all
language - te/os of any figure is disfiguration'V - and this possibility cannot be
outdone but it only relegitimates a call for endless critical vigilance of
deconstruction. Deconstruction that will never come to rest. This is why de Man
can write that "deconstructive discourses are suspiciously text-productive"
(Allegories, 200). What deconstruction cannot reach is closure; it cannot
complete itself, which is why it is not a system but rather a reading of inevitable
misreading inherent to all systems.
Man, reading is always already an interpretation - it is never blank or passive - and, only in that
it is, does it constantly call for revision, which keeps open the field of its multiple futures.
192 "The repetitive erasures by which language performs the erasure of its own positions can be
called disfiguration" ("Shelley Disfigured," 119).
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De Man's entire writing on rhetoric as a machine for undoing urgency193
is thus motivated by allegory and its first tentative formulation is developed in
"The Rhetoric of Temporality.v" As Waters suggests in his introduction to de
Man's Critical Writings, 1953-1978: "With his title ["The Rhetoric of
Temporality"] ... de Man gestured two ways, backward with the Heideggerian
word 'temporality' and forward with the word 'rhetoric.' In this essay he still
employed the Heideggerian terminology, but it was being displaced by that of
193 Introducing Blindness and Insight, Wlad Godzich writes: "Rhetoric, as a mode of language,
accommodates itself to human finitude, for, unlike other modes, it need not locate anything
beyond its boundaries: it operates on the materiality of the text and achieves effects ... de Man's
rhetorical inquiry consists in recognising the fmiteness of the text and in bringing out its
rhetorical machine" (xxviii). Rhetoric, as earlier suggested, is thus a historical structure of
aftereffects, a machine of misalignments in the text that produce its temporal structure. Trope
produces the very sense of that which it turns aside in deferral. Wlad Godzich, "Introduction:
Caution! Reader at Work!" Introduction to Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of
Contemporary Criticism by Paul de Man (London: Routledge, 1983), pp. xv-xxx,
194 The essay, hereafter referred to as "The Rhetoric," was written for a conference at John
Hopkins University in 1968 and subsequently published the following year. It was later included
in the revised 2nd edition of Blindness and Insight, 1983. Its radical impact is perhaps best
illustrated by David Lehman's account: '''The Rhetoric of Temporality' acquired renown as 'the
most photocopied essay in literary criticism.' Students passed it round, and more often than not
the copy was heavily underlined with an exclamatory 'wow' or two in the margins. 'You could
save your dope money for a month. That essay could blow your mind several times over,' a Yale
graduate told me." On a more "sober" note, however, the "'two dogmas'" that have governed
poetics have been solicited (in Derrida's sense of the word), "'the conception of irony as a fixed
perspective, and of the symbol as a fusion of image and idea which cannot be found in allegory ...
After one has read this essay, one's sense of the uses of irony can never be quite the same, and
there seems to be very little point in ever talking of the symbol again, except for thehistorical
purpose of exhibiting the preoccupations ofa school.'" David Lehman, Signs of the Times:
Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 153.
Hereafter, Signs of the Times. Now, although informative at times, Lehman's "historical" account
of Paul de Man as a fallen idol is still largely a fully fledged theatrical effect that stages history in
the very ruses of rhetoric and sensationalism it sets out to denounce, presumably in the name of
reference and literality. This is a reading that believes in "correct" reading, or, which amounts to
the same thing, in closure of reading, using all the force of journalistic rhetoric it can muster in
order to vilify deconstruction (in particular its uninformed analogies that level deconstruction
with "irrationalism" of fascism, pp. 224, 228, or unwarranted rhetorical obscenities and acts of
violence that identify "Derrida's logic" with Hitler's rhetorical strategies in Mein Kampf, pp. 238-
39). But the more vitriolic the argument, the more it overstrains to put an end to undecidability,
that is, the more it overstates precisely the impossibility of exorcising it. At times, it reaches the
hysteria of a witch hunt and worse, where all critical thought seen as derivative of deconstruction
- "the meteoric rise of 'gender' and 'ethnic' studies," as a deconstructive "example of the
marginal supplanting the central" - is part of a "larger problem" that "continues in alloyed form"
(261), a problem with one, let me say it,final solution against which his entire enterprise was
presumably mobilized. To invoke Derrida here from Memoires, Lehman's account only
"reproduce[ s] the exterminating gesture" it arms itself against (248).
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rhetoric." ("Life and Works," lii). Indeed, de Man opens the essay by restating a
rhetorical stake in contemporary criticism that has long been "eclipsed" by what
he calls the "subjectivist critical vocabulary" in need of displacement ("The
Rhetoric," 187). But what is thematized from the very outset is precisely the need
for an extended definition of rhetoric as the most general figurative structure of
language in which the problematic status of linguistic reference is in question:
" ... recent developments in criticism [that "fuse the conceptual terminology of
structural linguistics with traditional terms of rhetoric," as de Man specifies in a
footnote] reveal the possibility of a rhetoric that would no longer be normative or
descriptive but that would more or less openly raise the question of the
intentionality [that is, the referentiality] of rhetorical figures ... " (187-88).
However, he continues, "one of the main difficulties that still hamper these
investigations stems from the association of rhetorical terms with value
judgments that blur distinctions and hide the real structures" (188). In other
words, what is also called for is a rhetoric whose structure is older and thus
questions the valorisation of meaning. And it is this, the illicit valorisation of one
meaning over another to which every reading falls prey but nevertheless fails to
attain, that will be the hidden pivot of the entire essay.
Insofar as the text always exceeds its discursive limits, it will always have
another text within it, a certain latency or unconscious, a voice of another pushed
back that reading cannot account for - which is why every reading is a
misreading, but this also allows for what is other to come, to keep coming
without injunction. A text, in other words, is thus always divided, "there always
is an infra-text." It is never singular but always plural- there is not a text but,
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rather, there are always texts.195 Meaning then is radically unstable. Instituted, it
is subject to revision and continual pressures of reinscription, and it is this
essential instability that reading carries within it as its ghost that it tries to
exorcise at the same time. It is precisely by looking at the ghost of Romantic
diction, at an outside - or, literally here, at an other speaking - within the body of
its text, that de Man will open it to an absence of any unifying principle that
would arrest its semantic drift and its dismemberment in peripheral readings. Far
from being nihilistic, this is nothing other but the affirmation of reading in a
Nietzschean sense, as the joyous celebration of dismembering in a maenadic
ecstasy of otherness. Deconstruction is already at work in this essay, although it
is itself unacknowledged, allegorised, an other speaking. Deconstruction has
never really given up this ecstasy and remains complicit, without conscience,
with Nietzschean destruction of epistemic orders. What Derrida has written in
"Structure, Sign and Play" is precisely the affirmation of reading as a certain
continual intoxication of disinscription, the fact that reading disinscribes the
protocols of Reading, disfigures its monuments, so to speak, without being
governed by a desire for restitution.l'" The body of the text is lost, dismembered
195 What de Man will say when reading Baudelaire's "Correspondances" against his later poem
"Obsession" in "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric:" "There are always at least two
texts, regardless of whether they are actually written out or not ... Whenever we encounter a text
such as "Obsession" - that is, whenever we read - there always is an infra-text [emphasis added],
a bypogram like "Correspondances" underneath ... The power that takes one from one text to the
other is not just a power of displacement. .. but the sheer blind violence that Nietzsche ...
domesticated by calling it, metaphorically, an army of tropes" (RR, 262).
196 A quick reminder: "Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, [the]
structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty,
Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation,
that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the
affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to
an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of
the center. And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the
substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also surrenders
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in a dance of active interpretation, but it is lost without grandeur: there is
nothing to commemorate.
De Man thus takes his departure in the valorisation of symbol over
allegory as the organising principle of Romantic writing. "One has to return," de
Man writes, "to the moment when the rhetorical key-terms undergo significant
changes and are at the center of important tensions. A first and obvious example
would be the change that takes place in the latter half of the eighteenth century,
when the word 'symbol' tends to supplant other denominations for figural
language, including that of' allegory'" ("The Rhetoric," 188). But it is allegory
that will become, what de Man in Aesthetic Ideology calls, a "defective
cornerstone" (104) of the Romantic project experiencing the impossibility of its
own closure.
What motivates de Man's inquiry here is the power of allegory to
demystify the seductions of totality and transcendence vested in the Romantic
symbol.!" The symbolic could be seen as constituting the aesthetic moment
itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace." Jacques Derrida,
"Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 369.
197 Walter Benjamin, whose influence on de Man's notion of allegory is stated by de Man himself
in Blindness and Insight (35), writes: "Where man is drawn towards the symbol, allegory
emerges from the depths of being to intercept the intention, to triumph over it." Walter Benjamin,
The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London and New York: Verso, 1998), p. 183, emphasis
added. Hereafter cited as OGTD. Allegory then interferes; it "intercepts" the intention. And does
so precisely by registering the slippage of the signifier from its intended signified. It "reopens the
fissure," Ronell writes, "between word (Wort) and statement (Satz)" (Stupidity, 108). This is the
"disjunctive, atomizing principle of the allegorical approach" (OGTD, 208) that cuts across and
disrupts permanently linguistic anamnesis and recollection: "If it is to hold its own against the
tendency to absorption," Benjamin writes, "the allegorical must constantly unfold in new and
surprising ways" (OGTD, 183). In Proust, for instance, that both de Man and Benjamin had
engaged in their writing, it is forgetting and dismembrance that powers memoire involontaire as a
disturbance that tears open a hole in time. Rather than revealing a consistency of integrated
consciousness, memo ire involontaire reveals the impossibility of self-knowledge: "It is a waste of
effort for us to try to summon it, all the exertions of our intelligence are useless. The past is
hidden outside the realm of our intelligence and beyond its reach, in some material object (in the
sensation that this material object would give us) which we do not suspect. It depends on chance
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proper, "das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee.,,198Form becomes an analogic
extension of the natural world: "such as the life is such is the form" ("The
Rhetoric," 191), as de Man, quoting Coleridge here, suggests. Language of
Romantic thought seeks to overreach the radically historical nature of its form
through the symbolising power of imagination. If the symbol is the fallacy of a
desire for identity, allegory would be precisely the site of its exposure, the point
where symbolic form as organic unity breaks down. It is "disjunctive and
"atomizing," in Benjamin's words (OGTD, 208), the moment oflacerated beauty
whether we encounter this object before we die, or do not encounter it" (The Way by Swann's,
47). Half-asleep impressions and beginnings of lines that linger at the neglected comers of our
memory, that, strictly speaking, is no longer ours but that of the other, of allegoria, are suddenly
"unanchored at a great depth" (The Way by Swann's, 4S). Far from being integrative, this means
rather that self-knowledge is permanently disjunct and uncertain, unfolded only in what interrupts
self-possession, dependent on chance encounters and random occurrences without anything to
plot the drama of their appearance, like lightening in sudden bursts that interrupt history only to
unfold it. Such disintegrative moments are also effractions of the illusion of continuity and
narrative progression; hence, the digressive element of Proust's writing - in search of time that is
always, and remains, out of time. Involuntary memory, in other words, remembers as much as it
dismembers - what de Man will say of autobiography in general: "[it] deprives and disfigures to
the precise extent that it restores" ("Autobiography As De-Facement," SI). It reveals the
impossibility of integrated consciousness. In its sudden exposures, it tells that there is a sort of
half-open book to us (a hypogram?) whose lines we have written in a language we no longer
speak but that permanently speaks as a terror and limit of all language. Not the unconscious but
something radically exterior - the unconscious is still implicated in the economy of the ego, a
reserve fund for the inadmissible. Some other other that unravels the limits of identity, keeps it
wounded permanently, prevents it to close in upon its own, that shows the originary impossibility
of Narcissus. It is allegory rather than metaphor that is at the heart of Proust's writing. Indeed,
Proust's entire search for lost time could be seen as an allegory of the impossibility 'of integration,
of permanent loss and mourning. '
198 Hegel identifies beauty as the sensory expression of the idea. It effects thus a reconciliation
that circumvents the materiality of the medium that will always interfere to frustrate any attempt
at totalisation. Aesthetic in Hegel enables the passage towards the self-realisation of the Spirit,
which is nothing other but the progressive erosion of the image whose climax, of course, is the
end of art. Art, in this sense of its highest destiny, becomes "a thing of the past." It is then the
incursion of the medium, the materiality of inscription that keeps its future open. In Aesthetic
Ideology, de Man will write: "The theory of the aesthetic .. , is predicated, in Hegel, on a theory of
art as symbolic. The famous defmition of the beautiful as 'the sensory appearance [or
manifestation] of the idea' does not only translate the word 'aesthetics' ... but it could itselfbe
translated by the statement: the beautiful is symbolic" (93). The symbolic has always been in the
service of aesthetic ideologies that de Man's readings have never stopped troubling, and,
overstepping its bounds into the realm of cultural politics, the symbolic could be seen as the
poetico-ethnocultural desire for a lost organic community partaking of its roots, identity or
common essence, that it works to produce. Autochthony is based on the symbolic relation
between the son and the soil, the citizen and the polis; it literally means "from the soil itself."
Troubled identity will always find the means to consolidate itself, but it always does so by way of
exclusion and violence.
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that, as de Man continues, "appears dryly rational and dogmatic in its reference
to a meaning that it does not itself constitute" ("The Rhetoric," 189, emphasis
added). It introduces a fracture into the affirmative realm of the symbolic order;
in other words, it mutilates the beautiful face of art. Allegory, Benjamin writes,
"thereby declares itself to go beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm of
thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things" (OGTD, 178). And art for de
Man has never been anything but disfigured: art that cannot escape the separation
it seeks to overcome, which is why it remains a constantly unfulfilled agitation
and discontent. The symbol, however, is vested with the power to restore faces,
to rid truth of its phantasma. It is "founded on an intimate unity between the
image that rises before the senses and the supersensory totality that the image
suggests" ("The Rhetoric," 189). The valorisation of symbol over allegory is
therefore the valorisation of presence that has always governed, oriented and
structured any discourse on value. What confers value to the symbolic is that it is
suggestive of presence because the symbol constitutes a living part of what it
represents whereas allegory only narrates dissociative relations of difference - it
does not partake of its own origin but signifies precisely its misrecognition:
"allegory ... means something different from what it is. Itmeans precisely the
non-existence of what it presents" (OGTD, 233).199 The symbol thus abolishes
199 What is in question in allegory is the accountability of reference or anteriority. De Man takes
here his departure precisely in this statement from Benjamin where allegory begins with a loss of
reality rather than its reconstitution in symbolic anamnesis. So, in "Form and Intent in the
American New Criticism," De Man writes that "literature bears little resemblance to perception ...
It does not fulfil a plenitude but originates in the void that separates intent from reality. The
imagination takes its flight only after the void, the inauthenticity of the existential project has
been revealed; literature begins where the existential demystification ends and the critic has no
need to linger over this preliminary stage ... The critic ... [and] the German essayist Walter
Benjamin, knew this very well when he defmed allegory as a void 'that signifies precisely the
non-being of what it represents'" (Bl, 35, emphasis added). To understand a text then, as Waters
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the difference in which allegory founds its language. The valorisation of symbol,
as de Man writes, "coincide[ s] with the growth of an aesthetics that refuses to
distinguish between experience and the representation of this experience" ("The
Rhetoric," 188). This refusal is also what denies the figurative dimension of
language and consigns rhetoric to perversion. The symbol, "conceived as an
expression of unity between the representative and the semantic function of
language" (189), becomes then the way of ridding language of excess of
language, of sanitizing language, restoring it to its natural origins that will always
limit and magnetize its reference, guarding against play and the dizziness of
referential attrition.i'" Language thus becomes the product of true organic growth
limited by nature on both sides of its progression. De Man writes:
We find in Coleridge what appears to be ... an unqualified assertion of
the superiority of the symbol over allegory. The symbol is the product
of the organic growth of form; in the world of the symbol, life and form
are identical: "such as the life is, such is the form." Its structure is that
emphatically suggests in "Life and Works," is not a matter of "synthesizing it into a whole but
mortifying it, shattering it into pieces" (Iv). To dismember a text is to sever its organic roots and
reveal its radical contingency associated here with allegory, the sheer randomness' of its
origination.
200 This is also the primary concern of Derrida's Archeology of the Frivolous, first published in
1973, where symbolon ofCondillac's organicism is under watchful critical lens. The deficiency
of language, its supplementary structure, is to be genea(na)logically retraced to its natural origins
to constitute a new language or, rather, a new first metaphysics, "this time, the most natural one,
that which will have preceded all language in general." But "[i]sn't that," Derrida asks, "in order
to make amends through language for language's misdeeds, to push artifice to that limit which
leads back to nature?" The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, trans. John P.
Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln and London: Nebraska UP, 1980), p. 37. Language should be the analogical
unfolding of its natural roots. And this is what its narrative history should retrace: "the question
concerns history as a narrative retracing a prescribed progress, a natural progress. History is only
the development of a natural order" (67, emphasis added). Of course, as Derrida suggests,
"nothing of all this seems to make history" (67). History of language, of meaning, is a narrative
of aberration, of ruptured origins; it has nothing to do with natural order that once again here
confers value, "prescribes" - what is natural is what is right! If there is anything that de Man
cautions against, it is the danger of such seductions whose implications are evident enough to
warrant further elaboration. The symbolic can always be enlisted in the service of ideological
interests that rhetorical reading tirelessly demystifies.
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of synecdoche, for the symbol is always part of the totality that it
represents. Consequently, in the symbolic imagination, no disjunction of
the constitutive faculties takes place, since the material perception and
the symbolical imagination are continuous, as the part is continuous
with the whole. ("The Rhetoric," 191)
The symbolic saves language from the ravages of history whose stresses
allegory registers like a seismograph. "The measure of time for the experience of
the symbol," Benjamin writes, "is the mystical instant in which the symbol
assumes the meaning into its hidden, and if one might say so, wooded interior"
(OGTD, 165). "Wooded" here referring precisely to the organic totality of the
symbolic whose interior finally binds meaning to its natural origin and cancels
the creases of time its exile has shaped. It is rhetoric - for Benjamin, however,
still "the fallen nature" of language - that collects the dusts of finitude the
symbol brushes off from the surface of language (" ... it is [its] fallen nature
which bears the imprint of the progression of history." 180). If the symbol
transfigures the countenance of nature, allegory traces and rips apart the stitches
that reveal the depths of its wounds. It divides, says Benjamin, "a living entity
into the disjecta membra of allegory" (198). In allegory, life and form are not
identical; what divides them is the differential hollow of time. The sorrowful
drift of language from experience finds its resolution in the false transcendence
of the Romantic symbol whereas allegory, for Benjamin, signifies precisely the
pathos of this failure that binds it to the finitude and melancholy of human
existence, which is why "earthly mournfulness," as he writes, "is of a piece with
allegorical interpretation" (227). It is in its failure that allegory "bears the seal of
the all-too-earthly" (180). The allegorical mode greets - but with a melancholy
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gaze - in its structure the incompleteness of its representation that makes it
historically contingent and unstable, subject to revision and decay. It is "as
something incomplete and imperfect that the objects stare out from the
allegorical structure" (186). Allegory then is like a trace that in its
incompleteness points back to the event uncontained in the system of difference
that it opens up. It uproots the sign permanently from its own soil. It patterns the
very structure of writing and reveals what is an irreducible exteriority of the
signifier, its opaque character, black machine-like stains on white. In de Man's
terms, a de- facement to the second degree that "serves the disillusioning function
of recalling the substitutive character of the face and the forgotten fictivity of the
system.,,201This is why, for de Man, allegory is the exemplary figure of
rhetoricity that constitutes all language. The differential structure is not only not
forgotten but what figurative language masks is disclosed, like in Giotto's
Charity, in the very structure of allegory. Allegory registers the memory of all
figures as masks by tearing them off. It is a permanent interruption of the
aesthetic recouping: "it immerses itself into the depths which separate visual
being from meaning ... " (OGTD, 165). And, indeed, Benjamin identifies it
explicitly with the written.202There is an underlying written/spoken binary
201 In his contribution to The Lesson of Paul de Man, Hans-Jost Frey engages the double
movement of defacement and de Man's use of pro sopopei a or "face-lending" in "Autobiography
As De-Facement:" First, he writes, "the act of face-lending fprosopon poien, to confer a face or a
mask] as such is already a defacement ... But this is easily forgotten, because the constructive
urge, seeking to create coherence, does not like to recall the disaccord from which it springs. A
systematizing drive is at work in prosopopeia. The face fixes itself into a rigid order and is taken
seriously. In order to reestablish itself as the hypothetical figure it is, the face must decompose
itself again. This removal of the face is the second form of defacement, and serves the
disillusioning function of recalling the substitutive character of the face and the forgotten fictivity
of the system." ("Undecidability," YFS, 125, emphasis added).
202 Allegory has been denounced precisely because it allies itself with writing: "Allegory - as the
following pages will serve to show - is not a playful illustrative technique, but a form of
expression, just as speech is expression, and, indeed, just as writing is. This was the
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structure that like a wire filament is spun round the allegorical throughout
Benjamin's text to light up the field of the oppositions it regulates:
symbol/allegory, naturelhistory, the eternal/finitude, romanticism/baroque, etc.
Towards the end, allegory is considered precisely in terms of this structure that
echoes grammatological concerns of deconstruction in advance. Having spoken
of "the doctrine of the 'sensual' or natural language," Benjamin writes: "Spoken
language is thus the domain of the free, spontaneous utterance of the creature,
whereas the written language of allegory enslaves objects in the eccentric
embrace of meaning" (OGTD, 202). Ec-centric here as drawing away from the
centre, out of the centre (ekkentros), an embrace that grasps but can never truly
hold onto its object, that thus remains open, incomplete in the prison of
allegorical structure. Meaning, for Benjamin, begins with finitude as the
unfulfilled destiny of humanity. Or rather, history as destining - but without
destination - as an essential emptying and ruination of origin in what is an ever
more widening ec-centricity of meaning, begins with the linguistic fracture that
writing repeats every time it jabs the blank sheet.203 Writing is the unfinished
experimentum crucis. Writing seemed to be a conventional system of signs, par excellence.
Schopenhauer is not alone in dismissing allegory with the statement that it is not essentially
different from writing" (OGTD, 162). Or, "With the theory that every image is only a form of
writing ... [one] gets to the very heart of the allegorical attitude. In the context of allegory the
image is only a signature, only the monogram of essence, not the essence itself in a mask" (214).
Other references, pp. 175, 184, are made in the text that insistently push the allegiances of the
allegorical toward the scriptural.
203 Agamben, in his essay "Language and History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in
Benjamin's Thought," argues precisely that, for Benjamin, "the historical condition of human
beings is inseparable form their condition as speaking beings; it is inscribed in the very mode of
their access to language, which is originally marked by fracture." Quoting Benjamin, he
continues, 'history is born ... together with meaning ... ' It coincides, indeed, with a fracture in
language itself, that is, with the fall of language (Wort) from the 'pure life of feeling' (reines
Gefohlsleben), in which it is 'the pure sound of feeling,' into the domain of meaning
(Bedeutung) ... History and meaning are thus produced together, but they follow a condition of
language that is, so to speak, prehistoric, in which language exists in a 'pure life of feeling'
without meaning" (Potentialities, 51, emphasis added). Precisely the schema we have followed in
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pattern of history whose skeletal structure is flashed in allegorical X-ray
machine. And this is what consigns allegory to finitude. But for Benjamin, the
"eccentric embrace of meaning" is an open wound, an embrace of melancholy
that rushes in its grasp to keep what it can never appropriate, it leaps towards an
impossible closure.i'" Writing, for Benjamin, is a form of genealogical scripting
or melancholy writing, the "secular explanation of history as the Passion of the
world" (OGTD, 166) that thus inscribes pathos where the play is - and this is
where any analogy with deconstruction ends.2os Hence, Benjamin's persistent
pathologising of the allegorical structure and its association with melancholy:
"For the only pleasure the melancholic permits himself, and it is a powerful one,
is allegory" (185)_206 Melancholy follows the allegorist as he persists along the
the opening chapters. But this not only makes writing an en-gram of history - that is, the
necessary graphemic nature of history - but also makes mourning inseparable from writing.
204 Indeed, for Freud, melancholia is "an open wound." Bereavement or an abrupt loss of the
cathected object rips open a gap between the external world and the psychic life and to mourn is
precisely to allow time for the psychic reality to draw level and master the absence, although it
never fully does: "a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up"
("Mourning and Melancholia," 588). To mourn then is to remember and to repeat, to keep close
that whose intimacy one must renounce. In melancholia, however, the psychic and the external
reality are never reconciled. The ego internalises the cathexis in a narcissistic identification with
the lost object without the possibility of a new libidinal attachment or recathexis in a new
displacement. Melancholia literally drains the ego: "The sleeplessness in melancholia testifies to
the rigidity of the condition, the impossibility of effecting the general drawing-in of cathexes
necessary for sleep. The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself
cathectic energies ... from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished"
(589). From The Freud Reader (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 584-589.
20S At times, indeed, Benjamin's expression has all the shades of de Man's rigour. Engaging the
baroque, for instance, he writes: "The [allegorical] language of the baroque is constantly
convulsed by rebellion on the part of the elements which make it up" (OGTD, 207). This is the
very nature of disarticulation for de Man, where theoretical constructs are always built on the
points or "defective cornerstones" that deconstruct them. So, in Aesthetic Ideology, de Man writes
on Hegel's use of allegory that it "functions, categorically and logically, like the defective
cornerstone of the entire system" (104).
206 Ronell finds this formulation "enigmatic and unyielding" (Stupidity, 108). Unyielding indeed,
but not as enigmatic perhaps; in particular, if considered in conjunction with the inhibitive
messianic aspect of his writing where history or writing is the allegorical cipher that bars access
to the origin of language. In other words, as long as there is allegory, there will have been a
promise that in its unfulfillment dries the tears of humanity, so to speak. Furthermore, for Ronell,
the melancholic in Benjamin somehow "does not provide a perfect match with the retentive
heroes of Freud's Mourning and Melancholia" (l08). But the following analysis of allegory does
not fall short of a "perfect match:" "the melancholic who drowns her sorrows in allegory latches
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path of decay and skeletal remains of meaning scattered in fragments all over the
historical progress: "as a faculty of the spirit of language itself, it [the allegorical]
is at home in the Fall" (OGTD, 234). Nature, writes Benjamin, is not seen by the
allegorists "in bud and bloom but in the over-ripeness and decay of her creations.
In nature, they see eternal transience ... " (179). Allegory thus pronounces the
mortal truth of existence that it mourns like an open wound. But it is radically
historical. Benjamin writes:
Everything about history that, from the very beginning, has been
untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face - or rather in a
death's head. And although such a thing lacks all "symbolic" freedom of
expression, all classical proportion, all humanity - nevertheless, this is
the form in which man's subjection to nature is most obvious ... This is
the heart of the allegorical way of seeing ... secular explanation of
history as the Passion of the world; its importance resides solely in the
stations of its decline. The greater the significance, the greater the
subjection to death, because death digs most deeply the jagged line of
demarcation between physical nature and significance. But if nature has
always been subject to the power of death, it is also true that it has
always been allegorical. Significance and death both come to fruition in
historical development, just as they are closely linked as seeds in the
creature's graceless state of sin. (166, emphasis added)
Allegory carries within it the standard of its own unfulfillment. Finitude
and the awareness of mortality confronting the eternal that is at the heart of the
onto a rhetorical form in which the mark makes itself present only through erasure" (108). That is
precisely the lost object that is kept within as allegoria, as the other who still speaks, persists in
speaking, but whose absence of speech is inadmissible. "Allegory," she continues, "puts into play
the drama of catastrophic loss, permanent disruption, the Nichtsein (nonbeing) of what it
represents" (108). This truly is the drama of "Mouming and Melancholia" and "the catastrophic
loss" its motivating force. Catastrophic because irreconcilable, levelling, inadmissible, one that
consigns everything to the defiant silence and refusal to speak.
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melancholic attitude produces the allegorical structure. Allegory, says Benjamin,
"established itself most permanently where transitoriness and eternity confronted
each other most closely" (OGTD, 224). In the face of eternity whose call it
gathers in fragments, allegory encounters only the impossibility of piecing them
together - the very structure of signification rests on this impossibility. But this is
also why "meaning is encountered, and will continue to be encountered as the
reason for mournfulness" (209). History that is one of mourning is the history of
presence. And although allegory permanently deregulates the reappropriation of
presence and, as Ronell writes, quoting Levinas, "interrupts the 'assembling, the
recollection or the present of essence '" (Stupidity, 107), it is the structure of
mourning, and hence, of the very anteriority that it puts in question, that, for
Benjamin, organises and orients the history of its ghostly interruptions. The
unfulfilled promise that meaning carries in its ec-centric embrace is the passion
of language, its suffering; the sign is only the sign of destitution of humanity, of
the "graceless" fall, of history as awaiting.t'"
Still, allegory as the memento mori in the text is what wounds the text and
207 This is all "too archeo-eschatological." If there is history, surely, it is what interrupts the
course of history without assurance, ''for the best andfor the worst, without the slightest
assurance or anthropo-theological horizon," as Derrida says when discussing the messianic in
Benjamin. "This would be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of
justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration. The coming of the
other can only emerge as a singular event when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other
and death - and radical evil- can come as a surprise at any moment. Possibilities that both open
and can always interrupt history, or at least the ordinary course of history ... The messianic
exposes itself to absolute surprise [this would be the proper allegorical structure]. .. preparedfor
the best as for the worst, the one never coming without opening the possibility of the other. At
issue there is 'a general structure of experience. ' This messianic dimension does not depend upon
any messianism, itfollows no determinate revelation, it belongs properly to no Abrahamic
religion ... " Jacques Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits
of Reason Alone," in Acts of Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 56, 57.
Benjamin's "theory of the Fall and of originary authenticity, the polarity between originary
language and fallen language," are furthermore explicitly denounced by Derrida in the closing
paragraphs of "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority" (298) collected in the
same volume.
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drags history into it. An open or "amorphous fragment" (OGTD, 176), the text
stands there as a ruin, a petrified body of the past no longer knowing to whom it
belongs. It is the disinscription of identity, a disturbance of the unidentified
corpse in the text that makes it unstable, split, dispossessed, surrounded. The
dead haunt only because of a certain incompleteness, something undone that
gives them no rest. Indeed, in Benjamin, corpses are never far off from allegory;
one can only "enter the homeland of allegory" as a "corpse" (OGTD, 217). For
allegory petrifies its object, vacates it and offers it to a reading that will never
fulfill its demands. The world that is corp sed and emptied out of the past is the
detonating charge and the precondition of the allegorical reading that attempts to
restore its dismembered body in the structure of allegory but, in its attempt, only
reveals its dead bones. For Benjamin, the allegorical mode is specifically
associated with ruins:
When... history becomes part of the setting, it does so in script. The
word 'history' stands written on the countenance of nature in the
characters of transience. The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-
h· . . I" h fi f h . 208 I h .istory... IS present m rea ity m t e orm 0 t e rum. n t e rum
history has physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history
does not assume the form of the process of an eternal life so much as
that of irresistible decay. (177-78, emphasis added)
Ruins are the very taking place of history. But they are fragments that
testify both to what is an absolute antiquity of the past, its unreachability and
absolute remoteness - in other words, a severed link between sign and meaning,
208 Havingjust writtenthat it "is byvirtueof a strangecombinationof natureandhistorythatthe
allegoricalmodeof expressionis born"(OGTD, 167).
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and this is precisely why the allegorical structure "is present in reality in the form
of the ruin," as Benjamin writes - and its absolute proximity.i'" Ruins, like
writing, are both the death certificate of the past and its only residue. The past
then is present only in the form of dried ink - the ruin of the past that can only
"stand to be recast" in an infinite sequence of misreadings unable to stop
interrogating it. Allegory, for Benjamin, is an epitaph carved on the grave of
historical wreckage. But it stands unfinished amidst the debris of the past that is
always yet to come, yet to be decided. This is the power of allegory. Ronell
writes: "for Walter Benjamin, 'allegory seems to name a site of transformation in
which anteriority itself stands to be recast, reinscribed, and alternate 'futures'
opened ... ' [It is] an inscriptive force capable of effecting mutation in anteriority
and the future." (Stupidity, 106). Allegorical moment is the moment that in its
undecidability of reference will never stop deciding. As a fragment, it cannot be
at a closure but will always reinstitute new protocols for reading that make any
closure too precipitous. It is in the nature of the fragment to remain incomplete,
unfinished. "It is the border of meaning," as Frey writes in his essay on de Man.
"The fragment ends without being at an end." To integrate it is to disavow it.
This disavowal, however, is constitutive of every reading that "avoids the
undecidability of the fragment by assigning the abrupt ending a meaning. But the
209 This unreachable anteriority in the structure of the allegorical sign is precisely what de Man
insists on in "The Rhetoric of Temporality." In the allegorical structure, he writes, "[w]e have ... a
relationship between signs in which the reference to their respective meanings has become of
secondary importance. But this relationship between signs necessarily contains a constitutive
temporal element; it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to
another sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist
only in the repetition ... of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the
essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority" (207, emphasis added). This is what de Man
calls the "secularized" nature of allegory, the "painful knowledge" of an "authentically temporal
destiny" (206) in which Romantic thought "fmds its true voice" (207). The valorisation of the
symbol and synthesis in the structure of the Romantic image is capsized here.
213
breaking point of the fragment has no meaning ... It is discourse that does not
come to an end, that does not reach the point [of reference] towards which it is
underway" ("Undecidability," YFS, 132). The allegorical structure as a fragment
or ruin desediments meaning and opens it to a territorial loss; it prepares thus for
a decision to be made the only way it can be made: in absolutely undecidable
terrain.i'" This is what guarantees - but without guarantee - an openness of the
to-come as always alter that infinitely transcends any decision but whose
openness is kept precisely by deciding alone. Ronell continues: "marking the
disruption of historical narratives, by a kind of caesura ... allegory [is] that
which enables alternative pasts to be reinscribed and other, virtual futures to be
redeeided. By introducing the logic of tampering and engineering, allegory
evokes 'an always virtual technology for altering anteriority and the future'"
(Stupidity, 106-07, emphasis added). What de Man sees in Benjamin's
anatomisation of the allegorical structure is precisely this power of constantly
agitated reinscription that, like all rhetoric, disrupts epistemological systems and
prevents them from settling in other than ruins of their construction. Allegory is
what mortifies cognition by revealing the nakedness of its limits. "There is no
available code," Miller writes, "by which the [allegorical] relationship can be
made certain, masterable. It occurs, necessarily, but not in a predictable or
rational way ... In allegory anything can stand for anything. No ground whatever,
subjective, divine, transcendent, nor even that of social convention, supports the
210 We will return to Laclau and what he calls hegemony, "a theory of the decision taken in an
undecidable terrain" (60), in the last chapter. Cf. Deconstruction and Pragmatism here, pp. 47-
69, and also note 176 above, on the possible overlap between de Man's notion of misreading and
political strategy as developed by Laclau, which would ally de Man with radical democratic
politics.
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relationship" (RDR, 163).211Allegory points thus to uncertainty and
precipitousness inherent to all systems of judgment. It is a cipher of misreading
that constitutes all cognitive understanding. For in allegory, writes Benjamin,
[a]ny person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything
else. With this possibility a destructive, but just verdict is passed on the
profane world: it is characterized as a world in which the detail is of no
great importance ... it will be unmistakably apparent, especially to
anyone who is familiar with allegorical textual exegesis, that all of the
things which are used to signify derive ... from the fact of their pointing
to something else ... (OGTD, 175)
The site of allegory is one of referential undecidability and fatality of
judgment, but this is a properly historical site: "a destructive, but just verdict on
the profane world." This radical relativisation of the site where, in de Man's
words, "the relationship between the allegorical sign and its meaning (signifie') is
not decreed by dogma" ("The Rhetoric," 207), is also what politicises the site,
makes its limits shred. It is what is necessary for judgement, worthy of the name,
to begin - because judgement true to its name dispenses without measure, in the
absence of criteria. Allegory that points only to the instability of its referential
status seems to pronounce judgment on history as what is always to be done.
This is its truly historical force that, by exposing the contingency of the
historical, history that "stands written on the countenance of nature in the
characters of transience" (OGTD, 177), as Benjamin says, leaves its site open to
211 Allegorical disinscription is always ofa "convention" that has hardened enough through forms
of iterative social practices to forget its expiry date. Allegory is what reminds all conventions of
their substitutability. What Ronell says of irony is just as valid for the allegorical. It governs "its
particular moves on the destruction of limits," she writes, "and advances an 'ideology' of
Nietzschean rescindability that abounds in his thought on the experimental disposition and the
necessity of the test as trial, the Versuch" (Stupidity, 124).
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intervention of new signifying registers that are always performative. Allegory
thus disturbs established politico-epistemic orders - no wonder de Man could not
resist the power of its appeal. As long as the rapport between the sign and its
meaning remains contingent, "not decreed by dogma," it will always bend to the
pressure of misreadings that can never stop relegitimating the call for reading
otherwise. History will always remain yet to be read.
If allegory relegitimates the necessity of critical heritage by "constantly
unfold[ing] in new and surprising ways" (OGTD, 183), the symbol decidedly
does not:
We can be perfectly satisfied with the explanation that takes the one [the
symbol] as a sign for ideas, which is self-contained, concentrated, and
which steadfastly remains itself, while recognizing the other [allegory]
as a successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic
representation of ideas which has acquired the very fluidity of time.
They stand in relation to each other as does the silent, great and mighty
natural world of mountains and plants to the living progression of
human history. (OGTD, 165, emphasis added)
For de Man, it is precisely this alliance of allegory with temporality and
finitude, its constant devaluing of objects - which Benjamin had set in motion
but sealed prematurely in the thick drapes of mourning and fallen subjectivity -
that truly powers Romantic writing. Whereas the canonical reading - if one could
still call it reading212 - has always privileged the symbolic as the constitutive
212 Canonical reading is one that does not distrust its figures. For de Man, one could say that
reading always implicates a double bind. It is the Nietzschean forgetting or erasure of its
figurative status through its metaphoricity - the very power of figures to disfigure themselves, to
be worn out, and circulate as literal - and, hence, its own canonisation. But reading is also, and at
the same time, self-reflexive, where the literal or referential is remembered as rhetorical. This
remembrance would be the dismembering flash of allegory in the dark of reading. An
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category of romantic thought, de Man, committed precisely to unhinging of this
privilege as the organising interpretative category, to de-canonising reading, or
mortifying it, in Benjamin's words, in order to affirm it, sees allegory as the
originary - and always disintegrative - site where "early romantic literature finds
its true voice." ("The Rhetoric," 207).213 The "historical scheme" of valor isation
has thus been capsized: "We are led, in conclusion, to a historical scheme that
differs entirely from the customary picture. The dialectical relationship between
subject and object [that is, the symbolic relationship] is no longer the central
statement of romantic thought, but this dialectic is now located entirely in the
temporal relationships that exist within a system of allegorical signs" (208).214
interruption of the seductive continuity offigures. Reading, then, as Neil Hertz suggests in his
essay "Lurid Figures," would be both "the loss of clear distinctions" and "the discovery of
irreducible difference." It is "invariably entangling the reader in alternating apprehensions of
difference and indifference" (RDR, 86).
213 De Man here mobilises a few sources, in particular M. H. Abrams and Earl Wasserman, in
order to account for the canonised reading that valorises the synthesising power of the romantic
image, the "fundamental unity [of the symbol] that encompasses both mind and nature" (194).
The relation between subject and objet, mind and nature is one of continuity where ontological
priority is given to nature as the source of the unifying power that is "implicit in an organic
conception of language. So Abrams states: 'The best Romantic meditations on a landscape,
following Coleridge's example, all manifest a transaction between subject and object in which the
thought incorporates and makes explicit what was already implicit in the outer scene" (197). At
times, de Man writes, he even "makes it seem ... as if the romantic theory of imagination did
away with analogy altogether and that Coleridge in particular replaced it by a genuine working
monism. 'Nature is made thought and thought nature,' he writes, 'both by their sustained
interaction and by their seamless metaphoric continuity" (195). Both Coleridge, as "the great
synthesizer," and Wordsworth are enlisted to make the symbolic "the authentic pattern of
romantic imagery" (197). The relationship between mind and nature becomes dialectic but, for de
Man, an entirely negative or deflated one, without the third term that would close off the field in a
positive mastery. The triumph of allegory is the triumph of negativity of self-knowledge. The
self, now naked in its finitude, seeks refuge in symbolic mystifications. But, as de Man says, "this
symbolic style will never be allowed to exist in serenity; since it is a veil thrown over a light one
no longer wishes to perceive, it will never be able to gain an entirely good poetic conscience"
(208, emphasis added), conscience that Holderlin, Rousseau, and, for de Man, Wordsworth
presumably have. One can see here, indeed, that a certain drama of subjectivity and even guilt is
present in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," and has not yet entirely left de Man's writing but, as
suggested earlier, it is rather the displaced rhetorical structure - for de Man, the more archaic -
that figures in the guise of the fractured subject. "Rhetoric," as de Man will later say in Allegories
of Reading, far from being "incompatible with selthood ... all too easily appears as the tool of the
self' (173).
214 The hierarchy has not just been reversed here but the allegorical machine is found to be at the
origin - which, of course, scatters all origins.
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De Man uses passages from Rousseau and Wordsworth to reveal an allegorical
disturbance in the text of Romanticism and, hence, a failure of reading to
monumentalize itself. What takes place here is de Man's disarticulation of limits
that reading keeps exposed, open, and in question. A disarticulation that opens a
sustained aggression on limits and that is the energizing accomplice of every
reading. It is one of de Man's many reading lessons on reading that here puts in
question, as it must, "the assumed predominance of the symbol as the
outstanding characteristic of romantic diction" ("The Rhetoric," 198). In the
Meillerie episode of Rousseau's La Nouvelle Heloise, he first points to the close
affinity between the dramatic landscape and the inner state of turmoil of Julie
and St. Preux. The "sensuous passion," he writes, "is conveyed by the contrasting
effects of light and setting which give the passage its dramatic power. The
analogism of the style and the sensuous intensity of the passion are closely
related" (201) in a language of vitalism and spontaneity that masks an
inside/outside disjunction. The Meillerie landscape "where the language fuses
together the parallel movements of nature and passion" (203) is then both
thematically and rhetorically played off against Julie's garden, the Elysium,
emblematic of "the virtue associated with the figure of Julie" (201) and whose
"natural aspect is the result of extreme artifice" (202) and abstraction, usually
associated with the allegorical.i" The language, furthermore is "purely figural,
215 In The Statesman's Manual, Coleridge denounces allegory precisely for the mechanical nature
of its abstraction compared to the vitalism and naturalness of the symbol. "An allegory," he
writes, "is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing but
an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal [the original meaning, that is] being more
worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to
boot. .. [They] are but empty echoes which the fancy arbitrarily associates with apparitions of
matter." Qtd. in Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell UP, 1964), p. 16. Allegory here is truly a corpse or a dead letter emptied of meaning. De
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not based on perception, less still on an experienced dialectic between nature and
consciousness" (203). It is rather the aspect of abstraction - and death that
inhabits it - of dead nature, of its theft by history or "artifice," its coming apart in
its wreckage that Benjamin's Angelus Novus sees piling up, that shapes Julie's
garden.i'" De Man continues: "Julie's claim of domination and control over
nature ... may well be considered as the fitting emblem for a language that
submits the outside world entirely to its own purposes, contrary to what happens
in the Meillerie episode ... " (203). The rhetorical conflict between the totalising
language of the Meillerie landscape that is also one of vitalism, spontaneity and
passion, and the disjunctive language of allegory in the Elysium, one of death,
rational abstraction and virtue, figures thematically in the "moral contrast
between these two worlds [that] epitomizes the dramatic conflict of the novel"
(204). And it is the thematic reading, the very reading that produces what de Man
in Allegories of Reading will call the "aberrant semantic structure" (162), that
here establishes "the triumph" of allegory. The moral conflict, de Man writes,
aligning all along Julie's garden with "the Protestant allegorical tradition" of
"hardship, toil, and virtue" (204) compared to the "wilderness," the "sensuous
Man glosses parts of The Statesman's Manual at the outset of "The Rhetoric" when historically
tracing what he calls "the nearly unanimous conviction that the origins of romanticism coincide
with the beginnings of a predominantly symbolical diction" (200), the conviction that, of course,
is subjected to degrees of demystification in the essay.
216 The angel of History (Paul Klee's Angelus Novus) for Benjamin is borne forward by the
hurricane of dialectic but as if against its will. An image of sheer pathos, the angel, suspended in
the storm of history, is turned mournfully back toward the origin it no longer perceives for the
wreckage: "His face," Benjamin writes, is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence
that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to
which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what
we call progress." Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations
(London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 249, emphasis added.
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passion," and "temptation" (202) of the Meillerie landscape, is "ultimately
resolved in the triumph of a controlled and lucid renunciation of the values
associated with a cult of the moment, and this renunciation establishes the
priority of an allegorical over a symbolic diction" (204). Allegory thus
demystifies the symbolic stability of what is a fundamentally discontinuous
temporal structure. It "corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal
destiny" (206) - that is, finitude - that reveals the previous condition to be one of
error. It shows that "the term 'symbol' had in fact been substituted for that of
'allegory' in an act of ontological bad faith" (211). An act of self-mystification
that now stands fully revealed as "a veil thrown over a light one no longer wishes
to perceive ... " (208), light that of course is the flash of allegory, the negative
insight of finitude it reveals. However, the priority of allegorical attitude is
determined here precisely by an iconic or thematic reading that de Man cautions
against. But again, every reading cannot not misread; it is guilty of its own
aberrant function without which no reading would be possible nor would there be
anything like text. What appears here as a failure to differentiate between
performative and constative or thematic levels of articulation is an instance of the
inevitability of thematic violence or, in de Man's idiom, of"tropological
coercion" (Allegories, 208), implicit in every reading that systematically calls for
its undoing.i'" De Man is bound to repeat the disfiguration allegory unmasks.
217 The referential or iconic function is always imposed upon what is an arbitrary power of textual
effects or effects of the general grammatical structure as the most general possibility of meaning,
conceivable only in the suspension of reference: "Grammatical logic," de Man writes, "can
function only if its referential consequences are disregarded" (Allegories, 269). Reading then is
always a violence, a coercive "application of an undetermined, general potential for meaning to a
specific unit" (268). What is important here is "the indifference of the text," its machine-like
quality, "with regard to its referential meaning" (268). The text, however, can only reflect the
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Every disarticulation "turns immediately into a new unifying principle.,,218 But
this is the general condition of the possibility of reading. De Man: "Reading is a
praxis that thematizes its own thesis of the impossibility of thematization and this
makes it unavoidable, though hardly legitimate, for allegories to be interpreted in
thematic terms" (Allegories, 209, emphasis added). In other words, de Man's
reading here reveals what it says it does: the priority of allegorical reading, but
only just as much as it testifies precisely to the impossibility of allegorical
reading ever being done. Every reading, including de Man's - and especially de
Man's - will always "relapse into the figure it deconstructs" (Allegories, 275).
Allegory will always end up a metaphor of its own unreadability.r" Even the
most self-reflexive allegorical reading that hollows out a system of meaning to
uncover the forgotten skeletal remains of its rhetoricity "reintroduces the
error of reading precisely because "it is impossible for a statement not to connote a referential
meaning ... " (209), that is, for a reading not to be violent.
218 In "Setzung and Ubersetzung," first published in Diacritics (1981) and later collected in The
Wild Card of Reading, Rodolphe Gasche writes precisely on the unavoidability of thematic
coercion and self-reflexivity in deconstructive readings: "Undoubtedly, as soon as the rhetorical
structure of a poem or piece of literature has served to debunk the mystifications specific to the
thematic level of the text, it turns immediately into a new unifying principle ... Consequently, to
deconstruct does not simply mean to escape the possibility of error and illusion distinctive of
literature in general. .. " (23). Indeed, it is to retotalize reading in a new aberrant mode
deconstruction has invalidated. Deconstruction still belongs to the referential mode of the text,
but as a negative insight of this mode. Further down, Gasche continues: "The very rigour with
which the rhetorical is opposed to the grammatical [the opposition and interference of the two
orders, as will be shown, is what for de Man constitutes the text], and by means of which the
thematic levels of a text are deconstructed, leads to a reassertion of values that are as deceptive as
those deconstructed. Thus, for instance, the debunked referentiality of a text reappears as the self-
referentiality of the deconstructive reading. The reason that this return cannot be prevented is that
'the notion of a language entirely freed of referential constraints is properly inconceivable.'
Consequently, a 'relapse from a rhetoric of figuration into a rhetoric of signification' is
inevitable ... " (24). Rodolphe Gasche, The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de Man (Cambridge,
Mass. and London, England: Harvard UP, 1998), pp. 11-48. "Setzung and Ubersetzung," will be
cited separately with page references to this edition. The Wild Card of Reading hereafter cited as
The Wild Card.
219 Carol Jacobs, engaged in a dialectic between allegory and irony in de Man's writing, points
precisely to this compulsive disorder of the text unable to arrest the movement of its reversals:
"Thus the movement of the literary text is restated and repeated on an increasingly conscious
level by the critical reading that must, no less than irony, fail to overcome the inauthenticity of its
own language. Things can never be left to rest at any point one reaches, for the whole process
takes place at an unsettling speed" ("Allegories of Reading Paul de Man," RDR, 118).
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metaphorical [or thematic] model whose deconstruction had been the reason for
its own elaboration. It is therefore just as unreadable ... " (257, emphasis added).
The movement of reading is one of repeated reversals that "persists in
performing what it has shown to be impossible to do" (275), namely, to read. De
Man's reading is thus not exempt from but is rather a dramatization of a radical
failure to read.22oJacobs even argues that de Man's reading is "at its most
symbolic" when allegory is used to demystify "a former state of inauthenticity"
(RDR, 116), to dispel an error in "authentic" understanding. "For, it is in such a
rhetoric," he writes - and rhetoric here in the full sense of its disfigurative power
that does not depend on the speaker221- rhetoric "that claims to dispense with the
symbolic - where time as rupture has given way to the "now" of [authentic]
conclusions, where other texts are read for a gain in knowledge rather than for a
genuine recognition of their allegoricity - that de Man's diction is at its most
'symbolic" (117). However, it is precisely the allegoricity of reading that cannot
220 "Shelley Disfigured" is an essay entirely structured round this particular aporia of reading. It
pivots precisely on de Man's own failure to read. Having seemingly loosened Shelley's last,
unfinished poem The Triumph of Life - truly a fragment here or ruin - from any referential or
subjectival concerns, de Man argues toward the end of the essay that the drowned body of the
poet "is present in the margin of the last manuscript page and has become an inseparable part of
the poem" (I20). What shapes the poem is the disruptive instance of the poet's death: "It may
seem a freak of chance to have a text thus moulded by an actual occurrence, yet the reading of
The Triumph of Life establishes that this mutilated textual model exposes the wound of a fracture
that lies hidden in all texts" (120). Again, one could say, that a referential hors-texte, "an actual
occurrence" that reinscribes disfiguration of the rhetoricity of the poem shapes its allegorical
status, that is, the impossibility of its closure - hence, "the mutilated textual model," here literally
cut off and wounded on one side, the edge of meaning open to endless disinscription and
misreading, is taken as a general model oftextuality, "a fracture that lies hidden in all texts." In
other words, disfiguration here unmasks the figurative status of the text. But also, as Hertz
suggests in "Lurid Figures," it is the fact that aberration or thematic violence, that de Man in this
essay calls "a delusive act of figuration or forgetting" (I21), is inescapable: "de Man has shown
[in his reading of Shelley] how and why readers cannot help forcing their texts, but (or rather:
and) this awareness in no way prevents him from forcing his text. .. he will produce ... the
alternative reading ... But he will do so by means of a series of interpretations that culminate in
another strange, delusive act of figuration" (RDR, 95).
221 The implication being that even the rhetorically minded critic, and, indeed, none more so than
de Man, cannot escape the aporetic nature of his own discourse. Rhetoric of his text disfigures the
intended meaning of its writer.
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be re-cognised without a rhetorical bad faith, without defacement and forgetting.
On principle, Miller writes, "each reader must be blind to his or her own
blindness. Attempts to recognize it or to formulate it would be futile gestures,
merely compounding the error. This may be an area where it is better to keep
silent, as de Man does" (RDR, 166). But de Man, indeed, says as much: "the
form of a language [allegorical as well as ironic] that asserts the knowledge of
this inauthenticity ... does not, however, make it into an authentic language, for
to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be authentic" ("The Rhetoric," 214,
emphasis added). To know it is already to have given way to it. De Man's
authentic understanding, in other words, has never been anything but inauthentic
from the very beginning. Now this statement fissures the entire first part of "The
Rhetoric." There is a double reading, a retractive rent in a text - there always is-
that treads across it in reverse. As if to say that the historical tracing and
redressing of the symbolic mystification that has taken place in the essay is
indeed as inauthentic as the error it has attempted to set right. 222 De Man
ungrounds here his own statement leaving it open to harassment of reading. It is
now indexed precisely as a misreading open to the reversed engineering of
allegory. This, one could say, is indeed the triumph of allegory as the
222 De Man ironizes his own attempt at historical criticism here that manifests his suspicion of
naive genetic models of history as linear successive narrative patterns that share all the
unwarranted mystifications of the symbol in their unfolding, as developed in the introductory
chapter. For more on the ironization of allegory, Jacobs' essay provides a lucid critical
(mis)reading. I will only cite a part of an "Interview with Paul de Man" published in Yale Review,
1984, referenced in a footnote, that bears on the tension of irony and history and also sheds light
perhaps on the necessity of de Man to place his own historical trajectory here under erasure.
Irony, de Man says, "is for me something much more fundamental. .. One gets beyond problems
of self-reflection, self-consciousness. For me, irony is not something one can historically locate,
because what's involved in irony is precisely the impossibility of a system of linear and coherent
narrative. There is an inherent conflict or tension between irony on the one hand and history on
the other, between irony on the one hand and self-consciousness on the other" (RDR, 120). It is
the "authenticity" of the allegorical mode that is ironized but the irony of allegory is already
constitutive of the trope itself whose reference is never rid of an other speaking.
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impossibility of narrative closure that keeps the past forever undone. "For de
Man," as Miller will say, "this process," the process whereby language cannot
escape its overdetermination,
can never be closed off in the triumphant mastery of the text by itself in
its revelation of the erroneous figures on which it is built. In the act of
deconstructing itself a text commits again another version of the error it
denounces, and this means that all texts are a potentially endless series
of repetitions of the 'same' error only arbitrarily brought to closure.
(RDR, 158, emphasis added)
What is exposed here is the wound of his own text as an allegory of
unreadability or a misreading that catalogues its own lack in need of
supplementing. Someone, as we have said, is always absent in allegory, a voice
dead that is not there, and yet allegory insists on hearing its call and constantly
registering its absence. This is the general condition of writing and de Man
knows here that he is the victim of its incompletion in a sequence of mortifying
reversals or misreadings, none of them authentic, that constitute literary history.
De Man's reading here, after all, is not "symbolic," as Jacobs judiciously
contends, but a tension rather, stretched out and always breaking, between the
symbolic and the allegorical, precisely insofar as it draws itself out towards an
understanding of its own rhetoricity. And it is the frustration between the last two
terms that produces reading.
Turning to Wordsworth, de Man first uncovers an allegorization of
geographical site that in Romantic diction, according to Abrams, is '''a specific
locality ... present to the eye of the speaker" ("The Rhetoric," 205). The
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referential specificity of the landscape is a symbolic anchor for the reading
experience and the descriptive naturalism of poetic language. However, revealing
a crack in it crudely welded for a rhetorical reading, de Man writes that even in
"as geographically concrete a poet as Wordsworth, the significance of the locale
can extend so far as to include a meaning that is no longer circumscribed by the
literal horizon of a given place" (206). The specific becomes a catachresis, "a
mere name whose geographical significance has become almost meaningless"
(206). The allegorization of the site here truly comes to signify "the non-
existence of what it presents" (Benjamin, OGTD, 233). De Man, citing
Wordsworth from his "Essay upon Epitaphs" that he will revisit in The Rhetoric
of Romanticism, writes: "'The spirit of the answer [as to the whereabouts of the
river] through the word might be a certain stream, accompanied perhaps with an
image gathered from a Map, or from a real object in nature - these might have
been the latter, but the spirit of the answer must have been, as inevitably - a
receptacle without bounds or dimensions; - nothing less than infinity'" ("The
Rhetoric," 206). The specific here, for Wordsworth, is anything but specific, it is
"without bounds or dimensions," an empty allegorical echo whose phenomenal
nature is now immaterial and, to evoke Coleridge, "shapeless to boot." Indeed,
following Benjamin, the specific here could be "any object, any relationship
[that] can mean absolutely anything else" (OGTD, 175). The allegorical, as
Benjamin continues, is precisely "characterized as a world in which the detail is
of no great importance." The metaphorical object could "be a certain stream,"
Wordsworth writes, perhaps "an image gathered from a Map," or "a real object
in nature," but it is "nothing less than infinity" that puts a stop to referential
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displacements. Allegory seems to detonate a closed structure wide open. It
performs what de Man calls "the grammatization of rhetoric" (Allegories, 15), a
deconstruction of all mimetic rhetorical structures "that use resemblance as a
way to disguise differences ... " (16). An allegorical charge reveals an indifferent,
impersonal skeletal code - for Derrida, arche-writing - as the most general
structure of inscription that constitutes the very possibility of signification. De
Man: "By passing from a paradigmatic structure based on substitution, such as
metaphor, to a syntagmatic structure based on contingent association ... the
mechanical, repetitive aspect of grammatical forms is shown to be operative ... "
(Allegories, 15). The indifference of the grammatical machine in which the detail
truly is of no great importance - grammar can function only in the absence of
referential detail - is the assertion of the negative knowledge that exposes the
fallacy of valorised thematic structures. Grammatization of rhetoric, de Man
writes, like allegory, "seems to reach a truth, albeit by the negative road of
exposing an error, a false pretense." (16). His reading of Wordsworth's poem "A
slumber did my spirit seal" in "The Rhetoric" dramatizes precisely the proleptic
temporal structure of allegory where the state of error is "recovered from the
mystification of a past now presented as being in error" (224). The poem, writes
de Man, "describes the demystification as a temporal sequence: first there was
error, then the death occurred, and now the eternal insight into the rocky bareness
of the human predicament prevails ... The difference has been spread out over a
temporality ... in which the conditions of error and of wisdom have become
successive" (225). But wisdom here, as suggested earlier, is unwise insofar as it
irresistibly performs what it denounces. Its reading remains "in the same state of
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suspended ignorance" (Allegories, 19). This is perhaps the law of stupidity, of
the machine, Ronell did not articulate: the fact that "it is forever impossible to
read Reading" (77). Reading always fails to understand the implications of its
own insight. De Man's text blindly performs what it is helpless to avoid. It
commits itself, as it must, to the exact error it demystifies. Miller writes:
what is bound to take place in each act of reading is another
exemplification of the law of unread ability. The failure to read takes
place inexorably within the text itself. The reader must reenact this
failure in his or her own reading. Getting it right always means being
forced to reenact once more the necessity of getting it wrong. Each
reader must repeat the error the text denounces and then [or rather, all at
once, I would say] commits again. (ER, 53, emphasis added)
It is impossible to read the aberrancy of metaphor without committing
it.223 The more the text reveals its inauthenticity, the more it remembers, in other
words, the rhetoricity of its figures, the more radically it forgets. Reading is thus
helplessly generated by its own memory defect. The defacement of figures
reading unmasks only in compulsively repeating it. And there is no end to this
223 When revising one of his 1967 Gauss Lectures at Princeton, "Time and History in
Wordsworth," a few years later, de Man's transition from questions of temporality to rhetoric and
questions of reading can be traced in his opening remarks. And the lecture begins precisely with
the inescapability of the "thematic element" in reading, the impossibility of ridding reading of the
error. In his preparatory notes, reading gets tentatively defined as a certain "interference," that
will be fully articulated in Allegories of Reading. The notes proceed, as if arbitrarily, by breaking
off: "reading ... not declaim it - pure dramatic, vocal presence ... not analyze it structurally ... but
read, which means that the thematic element remains taken into consideration ... we look for the
delicate area where the thematic, semantic field and the rhetorical structures begin to interfere
with each other, begin to engage each other ... they are not necessarily congruent, and it may be
(it is, as a matter of fact, it is the case) that the thematic and the rhetorical structures are in
conflict and that, in apparent complicity, they hide each other from sight ... in truth, there are no
poems that are not, at the limit, about this paradoxical and deceptive interplay between theme and
figure; the thematization is always the thematization of an act of rhetorical deceit by which what
seems to be a theme, a statement, a truth-referent, has substituted itselffor afigure." Paul de
Man, "Time and History in Wordsworth," in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The
Gauss Seminar and Other Papers (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1993), p. 200,
emphasis added.
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obsessive de-facing offigures.224 The displacement of reading is permanent
which is why with allegory, says de Man, we "end up in a mood of negative
assurance that is highly productive of critical discourse" (Allegories, 16). What
reading resists is reading itself or, what amounts to the same thing, the
formalization of its limits. And this, for de Man, is precisely what allegory
archives in its structure: a permanent aberrancy of reading. In Ronell's words,
"allegory pleasures otherness; to the extent that it organises itself around
difference and absence, it never comes back to itself ... " (Stupidity, 108). It points
to the deflection of all language and, in that it does, also to otherness, a certain
"muteness," Hamacher says, but that is also what "attracts all speaking" (RDR,
200).
In allegory, de Man finds thus a structure of temporization constitutive of
language in general that derails all mimesis. Like irony, it is a structure of
permanent disruption that "leads to no synthesis" ("The Rhetoric," 220).225
Allegory is linked to irony, de Man continues, in "their common demystification
of an organic world postulated in a symbolic mode of analogical
correspondences or in a mimetic mode of representation in which fiction and
reality could coincide" (222). What both modes disrupt, and make possible, is the
224 Miller: "Deconstruction reaffirms at the same time as it puts in question, which means that the
whole chain of positings and putting in question remains unerased to the end, however many new
layers of the allegorical narrative are superposed on the original figure or system of figures: 'the
allegory does not erase the figure'" (RDR, 161, emphasis added).
225 Irony, to which the latter part of de Man's essay is dedicated, and to which de Man returns in
Aesthetic Ideology with an essay ironically (be)headed: "The Concept ofIrony" - as irony, de
Man shows, is precisely always of the concept - will not form as extensive an engagement as
allegory for several reasons, economy being one of them. It is in the allegorical structure that
rhetoricity first finds its proper site that also strongly bears on the political, the opening of its
field, that will be under lens in the fmal chapter. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, insofar as
allegory blindly compounds the error it dispels, irony appears as the irreversible truth of its own
mode of displacement. There can be no allegory without irony. Irony then, indeed, runs like a
secret narrative throughout, as the allegorical tip, so to speak, and a permanent dysfunction of
relieving reading of its impossibility.
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compulsive repetition of identity, compulsive because impossible. They both
reveal what is essentially an allegorical distance within the moment of identity, a
dysfunctional gap of time that makes possible precisely what it disables at the
start. The symbolic is only a delayed allegorical effect that can only be
rehabilitated as a nostalgic loss, an auto-affective asymptote of the text and this,
de Man reminds us, is "the true voice" of romantic writing:
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or
identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its
own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it
establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. In so
doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-
self [or, in other words, from borrowing the stability of natural forms to
hide from finitude allegory structurally implies] which is now fully,
though painfully recognized as a non-self. It is this painful knowledge
that we perceive at the moments when early romantic literature finds its
true voice. ("The Rhetoric," 207)
The symbolic then is a mystification, "a defensive strategy that tries to
hide from this negative self-knowledge" (208), as de Man writes, but one that the
text compulsively keeps erecting. This impossibility of authentic mastery of
textual guilt, of the text that would have "an entirely good poetic conscience"
(208),226although fully developed in Allegories of Reading, is already at work
226 What is important to note here is the radical eviction of psychologism and subjectivism that
will take place inAllegories of Reading but trails unspoken, as suggested earlier, already in "The
Rhetoric of Temporality." For guilt, for de Man, is structurally inscribed in the text as its failure
to read; it is not the subject but the text that carries the guilt of its own unreadability. Insofar as
the text compulsively misreads it only ever compounds the guilt it tries to excuse. As de Man will
say of Rousseau's Confessions: "Excuses generate the very guilt they exonerate, though always in
excess or by default... there is a lot more guilt around [at the end of the text] than we had at the
start... No excuse can ever hope to catch up with such proliferation of guilt" (Allegories, 299).
But the other side here is equally valid, as "there can never be enough guilt around to match the
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here: "The dialectical play between the two modes [that is, precisely the
imbricative structure of allegorical and ironic mode, earlier indicated], as well as
their common interplay with mystified forms of language (such as symbolic or
mimetic representation), which it is not in their power to eradicate, make up
what is called literary history" ("The Rhetoric," 226, emphasis added). The ironic
emptying of allegorical renunciation of error is what compels the text to a
renewed rigour of allegorical reading. This is precisely the referential function
the text cannot eradicate, although its status is in question in every reading.
Metaphor, de Man writes, is always "shown to be based on the misleading
assumption of identity, but the utterance of this negative insight is itself a new
metaphor that engenders its own semantic correlative, its own proper
meaning ... " (Allegories, 240). De Man's text then, like any other, not only says
what it does not mean but means what it cannot say.
Allegory, as a deconstruction of figure, reduces "to the rigours of
grammar ... rhetorical mystifications" (Allegories, 17). But the rhetorization of
grammar, as we have seen, is as unpreventable as the grammatization of rhetoric.
In fact, for de Man, the text is produced precisely as an interference of the two
codes:
We have moved closer and closer to the "definition" of text ... The
system of relationships that generates the text and that functions
independently of its referential meaning is its grammar ... We call a text
any entity that can be considered from such a double perspective: as a
generative, open-ended, non-referential grammatical system and a
text-machine's infinite power to excuse" (299). There can be no parity or "good conscience" in
the text and it is the disjunction between the constative and the performative levels of the text that
produce guilt. Guilt then would be only the "aberrant metaphorical correlative of the absolute
randomness of language, prior to any figuration or meaning" (299).
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figural system closed off by a transcendental signification that subverts
the grammatical code to which the text owes its existence. The
"definition" of the text also states the impossibility of its existence and
prefigures the allegorical narratives of this impossibility. (Allegories,
268,270)
The double bind that constitutes the structure of reading, its impossibility
or its pulling apart by the pressure of asymmetric demands of grammar and
rhetoric, cannot be squared because the error always gets cloned, reencrypted in
the new series of readings. This is what Miller calls "a built-in fatality of
language" (RDR, 157-58). It is not only "the positing that contains the
deconstruction" but deconstruction, as he writes further down, "is at the same
time a committing again of the error" (158). Aberrancy remains irreducible. This
also implies the radically impersonal performative function of the text.
The Machine
Each "text" is a machine with multiple reading heads
for other texts.
- Jacques Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines"
There is something machinistic, death-like227 in this pre-programmed
systematicity of textual aberrancy reading cannot escape. What reading performs
227 The machine is death. "Not because we risk death playing with machines, but because the
origin of machines is the relation to death," writes Geoffrey Bennington. "Machines repeat, and
repetition means danger - compulsion and death" ("Aberrations: de Man (and) the Machine,"
RDR,214).
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is independent of the authority of the subject. When considering the status of
autobiographical writing in Rousseau's Confessions, the law of unread ability is
shown to be neither voluntary nor involuntary but radically formal: "The
deconstruction of the figural dimension is a process that takes place
independently of any desire; as such it is not unconscious but mechanical,
systematic in its performance but arbitrary in its principle, like a grammar"
(Allegories, 298). And "to the extent that [every] text is grammatical, it is a
logical code or a machine ... there can be no agrammatical texts ... " (268).
Grammar is an automated self-disconnecting zeroing of meaning coded in the
text-machine that occurs every time one makes it mean - except that one does
not make it mean but is every time meant by it. The sheer senseless fact of
language - senseless because possible only if referential meaning is suspended -
that performs anyway or rather outperforms the reader's attempt to hold it back.
It is what wounds the text permanently or what, in Gasche's words, determines
"a text as the narration of its impossibility to become a whole" ("Setzung and
Ubersetzung," 44). The text, he continues, "as an agonistic field opposing the
machine of its grammar to the particular meanings that come to restrict the text's
generality ... leads to the notion that a text is the narrative (the temporal and
metonymic display) of its impossible closure, that is to say, of the impossibility
of what one calls (metaphorically) a 'self-reflexive' text" (44). There trails in the
text the possibility of being otherwise that keeps it wounded,228 a register of what
is not meant, an unregister of reading that allegory narrates which spells out the
228 This damage is the permanent condition of reading. It is also that textual excess or its default
that reading cannot take account of - but perhaps must count on - that destabilises every reading
while precisely making it forever possible.
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very condition of its politics. The task of reading is to idiomatize what reading
does not and cannot register, a stutter that interrupts it. This means that reading
must remain plural and open to what it cannot say, to that other that remains
mute in it but is also that which compels reading, without which reading would
stop, exhaust its disturbances in a negation of its futures that is also a negation of
politics. But this machine of unreadability that thus performs (in) the absence of
the subject is also what maintains an unrelieved openness of its definition in an
infinite alterity of (mis)readings that constitute it. The text-machine is indeed
"both the life and the death, the life-death of anything like a subject." Bennington
writes:
As supplement to the logos, it [the machine] gives rise to facility only
by opening up the possibility of uncontrollable mimetic doubling and
degradation and generates further apotropaic supplements to control and
police that threat. The machine is thus both text and text-productive;
conversely, the text is a machine and produces further machines ...
machine is an allegory of writing and/or reading that ... simultaneously
dispossess[es] the "subject" of writing/reading and set[s] up the drive to
signature as a means of legislating for that "subject" and its
"legitimacy" against such dispossession. The text as machine is thus
both the life and the death, the life-death of anything like a subject, be
that subject determined as "author," or "reader," "inventor" or "user."
(RDR,213)
No reading without the machine that makes it misread, no politics without
reading that keeps its future open to disturbances. The machine-text spins the
weave of its misreadings in order to foil the threat of the failure it repeats. The
threads of its web can only multiply in "further apotropaic supplements," in what
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it secretes to prevent. Reading carries within itself the seed of its own
degradation that is the ruin of the subject in its signatures. The iterability as the
necessary technical structure of the machine is also a progressive erasure of the
subject. It accelerates the more one signs to legitimate its absence. The machine
both performs and protects against the loss of the subject it structurally implies.
And there can be no end to what is an abortive mnemonic of reading that itself
produces the amnesia of origins it attempts to remember. The other name,
however, for this amnesic evil is finitude. The perverse possibility of
hypomnesis, "of uncontrollable mimetic doubling and degradation" (RDR, 213),
that the machine opens up within history is encoded in its very beginning.F'
History is given over to this possibility - is this very possibility - from the start.
No history without the machine, the technicity of deferral, destructive of the very
memory it keeps. And in Allegories of Reading, de Man becomes increasingly
attentive to its performances. The machine, he writes, is an "anti-grav,"
the anamorphosis of a form detached from meaning and capable of
taking on any structure whatever, yet entirely ruthless in its inability to
modify its own structural design for non-structural reasons. The
machine is like the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its
rhetoric, the merely formal element without which no text can be
generated. There can be no use of language which is not, within a
certain perspective thus radically formal, i.e. mechanical, no matter how
229 Cf. Derrida here. In particular Dissemination for his reading of Plato's anamnesis where the
recollection of presence, from the beginning, is always already infected by its technical
supplement, by hypomnesis or writing that constitutes the very structuring of the mnesic activity.
Without signs, that defer the very thing they offer, memory would not be able to recall what is not
present. It needs signs to recollect, precisely the signs, however, that produce and multiply its
own amnesia. In OfGrammatology, Derrida writes of history and the supplement: "From the first
departure from nature, the play of history - as supplementarity - carries within itself the principle
of its own degradation, of the supplementary degradation, of the degradation of degradation. The
acceleration, the precipitation of perversion within history, is implied from the very start by the
historical perversion itself' (179, emphasis added).
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deeply this aspect may be concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions.
(294)
What the machine maintains for de Man is the radical aberrancy of
reference - that is, precisely the alterity of the text. What is most inhuman in
language, the indifference of its "semi-automatic grammatical patterns"
(Allegories, 16), is what preserves the possibility of what is most human: the
rigorous openness to questioning. The machine clears the "aesthetic delusions"
of rhetoric, the foreclosures, and unwittingly opens onto the ethical where one
decides without criteria, that is to say, always aberrantly. But it is in the
aberrancy of judgement - its essential nervousness - that something like ethics is
possible. It is the fact of judgement not knowing that makes it possible to judge.
This has nothing to do with cognition then. In fact, it is the interference of the
machine in the cognitive that enables judgment.23o And, as Bennington writes,
insofar as "this machinelike performance is, in its disruption of cognition (in the
230 Decision taken in the abyss of knowledge, one that is mad, split, indeed undecidable, is the
only possible decision. One only ever decides where one does not know. For de Man, as for
Lyotard, the prescriptive categories can never be - and it is decisive that they remain so, if
anything like politics is to be possible - can never be reduced to the denotative categories of the
epistemic order, referential statements in de Man's terminology ("No bridge," he writes, "as
metaphor or as representation, can ever connect the natural realm of essences with the textual
realm of forms and values." Allegories, 100). What is right is only ever, can only be, necessary,
never true. The ethical demand is an irresistible one, not a verifiable one. And insofar as it is and
remains owed to the other, it is irreducible to referential orders. It is, indeed, what interrupts
these orders and opens them up to the exigency of rein scription. This is why, in his chapter on
allegory, de Man will say that "[a]llegories are always ethical, the term ethical designating the
structural interference of two distinct value systems" (Allegories, 206). For Lyotard, the
impossibility of a justified decision is irreducible. If there is "to be" justice, its "being" cannot be
onto logically determined: "No one can say what the being of justice is. That, at least, seems
certain ... Here we are in a relation that is proper to prescriptives, because there is no test for the
just whereas there is for the true ... There is no state of affairs that corresponds ... and it is proper
to prescriptives not to make commensurate their discourse with a reality, since the 'reality' they
speak of is still to be ... With the ontological axe, one always cuts a divide between that which
conforms to being and that which does not, by calling 'just' that which does." Jean-Francois
Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (published as part of Theory
and History of Literature series, vol. 20, Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1985), p. 66, emphasis
added.
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guise of referential dimension of descriptive or cognitive sentences), definitive of
what de Man means by 'text,' and thereby what 'reading' might possibly
mean ... " (RDR, 215-16), judgment becomes impossible without text or rhetorical
reading that makes it unwise, lost for reason, and, in this loss, harassed by its
other that cannot be sublated in the judgement but remains interminably an
unwanted silence within it that keeps its criteria open to question?31 Allegory, in
this sense, is the unrelieved delirium of every judgement because it unmasters it,
reveals the patterns of its contingency.
The text then, as de Man sees it, is essentially resistant. There is
something in it that refuses phenomenalization, a materiality that does not
cooperate with the order it seeks to enforce.232And like a machine, this
231 Allegory would have to remain silent if it were to escape the rhetorization - that is, the
metaphorization, the levelling out - of its own disturbances that it cannot escape. This does not
mean that it is not at work. It is a walled up sickness in the rhetoric of every text, a programmed
virus that shuts down the system every time it connects, without permission or even knowledge
of the user.
232 So in "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," it is the machine, the empty "materiality of
inscription" without any reference to meaning that disconnects the closure of Hegel's aesthetic
project. The articulation of the entire system in Hegel is dependent on the passage through the
aesthetics where the absolute Spirit will have exhausted its "objective" representations - in what
is law, politics, history - and finally recollected itself in "the sensory appearance of the idea,"
that for Hegel is the defmition of the beautiful. Aesthetics in Hegel is thus predicated - and it is
structurally critical that it be so - on the symbolic conception of art (cf. above, note 198). But,
asks de Man, "[w]here is it, in the Hegelian system, that it can be said that the intellect, the mind,
or the idea leaves a material trace upon the world, and how does this sensory appearance take
place?" (AI, 101). And it is memorization (Gedachtnisi, distinguished from recollection
(Erinnerung), that enables the transition. Memorization that is emptied of images and can be
associated with learning by rote: "We can learn by heart only when all meaning is forgotten and
words read as if they were mere list of names. 'It is well known,' says Hegel, 'that one knows a
text by heart [or by rote] only when one no longer associates any meaning with the words; in
reciting what one thus knows by heart one necessarily drops all accentuation. '" (101-02). And
this is where the system depending on the stability of the aesthetic gets undone. De Man:
"Memory, for Hegel, is the learning by rote of names ... and it can therefore not be separated
from notation, the inscription, or the writing down of these names. In order to remember, one is
forced to write down what one is likely to forget. The idea, in other words, makes its sensory
appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names. Thought is entirely dependant on a
mental faculty that is mechanical through and through ... The synthesis between name and thing
that characterizes memory is an 'empty link' [constitutive of the sign] and thus entirely unlike the
mutual complementarity and interpenetration of form and content that characterizes symbolic art"
(102). Art then becomes precisely what destabilises the category of the aesthetic in Hegel as the
loss of the symbolic. It disarticulates the symbolic synthesis that would end the destinerrance of
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resistance is blind and implacable in its recurrence. It produces effects it cannot
account for and nothing
in the blind aberrant machine of archiperformance [performance of
grammar here that has no access to any kind of referential legitimation ]
allows us the comfortable pathos of attributing any purpose or meaning
to it: the machine has no will but generates what we call the will -
before any specification as will to power, to truth, or to anything else,
this "will" strives for and against its blind "origin" in the aberrant
activity or passivity that opens the ethical. (Bennington, RDR, 220-21)
The perfunctory function of grammar, "its impersonal precision"
(Allegories, 16), performs without subjectival motives or intentions, without "the
will," and, indeed, in spite of it. It is inhuman. This senseless machine, the
inhuman in language, what de Man calls "the absolute randomness of language,
prior to any figuration or meaning" (Allegories, 299) - in other words, what in
language is unanalysable and radically heterogeneous to sense - is what disrupts
the cognitive patterns and, by revealing their contingency, opens the aberrancy -
that is, the politics - of reading.
The machine can never escape the negative valorisation of the inhuman,
the death and dissolution of the subject: "Traditional literary studies habitually
use the language of machines in a negative way, deploring the mechanical and
the Spirit in self-reflection. And since "the only activity of the intellect to occur as sensory
appearance of an idea" is as unaesthetic as the mechanicity of memorization by rote, then such
"memory is a truth of which the aesthetic is the defensive, ideological, and censored translation
[emphasis added]. In order to have memory one has to be able to forget remembrance and reach
the machinelike exteriority, the outward tum... the techne of writing" (102). For there to be
closure then, in the sensory manifestation of an idea, "consciousness ... has to become like the
machine of mechanical memory, a representation which is in fact merely an inscription or a
system of notation [grammar, in terms of Allegories of Reading]" which is precisely the breach
that makes closure impossible, "leav[ing] the interiorization of experience forever behind" (103).
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the technical as the death of the values attached to life, form, inspiration, and so
on. At best, a 'technical' use of concepts is accorded an uneasy neutrality,
without ever being allowed to become the heart of the matter" (Bennington,
RDR, 214). Indeed, even readers sympathetic to de Man are unwilling to see the
cogs at the dead centre of his writing staging with indifference the scenes of
performative disruptions and engaging the language-machine for its repetitive
motion, but rather opt for pathos and renunciation, saving de Man precisely by
resuscitating the corpse at the centre.233 Norris is thus only too quick to register
the "still" human in de Man. Already in the opening pages "one thing must be
clear:"
But if one thing is clear, it is the fact that de Man's language is still
haunted by ideas of sacrifice, loss, and renunciation - that he has not so
much broken with this habit of thinking as attempted to generalize it far
beyond the limits of any straightforward thematic understanding.
Mizumura makes this point in her essay when she remarks that 'he
continues to speak about renunciation even in his later works when the
word itself has disappeared from his text ... ' Any reading of de Man that
ignores this dimension will accept too readily his own rhetoric of
impersonal rigor and detachment. (The Critique, xix)
The "still" human in de Man makes him more humane e), intimate even if
unacceptable, forgivable at least. The machine cannot be forgiven because it
cannot be blamed. Forgiveness always exacerbates the blame it attempts to
233 This is nothing but a deep-seated prejudice of humanism and liberal individualism that cannot
see the subject as an effect of language, taken in its most general sense of organising structures.
The human with all its psychological and motivational concerns is not given prior to language, it
is language that constitutes and articulates these very concerns. There can be no subject without
language that articulates its lack. It is the always already being-there in language that is the
subject.
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exonerate. It points fingers and requires renunciation in order to forgive. It is
never given graciously, unconditionally. But the machine is radically outside any
criteria of accountability or forgiveness. It is unassimilable to the order of
forgiveness. The valorisation continues. Saving de Man here is saving our ability
to forgive him by ridding his text of the machine and testifying instead to the
moments of "lived experience" in his writing.r" In the closing paragraphs of her
essay, Mizumura writes:
The relentlessness with which de Man's text seems to have left behind
'the wealth of lived experience' - including 'the wealth of lived
experience' of reading - gives us the impression that we are forced in
reading him to become increasinglydeprived of what seems most dear
to us. And yet de Man actually had never left "the wealth of lived
experience." For, in pointing to the necessity of renouncing it, he is in
fact acknowledging the existence of temptation, and is thus already
speaking about it, albeit in a negative manner. The impression of
deprivation comes closer, nonetheless, to grasping the quintessence of
de Man than a placid acceptance of the extreme ascesis that reigns in his
work. ("Renunciation," YFS, 96-97)
Pathos of reference or "deprivation" recoups the human behind the
234 Forgiveness introduces here a new set of questions that for the sake of economy and
architecture will not be exhaustively treated. However, the entire tracery of its effects given in
Derrida's On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness is implied here. Forgiveness that forgives only
what is impossible to excuse, the unforgivable, what one cannot and should not forgive: "there is
only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable. That is to say that forgiveness
must announce itself as impossibility itself. It can only be possible in doing the impossible."
Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 32-33. There is thus something inhuman, ex-
orbitant, of which forgiveness partakes. However, it is not this forgiveness, but rather one that
"must rest on human possibility" (37), one that measures guilt and is capable of forgiving only
what it can punish that is in question here. One must find excuses for de Man, one must find what
will have abolished the very call for forgiveness, to finally forgive him. Cf. also de Man's last
chapter in Allegories of Reading, "Excuses (Confessions)," for the impasse of excuses that only
excuse by compounding the guilt they seem to exonerate. Which is why the text, he writes
towards the end, "can never stop apologizing for the suppression of guilt that it performs" (300).
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writing in order to make it readable, to retotalize the text.235 What is inhuman, in
other words, is reduced to a continuous gathering ofthe human subject in
reading. Language has never stopped speaking about man in its silences.
Renunciation of "lived experience," rhetorical reading demands, only
acknowledges the fact that it still precedes and orients the effects of its own
thinning-out in reading. But reading is radical negativity. Perhaps not even a
negativity insofar as it, however radical, shelters, in the reserves of the repressed,
precisely what it cancels out. The subject here is never truly lost in reading, only
displaced, held in the negative fund of misreadings and by reading its
"deprivation," we come to master its loss. But reading, allegory, is not a working
through, it is what unworks absolutely and then more. It never points to anything
but the sheer taking place of language. Language is the subject in making that is
undone the moment it states itself. There can be no residue of pathos or
renunciation in rhetorical reading precisely because, for de Man, this would be
another metaphor that "reclaims a measure of authority for the self' (Allegories,
175). In other words, a metaphor that does not account for the aberrant
conditions of its own production but reinscribes performativity, the deconstructed
subject, back within the referential system of cognition that saves the shatters of
the text in the very error it denounces. This is what Miller implies. De Man, he
235 "If to read is to understand a text and if to understand means thematically, aesthetically, or
conceptually to totalize a text, then the production of insights into the mechanics of the text will
certainly render that text ... unreadable" (Gasche, "Setzung and Ubersetzung," 23). It is precisely
the reverse temptation that is in question in Mizumura's reading of de Man: "the gesture and the
temptation of totalization" (22). A reading that covers the tracks of its own deconstruction in a
repossession of disarticulated subjectivity. This counter-pull of rhetorical reading, as we have
noted, is always at work, but de Man's rigour, "the extreme ascesis that reigns in his work,"
although unable to stop the retotalizing thrust of reading, is what points to the negative labour, the
unwork, of its deconstruction. In other words, it is rhetorically - not fully as this would close the
text in assurance of its negative insights - self-conscious.
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writes, "clearly recognizes ... that the self is a metaphor, moreover a metaphor
without particular authority. Especially does the self not have authority in that
attractive form of a return of the self beyond its deconstruction, as the wielder of
the instrument of deconstruction." (RDR, 166, emphasis added). In Allegories, de
Man continues: "The same strategy occurs ... for example, in Heidegger, who
also locates the deconstruction of the self as substance in a hermeneutic activity
which, in its turn, becomes the ground of a recovery of selfhood as the
springboard of futurity ... " (175). The self here is only ever a question of topos,
of place and displacement, not of radical loss. The "extreme askesis" of de Man's
writing is a necessary element in a rhetorically self-conscious reading and not an
arbitrary, misconceived distraction from human concerns, as implied by Norris
and Mizumura, that could and should be overlooked in favour of "lived
experience" or rehabilitated human subject. De Man wants to read precisely what
reading destroys. His reading itself is a performance of its own undoing, a
rhetorically self-conscious reading. Hence, the impersonal rigour, the machine-
detachment of his own writing: "The first person pronoun is used rarely and
sparingly by de Man ... This goes along with an austere rigor that makes his
essays sometimes sound as if they were written by some impersonal intelligence
or by language itself, not by someone to whom the laws of blindness and the
impossibility of reading also apply, as they do to the rest of us" (Miller, RDR,
165).
The inhuman in de Man is the negative cognition of the text that tirelessly
repeats the failure to account for its own rhetoricity. It is a machine that performs
indifferently and, like a machine, testifies to the impossibility of reading its own
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performance. Performance here cannot be read precisely because it is what
disrupts reading.r" It points to the unread in reading, to the unreasonable - both
that which is without reason and for which there is no reason. De Man would
say, to that which is not governed by the "necessary link" of analogical or
metaphoric structures but by "chance" and contiguity "in the purely relational
metonymic contact" (Allegories, 14), that de Man associates with the generative
power of grammar. It is "determined not by human will but by impersonal laws
of language over which we have no control and which we cannot even clearly
understand, since our understanding always contains a residue of
misunderstanding" (Miller, RDR, 167). But insofar as the machine disconnects
cognitive structures, insofar as it disables reading, it is also what enables the text
to assume the properties of the event. The eventfulness of the text, that is the
possibility of disinscription that threatens the modes of its receptivity precisely
by liberating them, by making possible what they make impossible, is dependent
on this very disconnection. The disruption of our modes of understanding
happens only by way of the silences they impose. The machine is what activates
the silences in the text. It is what endlessly calls for the event, as the trauma of
the unexplained, and keeps open the possibility of disruption.237
236 De Man will repeat this in Aesthetic Ideology, in the opening remarks of his lecture on Kant
and Schiller: "[I]t doesn't mean that the performative function oflanguage will then as such be
accepted or admitted. It will always be reinscribed within a cognitive system, it will always be
recuperated, it will relapse, so to speak, by a kind of reinscription of the performative in a
tropological system of cognition again. That relapse, however, is not the same as a reversal.
Because this is in its turn open to a critical discourse similar to the one that has taken one from
the notion of trope to that of the performative. So, it is not a return to the notion of trope and to
the notion of cognition," what could be said to motivate the movement of Mizumura's reading,
but now, continues de Man, "it is equally balanced between both, and equally poised between
both, and as such is not a reversal..." (133). There can be no full recovery of cognition here that
would also be the closure of the text.
237 Derrida in Given Time: "The text, then ... is a machine for provoking events: First of all, the
event of the text that is there, like a narrative offering itself or holding itself open to reading ...
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In the machine, the text then is equipped with what outmatches its
potential to be read but this is what keeps its reading uninterrupted. There is
always infinitely more text or a promise of text that reading will keep breaking.
"This complication is characteristic for all deconstructive discourse: the
deconstruction states the fallacy of reference in a necessarily referential mode.
There is no escape from this ... " (Allegories, 125). However, de Man continues,
"the reversal from denial to assertion implicit in deconstructive discourse never
reaches the symmetrical counterpart of what it denies ... The negative thrust of
the deconstruction remains unimpaired' (125-26, emphasis added). Not a
reversal then but an asymmetrical interference of the performative as the
machine and the cognitive structure of the text that produces excess oftextuality
which compels reading. A residue of traces that are also a promise and a call to
which one must respond - there is a certain to-come, Derrida would say, of the
text in the text. In other words, what is promised in deconstruction is evermore
deconstruction, or what amounts to the same thing, evermore reading. "The play
of the text, as Gasche says, "is without end:"
The irreducible performative constitutive of the text is manifest in the
'quantitative economy of loss,' in the textual thermodynamics governed
by a 'debilitating entropy' of the linguistic structure of the text, 'in
which grammar and figure, statement and speech act do not converge,'
or which is the same thing, in the production of textual excess. It is
visible as surplus or as deficiency." ("Setzung and Ubersetzung," 45)
Reading then, far from being an economy - in terms of return or
but also and consequently, from there, in the order of the opened possibility and of the aleatory,
an event pregnant with other events ... " (96).
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repatriation of the self in Romanticism, or an exile plagued by homesickness in
the pit of time hollowed out by allegory in Benjamin - is what in de Man, like a
gift, parts without return, it parts partitioning itself always slightly more (or less)
than it can account for. Not an economy but an uneconomy that suspends the
ratio. Reading simply does not payoff. It goes off empty-handed, broke, with
only a negative potential to accrue its losses. It speaks of an aborted merger in
the text and remains interminably overdrawn. Reading is like a permanently
negative credit report. It moves only on credit that it busts up every time it
borrows, which is why it is continually required to contend with the question of
its own credibility.r"
Compulsively aberrant, the machine-text overruns the circles of
reciprocity that it forces open in the very name of their historicity. Gasche here
continues on the performative as a disjunction in the text that powers its
temporality: "The performative constitutive of texts as displaced totalities of
paired but incompatible functions, far from permitting texts to close upon
themselves (from becoming selves, reflexive and autonomous entities)
temporalizes, historizes them. The performative, then, is characterized by its
power of dissociation" ("Setzung and Ubersetzung," 45). Generative of
misreading, this does not invest in reading the task of stabilizing its negative
238 Text is "a body on credit," as Derrida writes in Given Time. "Everything is an act of faith,
phenomenon of credit or credence, of belief and conventional authority ... which perhaps says
something essential about what here links literature to belief, to credit and thus to capital, to
economy and thus to politics. Authority is constituted by accreditation, both in the sense of
legitimation as effect of belief or credulity, and of bank credit ... One might draw from this all the
consequences regarding the institution of a body and a corpus and regarding the phenomena of
canonization that follow ... There would be no problem of the canon if this whole institution were
natural" (97). The fact that it is not, however, is a chance for politics, for reading other(wise), for
perfectibility - perfectibility that is not governed here by teleology of progress, but by the
irruption of always other than expected, the im-possible.
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economy. If reading is a gift then reading is for nothing in the economy of sense
that would still animate it. A certain idleness or unemployability generated by the
system as a counter-productive inefficiency it cannot assimilate. Not a
reconstitution but a deconstitution of associative levels that govern the topology
of reading. The dissociative power of the performative then is not a task of the
hermeneutic of reading but precisely an unmasterable disturbance of cognition at
loss that disempowers it by opting for the radically untranslatable.r'" There is
something acutely estranging in reading for de Man that is not only untrackable
by cognition but that shortwires its entire conceptual grid while at the same time
offering it to thought. This untrackable static that engages thought is what de
Man's reading compulsively stalks. De Man, Ronell writes, "locates himself at
the dead and dumb center of signification ... gambling his insight on that which
fails to make sense ... " (Stupidity, 111). Reading what refuses itself to reading or
what reading qua reading destroys, not "the meaning or the value," as he writes
in The Resistance to Theory, "but the modalities of production and of reception
of meaning and of value prior to their establishment" (7).240 It is a reading of a
239 That which disrupts cognitive structures and archetypes at all points along the line. It is
important, Lyotard would say, indeed it is "necessary," he says, "to positthe existence of a power
that destabilizes the capacity for explanation ... " (The Postmodern Condition, 61). What is
radically untranslatable here is also the difJerend, what incurs debt (but debt beyond economy),
what is owed to the one deprived of standing in whose name there is politics. Politics is not only
the name that has none but, if there is any, it is in the name ofwho/what has none.
240 Modalities that, as we have already noted, reading cannot account for. Reading "can never
hope to know the process of its own production (the only thing worth knowing)," says de Man
(Allegories, 300). This productivity is what at the same time zeroes out any surplus of insight,
any positivity, when the books are closed and maintains the negative thrust of reading that re-
opens them - always something fraudulent and deceptive with reading, an entry forgotten, not
accounted for, that keeps the books open. What reading resists, in Gasche's words, is "the effort
to aesthetically reify its referential structures and to transform them into phenomena, into sensibly
apprehendable commodities. By phenomenalizing the production process, the process itself is
stripped of what is proper to it, made into meaning and understanding" (The Wild Card, 133).
However, he continues, phenomenalization itself"is also an illusion made possible by language"
(133), by its rhetoric, to be precise, that enables aestheticisation of texts. But rhetoric is always
the forgotten entry, a disfigured figure of identity in general.
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certain paralysis of reading, a "mere reading" Gasche calls it, in that it
has silenced the power of the eye to hear as much as its power to see.
For mere reading is not to proceed anymore in analogy to the plastic arts
and music.i" Mere reading is a silent reading in that it silences all
intuitive, perceptional, sensual approaches to the written text. As if
echoing Saint Augustin's denunciation of the seductions of the senses,
mere reading practices radical asceticism. It is deliberately mute, and
deliberately blind. (The Wild Card, 121)
A reading of the disaster of reading, of the dumb machine, blind and
mute, that wrecks it and where what is estranged, what awaits in reading is not a
negative ontology or an exteriority of the other that is unreadable and without
idiom, offering itself in withdrawal of reading, but precisely offering itself as a
devastation of reading, the clearing and the openness to (of) what comes. And
what comes, comes before, indeed in spite of, is older than, all cognition and
always comes beyond recognition. The it happens one does not see come. And
given that theory, Gasche continues, "_ from thea, sight, contemplation _ is in
essence a perceptual approach, it comes, therefore, as no surprise that, from the
outset, de Man defines mere reading as a reading 'prior to any theory'" (The
Wild Card, 121). Hence, the apathetic rigour of rhetorical reading, its "dumb
formalism," in Ronell's words (Stupidity, 114), that stuns cognition in its loss of
sight or rather stalls its tracking devices by opening up the initial thaumazein
241 Indeed, in The Resistance to Theory, de Man writes of the cancelled aesthetic moment of
reading and instead of reading "by analogy with plastic arts and with music, we now have to
recognize the necessity of a non-perceptual, linguistic moment in painting and music, and learn to
read pictures rather than to imagine meaning" (l0).
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every time one reads.242
What is at stake in de Man's "nonphenomenal reading" is a retracal of the
half-erased figurality of the text that systematically unforgets the unwarranted
aesthetic levelling of its alterity.243This is the aesthetico-ideological function of
reading that, one could say, de-politicises the text. The machinal in reading, for
de Man, is not only a recovery of a certain originary technics of cognition but
also, and importantly, what points to a latency of structural possibilities as its
profound resource. What enables the self-reflexive closure of the text is the
forgetting of its rhetoricity that uproots it, a certain stupor of reading. But it is
precisely rhetoricity, the radically generative potential of the text, that will have
always saved the noise of other worlds in the very still of reading. That the text is
the natural power haunt of otherness is what Gasche prefers to overlook. And the
242 Ronell: "To assert that de Man's work stages a contemporary rendition of thaumazein, taking
a step back in bewilderment, allows for the possibility that it both discloses critical involvement
with the question of that which baffles absolutely and comes from elsewhere, from a place of
exteriority, and is itself implicated in the autistic (the undisrupted singular dimension) of such a
repertory" (Stupidity, 112). For Gasche, however, it is precisely the stepping back in thaumazein
from the immediate or the authority of "philosophical difference" that is subjected to systematic
levelling out at the hands of de Man: "A rhetorical reading, for de Man, is, indeed, a reading that
seeks the transgression of philosophical difference in an indifference that is so radical as to
become entirely indifferent - devoid of all relation - to the philosophical" (The Wild Card, 51-
52).
243 In his essay "In-difference to Philosophy," first published in Reading de Man Reading (1989)
and reprinted later in The Wild Card of Reading, Gasche is writing on the purely formal aspect of
de Man's reading that traces the blind matter of language - the texte brut in every text that is
prior to any relation - that punctuates and reformats cognitive content. This reading is for Gasche
"a nonphenomenal reading:" "A linguistic or rhetorical reading, as de Man understands it, is
essentially a nonphenomenal reading ... [It] is, thus, first, a nonperceptual or nonaesthetic reading.
It centers not on images and tropes but on what de Man calls at one point the 'para-figural. .. ' For
de Man, however, the phenomenal [what is accessible to the senses] 'implies the possibility ofa
determined totalization, ofa contour' as well ... It captures the meaning of texts not only as
tangible figures but also as totalizing figures. A nonphenomenal reading, consequently, is a
reading that reaches beyond the imposition ... of unity upon the text. It extends beyond the
totalizing function of figures or tropes ... It is an approach to the texte brut, to the text before it
starts to signify ... a reading 'by rote,' as he also calls it, that is, a reading that proceeds
mechanically and unthinkingly" (The Wild Card, 53, 55). It is also a noncognitive reading then
or, in other words, the resistance to reading that is integral to any text. "In-difference to
Philosophy" cited hereafter separately as "In-difference" with all subsequent page references to
this edition.
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pressure its to-come exerts on reading, as we shall see in the following chapter, is
what enables political effects.
The fact that reading - and, in extension, language - resists
aestheticisation, that "its very nature is the resistance to all meaningful and
propositional commodification" (The Wild Card, 128), is what, for Gasche,
makes de Man's reading ultimately unassimilable to the order of intelligibility. If
reading is "encountered only where all understanding breaks off, that is, where
all aestheticization has been successfully checked, the encounter itself, with its
unintelligibility, escapes intelligibility as well. It is marked by an irreducibly
opaque moment, a moment a/pragmatism or the empirical" (146, emphasis
added) that cannot be accounted for, except by deflection, that is to say, by
default or surplus of cognition that remains irreducibly misaligned or out of
touch.244 De Man's reading then is an encounter with what is radically
heterogeneous to the cognitive agencies that always advance by a certain
blockage of paths. This is the order of identity - and always also exclusion by
one and the same stroke of difference. Identity presupposes this blockage by
reducing - but never truly mastering - its field of synchronicity and' associative
overlaps to a binary logic that blocks the right of passage to the outside of
structural poles, or rather cancels out the allegorical resources of the text, the
reserve and the threat of its alterity, that is also the possibility of its future(s). But
there is blockage only insofar and precisely because language is radically
unstable. What the machine does is precisely unblock the passage opening the
244 More will be said of this radical pragmaticity in de Man - that is not strictly empirical, as we
shall see - and its resistance to totalizing structures in the next chapter, as it opens onto the
political. It is what Derrida calls "materiality without matter" that resists "every possible
reappropriation." Cf. below, note 272. It is what, in de Man, fractures the aesthetic.
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terms to allegorical valences that the structure of identity pushes into latency,
opening them to textuality in other words. Reading is not natural, but only
because it is not does it give us to read. And the gift here is the possibility of the
other. It is as if de Man by opening the book were promising the future or leaving
the future open. For Gasche, however, de Man's reading
seeks to locate in a text a point of unintelligibility, associated with
figural undecidability, a point, moreover, that sends shockwaves
throughout the whole text with the effect that on none of its possible
strata any certitude whatsoever is allowed to occur. No unfolding takes
place either. By contrast, there is only a repetitive reverberation of the
text's figural undecidability ... mere reading destroys, by dint of a
reactivation of the rhetorical, all the sediments of meaning ... to exhibit
language in its pristine state of unintelligibility, before all
epistemological and aesthetic commodification. Reading is the negative
process in which the text is restored, as it were, to the bare facticity of
language ... (The Wild Card, 146, 147-48)
But this un-reading or what amounts to an unforgetting of the radical
potential of language that in its arbitrariness and naive state of unrelatedness, in
its pragmaticity, repeatedly cuts, with a precision and obstinacy of a machine,
what it stitches, what it effects or makes possible, is, for Gasche, a pathological
stutter destined by "lack of generative power" to "endlessly repeating the
punctuality of [its] lone meaninglessness" ("In-Difference," 82). This autism of
de Man's reading is due to the fact that the blind and dumb rhetoricity, "the
formal materiality" that punctuates the text and "makes figuration as such
possible," but that is unrelated to reading, "cannot be made part of the text" (83).
It cannot be read, in other words, without committing itself to the aberrancy of
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reading, its metaphoric reversion which makes reading itself the recurring object
of reading, the empty reference of its own incompleteness. Indeed, if there is
reading, it requires the forgetting of its rhetoricity: " ... the possibility of a
meaningful text requires that the material and formal cause of the text recede into
oblivion. Such constituting forgetting is achieved by imposing the authority of
sense and meaning on the material and formal linguistic event and on the
senseless power of positing language" (84). But this circularity is a commitment
to a certain resistance of reading that structurally unbinds it from the circle to
incompletion, a commitment to what separates reading permanently from itself
and demands that it answer, and answer now, for the absence of what speaks in
it. Nothing in it is as yet constituted but precisely this exigency. Reading is in the
reserve of reading and there is a stake of responsibility in this "indifferent" and
"idiosyncratic" reading that Gasche does not recognise. "In contrast to
philosophy," as he writes in the closing paragraphs of his essay, "de Man's
readings do not attempt to make any difference. In this sense they are 'different,'
idiosyncratic to a point where, by making no point, they will have made their
point - so singular as to make no difference but, perhaps, in that total apathy a
formidable challenge to philosophical difference" ("In-Difference," 90). On the
contrary, it is a difference that makes all the difference. Unreadable, it gives us to
read. And in its obsessive repetition of the failure to speak of it, de Man's writing
is committed to the gift of reading. Furthermore, apathos, as we have said, is not
only structurally implied in de Man's reading but points to a certain irreducible
resistance of reading that dissipates it by ruining its work, that guarantees its
future by destroying all guarantees. For Gasche, however, it is the work of
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philosophical text that can no longer be guaranteed as it goes bust under the
pressures of rhetorical reading: "The difficulty in question first arises from a
systematic estrangement to which the philosophical texts are subjected in
rhetorical reading" ("In-difference," 57). Gasche's anxiety is one of limits, one of
territories and failed topographies, as suggested in the opening chapters.
Philosophy, he writes, "hinges entirely on its sharp distinctions of levels and
conceptual differences" (51), precisely what de Man systematically
disarticulates. What Gasche finds "baffling" is de Man's arbitrary incision in
philosophical texts where, "from a traditional philosophical perspective, it is
altogether incomprehensible why certain passages [in de Man's reading of Kant
and Hegel in Aesthetic Ideology, for instance] to which de Man refers in his
readings are supposed to be 'baffling,' 'surprising,' 'bewildering,' or 'startling,'
and thus taken as key passages" (57). As if rhetorical reading were determined by
a point of departure. Rhetorical reading begins before one departs and whether
one does or not. It is what makes departure possible. "The philosopher," he
continues further down, "has also difficulty realizing why certain philosophical
movements are said to occur 'somewhat abruptly' or why the introduction of
certain specific statements is judged 'unexpected' or 'sudden" (57). Sudden
disconnections, abrupt movements, unaccounted stresses that all throw "the
philosopher" of guard, "the traditional philosophical perspective" is divested of
sight, indeed castrated, can no longer see, no longer "look through," the medium
has turned opaque, seductive - one can no longer not look, hence misleading and
abusive - much like rhetoric.r" But if every reading is a misreading then every
245 In Stupidity, Ronell comments on Gasche's anxiety here: "Gasche finds incomprehensible
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point of entry is misleading, a missed entry. If the center has defected from the
text then every passage is a key passage that does not fit the lock. Every nook
across the body of the text is sensitized with disinscriptive energies. Wherever
one begins, one will have been aroused to look - even Gasche is. The text then is
opened there where it appears most shut, and it is opened by its comers or
margins that for de Man are abortive of the entire system. The idiocy and the
radical materiality of the signifier, in its absolute exteriority, disrupts the
conceptual "architecture" of the work, any work; the body, like the machine, has
no meaning, it is what un-works any work. And philosophy carries as much - or
rather more - textual guilt for unwarranted aesthetic ruses, where metaphoric
placeholders are constantly used for what is an irreducible ignorance that founds
it.246 The philosopher, in fact, is "floored:"
... the philosophically trained reader is certainly floored when he or she
realises that the rhetorical reading of philosophical texts not only
completely disregards the literal meaning of texts but proceeds by
means of a total levelling of everything constitutive of the text's
specificity. The nonphenomenal reading collapses all differences that
what de Man finds incomprehensible. Hence their differences. One aspect of the
uncomprehending emerges on the side of sharpness (Gasche doesn't understand what's not to
understand)... De Man introduces certain passages, Gasche insists, as though he is stumped by
them. Where there is relation and the index of coherency, de Man opts for absolutely singular and
disconnects. His resolve keeps him bound to the anxiety of unrelieved ignorance, a condition
stipulated by language to the extent that it is hounded by referentiality" (110, 111).Gasche is too
much of a philosopher, the one who "connects," to not understand de Man.
246 In Aesthetic Ideology, for instance, speaking of Schiller's psychological misappropriations of
Kant's sublime, de Man will comment towards the end of the lecture on hypotyposis in Kant, "the
difficulty of rendering, by means of sensory elements, purely intellectual concepts. And the
particular necessity which philosophy has, to take its terminology not from purely intellectual
concepts but from material, sensory elements, which it then uses metaphorically, and frequently
forgets that it does so. So that when philosophy speaks of the ground of being, or says that
something/ollows, or that something depends on something else, it is really using physical terms,
it is really using metaphors, and it forgets that it does so. Since [Derrida's] the 'Mythologie
blanche,' we have all become aware of that and we would never do this nasty thing again!" (153),
says de Man.
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serve as barriers between concepts and discursive levels, as well as
between the premises and conclusions of the separate steps of
argumentation, differences on which the whole argument and its
movements are dependent. Such a reading pays no respect to the
architecture of a work of philosophy or to the differences between
different works in the corpus of a philosopher. ("In-difference," 58)
De Man disrespects what one must not by debordering distinctions and
narrative taxonomies. He is too frivolous. But the diachronic structure of
narrative progression in a philosophical text is a rhetorization of an undecidable
grammatic pattern. A metaphoric ruse without authority. The text gazes finally
with no semantic depth and if it has any, it is an attempt to aestheticize what is
absolutely arbitrary - and, therefore, radically disintegrative. Precisely what de
Man in "The Concept ofIrony," following Schlegel, refers to as reelle Sprache,
the authentic language as "the language of madness, the language of error, and
the language of stupidity" (AI, 181). There is no border that can be instituted and
protected against this because, like "a terrorist weapon," it attacks from within
(Allegories, x).
Deconstruction, at the hands of de Man, seems thus to pirouette outside
the margins of its legitimacy as a serious philosophical discourse, turning into a
tropological stunt that "shows little or no concern about philosophy" ("In-
difference," 89). It aborts any connective attempt, even its own, as it is constantly
re-called to account by its own disconnections. It can thus make no claim without
denial. In fact, as we have seen, it makes no difference at all: " ... it is the
unheard-of attempt to think an indifference that makes no difference at all. A
rhetorical reading, for de Man, is, indeed, a reading that seeks the transgression
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of philosophical difference in an indifference that is so radical as to become
entirely indifferent - devoid of all relation - to the philosophical" (51-52).
However, what is indifferent to all relation, the machine, the randomness of
linguistic matter that ruins epistemic calculative grids, is also what in reading
resists absolutely. Whereas Gasche labours to expose its ultimate indifference,
the linguistic material event becomes a point of possible resistance, of that which
interrupts every economy and, like madness, irrupts into the scene of reason to
open the closed circles of tropologic and symbolic exchange.
De Man's thought, for Gasche, is aligned with formalism and apathy that
"achieves a singularity so radical that it defies all communication, all mediation,
and thus, all universality ... It is thus impossible that it could seek imitation, let
alone become an integrating factor in a humanistically inspired paideia" (The
Wild Card, 112). If it does anything, it is to force "mere reading into running in
place and into the monotonous repetition that language (is) language (is)
language (is) ... " (233). But the obsession of reading is what escapes its mastery.
It repeats compulsively because it attempts to master the failure of reading, the
default in its economy. It is infinite resistance to everything that would close the
books. It un-reads whenever and wherever it reads. What Gasche seems to repeat
and resediment, however, is that history that will have forgotten de Man, and
that, precisely in order to be able to read, to make sense of its own texts. This
history is well known; it is prompted by unsavoury dangers of collusion that
would wreck the policed borders between the serious, the philosophical, what
deconstruction in the end merits, and the play and technicity of rhetoric, of
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doubling that must be contained like madness, not realising that philosophy is
already taken hostage by the very thing it believes to master.
De Man's reading is like a wrongly put, reversed tag question, that,
having contracted an allegorical bug, constantly seeks disaffirmation, shadowing
each sentence and repeated with an automaticity of a reflex. It is a reactive failure
in the nervous system repossessed each time anew with the possibility of
understanding that remains a head of it or lagging behind. And everyone has
grown tired of it. What it names, however, is an imperative to understand. But if
there is one it is because of its impossibility, because finally "understanding does
not come, but remains lost to us" (Ronell, Stupidity, 161). Incomplete, allegory
reiterates this imperative, giving us to understand, its only injunction being:
• Keep watch over absent meaning.
- Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster
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Chapter Five
Politics de trop
What is to be done? .. it is ineluctable to invent a
world, instead of being subjected to one, or dreaming of
another. Invention is always without model and without
warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil,
anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart,
there too gathers the strength that no certainty can
match.
- Jean-Luc Nancy, Retreating the Political
The excessive demand to keep watch over absent meaning is one that cleaves de
Man's work. It is devastating. It ruins the work, unworks it, makes it split from
the start, makes it accountable. This patience disables judgement in a recoil of
undecidability where one will have always been too quick. In this demand, that is
a demand of language, the subject will have found his anonymity, no longer an
agency of social and political change but of his own undoing. But the work is
called upon to be only under the threat of its alterity, the absentee that
disidentifies the work is alone what makes it possible. And does one not owe
oneself, everything and then more, to this absentee? Is not the political the
coming of its interruption?
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Any given text, as we have seen, exists on account of the disruption of its
own unity. There is something in it unrelated, machinelike, that unbinds, that will
have not only escaped but severed all relations and yet, precisely in this coming
apart, in this breach of all relation, will have opened the possibility of another.
This opening up by coming apart is what de Man calls reading. And the
disintegrative force of reading, one that in disrupting its hermeneutic keeps watch
over its future, is allegory.i" Allegory tears open the memory of unrelated ness in
reading. In other words, it frees up the passage between sign and meaning,
blocked by referential systems, as we shall see. It articulates a concern, the
distress of reading held hostage by a radical demand that calls for an
interminable critique of its politico-epistemic inheritance. The fact that "the
relationship between the allegorical sign and its meaning (signifie) is not decreed
by dogma" ("The Rhetoric," 207), to reiterate de Man, means that the relays of
reading are never assured in advance, other than by a "sleight of hand," but
247 Allegory, as we know, commits itself to fragments, or rather to certain blanks at their borders.
This is what Blanchot writes of the fragment: "Fragments are written as unfinished separations.
Their incompletion, their insufficiency, the disappointment at work in them, is their aimless drift,
the indication that, neither unifiable nor consistent, they accommodate a certain array of marks -
the marks with which thought ... represents the furtive groupings that fictively open and close the
absence of totality ... For fragments, destined partly to the blank that separates them, find in this
gap not what ends them, but what prolongs them ... causing them to persist on account of their
incompletion. And thus are they always ready to let themselves be worked upon ... instead of
remaining as fallen utterances, left aside, the secret void of mystery which no elaboration could
ever fill." Maurice Blanchot, Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln and London:
Nebraska UP, 1995), p. 58. Hereafter cited as WD. For de Man, every text is a fragment or a
separation that undersigns its own conditions of unreadability. What resists in the fragment - the
blank at the end that incompletes it - is what makes it infinitely malleable without ever
approaching it. This resistance is also what makes the text accountable. Something left aside for
which the text cannot account is what makes it infinitely responsible. In the preface to The
Rhetoric of Romanticism, for instance, de Man will come to stress precisely "the fragmentary
aspect of the whole," where the essays in the volume "do not evolve in a manner that easily
allows for dialectical progression, or ultimately, for historical totalization. Rather it seems that
they always start again from scratch and that their conclusions fail to add up to anything" (viii,
emphasis added), as if to reiterate that the failure of reading is the responsibility of right reading
whose task is always to be done, for right reading is precisely the one that is never done as it
continuously fragments its own attempt at aesthetic closures.
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called to account and continually redecided. Allegory points to a past that is
always other, and, therefore, one that we will never have finished reading.
Reading it, for de Man, is always rewriting it but this is the very exigency of
reading. If history is not guaranteed by language, as allegory implies, then it is
always hounded by reading that keeps watch over its absent archives of meaning.
In other words, reference, our addiction to it, is submitted to a programmatic and
continual pressure of unlearning. The passage of discontinuity allegory
supervises is a site of intervention. The empty space of detachment that reserves
the possibility of what Blanchot calls "the ethics of revolt," that is to say, the
exigency of the political that "is opposed to all classical notions of the Sovereign
Good, and to all moral or immoral claims, for it constructs, protects, maintains an
empty place, letting another history come to us" (WD, 138). It is in the reserve of
reference then, one that is irreducible for de Man, that "another history" comes to
us. This is where the possibility of reinscription of anteriority is kept and with it
the possibility of thinking anything like politics or the future of politics. What
never stops in reading is the reinscription of the past - the disturbance of the
dead called to account. But that one is never done with the past, one could say,
guarantees the coming of the future that is always plural, and, thus, without
guarantee. And this may be the challenge of de Man to politics: the fact that it
arrives in plural, there is always too much of it, politics de trop.
De Man's machine then is reactive, mobilised by aesthetic levelling and
totalization of difference. By reactivating difference the machine does not
paralyse but rather enables the political as much as it requires its rethinking
because it introduces a persistent threat of dismemberment that binds the political
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to a certain unfulfilled agitation. The text one reads never fully integrates itself
into the practice of reading, it is never one, but is sustained by a continuous
demand to uproot itself, to continually disrupt and surpass the formation of an
overbearing unity. In this sense the text is the allegory of the political. It sustains
itself through an idea of coming apart in dispersion, of the continuous political
demand of going outside of identity that has been established. There is thus a
dissatisfaction in the text with what it is and politics, indeed, is no different, it
implies the same laceration of identity: "When one says politics," Lyotard
responds in an interview, "one always insists that there is something to institute.
There is no politics if there is not at the very centre of society ... a questioning of
existing institutions [a decentring then and a coming apart], a project to improve
them, to make them more just. This means that all politics implies the
prescription of doing something else than what is" (Just Gaming, 23, emphasis
added). This does not only bind the political to the prescriptive that surpasses the
given and demands inventiveness but also implies that living in a world does not
exhaust the political, the political begins rather with imagining alternatives to the
world. It is essentially linked to "the possibility of relating things differently"
(42), says Lyotard, that is to say, to a certain narrative interruption that does not
found a politics but renews the pressure against its foundations. For politics
precisely cannot be founded and is the place and exposure of this very
impossibility. A demand then to contest all projects of its completion insofar as it
protects an empty place for an always other history unwritten by the existing
orders of meaning. This is where the political begins, at the emptiness of its limit,
an allegorical fragment, where the question of the political is raised.
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The text, for de Man, is dangerous precisely because it is innocent,
anonymous and radically unrelated -like a machine. Its pragmaticity, "the
material and formal base" of the text, as Gasche says, "is absolutely indifferent to
what comes before it and what follows it. It is irreducibly singular, destitute of all
possible relations" ("In-difference," 84). What comes to be a meaning then, the
applicability of the text, is only an attempt to master the innocence of its passive
refusal. There is thus a withdrawal in the text, an estrangement that holds itself
and escapes systems of meaning. And politics would be an approach on the basis
of this estrangement, a distance that must be preserved ifthere is to be politics. It
is precisely because the text is absolutely innocent that it remains politically
active. It is the passivity of its refusal, the inability of its integration, that calls
into question the instituted order of meaning?48 The text is thus an unpower of
contestation charged against all identity. And in this sense is it political. The
"stony gaze" at the bottom of the text, "entirely devoid of any substitutive
exchange, of any negotiated economy," the moment, de Man says, of its "a-
pathos, or apathy, as the complete loss of the symbolic" that "entertains no
notion of reference or semiosis" is the absolute anonymity of the text that
punctuates the identification and authority of meaning.i" But the machine in the
248 This inability is unrelieved because reading, as we have seen, only ever reiterates a deflection
of the text it deconstructs. It is what Gasche calls the "negative cognition" of reading, "an
invitation to endlessly and in an infinite process debunk the totalizations of knowledge, its own
included' ("Setzung and Ubersetzung," 27, emphasis added). Something unworkable will have
resisted.
249 This is the gaze de Man finds in Kant's vision of the sublime. The gaze that in "Kant's
Materialism" disarticulates the aesthetic ruse of transcendental closure that in The Critique of
Judgment would make cognition and act cohere and thus guarantee the totality of the
philosophical system. The aesthetic category would be the articulation of the unity and closure of
epistemology and ethics opened up by pure and practical reason. It is what regulates the entire
system, and the sublime, as the manifestation of the unpresentable, is the hinge - as it manifests
what is beyond the limits of experience, it is precisely what makes "the junction of cognition with
morality possible," as de Man writes in the essay (AI, 125). Quoting Kant on the sublime, he
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text that disengages any attempt to master its passivity is also what puts mastery
in playas a repetition of aberrancy that keeps open the empty place of the
political.
It is thus the estrangement in the text, this rock-bottom of the text, that
opens a hole in the instituted semantic order precisely by revealing the illicit
make-up of its aesthetic and conceptual constructs. For in its passivity, the
machine-text is not coextensive with any applicability of its use. It is rather what
undercuts all motivating relation that would legitimate its applicability. It stands
radically foreign to the effects it produces. In other words, its significance is
always yet to come. "Like the legal text," Gasche writes,
all texts are distinguished by 'an unavoidable estrangement' between the
generality of their functioning and the particularity of their meaning,
says de Man. This estrangement is one between 'the system of
relationships that generates the text and that functions independently of
its referential meaning' (i.e., its grammar) and its referentiality; between
the text as 'a logical code or machine' and considerations of its
applicability or interpretability." ("Setzung and Ubersetzung," 44)
continues: "'If we call sublime the sight of a star-studded sky, we must not base this judgment on
a notion of the stars as worlds inhabited by rational beings ... We must instead consider the sky as
we see it, as a wide vault that contains everything. This is the only way to conceive of the
sublime as the source of pure aesthetic judgment. The same is true of the sea: we must not look
upon the ocean with the enriching knowledge that makes us conceive it as, for example, the vast
habitat of nautical animals, or as the water supply ... or even as an element that keeps continents
apart ... All these are teleological judgements. Instead, one must see the ocean as poets do, as the
eye seems to perceive it ... as a transparent mirror when it is at peace ... and when it is in motion,
as an abyss that threatens to swallow everything '" (126). What de Man sees here is not an
articulation of closure but a certain radical and absolute formalism "that entertains no notion of
reference or semiosis" (128), a passivity of vision without any perceptive depth or insight that
resists totalization and breaks open the system: "No mind, no inside," he writes, "to correspond to
an outside, can be found in Kant's scene. To the extent that any mind or judgment are present at
all, they are in error ... the eye, left to itself, entirely ignores understanding ... The passage is
entirely devoid of any substitutive exchange, of any negotiated economy, between nature and
mind ... The dynamics of the sublime mark the moment when the infmite is frozen into the
materiality of stone, when no pathos, anxiety, or sympathy is conceivable; it is, indeed ... the
complete loss of the symbolic" (127).
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This estrangement, a certain sundering in the text, is also the battleground
where the nature of the political relation is to be continually redecided. When
writing on Rousseau's The Social Contract and the problematic relation between
the general and the singular that for de Man constitutes any text/50 he will come
to countersign an interruption of relation as the very possibility of the political.
And he will come to sign this in spite of himself, answer to a call of another in
secret, and by pretending not to, by not wanting to, he still will have signed, or
rather (his) writing that is no longer his, the text, will have opened the possibility
of signing on_251And is not the text precisely an opening up and a possibility of
countersignature in which the text infinitely reserves itself while making possible
a response-ability without end that constitutes its very historicity? This is the
generosity of writing. An invitation extended to the to-come of an always other
possibility of reading. For responsibility without end is nothing but a finitude as
depropriation of all ends. This is where the political begins, in the possibility of
misreading. Not to be able to respond, to shed limits of a discourse that is the
very injunction of reading - it is in this injunction that totality will have seen
itself be exceeded - to be excluded from playing the game, as Lyotard says, is
250 In the previous chapter, we have seen that it is precisely the interference of "a generative,
open-ended, non-referential grammatical system" and "the referential moment" that "subverts the
grammatical code" to which the text owes its existence (Allegories, 268, 270). This aporia,
however, is the very specificity of "the legal text." All texts then, in a sense, articulate the
aRoretic nature of juridico-ethical imperatives.
2 I A countersignature that comes in form of a disclaimer he writes in the chapter, as if to carry no
risk of unreasonable misappropriations, kidnappings and sense abductions: "We are not here
concerned with the technically political significance of this text," he writes, "still less with an
evaluation of the political and ethical praxis that can be derived from it. Our reading merely tries
to define the rhetorical patterns that organize the distribution and the movement of the key terms
- while contending that questions of valorization can be relevantly considered only after the
rhetorical status of the text has been clarified" (Allegories, 258). But it is precisely "the rhetorical
patterns that organize the distribution and the movement of the key terms," as we know from de
Man, that carry the traces of misappropriations - ideological and political. It is impossible not to
be concerned, not to claim what de Man disclaims.
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absolute injustice: "Absolute injustice would occur if the pragmatics of
obligation, that is, the possibility of continuing to play the game of the just, were
excluded. That is what is unjust. Not the opposite of just, but that which prohibits
that the question of the just and the unjust be raised" (Just Gaming, 66-67,
emphasis added). The raising of the question here is countersigning the text in
what de Man calls misreading that cannot be closed off. Signature, reading, the
just is not finished until countersigned in a response that incompletes it. Derrida
on Joyce and countersignature: "[O]n the one hand, we must write, we must sign,
we must bring about new events with untranslatable marks - and this is the
frantic call, the distress of a signature that is asking for a yes from the other, the
pleading injunction for a counter-signature; but on the other hand, the singular
novelty of any other yes, of any other signature, finds itself already
programophoned in the Joycean cOrpUS.,,252Everything appears to hinge on the
possibility of "playing the game," that is one of response, indeed of dis-course or
even dis-corpus, of mutilated body, to use de Man's terminology, that is never far
from the political. It solicits an opening making possible and being made
possible by the call of the other as disaster/chance event. What is .
"programophoned" in the corpus, Derrida says, is not only the fact that the
unforeseeable, an-other yes of reading, is being suspended, in advance cut off, so
to speak, but also that the possibility of countersigning is always already
"programophoned," in and by the text. The text, that is the body, "the Joycean
corpus," precipitates, in advance, its own shattering. It is this very shattering. It is
252 Jacques Derrida, "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce," inActs of Literature
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 282-83.
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a ''yes from the other" and "a counter-signature" before it is itself. Everything,
Derrida continues, addressing the Joyce scholarship,
is integrable in the "this is my body" of the corpus. But from another
point of view, this hyper-mnesic interiorization [the competence of
Joyce scholarship, that is] can never be closed upon itself. For reasons
connected with the structure of the corpus, the project and the signature,
there can be no assurance of any principle of truth and legitimacy, so
you also have the feeling, given that nothing new can take you by
surprisefrom the inside, that something might eventually happen to you
from an unforeseeable outside. And you have guests. (Acts, 283,
emphasis added)
But before any identity of a host inside, protected by the "domestic
interiority" of its laws and competence (283), before any signature, there must be
already a guest, the possibility of some other, coming from an elsewhere of
outside already countersigning, putting domestic laws and their legitimacy in
question. The structure of identity of a body of writing preprograms its coming
apart, its mutilation and dismemberment; this is the condition of its possibility -
it lives on by allowing the possibility of its ruination alone. The possibility of
response then, of an other yes, of signing on, that is also, and always, a disastrous
unravelling of totality - the beginning of the political - is inscribed in the ad-
venture, the to-come, of reading.
We must sign on, continue to play the game.
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Space Engineers
De Man's text, as we have seen, opens a relation of estrangement in the political.
A relation that must be outside belonging, that gathers those who in coming
together only seem to affirm the dispersal of the collective being, but in dispersal
a desire for solidarity. A gathering of others that can always interrupt the
gathering. Of others who cannot completely say "we" because of a certain
unbinding and tremor in the structure of belonging. Being together, in fact, is
never total, and is possible only as an affirmation of a diastem that sustains the
relation. What constitutes collectiveness, its affirmation, is precisely the
possibility of reserve in the in-common of the political bond, that which in its
mad exposure to the call of the other threatens to tear the very fabric of collective
being. But this would be the most profound affirmation of solidarity. Without
this exposure there would be no common relation, one would not belong. There
is something dissimilar, dissymmetry and curvature of social space, in political
relation that requires another thought of the political. This "decisive relationship"
is what constitutes "the political entity" here precisely by always exposing it to
the risk of deconstitution because political relation, as de Man insists, is not
essential but "contingent," constituted not by what (it) is, in other words, but
precisely by what (it) is not yet:
The decisive relationship is no longer between constituting and
constituted elements ... The very concept of a political entity, be it a
State, a class or a person ... changes: an entity can be called political, not
because it is collective (constituted by a plurality of similar units), but
precisely because it is not, because it sets up relationships with other
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entities on a non-constitutive basis. The encounter between one political
unit and another is not a generalization in which a structure is extended
on the basis of a principle of similarity (or of a proximity considered as
similarity) to include both under its common aegis ... the relationships
of the units among each other are not stated in terms of affinities,
analogies, common properties or any other principle of metaphorical
exchange. They depend instead on the ability of one entity, regardless of
similarities, to keep the relationship to another contingent ... In other
words, the structure postulates the necessary existence of radical
estrangement between political entities. (Allegories, 254)
There could be no politics, no response that constitutes its empty place,
and thus no concern for justice without this contingency. "Such patterns of
estrangement are an inevitable aspect of political structures" (255), writes de
Man. For politics is essentially an ethos of destinerrance, of improper and the
unfamiliar. A site of contestive demands hypersensitized by a concern for justice
it can never embody or approximate. For justice is disembodied, undecidable,
weak, a force of weakness, Derrida would say, and it is essential that it remain
so. Insofar as it cannot be represented by a body politic it will demand its
continual dismemberment. Without disembodiment, the without-content of
justice that exceeds the horizon and history of its becoming in the conditionality
of law and politics, there would be no exigency of political transformation, no
perfectibility of its performatives.P' Justice is always estranged, and as such, it is
apermanent interruption of the political.
253 In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Derrida gives an instance of the heterology here in
question between the calculative and conditional order of politics and law and the unconditional
interrogative demand of justice: "For example... human rights, such as the history of a certain
number of juridical performatives has determined and enriched them from one declaration to the
next over the course of the last two centuries, and the exigency of an unconditional justice to
which these performatives will always be inadequate, [and thus] open to perfectibility ... exposed
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The contingency of the social space, its structural undecidability and
incompleteness, the fact that it rests "on a non-constitutive basis," as de Man
says, is what ensures the possibility of politics and decision. The "political
entity," in other words, is always a transitional state, subject to a constant
revision and undoing from what is exterior to it. This contingency extends to the
entire system of which it forms a part - the part then always being larger than the
whole. The totality of social relations, the social bond itself, becomes a
mythogenic effect of its own impossibility. And the political would be precisely
what effects the ruin of the bond, an unlocking of the social to the loss of its
presuppositions. It is the affirmation of constitutive openness of all social
relation. Incompleteness here is not a negativity, however, that needs to be filled.
What makes the social incomplete is also what makes it experience its own limit
at which it is exposed to the other. But the limit is also a passage that opens, a
point of contact. It is the limit that makes the outside its face. Everything happens
to a rational deconstruction that will endlessly question their limits and presuppositions, the
interests and calculations that order their deployment, and their concepts ... " Jacques Derrida,
Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford UP, 2005), p. 151. Hereafter cited as Rogues. For the undeconstructibility of justice, in
the name of which, and by virtue of which alone, deconstruction gets under way, cf. Derrida's
"Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority, '" in Acts of Religion, in particular pp.
230-51. "[L Jaw is essentially deconstructible, whether because it is founded, that is to say
constructed, upon interpretable and transformable textual strata (and this is the history of law, its
possible and necessary transformation ... ), or because its ultimate foundation is by definition
unfounded. The fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. One may find in this the political
chance of all historical progress ... [emphasis added]. Justice [on the other hand], in itself, if such
a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if
such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice" (242-43), in the sense here, I would add, of its
indefmite interrogative right. "For in the end," Derrida will say a few pages later, "where would
deconstruction fmd its force, its movement or its motivation if not in this always unsatisfied
appeal, beyond the determinations of what one names, in determined contexts, justice, the
possibility of justice" (249). Between - because there is a disjunctive and irreducible between
here, it is what makes deconstruction possible - "between law and justice, deconstruction finds its
privileged site, or rather, its privileged instability" (249-50), There is no distance here between de
Man and Derrida in terms of politicity of deconstruction as a continual desedimentation of
superstructures, although it remains curious whether de Man here would have seen justice as a
rhetorical cipher or metaphor for the unpresentable and, hence, implicitly deconstructible.
267
here on the limit that defines social relation while, at the same time, opening it to
the experience that undoes its definition. It will thus never complete itself, never
seal itself narcissistically round its being and sink in it, as it is constantly emptied
from along its limits. This empty space that is in the midst of us, the fire that is
now completely snuffed out and no longer gathers us round, its ashes rather that
scatter us, is also what radically opens us to the ethical. This also means that
social identity is never saturated by the fullness of the social bond but by a
relation to a totality of its possibilities as an empty space. And it is this relation
that constitutes the political.
Insofar as it thus disconfirms the social bond, exposing it to its limit and,
at its limit, to an outside, the political cannot be aligned with the law. Law is
precisely what is under constant erasure in the political:
The Social Contract does not warrant belief in a suprahistorical political
model that. .. would make the political State 'perpetual.' [which, in
Geneva, had led to "the condemnation of the Social Contract as
'destructive of all governments,' de Man comments in a footnote]. For
this would ... cause the State to relapse into the kind of aberrant natural
model, .. The declaration of the 'permanence' of the State would thus
greatly hasten its dissolution. It follows, however, that the meaning of
the contractual text has to remain suspended and undecidable: 'there
can be no fundamental Law that is binding for the entire body of the
people ... ' Revolution and legality by no means cancel each other out,
since the text of the law is, per definition, in a condition of
unpredictable change. Its mode of existence is necessarily temporal and
historical, though in a strictly non teleological sense." (Allegories, 266-
67, emphasis added)
The political would be the space that opens the law to its undoing. An
268
unlawful place within law where "the meaning of the contractual text has to
remain suspended and undecided." If there is a specificity of the political, it lies
precisely in this undecidability that exposes the law to the infinite demand of
reading. It opens the law to a certain hauntology, to the ghosts of its others that
constitute its history. For the history of the law, "the text of the law" - it has no
other - as de Man says, is the history of its illegitimacy, it is "per definition, in a
condition of unpredictable change." Its historicity then is dependent on its
epistemological unreliability. Any attempt to ground the law in a foundational
epistemology, to legitimize it referentially, an idiom specific to ideology for de
Man, would amount to a closure of the political, a desire to end contestation, to
be right without remainder. A terror, Bill Readings calls it, "the terror of the real
that governs the government and the argument (so that argument is limited to
government) of Western politics in democracy or in its most extended form in
totalitarianism, a terror that operates by grounding its prescriptive judgments as
the descriptions of an empirical reality outside signifying practice.,,254 Wherever
the authority of the law is referentially determined, the alterity of its future that
the political maintains will have been foreclosed in advance.255 It is 'the refusal to
close politics, that is, "to allow law to assume the status of a literally
representable nature" (Readings, RDR, 241), that makes de Man always insist on
254 Bill Readings, "The Deconstruction of Politics," in Reading de Man Reading (Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1989), p. 230.
255 This is why Readings can write further that "the 'real' is the accomplished ground of
injustice ... " The real is always mobilized as a strategy of depoliticization in the service of
specific ideological ends. It is a strategico-political concept that relies for its force on a certain
pre-conceptuality. Readings continues, "it is always, the assertion of the possibility of a
nonmetaphorical voice, a pure literality. To appeal to the 'real' is always to lend a voice to the
state of things - what we do when we appeal to a 'political reality' is to personify literality, to
invoke a possibility of a purely literal voice that would provide the criteria of justice, in that it
would speak a nature. Thus a literal voice would provide both the form and the content of justice:
as mimetic adequation to a nature that would be just because it would be just nature (no rhetoric)"
(RDR,231).
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the textuality of law, "the contractual text" or "the text of the law" (Allegories,
266), and its radical unrepresentability.r" The refusal to provide any positive
grounding of law is the refusal of political closure. The structure of the text
follows closely the structure of the law:
Just as no law can be written unless one suspends any consideration of
applicability to a particular entity ... grammatical logic can function only
if its referential consequences are disregarded. On the other hand, no
law is a law unless it also applies to particular individual. It cannot be
left hanging in the air, in the abstraction of its generality. Only thus by
refereeing it back to particular praxis can the justice of the law be tested,
exactly as the justesse of any statement can be only be tested by
referential verifiability, or by deviation from this verification. For how
is justice to be determined if not by a particular reference? (Allegories,
269)
There would be no justice without its juridical determinations, without
the procedural practice or system of laws that distribute its history unevenly.
Justice, in other words, demands its idiom of dispensation, the step of the law
that engages its history: "For, how is justice to be determined if not by a
particular reference?" Disembodied, justice needs the body of its laws in order to
be effective. But, writes de Man, "the incompatibility between the elaboration of
the law [possible only in suspension of reference] and its application (or justice)
can only be bridged by an act of deceit ... [To appropriate the general structure of
the law] is to steal from the text the very meaning to which, according to this
256 Indeed, law, politics, is never substantialist for de Man, it can never be justified, which is why
it is never divorced from the text. It is the "legal text," for instance, that in its general form
"subsumes" the aporetic structure of the polity: "The structure of the entity with which we are
concerned (be it as property, as national State or any other political institution) is most clearly
revealed when it is considered as the general form that subsumes all these particular versions,
namely as legal text. The first characteristic of such a text is its generality ... " (Allegories, 267).
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text, we are not entitled, the particular Iwhich destroys its generality ... " (269).
The legitimacy of the law requires "an act of deceit," an ideological sleight of
hand that conceals the theft.257The demand of justice, the demand that it be tried,
can only be answered to in its corruption and threat ofpervertibility. But this
pervertibility, Derrida will say, is both essential and irreducible. Writing on the
unconditional law of hospitality that reiterates the structure of estrangement
engaged here, Derrida notes: "In order to be what it is, the law [that is
unconditional, disembodied, as I mentioned earlier] thus needs the laws, which,
however, deny it, or at any rate threaten it, sometimes corrupt or pervert it. And
must always be able to do this. For this pervertibility is essential, irreducible,
necessary too. The perfectibility of laws is at this cost. And therefore their
historicity.,,258 The step of the law can thus never approach a certain madness
that inhabits justice but that also exposes the order of law to (r)evolutions and
countersignatures that punctuate its history.
The structure of just law then, in de Man's terms, would be reflected in
the aporetic structure of the text: "It seems that as soon as a text knows what it
states, it can only act deceptively, like the thieving lawmaker ... and' if a text does
not act, it cannot state what it knows" (Allegories, 270). The singular, idiomatic
address, the justesse of the law, compromises the justice of the law. Is this not
why the gate in Kafka's parable "Before the Law" is finally shut? It is the very
address, the announcement: "No one else could ever be admitted here, since this
257 This would be the light of eidos in ideo-logy that blinds the vision of its inscription, that is, its
contingency.
258 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourrnantelle, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites
Jacques Derrida to Respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2000), p. 79.
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gate was made only for you,,,259that shuts the gate. The command of the law
fails and deceives, as it must, in the exemplarity of its address, in "the particular
I" (Allegories, 269) that it demands for its determination and that measures its
finitude. But it is in its very failing that the law continues to command. This
failure is not only what constitutes the imperative of the law, the "it is necessary"
of its injunction, it is also what writes the law, what orders the narrativity of its
history. That the story is written at all testifies to the failure of the law, for the
law itself is unrelatable. It relates itself only allegorically, in the full sense of the
term, as a missed encounter between the justesse of its address and the justice of
its command. To respond to the law is to respond to a radically formal command
that, like grammar, is no longer dependent on the notion of reference or semantic
intention. And like grammar, it refers irreducibly but never to the right referent,
producing thus always "a little more or a little less" than expected, which
disables structural closure and opens "the game of the just" one will never have
finished playing:
The legal machine, it turns out, never works exactly as it was
programmed to do. It always produces a little more or a little less than
the original, theoretical input... Regardless of whether the
differentiation engenders excess or default, it always results in an
increasing deviation of the law of the State from the state of the law,
between constitutional prescription and political action. (Allegories,
271,272).
The default or excess of judgment, its always misdirected force that
259 Franz Kafka, "Before the Law," in The Complete Short Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer
(London: Vintage, 2005), p. 4.
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generates destabilization of closed systems is what constitutes the political. That
there is the political traces a primary dislocation of the system, its impossibility
to close itself off in a representable totality. One could say that politics is
precisely the possibility of "deviation of the law of the State from the state of the
law," an irreducible emptiness lodged between prescriptive and denotative
orders, for Lyotard, language games, or later, phrase regimens, translatable to
one another only at the price of terror, that is the closure of politics.P" This
"deviation," or misalignment, "a debilitating entropy" that governs "the political
thermodynamics ... illustrates the practical consequences of a linguistic structure
in which grammar and figure, statement and speech act do not converge"
(Allegories, 272). Once again, for de Man, politics cannot be dissociated from the
rhetorical structure. Indeed, politicization, "the game of the just," as we have
seen, its very possibility, depends on the aberrancy of referential misrecognition,
"this tendency," Laclau writes, "of a signifier to evade its strict attachment to a
signified:"
It is because of this constitutive split between singularity and
universality - this tendency of a signifier to evade its strict attachment to
a signified while keeping a ghostly relation to it - that politics is
possible at all. Otherwise, there would be only a blind clash between
260 "[I]t must be clear," Lyotard is adamant, "that it is our business not to supply reality but to
invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented [that is, to the sublime that
destabilises reality by offering visions of alternate futures]. And it is not to be expected that this
task will effect the last reconciliation between language games (which under the names of
faculties Kant knew to be separated by a chasm), and that only the transcendental illusion (that of
Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity. But Kant also knew that the price to pay for
such an illusion is terror" (Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 81). Terror then, as Readings
argues in "Deconstruction of Politics," "consists in seeking to establish the justice of an ethical
judgement (prescriptive statement) by reference to a representable order of things (a descriptive
statement)." Lyotard, like de Man, "stresses the impossibility of passage from the true to the just,
the incommensurability of descriptive and prescriptive language games" (RDR, 232).
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impenetrable social forces. It is because particularity of the decision
[reference in de Man's terms] assumes the function of imaginary closure
[a "hegemonic" decision for Laclau that is irreducible, where "a
particular element assumes the impossible task of a universal
representation"] - while not being entirely able to perform an actual and
final closure - that no blind clash exists, but instead, a reciprocal
contamination between the universal and the singular or, rather, the
never ending and never totally convincing impersonation of the former
by the latter." (DP, 59, emphasis addedj'"
The structure of hegemonic relation here where a referential model
"impersonates" the undetermined content of the law, while never being "entirely
able to perform an actual and final closure," is a rhetorical agonistic relation of
tropological and grammatical code interference, a certain grid static, that for de
Man, as we know, reiterates the structure of the text:
From the point of view of the legal text, it is this generality which
ruthlessly rejects any particularization, which allows for the possibility
261 Laclau's significance here and in general for the tropologico-political implications of de
Man's thought is addressed by Laclau himself in the opening lines of his essay "The Politics of
Rhetoric:" "Why would a political theorist like me," he asks, "working mainly on the role of
hegemonic logics in the stracturation of political spaces, be interested in the work .of Paul de
Man?" (229). And one of the reasons is precisely the tropological structure of the political field
that he calls hegemony: "[E]ach political institution, each category of political analysis shows
itself today as the locus of undecidable language games. The overdetermined nature of all
political difference or identity opens the space for a generalised tropological movement and thus
reveals the fruitfulness of de Man's intellectual project for ideological and political analysis. In
my work, this generalised politico-tropological movement has been called 'hegemony'" (230).
Emesto Laclau, "The Politics of Rhetoric," in Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of
Theory, ed. Tom Cohen et al. (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001), pp. 229-54.
Hereafter cited as ME. Hegemonic relation is necessary because of the inherent structural
undecidability of the political- decision is when taken in undecidable terrain alone. Insofar as
there can be no positive grounding of a decision, every decision is constitutively hegemonic (but
also contingent) and only as such can it be accountable. Decision, he continues in
"Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," "can only be a hegemonic one - i.e. one that is (a)
self-grounded; (b) is exclusionary, as far as it involves the repression of alternative decisions [this
would be the threat of differend for Lyotard present in every phrase]; and (c) is internally split,
because it is both this decision but also a decision" (DP, 60), that is, the hauntology of a decision
that cannot be laid to rest, its spectral other lodged in it that makes it responsible. For Laclau
then, de Man is very much a part of radical anti-foundationalist politics, clearing the path, so to
speak, for agonistic pluralism by increasing structural undecidability.
274
of its coming into being. Within the textual model, particularization
corresponds to reference, since reference is the application of an
undetermined, general potential for meaning to a specific unit. The
indifference ofthe text with regard to its referential meaning is what
allows the legal text to proliferate. (Allegories, 268)
Grammar like law is bound to be overdetermined without ever receiving
its full. And "as that fullness has to express itself through contents which have no
common measure with it, a plurality of contents will be equally able to assume
the function of universal representation ... It is the indeterminacy of the content
through which the universal finds its expression ... " (Laclau, DP, 58). Law like
text can thus only narrate the impossibility of its becoming whole in what we call
politics. Its gate being shut in the end is the equivalent of the text never being
finished. In other words, there is an injunction to write, for writing measures the
pulse and rhythm of the political. It is in fact a residue or trace of fractured law
that implies infinite resistance to its becoming whole. It is in writing that the true
political exigency is inscribed?62
262 Cf. Nancy's demand for "literary communism," the imperative not to stop writing in The
Inoperative Community (esp. towards the end of chap. 2 and chap. 3) here for cross-fertilization,
e.g. "The task of what has been designated as ecriture (writing) and the thinking of ecriture has
been, precisely, to render ... impossible a certain type of foundation, utterance, and literary and
communitarian fulfillment: in short, a politics [emphasis added]." Jean-Luc Nancy, The
Inoperative Community, ed. and trans. Peter Connor et al. (part of Theory and History of
Literature series, vol. 76, Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 1991), p. 69. Blanchot's
"unavowable community," of course, also implies unworking of its limits that is writing. Writing
as the absence of the work that would constitute the true being of community, in other words,
writing, again, as politics. For de Man of Allegories, writing is the radical unravelling of the
subject, its ex-position, Nancy would say. This is "the lethal quality of all writing," de Man
writes. "Writing always includes the moment of dispossession in favour of the arbitrary power
play of the signifier [that is, a certain materiality of text as event machine] and from the point of
view of the subject, this can only be experienced as a dismemberment, a beheading or a
castration" (Allegories, 296). What is important here is precisely the irreducibility ofthe text to
any desire or psychology of the subject which ties it to the possibility of the event that will have
always caught desire unprepared - the event devastates the subject or it is not at all- and thus to
historicity. Only as "beheaded" does the text become a chance for event, for what incompletes,
the watchword for which may be politics.
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Although de Man, in this chapter, uses the structure of political space to
come closer to a definition of text ("In the description of the structure of political
society the 'definition' of a text as the contradictory interference of the
grammatical with the figural field emerges in its most systematic form."
Allegories, 270), its rhetorical structure turns out to be the most systematic
articulation of the political. A degree oftropological or referential coercion of
sheer syntagmatic structures is equivalent to a partial stabilization of political
discursivity that, Laclau writes, "always keeps the traces of its own contingency
and incompleteness visible" (ME, 250), or, in other words, that is partially self-
conscious of its own rhetoricity. Any act of political institution is as arbitrary -
and as necessary - as the referential function of the text that exceeds it. It is
essentially incomplete and without positive identity, a signifier of an absent
whole. The attempt to supplement this lack of foundation263 with a referential
content ends, for de Man, in aesthetico-ideological stabilization or a metaphoric
recouping of dispersed politico-referential systems. This recuperation is one of
imaginary closure of meaning and the memory of a certain virtuality that inhabits
it. It is a tropological reinscription of a disruptive field of contingent forces that
ends in a society that has found its full expression, is fully transparent and
present to itself, an "aesthetic state" that Tom Cohen, writing on the important
notion of disinscription and materiality in de Man, specifies as "the manner in
which hermeneutic and humanistic programs function in a repressively epistemo-
263 To recall Derrida here for a moment: "the moment of foundation, the instituting moment, is
anterior to the law or legitimacy which it founds. It is thus outside the law, and violent by that
very fact ... This foundational violence is not only forgotten. The foundation is made in order to
hide it; by essence it tends to organize amnesia, sometimes under the celebration and sublimation
of the grand beginnings" (Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 57).
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political and statist fashion.,,264What is recuperative here then is essentially
nihilistic, for politics is precisely constituted in the dispersal of the conditions of
its full closure, that is, in the memory of its rhetoricity reactivated constantly.
This is why Cohen sees de Man as a kind of mnemonic "engineer" at pains to
"alter the archive, the prerecordings out of which experience is projected and
semantic economies policed ... " (ME, ix). De Man's
intervention in received programs of history prepares for and theorizes
itself as an event - associated with mnemonic suspension or 'shock' ...
that emerges from thekatabasis of 'literary history' and philosophical
aesthetics as a kind of technical apparatus that tracks and aims at a
virtual disruption, and alteration, of anteriority itself ... out of which,
necessarily, various 'futures' are projected as well. (ix-x)
Without this possibility of mnemotechnics, of intervention in "the politics
of hermeneutic regimes and epistemo-aesthetic programming" (x), that de Man
calls aesthetic ideology, all possibility of resistance would be lost. What activates
resistance is a mutation, "a radical (re)programming of the (historical) archive
out of which the 'sensorium' would be alternatively produced" (x). But this is
made possible by the essential unmasterability of reference alone.
The tireless unworking of hermeneutic closures in which judgment could
settle finally sees space being open for justice as the possibility of an always-
other. The impossibility of ever being done that Gasche identifies in de Man's
deconstructive readings ("it always stages only a figure in need of further
deconstruction," The Wild Card, 86) is then precisely the possibility of justice
264 Tom Cohen, "A 'Materiality without Matter'?," inMaterial Events: Paul de Man and the
Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001), p. ix.
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always to be done. What does not end is the ideological reinscription of alterity
in recognizable tropological systems. Justice, in a sense, is a response to this
alterity, it can only consist in letting it come. But this demands a certain madness
or paralogic of reading, a compulsive reactivation of undecidability that stalks all
structural closure, that reactivates disturbances, occurrences that cannot be
reassimilated as moments within its history but that make up its history by
ripping it apart_265A rhetorical mnemotechnics that liquidates certainty and
suspends knowledge, and, in that it does, obligates us freely in our response.
Indeed, without it, there would be no place for responsibility, one would no
longer hesitate, and where one no longer hesitates, as Derrida says, one no longer
decides.f" This is why undecidability is essential to any political analytic. That
there is politics, one could say, is only because undecidability is irreducible, or,
in other words, because reference cannot be mastered. It is this unmasterability
that produces politics de trop and is that which keeps open the to-come of justice.
The "engineer's" interventionist task then, that reactivates undecidability in
aesthetico-political reference regimes, as de Man reminds us, would be the task
of reading: "The commentator," he writes in "Reply to Raymond Geuss,"
265 Laclau: "It is only through the pure, irreducible event that consists in a contingent
displacement not retrievable by any metaphoric reaggregation that we can have a history, in the
sense of both Geschichte and Historie." (ME, 243).
266 Derrida: "The responsibility of what remains to be decided or done (in actuality) cannot
consist of following, applying, or carrying out a norm or rule. Wherever I have at my disposal a
determinable rule, I know what must be done, and as soon as such knowledge dictates the law,
action follows knowledge as a calculable consequence: one knows what path to make, one no
longer hesitates. The decision then no longer decides anything but is made in advance and is thus
in advance annulled" (Rogues, 85). Undecidability then is the trial of every decision. The moment
in it that cannot be (sur)passed or exorcised. "The undecidable remains caught," he writes in
"Force of Law," "as a ghost at least, but an essential ghost, in every decision, in every event of
decision. Its ghostliness [sa fantomaticite] deconstructs from within all assurance of presence, all
certainty or all alleged criteriology assuring us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very
event of a decision" (Acts of Religion, 253). What undecidability cannot do is provide a positive
fiat for a decision, but this very inability accounts for its responsibility; without it no decision is
ever made.
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should persist as long as possible in the canonical reading and should
begin to swerve away from it only when he encounters difficulties
which the methodological and substantial assertions of the system are no
longer able to master. Whether or not such a point has been reached
should be left open as part of an ongoing critical investigation. But it
would be naive to believe that such an investigation could be avoided,
even for the best of reasons. The necessity to revise the canon arises
from resistances encountered in the text itself (extensively conceived)
and not from preconceptions imported from elsewhere.i'"
The exigency of reading seems to arise precisely from an infinite pledge
to alterity, one that is "ongoing" and cannot be "avoided." It is impossible to
domesticate reading and every such impossibility reiterates the empty place from
which the authority of received narratives derives. Every obstacle in reading,
every stutter, like the one de Man identifies at the end of Baudelaire's
"Correspondances" where "the symbolist ideology" of the text, its totalizing
claim, is disrupted by sheer "enumeration" that gets stuck in the repetition of its
own register, carries within it a virtuality coming from an alternate future.268
267 Paul de Man, "Reply to Raymond Geuss," in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 1996), p. 186.
268 In the first part of "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," de Man traces a symbolist
desire of Baudelaire's "Correspondances" that through a series oftropological substitutions
triggered by analogies of "comme" seeks transcendence of subjectivity and "states the totalising
power of metaphor as it moves from analogy to identity, from simile to symbol and to a higher
order of truth" (RR, 248). However, the last instance of "com me" is no longer analogical, an
operator of disfiguration or identity, but introduces what for de Man is a tautological stutter that
catalogues the examples of scents that interrupts the analogy: "For although the burden of
totalizing expansion seems to be attributed to these particular scents... the logic of 'comme'
restricts the semantic field of 'parfums' and confines it to tautology: 'II est des parfums... /
Comme (des parfums).' Instead of analogy, we have enumeration, and an enumeration which
never moves beyond the confines of a set of particulars... [examples] refrained by 'comme' ever
to lead beyond themselves" (250). Analogy that remains stuck in "transport," as de Man will
note. "Enumerative repetition," he goes on to conclude, "disrupts the chain oftropological
substitution at the crucial moment when the poem promises, by way of these very substitutions,
to reconcile the pleasures of the mind with those of the senses and to unite aesthetics with
epistemology." There can be no "transport" then, only an obsessive stutter "that never goes
279
Reading, to invoke Cohen, is what "redistributes (and voids) the inherited uses of
each term to designate how a rewriting of the archive stands to intervene in
received narratives, with the aim of optioning alternative pasts, and hence
futures" (ME, ix). In reading then, "the present" always stands to correction. And
it is justice that demands this.
Human Relapses, Inhuman Events
However, the recognition of the essential failure of language to positively ground
its own statements that accounts for its epistemological instability also folds the
cognitive ground of judgment, a desertion of foundation of the political that finds
itself held hostage by the text. Precisely the issue of Andrzej Warminski's
question when considering the initial title of Aesthetic Ideology - intended by de
Man as Aesthetics, Rhetoric, Ideology but modified posthumously on "quite
legitimate" marketing grounds: "Would [not] the (re)insertion of the word
rhetoric," he asks, "merely reconfirm the suspicion or assumption that de Man's
notion of ideology and of the political never gets beyond the analysis of purely
linguistic phenomena and their reduction to rhetorical structures?,,269 Does
rhetoric, and the evacuation of grounding criteria that seems to shadow every
reference to it, prepare for disruptive relativism that defers consensus and
disables a politically mobilized collective subject? Rhetorical structures, as we
anywhere:" "the enumeration could be continued at will without ceasing to be a repetition,
without ceasing to be an obsession rather than a metamorphosis, let alone a rebirth" in higher
s~irituality (250, emphasis added).
29 Andrzej Warminski, "'As the poets do it': On the material sublime," in Material Events: Paul
de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 200 I), p. 22.
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have argued, cannot be separated from the political. If politics takes its point of
departure in a continuous drift of referential ground - which also prepares for
Laclau's hegemonic articulations of the political- then rhetoric is rather what
makes it possible. What rhetoric sheds is precisely a history of oppression that
always stakes the claim of its authority on the existence of pre-discursive
categories that would stabilise reference and enforce irremovability of social
structures. It is to give voice to "pure literality, which might speak the law as
such, [and which] always performs the operation of terror, in that to assert the
law as literally representable is to silence its victims by relegating the operation
of resistance to the condition of transgression" (Readings, RDR, 232). Rhetoric
then by reactivating undecidability of the social, that is, the impossibility of its
closure, also intervenes in the regime of reference opening a possibility to
reinscribe the ruses of its force. Rhetoric always reinscribes the new. It unravels
pre-machinal genetic ruses that give foundation to the law and not just sustain
but authorise a regime of oppression by foreclosing differential effects. These
regimes are always historically revisable and rhetoric only reveals traces of
emancipatory possibility of their disruption.
Warminski's response is that the question of "[h]ow to take the next step,
the step beyond merely linguistic phenomena, to what really matters, to political
stands and political programmes and political power ... " (ME, 23) is misleading
altogether because there can be "no direct, immediate, royal road to the
performative, to action and the act, political or otherwise" (28). In other words,
the question itself plots a pre-discursive political field separate from its
signifying practice. But, as we have said, pre-discursivity only ever signals the
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imminent closure of the political in total aesthetic systems. Indeed, it is an
impossibility, one could say, that rhetoric generates and prohibits at the same
time. Political space begins rather with the withdrawal of totality. Its only
measure is the absence of any measurable content that would ground it.
The question itself then relies on a radical divorce of the rhetorical and
the referential, or literal as phenomenalized reference, in de Man's terminology.
And it is precisely this binary structure that de Man refers to as aesthetic
ideology. It reveals, Readings writes, "the whole project of classical 'political'
criticism of literature as organized through an abiding opposition between the
literal or contentual (the political) and the rhetorical or formal (the textual)"
(RDR, 226). The "literal," however, would always be obliteration of virtuality
rhetoric opens up that ties politics precisely to the coming of an always other
future. "The textual," in aesthetic ideology, Readings continues, "is implicated in
the political only at the expense of its relinquishing the rhetorical for the literal ...
To put it bluntly, literature is political only to the extent that the political is in
some sense the referent of the text, a referent that is conceived literally, as
something exterior to the text" (226-27). First, to relinquish the rhetorical is, in
fact, to relinquish the political. Second, the literal is itself an effect of rhetoric
always offered to further tropological displacements. As mentioned earlier,
rhetoric both generates and prohibits it at the same time. In other words, what
rhetorical reading retraces is precisely the tropology of the literal: "The
distinction of figural from literal must not be read as a difference in the order of
literal meaning ... the literal is a trope within rhetoric, rhetoric's trope of the
absence of rhetoric [emphasis added]. The referent is the text's fiction of the
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absence of text, the text's fiction of its own outside ... There is no pure
exteriority, no referent outside the text" (RDR, 230). To think the political as the
literal is precisely to deny the political as that space that frees virtuality of
reference by ceaselessly overtasking the borders of the possible. Rhetoric makes
resistance only too apparent, which may be why it is shunned. It is
a powerful and indispensible tool in the unmasking of ideological
aberrations, as well as a determining factor in accounting for their
occurrence. Those who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to
social and historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating
their fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by the
tool they are trying to discredit. (de Man, RT, 11)
This, however, does not imply that rhetorical exposure of mimetic
machinery in aesthetic politics can escape the metaphoric relapse of the shock-
event or mutation in symbolic historical archives it performs. In other words, it is
not a form of ideologiekritik in that it does not, as we have pointed out in the
previous chapter, escape retotalization of its own performances. This relapse or
hermeneutic retracing "recurs routinely," Cohen writes, "as an artificial
humanization, effacement and interpretative inversion of what the (textual) event
performed ... " (ME, xi, emphasis added). There is always a cognitive retracement
of performativity in reading ("It will always be reinscribed within a cognitive
system, it will always be recuperated, it will relapse, so to speak, by a kind of
reinscription of the performative in a tropological system of cognition again." De
Man, AI, 133) because to read, as de Man insists in "Shelley Disfigured," is
precisely "to understand, to question, to know, [and thus] to forget, to erase, to
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deface, to repeat ... " (RR, 122). Referential blockage of paths is irreducible. De
Man is clear:
The Triumph of Life warns us that nothing, whether deed, word, thought,
or text, ever happens in relation, positive or negative, to anything that
precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event
whose power, like the power of death, is due to the randomness of its
occurrence. It also warns us why and how these events then have to be
reintegrated in a historical and aesthetic system of recuperation that
repeats itself regardless of the exposure of its fallacy. (122, emphasis
addedi70
The negative knowledge of ideological blockage is itself reflexive and
ends in a relapse "regardless of the exposure of its fallacy." If there are arbitrary,
paralogic markers and crypt sequences, phantoms, that like free radicals traverse
across the textual surface to form unforeseen protocols of reading, generating an
unsystemic excess, a de trap that cannot be accounted for and is exterior to the
system271 - these would be precisely the ciphers of deregulating stutters,
disintegers and aphasic signifiers de Man usually identifies in his texts and that
270For further reference on the complicity of reading with the aesthetic violence against which it
reacts and de Man's failure to read Shelley's poem, cf. note 220 in the previous chapter. "The
process [of reintegration] is endless," he writes, "since the knowledge of the language's
performative power is itself a figure in its own right and, as such, bound to repeat the
disfiguration of metaphor ... " ("Shelley Disfigured," 120). Tropes, and by extension language, are
caught in a double, specular structure. Specularity that admits of analogical substitutions and
articulation of identity is also what at the same time still keeps the seeds of its own disruption.
And this process "is endless." This double bind is registered by Cohen as a stunted reading
movement: "There is 'the entire transformational system of tropes' that sustains representation or
mimetic ideologies, and there (already) is a 'movement' that tries to locate itself in different
indices - an interruption of 'movement' as though by itself ... " (ME, 123).
271What de Man says in "Kant and Schiller:" "[Cjertain linguistic elements will remain which the
concept of trope cannot reach, and which then can be, for example - though there are other
possibilities - performative" (AI, 133).
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Derrida will later term "materiality without matter,,272- they are always
reintegrated in a referential metaphorics of reading that effaces the occurrence or
event of its disruption. Aesthetics would be precisely the category that supervises
and equalizes this excess. And what is effaced, Cohen writes, "is the
programming, the mnemotechnics, so as to affirm a putative immediacy of the
perceived, of facticity [that is to say, literality], and so on - yet just this
mnemotechnic order is what would have to be assaulted, or altered, if the
prerecordings of historicism, agency, or for that matter the sensorium were to be
ex-posed or suspended.,,273 Aesthetics then is always generated out of human
forgetfulness. And this amnesia is called reading. Reading, rhetorical or
otherwise, can thus not escape the ideologico-cognitive grid it attempts to
reformat. The evisceration of the representational content in rhetorical reading is
caught up in its own epistemic structure it cannot successfully close off. De
Man's reading then is not a form of ideologiekritik, an epistemic and a mark
272 In "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) ('within such limits')," Derrida will reiterate several
times, what may be clear by now, that "materiality" in de Man, far from being a metaphysical
concept, is a resistance and assault on any notion of matter or body, a kind of a shock wave
machine that collapses the solid (Derrida will later associate it with the automaticity of the
machine and the threat of subject-mutilation always implied, as earlier indicated, in the machine):
"The literality of the letter situates in fact this materiality not so much because it would be a
physical or sensible (aesthetic) substance, or even matter, but because it is the place of prosaic
resistance ... to any organic and aesthetic totalization, to any aesthetic form. And first of all, I
would say for my part, a resistance to every possible reappropriation ... The materiality in
question - and one must gauge the importance of this irony or paradox - is not a thing; it is not
even the matter of a body ... and yet it works, this nothing therefore operates, it forces, but as a
force of resistance ... I would say [not without risk, he notes] that it is a materiality without
matter ... " (ME, 350). "This force of resistance," as he continues on the next page, that is "without
material substance derives from the dissociative, dismembering, fracturing, disarticulating, and
even disseminal power that de Man attributes to the letter ... [which] affects not only nature but
the body itself - as organic and organized totality" (351). It is thus indissociable from the textual
event that, as we shall see, still occurs. There will have been an occurrence still, that is not
without political consequence or rather that is the political con-sequence, I would say - because
reintegration is never total. Jacques Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) ('within such
limits')," in Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 2001), pp. 277-361. Hereafter cited as "Typewriter Ribbon."
273 Tom Cohen, "Political Thrillers: Hitchcock, de Man, and Secret Agency in the' Aesthetic
State,'" in Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 2001), p. 120.
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presumably outside the discourse it interrupts. Marks and traces of a passage
opened in the mnemic archive that is to be altered are muted in reading, escaping
the referential mapping of their itineraries.
So in "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant,,,274de Man identifies a
passage, "a deep, perhaps fatal, break or discontinuity" (AI, 79) in the section on
the sublime that disarticulates the aesthetic project of the third Critique. "From
the phenomenality of the aesthetic (which is always based on an adequacy of the
mind to its physical object, based on what is referred to, in the definition of the
sublime, as the concrete representation of ideas - Darstellung der Ideen) we have
moved to the pure materiality of Augenschein, of aesthetic vision" (88), where
Augenschein, in opposition to "Ideenschein" is not "supposed to reflect anything,
but to stress a flatness devoid of any suggestion of depth ... this vision is purely
material, devoid of any reflexive or intellectual complication ... of any semantic
depth and reducible to formal mathematization or geometrization of pure optics"
(83). Aesthetics, instead of articulating the architectonic unity of epistemo-
political orders "ends up, in Kant, in a formal materialism that runs counter to all
values and characteristics associated with aesthetic experience, including the
aesthetic experience of the beautiful and of the sublime as described by Kant and
Hegel themselves" (83). Pure aesthetic vision, that Kant identifies with poetic
vision ("one must see the ocean as the poets do," AI, 126), is purely unaesthetic,
equivalent to the automaticity of optical spectrum analysis. And, "devoid of any
reflexive or intellectual complication," it marks a material site that precedes the
274 Paul de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis
and London: Minnesota UP, 1996), pp. 70-91. Cf. earlier note 249 for further reference on the
analytic burden of the sublime and the undoing of aesthetics, that is also a centrepiece of de
Man's earlier essay "Kant's Materialism" published in the same volume.
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tropological registers of light or phenomenalization: "Not being part of trope or
figuration, the purely aesthetic vision of the natural world is in no way solar"
(82), de Man writes. But without light, without phenomenalization, the vision
that disrupts aesthetic closure becomes an event or occurrence of sudden
blindness that cannot read what it performs. Every reading is only a mock-
archive of this blindness, including de Man's own:
[T]o the extent that Kant is attempting in the passage cited [the passage
on the material vision of the poets that defines the sublime while
emptying its aesthetic function - cf. note 249] to define a
representational modality ("seeing as the poets do it") and thereby make
it available to understanding, what he writes necessarily possesses a
conceptual dimension, or else it would not be readable at all. Materiality
(that to which Kant refers or that which he posits) may not be
conceptual, but theory (the mode of Kant's referring or positing) of the
materiality of art, of seeing "as the poets do it," cannot do without
concepts, empty or not.275
Reading then cannot not archive the event that destabilizes all archives.
This is reading as the prosthetic repetition of programs that remasters the shock
of its blindness. A certain Schillerization of the Kantian event, its ideologico-
aesthetic reinscription "in the cognition of tropes" (AI, 134), is scripted in
advance. We are all Schillerians, as de Man will say in his lecture on "Kant and
Schiller:" "Whatever writing we do, whatever way we have of talking about art,
whatever way we have of teaching, whatever justification we give ourselves for
275 This is Michael Sprinker's reply in a footnote to Judith Butler's question whether what de
Man identifies inKant as materialism could be seen as a concept at all, as it is precisely what
derails any conceptuality. Michael Sprinker, "Art and Ideology: Althusser and de Man," in
Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota
UP, 2001), p. 46.
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teaching, whatever the standards are and the values by means of which we teach,
they are more than ever and profoundly Schillerian. They come from Schiller,
and not from Kant" (AI, 142). An ideologico-critical reading that would step
outside the aesthetico-political regime it presumably sheds would have to step
outside the tropes that make possible its mimetic techniques of identification,
which is precisely impossible. Ideologiekritik would be a form of social
epistemology, a "true" hermeneutic that would be justified to legislate the terms
for the unfolding of the social, and, in terms of our argument, the closure of the
political.
In "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," where de Man's reading
of the enumerative tautological stutter276in Baudelaire's "Correspondances" foils
the anthropomorphism of nature that the poem and its reception program itself
ends in personification, recasting the very figure it disfigures. Barbara Johnson
writes: "The subjectivizations performed by lyric upon the unintelligible are here
rejected, but by a personification ofmourning,,,277 she identifies in de Man's exit
where he notes that "true 'mourning' [for lost "Correspondances"] is less
deluded. The most it can do is to allow for non-comprehension, and enumerate
non-anthropomorphic, non-elegiac, non-celebratory, non-lyrical, non-poetic, that
is to say, prosaic, or, better, historical modes of language power (RR, 262). What
is irreducible once again is the regression of the tropological model, reading
276 Cf. above, note 268 for further reference on the sheer "enumeration which never moves
beyond the confines of a set of particulars" (RR, 250) restricting itself to a tautological stutter
caught up in its own register: perfumes are like ... (perfumes) which disrupts the techniques of
analogy and anthropomorphism. The very title, "Correspondances," de Man writes, "is like the
anagrammatic condensation of the text's entire [symbolist] program: 'corps' and 'esprit' brought
to.pether and harmonized by the ance ... " (245).
27 Barbara Johnson, "Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law," in Material Events: Paul de Man
and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001), p. 213.
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"performing the inescapability of the structures it is casting off." (ME, 213).
"The least we can say," Johnson continues, "is that de Man has given the last
word in his own text to personification" (214). Ideological unperfonnances or
metaphoric retracements of events are path blockers no reading can escape to
stage. Critical or other, it is always a partial retotalization of the interruptions that
make it halt in its tracks and rewind; it is, therefore, always ideological.
And yet, at the same time, there is an event. Something has happened, as
de Man insists in "Kant and Schiller," something that rips out and reroutes the
familiar tracks of transit. There has been "a movement, from cognition, from acts
of knowledge, from states of cognition, to something which is no longer a
cognition but which is to some extent an occurrence" (AI, 132), and this
movement or passage, is "irreversible:"
"this passage occurs always, and can only occur, by ways of an
epistemological critique of trope ... That process, which we have
encountered a certain number of times, is irreversible. That goes in that
direction and you cannot get back from the one to the one before. But
that does not mean ... that the performative function of language will
then as such be accepted and admitted. It will always be reinscribed
within cognitive system, it will always be recuperated, it will relapse, so
to speak, by a kind of rein scription of the performative in a tropological
system of cognition again. That relapse, however is not the same as
reversal. Because this is in its turn open to a critical discourse similar to
the one that has taken one from the notion of trope to that of the
performative. So it is not a return to the notion of trope and to the notion
of cognition; it is equally balanced between both, and equally poised
between both, and as such is not a reversal, it's a relapse. And a relapse
in that sense is not the same; it has to be distinguished in a way which I
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am only indicating here... the recuperation, the relapse, has to be
distinguished from a reversal. (AI, 133)
A relapse of the performative is not a reversal in that it does not erase the
inscriptive traces of the contingency it carries. Every ideological blockage, in
other words, carries the seeds of its own aborted genetics that makes it possible
while at the same time tracing its limits. Recuperation is never total but only
indicative of anteriority that is always in transit so to speak, "open to a critical
discourse similar to the one that has taken one from the notion of trope to that of
the performative." There is thus a persistent assault on and opening of the limit
of memory archives in which the collective subject is contained towards the
unregistered - inhuman? - histories of its transformation. This is why Cohen, in
a footnote, notes not one but a double relapse: "There are now two 'relapses,' he
writes, "the site of the relapse [as] the mimetic image of the narrative, every logic
of knowingly solicited identification, whereas the other interrupts that like the
Waltzing Couples, without reference ... " This other is of "the order of mechanical
memory, inscription, materiality, evinced in the formalized system of markers ...
parabases and letteral or pre-letteral repetitions that recall the narrative to the
machinal prosthesis of the visible by such devices ..." (ME, 152, emphasis added).
What is recalled is the primary rhetoricity, the tete-presence, and uprootedness of
hermeneutic structures organized round fetishized figures of the literal in order to
disappear, like a ghostly state that obliterates the traces of its own inscription.
Under the pressure of rhetorical reading, however, these signifying orders self-
destruct opening up, among the debris, for new ones to emerge. The constant
pressure of de Man's writing on a mounted mimetic regime that integrates all
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dissention is thus a politicized assault, one that opens for a non-contemporaneity
of justice, of some other to-come, not messianic but already here, outsourcing
virtual presents. This, indeed, undermines, Readings writes, "the possibility of
determinant literal criteria, a literally representable law, but proposes ajustice
without criteria and proposes that justice (the possibility of responsible judgment
as opposed to operation) in fact relies upon the absence of criteria" (RDR, 231),
and, therefore, upon the permanent revolution of what grounds them. "This
judgment," he continues, "is not an undifferentiated pluralism, but is based in the
most rigorous respect for difference" (231).
The textual event is thus a politico-strategic archival opening, the
exposure of technicity of all archives that blows open a passage charged with
emancipatory historical capacities. It is an initiative, an anacoluthic con(tra)-
sequence that intervenes in the past and disinvests its authoritative indices only
"so as to allow for the passage toward the other." If one is inclined to think that
"only" I have emphasized here is not nearly enough, it implies, however, that one
wage war on the entire system of valorization and the inherited signifying orders
of the social-epistemic machine that redistributes memory losses on a conveyor
belt of serialized value production. This "only" is at the same time more than
everything one does and, therefore, all one should do?78 To let the other come,
Derrida writes:
278 In "Kant and Schiller," de Man speculates precisely on the future of this "only." We are all
Schillerians, he says, "whatever justification we give ourselves for teaching, whatever the
standards are and the values by means of which we teach, they are more than ever and profoundly
Schillerian ... And if you ever try to do something in the other direction and you touch on it you'll
see what will happen to you. Better be very sure, wherever you are, that your tenure is very well
established, and that the institution for which you work has a very well-established reputation.
Then you can take some risks ... " (AI, 142).
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I am careful to say 'let it come' because if the other is precisely what is
not invented [in Derrida's register, the other exceeds invention insofar
as invention is calculable and programmatic and the other always
escapes and traumatizes the program that would make it possible and
foreseeable], the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist
only in opening, in uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures
so as to allow for the passage toward the other. But one does not make
the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its coming. The
coming of the other or its coming back is the only possible arrival, but it
is not invented, even ifthe most genial inventiveness is needed to
prepare to welcome it. .. ("Psyche: Inventions of the Other," RDR, 60)
One could say that de Man, as the "penultimate technician or engineer" of
mnemonic imprints (Cohen, ME, 118), the double-head reading machine in his
text that traces inscriptive markers of aesthetic regimes closed against incursions
of the other without which no history ever arrives, prepares precisely for the
coming of history by unblocking regulative structures as soon as they appear
reified enough - in all the aesthetico-referential weight of this term - to dictate
judgment. 279 And the "most genial inventiveness" is required to prepare for its
279 History, for de Man, is not strictly speaking temporal but that which will have derailed
temporality, an event or occurrence temporality does not see coming. It is worth quoting a
passage from de Man's lecture on "Kant and Schiller" here, as it ties history to its unregister of
performativity: "History, the sense of the notion of history as the historicity a priori of this type of
textual model which I have been suggesting here, there history is not thought of as a progression
or a regression, but is thought of as an event, as an occurrence ... History is therefore not a
temporal notion, it has nothing to do with temporality, but it is the emergence of a language
power out of a language of cognition [that is, the irreversible passage discussed earlier]. An
emergence, which is, however, not itself either a dialectical movement or any kind of
continuum ... that would be accessible to a cognition ... it is not susceptible of being represented
as a temporal process. That is historical, and it doesn't allow for any rein scription of history into
any kind of cognition. The apparent regression which we talked about ... the regression from the
event, from the materiality of the inscribed signifier in Kant, or from any of those disruptions ...
within the cognitive discourse of trope - this regression is no longer historical, because that
regression takes place in temporal mode and it is as such not history. Once could say, for
example, that in the reception of Kant, in the way Kant has been read, since the third Critique -
and that was an occurrence, something happened there, something occurred - that in the whole
reception of Kant... nothing has happened, only regression, nothing has happened at all. Which is
another way of saying there is no history, which is another way of saying ... that reception is not
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coming.28o Insofar as justice is a sleepless wake for the unforeseeable, de Man
must be heavy-eyed, precisely because tireless, wide awake.
This destabilising of closed structures, of certain "realisms" in Lyotard's
terms that "attempt to reconstitute symbolic systems,,,281 is what turns de Man's
writing along its course of textual derailments. But it is what turns reading in
general for de Man against its own cognitive retraction of disturbances it traces.
It becomes an inscriptive event of the "it happens" on the body of history unable
historical, that between reception and history there is an absolute separation, and that to take
reception as a model for historical event is an error, is a mistake ... One thing, however, is certain.
The event, the occurrence, is resisted by reinscribing it in the cognition of tropes, and that is
itself a tropological, cognitive, and not a historical move" (AI, 133-34, emphasis added). The
disarticulative event cannot be accounted for because it suspends all accounts, there can be no
reception ready to accommodate it. This is also why in "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the
Lyric," de Man writes that generic typology and continuity of "pseudo-historical period terms
such as 'romanticism' or 'classicism' are always terms of resistance and nostalgia, at the furthest
remove from the materiality of actual history" (RR, 262, emphasis added) and should be taken
"for what they are: rather crude metaphors for figural patterns rather that historical events or acts"
(254). As Derrida notes, however, in "Typewriter Ribbon," commanded by prudence here rather
than critique, this notion of history or rather its historicity may be a de Manian "hyperbolic
provocation ... [that] certainly does not negate all temporality of history; it merely recalls that
time, temporal unfolding, is not the essential predicate of the concept of history: time is not
enough to make history" (ME, 319-20). And it certainly intersects on all points Derrida's general
thinking of decision and responsibility, of the event, he continues a few pages later, as "the real,
undeniable, inscribed, singular event, of an always essentially traumatic type, even when it is a
happy event, inasmuch as its singularity interrupts an order and rips apart, like every decision
worthy of the name, the normal tissue of temporality or history" (336).
280 In "Typewriter Ribbon," for instance, Derrida writes of materiality in de Man as a strategic
"invention:" "It is a sort of invention by de Man ... produced in the movement of a strategy" (ME,
353), a paleonymic that reads materialism backwards, as a radical formalism.
281 In The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, discussing the political stakes of the avant-garde in the
post-industrial world, Lyotard writes: "In the techno-scientific industrial world, there can be no
stable symbols of the good, the just, the true, the infinite, etc. Certain 'realisms' (which in fact are
academicisms: bourgeois at the end of the nineteenth Century, socialist and national-socialist
during the twentieth) attempt to reconstitute symbolic systems, to offer the public work it can
enjoy and on the occasion of which it can identify with Images (race, socialism, nation, etc.) We
know that this effort always demanded the elimination of the avant-gardes" (125). The avant-
gardes, for Lyotard, carry out what for de Man is the programmatic questioning of reading, a
"secret questioning of the ... presuppositions ... which leads them to a complete neglect of the
'cultural' function of stabilization of taste and identification ofa community by means of visible
symbols" (125-26). Hence, the public distaste, the always monstrous shock-event of the avant-
garde art, presentable as unpresentable, citing, through inevitable misquotations, "the invisible in
the visible" (126), just like the unread in reading that opens the world to the noise of its others.
This, Lyotard will say, "has nothing edifying about it, but... is inscribed in the infinity of the
transformation of 'realities '" (128, emphasis added). Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Inhuman:
Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1991). Hereafter cited as The Inhuman.
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to register the shock. De Man's mutilations of texts, as Gasche would see
them,282his reading of Kant for instance, would then be a paramnestic index of
material occurrences that escape historical regimes of receptivity, freeing up
unassimilable textual energies that contain the potential to disrupt them. This is
why Gasche sees de Man's reading as all but pathological, "idiosyncratic," it
"defies all comprehensibility," he writes ("In-Difference," 90). But "[n]o degree
of knowledge can ever stop this madness," says de Man, "for it is the madness of
words" ("Shelley Disfigured," 122). This "madness of words," de Man will later
call irony,283is what elbows enough room for the "it happens" that is not
destined, that allows for the impossible to take place. And it is this madness that
Lyotard in The Inhuman will call for to disarm thought. If there is
a matter of thought, a nuance, a grain, a timbre which makes an event
for thought and unsettles it. .. [p]erhaps here we have to invoke words.
Perhaps words themselves, in the most secret place of thought, are its
282 Cf. pp. 245 through to 251, especially 247-50, in the previous chapter, for Gasche's reaction to
de Man's textual mutilations.
283 Already in 1967, at the first of six lectures given at the Gauss Seminar at Princeton, de Man
mentioned this "madness" as "the privilege" and "the curse of aU language," that he would later
reiterate in the opening essay of Blindness and Insight (cf. "Criticism and Crisis," p. 11): "The
same discrepancy," says de Man, "exists in everyday language, in the impossibility of making the
actual expression coincide with what has to be expressed, of making the actual sign coincide with
what it signifies. It is the distinctive privilege of language to be able to conceal meaning behind a
misleading sign, as when we hide rage or hatred behind a smile. But it is the distinctive curse of
all language ... that it is forced to act this way." Paul de Man, "The Contemporary Criticism of
Romanticism," in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other
Papers (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1993), p. 12. Hereafter cited as RCC. In "The
Concept of Irony," ten years later, de Man will write of the same madness, but this time identified
as irony and its permanent assault on cognition. It "is tied with the impossibility of
understanding," he writes. And "if irony is of understanding, [then] no understanding of irony
will ever be able to control and stop it. .. what is at stake in irony is the possibility of
understanding, the possibility of reading, the readability of texts, the possibility of deciding on a
meaning or on a multiple set of meanings or on a controlled polysemy of meanings ... There
would be in irony something very threatening ... (AI, 166-67). It is "a permanent parabasis," not
an interruption, "not just at one point but at all points ... at all points the narrative can be
interrupted" (179). Irony, being always of understanding, may "venture deals that cannot be
closed," as Ronell writes, but, and in that it does, it also "leaves room for futurity" (Stupidity,
126).
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matter, its timbre, its nuance, i.e. what it cannot manage to think. Words
'say', sound, touch, always 'before' thought. And they always 'say'
something other than what thought signifies, and what it wants to
signify by putting them into form. Words want nothing. They are the
'un-will' [precisely the machine then, irreducible to desire or any
psychology of the subject], the 'non-sense' of thought, its mass. They
are innumerable ... always older than thought. But like timbers and
nuances, they are always being born. Thought tries to tidy them up,
arrange them, control them and manipulate them. But as they are old
people and children, words are not obedient ... From this point of view,
theory, aesthetic theory, seems ... to be the attempt by which the mind
tries to get rid itself of words, of the matter that they are, and finally of
matter itself. Happily, this attempt has no chance of success. One cannot
get rid of the Thing [that is, the unpresentable]. Always forgotten, it is
unforgettable. (142-43)
As much as reading wants to have done with this madness, this
indeterminacy that, Lyotard says elsewhere, "exercises a gentle violence over the
determinate, so as to make it give up its QUOD" (The Inhuman, 184), it is also
sustained by it, by the unaccountability of the to-come this madness keeps.284
And if there is a pathos of reading, it is this suffering from a memory of what is
yet to be inscribed. This is the duty of reading. The movement in reading the
gaze will not have read but one that perhaps reads the eye, placing its scanning
284 "And it is not L" Lyotard continues, "nor anyone, who begets this non-place" (184, emphasis
added). What is important to note here is that for Lyotard and for de Man, the human, the subject,
does not have the last word, is not a definitional closure of all politics and remains accessible to
mnemonic reengineering and displacements of its centrality. This is what de Man says in his
lecture on "Kant and Schiller:" "To say that the human is a principle of closure, and that the
ultimate word, the last word, belongs to man, to the human, is to assume a continuity between
language and man, is to assume a control of man over language ... [but] there is entirely ignored
the possibility of a language that would not be definable in human terms, and that would not be
accessible to the human will at all- none - of a language that would to some extent not be - in a
very radical sense, not be human. So that we would at least have a complication ... in which the
principle of closure is not the human - because language can always undo that principle of
closure ... " (AI, 152).
295
techniques in question by disconnecting the power grids. And it "is older than
thought," Lyotard says. In fact, one only ever thinks due to this madness. And it
occurs in reading de Man says, as a movement "from states of cognition, to
something which is no longer a cognition but which is to some extent an
occurrence, which has the materiality of something that actually happens." And
"the thought of material occurrence," or rather the unthought, Lyotard would say,
"of something that occurs materially, that leaves a trace on the world ... is not
opposed in any sense to the notion of writing. But it is opposed to some extent to
the notion of cognition" (AI, 132). What "happens" is only when cognitive
programs are stalled and set to reboot by a reading that will have made them give
up their "quod." This reading that would be rhetorical- insofar as it remembers
the traces of its inscription, of its own dismemberment - is a reading itself
deciding to be indecisive, placing its bet on patience, on not wanting to say, for
to say is already to have said too much. And this indecisiveness is a commitment
to a responsibility that is always yet to be named. A response that perhaps is not
a debt to anyone, not a politics of guilt or forgiveness, but just a making-room for
the impossible, for what cannot (to) occur.
What retains the possibility of event, of anacoluthic dis-course held in the
limit reserves of the system, is the disobedience of words. It is the sheer
exteriority of inscription, words that "want nothing," that retains the power to
wreck desire. "The bottom line, in Kant as well as in Hegel," as de Man writes,
"is the prosaic materiality of the letter and no degree of obfuscation or ideology
can transform this materiality into the phenomenal cognition of aesthetic
judgment" (AI, 90, emphasis added). This is the radical "un-will," in Lyotard's
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idiom, of their texts, but also of aesthetico-epistemic memory regulation of their
receptivity, the mnemonic trace of its rhetoricity it cannot get rid, and one that is
permanently active precisely insofar as its mimetic regimes propagate through
and by the printing techniques of machine writing. It is its own inscriptive
machine, or delay, a certain tele-techno-poesis, that aesthetic ideology obfuscates
in referential erasures. Ideological "signature," Cohen writes, "occurs when a
model of reference is imposed upon the same conceptual space whose impulse is
to fabricate an organizing ground or immediacy (the subject, experience, history)
that effaces the problematic of inscription" (ME, ix). And it is the confusion of an
inscriptive effect and phenomenality or perception that de Man calls ideology
("What we call ideology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with natural
reality, of reference with phenomenalism." RT, 11). Referential erasure of
inscriptive traces, of historiography that programs perception is what becomes
systematized in aesthetic politics. An "occlusion of the order of inscription," as
Cohen continues, "(on this a certain definitional closure of the 'human' depends)
in favour of tropes guarding the claims of human immediacy and perception.
This, suggests de Man, renders imperceptible the mistaking for perception or
phenomenality of a linguistic and mnemonically programmed effect" (ME, xii),
that is reference. The scenography of this erasure leads directly to the mythogeny
of body, birth, identity, origin, nation etc. as quasi-political limits or irreducibles
rhetorical reading dis invests by exposing their graphic nature, the mise-en-scene
of their writtenness. "One can see," then, to reiterate de Man,
why any ideology would always have a vested interest in theories of
language advocating correspondence between sign and meaning, since
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they depend on the illusion of this correspondence for their
effectiveness. On the other hand, theories of language that put into
question the subservience, resemblance, or potential identity between
sign and meaning are always subversive, even if they remain strictly
confined to linguistic phenomena. (RCC, 170i85
The disinscription of rhetorical reading, its retracing of the figurativity of
identities, would not be "subversive," if identity were not removable already. In
other words, it is not the trauma of its loss, it is rather the inadmissibility of its
ever being there, the more radical exposure of its primary unlocatability. It is this
trauma aesthetic ideology blocks by serializing erasures that rhetorical reading
reinscribes, making visible hegemonic strategies of erasure. We can see then why
'"irony,''' as the master trope of this disarticulation of identities, at a certain
point, Cohen writes, "ceases to be a rhetorical trope and operates as a techne of
suspension preparatory to the possibility of an event ... a techne for rendering
virtual all that a given historical arrangement of marks encodes as real, or 'fact'"
(ME, xii). But this could be said of rhetoric in general, that always points out the
possibility of ironic investments, the disobedience of words that holds us hostage
and the ghosts of always having meant other that remain inscribed in virtual
285 Ideology is most at work, as we have said, precisely when the traces of its inscription are
effaced, when anti-physis, in structuralist terms, operates as pseudo-physis (cf. above, note 33).
Structuralist critique, however, in all its rigour, fails to account for the positivist implications of
its own discourse: "Sooner or later, any literary study must face the problem of the truth value of
its own interpretations, no longer with the naive conviction of a priority of content over form, but
as a consequence of the much more unsettling experience of being unable to cleanse its own
discourse of aberrantly referential implications" (RCC, 174, emphasis added). What de Man
targets here is the scientific claim of structuralism to objectivity and the quantifiability of its
method that remains blind to the aesthetic relapse of its own conclusions. It is thus "unable to
read itself' (174): "Barthes's social criticism and the means used in accomplishing its highly
laudable aim engender their own mystification, this time at the level of method rather than of
substance. The very power of the instrument creates an assurance that generates its own set of
counterquestions. In this case, the questions have to do with the claim of having grounded the
study of literature on foundations epistemologically strong enough to be called scientific" (171).
The relapse is systemic and irreducible. Even the most nonphenomenal, rigorous reading "plots"
a narrative of its own disinscription.
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states keeping all work undone - rhetoric would be this notification that the work
remains undone. It offers thought a "suspension," that is precisely the blank sheet
of the paper ready for inscription, the always new white where resistance to
programs and received codes is kept.
As we have seen, tropes both make possible and disrupt semantic
regimes. The sense is always carried off elsewhere, and with it, identities and
analogical closures become admissible for retests. This admissibility is the duty
of reading. In "Art and Ideology," however, Michael Sprinker overlooks
precisely this point at which rhetoric becomes a disruptive techne of its own
relapse, that we have been tracing throughout this chapter. "Tropes," he writes,
are perforce meaningful, but their meanings can never be equated with
that which is true, in the sense of being rationally demonstrable or
justifiable; "they posit a meaning whose existence cannot be verified."
And yet the tropological imperative is "unavoidable" ... Itwould not be
stretching a point to say that [de Man's] account of the operation of
tropes ... contains in nuce the de Manian conception of ideology, which
is a property of language, or more precisely, of the figural or
tropological aspects of language ... (ME, 34)
However, he continues, "de Man stops just here, where the most
interesting question arises: to wit, what effects are to be achieved by this
rigorously antihumanist aesthetic practice?" (41).286 These effects do not only
286 Indeed, what Sprinker then proceeds to find in Althusser, "another type of history," we have
already located in de Man as the event or the unaccountable to which reading is committed and
that, in suspending all historical accounts, will have made history possible. This is Sprinker
quoting Althusser, "concerning the possibility of conceiving' another type of history,'" he does
not see de Man making - although it is precisely what is constantly made (as we have seen in his
readings of Kant and Hegel that are found irruptive and baffling). It is constantly made in his
reactivating of half-erased inscriptive traces that always exceed the aesthetic policing of
hermeneutic programs calling for their interruption. This is what makes history re-testable,
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resist aesthetic retotalizations, making visible the unensurability and constitutive
incompleteness of all forms of epistemo-political stracturation, but are
interventionist insofar as new histories are contracted and virtual futures opened
up by an alteration in the memory archive - the scripted event. Such an alteration
is not only to be traced in Aesthetic Ideology but also in de Man's effective
reformatting of Romanticism in general. In Romanticism and Contemporary
Criticism, for instance, the prevalent reintegrative metaphorics of recovery and
restoration of lost unity with the natural world through the romantic image and
poetics of symbolism is repeatedly found to be the "Schillerized" relapse, so to
speak, of what in Romanticism will have resisted aesthetic investments and that
de Man shows to be founded precisely on the repeated failures of any such
attempt. "The existence of poetic image is itself a sign of divine absence, and the
conscious use of poetic imagery an admission of this absence" (RR, 6), its most
affirmative recognition. Wordsworth and Holderlin, rather than being exponents
of integrated consciousness, are found to have a privileged access to such
negative self-insights. In "Time and History in Wordsworth," the fourth Gauss
lecture, this structure is evident, although given in temporal and ontological
concerns of finitude, more distinctive of de Man's earlier writing: "History, like
childhood, is what allows recollection to originate in a truly temporal
subject to constant retakes reading effects - history as anterior future. So, Althusser, in Sprinker's
translation, about the possibility of another history not bound by the tropological imperative of
aesthetic relapse: "Yet, the German language presents us with another term: Geschichte, which
does not designate a history completed at present, doubtless determined to a large extent by an
already completed past, but only in part, since present, living history [/'histoire] is also open to an
uncertain, unforeseen future, not yet completed and consequently aleatory. Living history only
obeys ... 'tendentiallaw' ... which means that [it] does not possess the form or figure of a linear
law, but that it can bifurcate under the effect of an encounter with another tendency and so forth
to infmity. At each intersection, the tendency can take an unforeseeable form, just because it is
aleatory" (ME, 42).
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perspective, not as a memory of a unity that never existed, but as the awareness,
the remembrance of a precarious condition of falling that has never ceased to
prevail" (RCC, 88). What is significant here, in terms of our argument, is that
Romanticism, in this case, is disarticulated as a stable category in the diachronic
grid of literary history, precisely to the extent that it is pregnant with capacities
that put this very history in question. It contains, in other words, the possibility of
its own disruption as aesthetic category. Romanticism then becomes an
inscriptive opening, a body of writing shown to leak on all sides. Hermeneutic
programs are always set up in a relay of differends,287 violations one does not
see, insofar as they both determine the limits of perception - they affect the iris
itself, that becomes their messenger - and are in force as generative sites. The
effects Sprinker calls for in de Man are, in fact, reactivations of differends that
have always been the very burden of de Man's reading, and that remain lethal to
any generative logic of politico-referential systems, a "rendering virtual of what
is taken as fixed, as reified, as immediate, as 'experience' from within an
operation of disinscription" (Cohen, ME, Xii).288 And, for de Man, they are
irreversible as they are automatic.
287 DifJerendthat for Lyotard is a silence in discourse or the impossibility of bearing witness. It is
a marker of injustice, a privation that, moreover, is deprived of voice. "This is what a wrong
[tort] would be: a damage [dommage] accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the
damage." The difJerend marks a wrong for which no idiom yet exists and "[w]hat is at stake," he
writes, "in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by
fmding idioms for them." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The DifJerend: Phrases in Dispute, trans.
Georges Van Den Abbeele (part of Theory and History of Literature series, vol. 46, Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1988), pp. 5, 13.
288 So, in an interview with Stefano Rosso, when asked about "the frequent recurrence of the
terms 'ideology' and 'politics' ... noticed recently" in his writing, de Man replies: "I don't think I
ever was away from these problems, they were always uppermost in my mind. I have always
maintained that one could approach the problems of ideology and by extension the problems of
politics only on the basis of critical-linguistic analysis, which had to be done in its own terms, in
the medium of language, and I felt I could approach those problems only after having achieved a
certain control over those questions." Questions that, indeed, "are really already of a political and
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The inscriptive event, in Derrida's words, is "a machine-like
deconstruction of the body proper ... as organic totality. This machine-like
deconstruction is also a deconstruction of metaphor, of the totalizing
metaphorical model, by dissociative metonymic structure ... there where 'the
attribute of naturalness shifts from the metaphorical totality to the metonymic
aggregate" (ME, 353-54). In de Man's reading of Proust, metaphor that is
always "powerful enough to transform a temporal contiguity into an infinite
duration" (Allegories, 63) is found to be structured by metonymy that is a
contiguous and successive rather than unifying process.289 Proustian metaphor,
de Man writes further down, "fails to lead to the totalising stability of
metaphorical processes. If metonymy is distinguished from metaphor in terms of
necessity and contingency (an interpretation of the term that is not illegitimate),
then metonymy is per definition unable to create genuine [that is to say,
generative] links." Metaphor that thus creates "an illusion of a synthesis by
totalisation" (63) is shown to be dependent on purely relational metonymic
structures that keep breaking open "the necessary link" (62). What de Man shows
here is precisely the originary virtuality, the tele-technics, of any generative
linkage, the link of necessity is found to be contingent. Insofar as ideology is
precisely what provides an "illusion of a synthesis by totalisation,"
deconstruction of metaphor is also what reveals ideological structures as a dance
round the void or a-void-dance of difference. "And we see why metonymy,"
Laclau writes, "is, in some sense, more 'primordial' than metaphor (or as in other
ideological nature." From "An Interview with Paul de Man," in The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986), p. 121.
289 Cf. pp. 189 through to 192 as well as note 197, in the previous chapter, for further reference on
disintegrative disturbances of analogic metaphorical patterns in Proust.
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of de Man's analyses, why allegory takes precedence over the symbol): because
in a situation of radical contingency no criterion of analogy is stable; it is always
governed by changing relations of contiguity that no metaphorical totalization
can control." (ME, 247, emphasis added).29oThis "process of general
rhetorization" is not without political effects. Metaphor itself becomes a figure of
a "partial stabilization," an ideologico-aesthetic arrest of radically disruptive
agencies: "Metaphor - and analogy - is at most a 'superstructural' effect of a
partial stabilization in relations of contiguity that are not submitted to any literal
principle of a priori determination" (247). For Laclau, it is "the metonymic game
[that] occupies center stage, and [with it] politics takes upper hand" (244), one
that no foundational or generative logic can govern.
The process is demetaphorization by rote, it is "machine-like," as Derrida
writes. A "machine-like dis-figuration" of the body, automatic in its
"independence in relation to any subject, any subject of desire and its
unconscious, and therefore, de Man doubtless thinks, any psychology or
psychoanalysis as such" (ME, 355). The machine mutilates the body. It is an
irreparable undoing of any system that relies on organic links. Hence, the
frequent thematic of mutilation and dismemberment in de Man's writing_291This,
however, is not an evidence of pathos but comes precisely from this automaticity
of language, its arbitrary power that performs irrespectively of any desire. "De
Man associates this feeling of arbitrariness with the experience of threat, cruelty,
290 For Laclau, this rendering virtual of politico-referential structures is enough: "If hegemony
means the representation, by a particular social sector, of an impossible totality with which it is
incommensurable, then it is enough that we make the space of tropological substitutions fully
visible, to enable hegemonic logic to operate freely" (ME, 244). It is "accepting as inevitable the
metonymic terrain" (244) that necessarily leads to interventions.
291 The Rhetoric of Romanticism, in particular, abounds in references of defaced bodies, and
"mutilated textual models" ("Shelley Disfigured," l20).
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suffering in dismemberment, decapitation, disfiguration ... " (357). But, in that it
escapes the subject, it is also what politicises desire because it opens it onto the
unexpected - that which is always undesired - onto what is beyond the economy
of psychoanalysis, beyond the intractable agencies of primary narcissism kept in
reserve by displacement, or by tropological substitution, as de Man would say.
"Cruelty" is not of desire, it is what wrecks desire. It is not that there is a
linguistic unconscious, in other words, but that the unconscious is linguistic.292
And there is something "irrefutable about it," Derrida writes:
It is a logic that has something irrefutable about it. If, on the one hand,
the event supposes surprise, contingency or the arbitrary ... it also
supposes, on the other hand, this exteriority or this irreducibility to
desire. And therefore it supposes that which makes it radically
inappropriable, nonreappropriable, radically resistant to the logic of the
proper. Moreover, what elsewhere I have called exappropriation
concerns this work of the inappropriable in the process of
292 This would be what traces the edge of difference between de Man and Lyotard here (cf. also
note 293 below). In Lyotard, "the inhuman" is still very much human, still in the possibility of
the human, of what one "can." Lyotard has never given up on the psychoanalytic categories that,
to a large extent, govern his writing on the sublime as well as the essays collected in The
Inhuman (cf. "Rewriting Modernity" and "Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy," for instance). In
the "Introduction: About the Human," he writes of "two sorts of inhuman" and it "is indispensible
to keep them dissociated. The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated
under the name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely secret
one of which the soul is hostage." The first one "has the consequence of causing the forgetting of
what escapes it. But the anguish is that of a mind haunted by a familiar and unknown guest which
is agitating it, sending it delirious but also making it think - if one claims to exclude it, if one
doesn't give it an outlet, one aggravates it. Discontent grows with this civilization, foreclosure
along with information" (The Inhuman, 2) - Freud is ineffaceable here. It is, of course, the
reactivation of the other inhuman, through the anamnestic strategies of working through or
"rewriting" in Lyotard's terminology, the stir of the one active in its displacement, and "so
threatening that the reasonable mind cannot fail to fear in it, and rightly, an inhuman power of
deregulation" (5), that is the very burden of Lyotard's writing. But this other inhuman is still
"eminently the human," he writes (Lyotard uses analogy with the child here, that is "the hostage
of the adult community"), because its indetermination, "its distress heralds and promises things
possible" (4). For Lyotard, the question of politics becomes then the possibility of resistance to
the first inhuman, and what else is there "to resist with," he continues, ifnot that "other inhuman"
(7). De Man, however, as we have seen, fmds "the inhuman" in technicity that goes beyond any
reappropriative categories of the subject - which makes him more inhumanee), alien, inexcusable.
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appropriation... I would draw another consequence that no doubt goes
beyond what de Man says... It is this: By reason of this unforseeability,
this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority for the subject of
experience, every event as such is traumatic. Even an event experienced
as a 'happy' one... An event is traumatic or it does not happen. It
injures desire, whether or not desire desires or does not desire what
happens. It is that which, within desire, constitutes it as possible and
insists there while resisting it, as the impossible: some outside,
irreducibly, as some nondesire, some death, and something
inorganic ... " (ME, 358, emphasis added).
The inhuman, for de Man, is radically inhuman, "some nondesire, some
death, and something inorganic," not a nameless possibility of the human, but a
sheer performative that is constitutive of language. 293 It is what wrecks every
possible desire - conscious, or one more radical that annexes disruptive energies
through blockage, anticathexis or resistance. The inhuman, for de Man, "the
machine," does not operate within the binary psychoanalytic grids or any other
reappropriative economy, but on the more primitive - more emancipatory?-
level, one of sheer expenditure inherent in language that disrupts, or rather
unties, all cognitive structure. It is a "place of prosaic resistance ... to every
293 After his lecture on Benjamin in The Resistance to Theory, de Man will say: '''the inhuman,'
however, is not some kind of mystery, or some kind of secret; the inhuman is: linguistic
structures, the play of linguistic tensions, linguistic events that occur, possibilities which are
inherent in language - independently of any intent or any drive or any wish or any desire we
might have. So that, more than nature, toward which one can have, toward which one sets up, a
human rapport - which is illegitimate ... in the final run, the interpersonal rapport, which is
illegitimate too, since there is in a very radical sense, no such thing as the human. If one speaks of
the inhuman, the fundamental non-human character of language, one also speaks of the
fundamental non-definition of the human as such, since the word human doesn't correspond to
anything like that. So by extension ... [w]hat in language does not pertain to the human, what in
language is unlike nature and is not assimilable, or doesn't resemble, what in language does not
resemble the human in any way, is totally indifferent in relation to the human, is not therefore
mysterious; it is eminently prosaic ... " (96, emphasis added).
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possible reappropriation" (Derrida, ME, 350) and, in that it is, what keeps open
the im-possible, the "it happens" as possible_294
It is precisely this radical resistance of the inhuman in de Man that for
Barbara Johnson, as David Lehman notes, vectors all the heat of critical response
denouncing deconstruction either as a "nihilistic" bug that disables agency or as
"a terrorist weapon.,,295 De Man's writing, '''is viewed, both from the left and
from the right, not just as misguided or useless, but somehow almost as evil.
Radicals see in his writing a conservative plot to talk literary critics out of
participating in social change. Conservatives see in it a nihilistic desire to cancel
out human meaning altogether." And it is "de Man's 'central insight': that
language 'cannot itself be entirely human," that animates both positions.
"Beyond its surface meaning there are hidden messages, and even beyond these,
294 Cf. "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," in The Inhuman, where the possibility of the event is
given in terms of negative presentation as the task of the avant-garde, What is important,
however, is that the task is not to be identified with mere "innovation," "the cheap thrill," that
sustains the addictive energies of the capital: "The occurrence, the Ereignis," Lyotard writes, "has
nothing to do with the petit frisson, the cheap thrill, the profitable pathos, that accompanies an
innovation. Hidden in the cynicism of innovation is certainly the despair that nothing further will
happen ... Through innovation, the will affirms its hegemony over time ... The question mark of
the 'Is it happening?' stops. With the occurrence, the will is defeated. The avant-gardist task
remains that of undoing the presumption of the mind with respect to time. The sublime feeling is
the name of this privation" (107, emphasis added).
295 It is not just a question of "metaphoric" affinity here for Lehman, as he writes elsewhere in
Signs of The Times. "Of the various metaphors in currency for deconstruction, surely the most
disturbing is 'critical terrorism.'" The analogy, he continues, "appears to be based on several
considerations besides the casual fact that both are features of the contemporary Zeitgeist. Both
are, by temperament or by instinct, extremist. Deconstructionists have a reputation for
ruthlessness and intransigence in pursuit of their agenda ... They would like to blow up -
metaphorically, of course - the legitimacy of institutions, and traditions, canons of taste and
judgment, and received values of any kind. And like terrorists, deconstructionists steel
themselves to toss their bombs without regard for the comfort of bystanders - in this case, the
authors and readers of literature." However, the metaphor is soon worn out and shades into
"grounds" and "real affinities," as Lehman continues: "The ideas that deconstructionists
articulate ... do provide grounds for the terrorist analogy. There is for one thing, the relentlessly
nihilistic drive of deconstruction. It asks how we can know anything and answers that we can't -
nothing can be known. And there is its real or metaphorical affinity with the projects of
destruction and demolition, decentring and demystifying ... " (76-77,78). "Critical terrorism," "a
terrorist weapon," in de Man's own words (Allegories, x), or in Derrida's "a militant and
interminable political critique" (Rogues, 86), are all what others may call responsibility.
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Johnson writes, there is 'a residue of functioning - which produces effects - that
is not a sign of anything, but merely the outcome of linguistic rules, or even of
the absolute randomness of language. Not that language is always absolutely
random, but that we can never be sure that it isn't'" (qtd. in Signs a/the Times,
150-51). It is in the traces of this indeterminacy that the inhuman persists,
holding all possibility infinitely accountable. Undecidable blocks of writing that
resist all political programs. True then, it is not radical, nor is it conservative, but
it is radically political. And like politics, it implies a power of contestation alone,
remove it and the political retreats. The inhuman is what always remains
subtracted from the systematicity it destabilizes. It is what makes invention
ineluctable. And "it is ineluctable to invent a world, instead of being subjected to
one," as Nancy insists. This, and this alone, is the political imperative. Invention,
however, being "without model and without warranty," always "implies facing
up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray.,,296This is the burden of de Man's reading.
But it ups the urgency of the task.
The possibility of the im-possible is what protects us from political
positivism. The aesthetic totalizations of politico-referential systems, as we have
seen, are irreducible. The rudderless effects of reading are always reintegrated
within a referential structure. But the traces of disarray, as de Man maintains,
cannot be erased. Erasure itself leaves traces that reading reactivates. For de
Man, reading is suicidal or it is not at all. Itwill always and everywhere double
296 For, "[w]hat will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer
believe in being able to predict or command it. But we can act in such a way that this world is a
world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such." Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy, Retreating the Political, ed. Simon Sparks (London and New York: Routledge,
1997), p. 158.
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back on itself, coming to reflect on its own formal process that opens the
possibility of always reading otherwise. No reading then except by virtue of its
own undoing. This is the rhetorical fiat of reading and its irreversibly allegorical
structure. But the subversive politico-critical energies of reading are contained
precisely in its autoimmunity that is also an impetus of interminable critique.
Undecidability is essentially the idea of permanent revolution.
-- Where certainties come apart,
there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match.
308
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
De Man, Paul. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche,
Ri/ke, and Proust. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1979.
---. Interview with Stefano Rosso. "An Interview with Paul de Man." The
Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986, pp. 115-22.
---. "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric." The Rhetoric of Romanticism.
New York: Columbia UP, 1984, pp.239-63.
---. "Autobiography As De-Facement." The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New
York: Columbia UP, 1984, pp.67-83.
---. "Conclusions: Walter Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator. '" The
Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986, pp.73-106.
309
"Criticism and Crisis." Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of
Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983, pp. 3-20.
---. "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism." Blindness and Insight:
Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge,
1983, pp. 20-36.
---. "Foreword to Revised, Second Edition." Blindness and Insight: Essays in
the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. By de Man. 2nd ed. London:
Routledge, 1983, pp. xi-xiii.
---. "Heidegger's Exegeses of Holderlin." Blindness and Insight: Essays in the
Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983, pp.
246-67.
---. "Impersonality in the Criticism of Maurice Blanchot." Blindness and
Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London:
Routledge, 1983, pp.60-79.
---. "Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image." The Rhetoric of
Romanticism. New York: Columbia UP, 1984, pp.I-19.
---. "Kant and Schiller." Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 1996, pp. 129-63.
310
---. "Kant's Materialism." Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 1996, pp.119-29.
---. "Literature and Language: A Commentary." Appendix B to Blindness and
Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London:
Routledge, 1983, pp. 277-91.
---. "Literary History and Literary Modernity." Blindness and Insight: Essays in
the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983,
pp.142-66.
---. "Modem Poetics in France and Germany." Critical Writings, 1953-1978.
Ed. Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp. 153-61.
---. "Montaigne and Transcendence." Critical Writings, 1953-1978. Ed.
Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.3-12.
---. "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant." Aesthetic Ideology. Ed. Andrzej
Warminski. Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 1996, pp. 70-91.
---. "Poetic Nothingness: On a Hermetic Sonnet by Mallarme." Critical
Writings, 1953-1978. Ed. Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989,
pp. 18-30.
311
---. Preface. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. By de Man. New York: Columbia
UP, 1984, pp. vii-ix.
---. "Process and Poetry." Critical Writings, 1953-1978. Ed. Lindsay Waters.
Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.64-76.
---. "Reply to Raymond Geuss." Aesthetic Ideology. Ed. Andrzej Warminski.
Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 1996, pp. 185-93.
---. "Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism." Romanticism and
Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers. Ed. E. S. Burt
et al. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1993, pp.164-81.
---. "Shelley Disfigured." The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: Columbia
UP, 1984, pp.93-125.
---. "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics." Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis
and London: Minnesota UP, 1996, pp.91-105.
---. "The Concept of Irony," Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 1996, pp. 163-85.
312
---. "The Contemporary Criticism of Romanticism." Romanticism and
Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers. Ed. E. S. Burt
et al. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1993, pp.3-25.
---. "The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism." Blindness and Insight: Essays in
the Rhetoric 0/ Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983,
pp.229-46.
---. "The Epistemology of Metaphor." Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis and
London: Minnesota UP, 1996, pp.34-51.
---. "The Inward Generation." Critical Writings, 1953-1978. Ed. Lindsay
Waters. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp. 12-18.
---. "The Resistance to Theory." The Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1986, pp.3-21.
---. "The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau."
Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric 0/Contemporary Criticism. 2nd
ed. London: Routledge, 1983, pp. 102-42.
---. "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Blindness and Insight: Essays in the
Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983, pp.
187-229.
313
---. "The Temptation of Permanence." Critical Writings, 1953-1978. Ed.
Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.30-41.
---. "Time and History in Wordsworth." Romanticism and Contemporary
Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers. Ed. E. S. Burt et al. Baltimore
and London: John Hopkins UP, 1993, pp.74-95.
Secondary Sources:
Agamben, Giorgio. "Language and History: Linguistic and Historical Categories
in Benjamin's Thought." Potentialities. Ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen.
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999, pp. 48-62.
---. "Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality." Potentialities. Ed. and trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999, pp.205-20.
---. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 2005.
---. "The Idea of Language." Potentialities. Ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999, pp.39-48.
314
---. "The Passion of Facti city." Potentialities. Ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1999, pp.185-205.
Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." Lenin and
Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1971, pp.127-86.
Attridge, Derek. "Derrida and the Questioning of Literature." Introduction.
Acts of Literature. By Jacques Derrida. Ed. Derek Attridge. London and New
York: Routledge, 1992, pp.I-33.
Bataille, Georges. Inner Experience. Trans. Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany: SUNY
Press, 1988.
Baudelaire, Charles. "Skeletons Digging." The Flowers of Evil. Trans. James
McGowan. Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1993, pp.189-93.
---. "St Peter's Denial." The Flowers of Evil. Trans. James McGowan. Oxford
and New York: Oxford UP, 1993, pp.265-67.
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne.
London and New York: Verso, 1998.
315
---. "The Task of the Translator." Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zorn. Ed.
Hannah Arendt. London: Pimlico, 1999, pp. 70-83.
---. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zorn.
Ed. Hannah Arendt. London: Pimlico, 1999, pp. 245-56.
Bennington, Geoffrey. "Aberrations: de Man (and) the Machine." Reading de
Man Reading. Ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota
UP, 1989, pp.209-23.
Blanchot, Maurice. "Interruption (as on a Riemann surface)." The Infinite
Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993, pp.
75-80.
---. "Kafka and Literature." The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell.
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995, pp. 12-27.
---. "Literature and the Right to Death." The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte
Mandell. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995, pp.300-44.
---. "Mystery in Literature." The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell.
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995, pp.43-61.
316
---. "The Myth of Mall arme." The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell.
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995, pp.27-43.
---. The Space of Literature. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln and London:
Nebraska UP, 1982.
The Step Not Beyond. Trans. Lycette Nelson. Albany: SUNY UP, 1992.
---. The Writing of the Disaster. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln and London:
Nebraska UP, 1995.
Cohen, Tom. "A 'Materiality without Matter'?" Introduction. Material Events:
Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al. Minneapolis and
London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp. vii-xxv.
---. "Political Thrillers: Hitchcock, de Man, and Secret Agency in the 'Aesthetic
State. ", Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory .:Ed. Tom
Cohen et al. Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp. 114-53.
Critchley, Simon. "Deconstruction and Pragmatism - Is Derrida a Private Ironist
or a Public Liberal?" Deconstruction and Pragmatism. Ed. Chantal Mouffe.
London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 19-41.
317
Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism.
London: Routledge, 1989.
Derrida, Jacques. "Cogito and the History of Madness." Writing and Difference.
Trans. Alan Bass. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 36-77.
---. "Demeure: Fiction and Testimony." The Instant of My Death. By Maurice
Blanchot. Trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2000, pp.
13-104.
---. "Differance." Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Chicago
UP, 1982, pp. 1-29.
---. "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of
Reason Alone." Acts of Religion. Ed. Gil Anidjar. New York and London:
Routledge, 2002, pp. 40-102.
---. "Force and Signification." Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass.
London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp.I-36.
---. "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority.'" Acts of Religion.
Ed. Gil Anidjar. New York and London: Routledge, 2002, pp.228-99.
318
"From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve."
Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. London and New York: Routledge,
2001, pp.317-51.
---. Given Time: 1Counterfeit Money. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago and
London: Chicago UP, 1994.
---. "Hors Livre: Outwork, Hors d'oeuvre, Extratext, Foreplay, Bookend,
Facing, Prefacing." Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. London: The
Athlone Press, 1981, pp. 1-61.
---. "Letter to a Japanese Friend." Psyche: Inventions of the Other. Ed. Peggy
Kamufand Elizabeth Rottenberg. Vol. 2. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2008,
pp.I-7.
---. "Living On: Border Lines." Deconstruction and Criticism. Ed. Harold
Bloom et al. London and New York: Continuum, 2004, pp.62-143.
---. "Mallarme." Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge. London and New
York: Routledge, 1992, pp.ll0-27.
---. Memoires: for Paul de Man. Trans. Cecile Lindsay et al. New York:
Columbia UP, 1989.
319
---. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore and
London: John Hopkins UP, 1997.
---. of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond.
Trans. Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2000.
---. "On Colleges and Philosophy: Jacques Derrida with Geoffrey Bennington."
Postmodernism: ICA Documents. Ed. Lisa Appignanesi. London: Free
Association Books, 1989, pp. 209-28.
---. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Trans. Mark Dooley and Michael
Hughes. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
---. Points ... : Interviews, 1974-1994. Trans. Peggy Kamufet al. Ed. Elisabeth
Weber. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1995.
---. Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982.
---. "Psyche: Inventions of the Other." Reading de Man Reading. Ed. Lindsay
Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.25-66.
---. "Qual Quelle: Valery's Sources." Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass.
Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982, pp.273-307.
320
---. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael
Naas. Ed. Werner Hamacher. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 2005.
---. "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." Writing
and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. London and New York: Routledge, 2001,
pp.351-71.
---. The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac. Trans. John P.
Leavey, Jr. Lincoln and London: Nebraska UP, 1980.
---. "The Double Session." Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. London:
The Athlone Press, 1981, pp. 173-287.
---. Interview with Derek Attridge. "The Strange Institution Called Literature:
An Interview with Jacques Derrida." Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge.
London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 33-76.
---. "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) ('within such limits'}." Material
Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al.
Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp.277-361.
---. "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce." Acts of Literature. Ed.
Derek Attridge. London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 253-310.
321
---. "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel
Levinas." Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. London and New York:
Routledge, 2001, pp.97-193.
---. "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." Margins of
Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1982, pp.207-73.
Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
Ellis, John M. Against Deconstruction. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP,
1989.
Fletcher, Angus. Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell UP, 1964.
Freud, Sigmund. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter
Gay. London: Vintage, 1995, pp. 594-626.
---. "Mourning and Melancholia." The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay. London:
Vintage, 1995, pp. 584-89.
---. "Observations on Transference-Love." The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay.
London: Vintage, 1995, pp.378-87.
322
Frey, Hans-Jost. "Undecidability." Yale French Studies: The Lesson of Paul de
Man. Vol. 69. Ed. Peter Brooks, Shoshana Felman, and 1. Hillis Miller. New
Haven: Yale UP, 1985, pp.124-34.
Gasche, Rodolphe. "In-difference to Philosophy." The Wild Card of Reading:
On Paul de Man. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard UP, 1998,
pp.48-91.
---. "Setzung and Ubersetzung." The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de Man.
Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard UP, 1998, pp.11-48.
---. The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1986.
Godzich, Wlad. "Introduction: Caution! Reader at Work!" Introduction.
Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. By
Paul de Man. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1983, pp. xv-xxx.
Hamacher, Werner. "LECTIO: de Man's Imperative." Reading de Man
Reading. Ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP,
1989, pp. 171-202.
Hartman, Geoffrey H. Preface. Deconstruction and Criticism. Ed. Harold
Bloom et al. London and New York: Continuum, 2004, pp. vi-ix.
323
Hegel, G. W. F. "Phenomenology of Spirit." Excerpt. Deconstruction in
Context: Literature and Philosophy. Ed. Mark C. Taylor. Chicago and London:
Chicago UP, 1986, pp.67-98.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.
---. "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." Excerpt.
Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Ed. Mark C. Taylor.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986, pp.242-56.
---. "The Origin of the Work of Art." Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert
Hofstadter. New York: HarperCollins, 2001, pp. 15-87.
---. "What Are Poets For." Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert
Hofstadter. New York: HarperCollins, 2001, pp.87-141.
Hertz, Neil. "Lurid Figures." Reading de Man Reading. Ed. Lindsay Waters &
Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.82-105.
Jacobs, Carol. "Allegories of Reading Paul de Man." Reading de Man Reading.
Ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.
105-21.
324
Johnson, Barbara. "Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law." Material Events:
Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al. Minneapolis and
London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp.205-29.
Kafka, Franz. "Before the Law." The Complete Short Stories. Ed. Nahum N.
Glatzer. London: Vintage, 2005, pp. 3-4.
Kierkegaard, Seren. "Concluding Unscientific Postscript." Excerpt.
Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Ed. Mark C. Taylor.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986, pp. 169-91.
Kojeve, Alexandre. "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel." Excerpt.
Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Ed. Mark C. Taylor.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986, pp.98-121.
Laclau, Emesto. "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony." Deconstruction
and Pragmatism. Ed. Chantal Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge,
1996, pp. 47-69.
---. "The Politics of Rhetoric." Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife
of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al. Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP,
2001, pp.229-54.
325
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe and Jean-Luc Nancy. Retreating the Political. Ed.
Simon Sparks. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
Lehman, David. Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de
Man. New York: Poseidon Press, 1991.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois and Jean-Loup Thebaud. Just Gaming. Trans. Wlad
Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1985.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Trans. Georges Van
Den Abbeele. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1988.
---. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel
Bowlby. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
---. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchaster UP, 1984.
Mallarme, Stephane, A Throw of the Dice. Stephane Mallarme: Collected
Poems. Trans. Henry Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California
UP, 1994, pp. 124-47.
---. "Crisis in Poetry." Mallarme: Selected Prose Poems, Essays & Letters.
Trans. Bradford Cook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956, pp. 34-43.
326
---. "Does Pride at evening always fume." Stephane Mallarme: Collected
Poems. Trans. Henry Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California
UP, 1994, pp.78-79.
---. "Sea Breeze." Stephane Mallarme: Collected Poems. Trans. Henry
Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California UP, 1994, pp.21-22.
---. Selected Letters of Stephane Mallarme. Ed. and Trans. Rosemary Lloyd.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1988.
---. "Sprung from the croup and the flight." Stephane Mallarme: Collected
Poems. Trans. Henry Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California
UP, 1994, pp. 79-80.
---. "The virginal, vibrant, and beautiful dawn." Stephane Mallarme: Collected
Poems. Trans. Henry Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California
UP, 1994, pp.67-68.
---. "The Windows." Stephane Mallarme: Collected Poems. Trans. Henry
Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California UP, 1994, pp. 11-13.
327
Miller, J. Hillis. "Paul de Man as Allergen." Material Events: Paul de Man and
the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al. Minneapolis and London:
Minnesota UP, 2001, pp. 183-205.
---. '''Reading' Part of a Paragraph in Allegories of Reading." Reading de Man
Reading. Ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP,
1989, pp.155-71.
---. "The Critic as Host." Deconstruction and Criticism. Ed. Harold Bloom et
al. London and New York: Continuum, 2004, pp.217-53.
The Ethics of Reading. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
Mizumura, Minae. "Renunciation." Yale French Studies: The Lesson of Paul de
Man. Vol. 69. Ed. Peter Brooks, Shoshana Felman, and 1. Hillis Miller. New
Haven: Yale UP, 1985, pp.81-98.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Inoperative Community. Ed. Peter Conner. Trans. Peter
Connor et al. Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 1991.
Nealon, Jeffrey. T. Double Reading: Postmodernism after Deconstruction.
Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1993.
328
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense." Literary
Theory: An Anthology. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. 2nd ed. Oxford:
Blackwell, 2004, pp. 262-66.
Norris, Christopher. Deconstruction: Theory and Practice. London and New
York: Routledge, 1991.
---. Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology. New
York and London: Routledge, 1988.
Proust, Marcel. The Way by Swann's. Trans. Lydia Davis. London: Penguin
Books, 2002.
Readings, Bill. "The Deconstruction of Politics." Reading de Man Reading. Ed.
Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989, pp.223-
44.
Ronell, Avital. Stupidity. Urbana and Chicago: Illinois UP, 2002.
Rorty, Richard. "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism." Deconstruction
and Pragmatism. Ed. Chantal Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge,
1996, pp. 13-19.
329
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Translator's Preface." Preface. 0/
Grammatology. By Jacques Derrida. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 1997, pp. ix-lxxxix,
Sprinker, Michael. "Art and Ideology: Althusser and de Man." Material Events:
Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al. Minneapolis and
London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp.32-49.
Taylor, Mark C. "System ... Structure ... Difference ... Other." Introduction.
Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Ed. Mark C. Taylor.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986, pp. 1-35.
Valery, Paul. "Remarks on Poetry." Literature in the Modern World: Critical
Essays and Documents. Ed. Dennis Walder. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004, pp.
154-58.
Warminski, Andrzej. "'As the poets do it': On the material sublime." Material
Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen et al.
Minneapolis and London: Minnesota UP, 2001, pp.3-32.
Waters, Lindsay. "Paul de Man: Life and Works." Introduction. Critical
Writings, 1953-1978. By Paul de Man. Ed. Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis:
Minnesota UP, 1989, pp. ix-lxxiv.
330
Weinfield, Henry. "Commentary." Stephane Mallarme: Collected Poems.
Trans. Henry Weinfield. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California UP,
1994, pp.147-277.
